To Arms

by Hew Strachan

  1 Quoted in Offer, First World War, 308; see also Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley, 142–3.

  2 Sumida, In defence of naval supremacy, 18–21, 24–6,186–90.

  3 Offer, First World War, 218–20.

  4 McNeill, Pursuit of power, 285.

  5 On the Royal Navy’s management of the press, see Morris, Scaremongers.

  6 Quoted in Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 71.

  7 Philippe Masson, ‘La Marine française de 1871 à 1914’, in Pedroncini (ed.), Histoire militaire de la France, iii. 125–49; Stevenson, Armaments and the coming of war, 30–1, 85–7, 135–6; Halpern, Naval history, 6–15.

  8 Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 288–309; Williamson, Politics of grand strategy, chs. 9,11, and 12; Halpern, Naval war in the Mediterranean, 2–8.

  9 Williams, Defending the empire, 68–9, 86–8, 121–35, 163–76; Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 90–103, and in Fear God and dread nought, ii. 39–44, is very critical of Beresford; for the legitimacy of Beresford’s case, see his own letter to Fisher, 2 May 1907, in Fear God and dread nought, ii. 123, and P. Haggie ‘Royal Navy and war planning in the Fisher era’, in Kennedy (ed.), War plans, 129.

  10 John Gooch, ‘Adversarial atitudes: servicemen, politicians and strategic policy in Edwardian England, 1899–1914’, in Smith (ed.), Government and the armed forces, 60–1, 67–8, 71.

  11 See the essays by Nicholas A. Lambert on Wilson and Bridgeman, and by John B. Hattendorf on Battenberg, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords.

  12 Ibid., esp. Lambert, ‘Bridgeman’, 57–9.

  13 Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 247–50,265–7;v. 313–14,317–19; James Goldrick, ‘The irresistible force and the immovable object: The Naval Review, the Young Turks, and the Royal Navy, 1911–1931’, in Goldrick and Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan is not enough, 84–90.

  14 Miller, Superior force, 64–5.

  15 Sumida, Journal of Military History, LIV (1990), 9–10,19–21.

  16 Goldrick, King’s ships were at sea, 19 and generally 15–20.

  17 Ibid. 16.

  18 Lambert, ‘Wilson’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 49; Paul Hayes, ‘Britain, Germany, and the Admiralty’s plans for attacking German territory 1906–1915’, in Freedman et al. (eds.), War, strategy and international politics, 104–5.

  19 Roskill, Beatty, 98.

  20 Fundamental here is the work of Sumida, In defence of naval supremacy ; also his article, Journal of Modern History, LI (1979), 205–30, and his edition of The Pollen papers. See also Fairbanks, International History Review, XIII (1991), 246–72.

  21 Fairbanks, International History Review, XIII (1991), 265–72; Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘The opportunities of technology: British and French naval strategies in the Pacific, 1905–1909’, in Rodger (ed.), Naval power, 43–4; Williams, Defending the empire, 30, 59–67,72–5; Bryan Ranft, ‘Parliamentary debate, economic vulnerability and British naval expansion 1860–1905’, in Freedman et al. (eds.), War, strategy and international politics.

  22 Lambert, ‘The opportunities of technology’, in Rodger, Naval power, 50.

  23 Lautenschläger, International Security, VII (1983), 13–14,17–18.

  24 Lambert, Journal of Military History, LIX (1995), 639–60, is vital on this point; see also Sumida, ibid. 620; Hadley and Sarty, Tin-pots and pirate ships, 20–1.

  25 Marder, Fear God and dread nought, ii. 426; see also Sumida, In defence of naval supremacy, 159.

  26 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, ‘The historian as contemporary analyst: Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir John Fisher’, in Godrick and Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan is not enough, 127.

  27 Stevenson, Armaments and the coming of war, 165,174–5; Epkenhans, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, 123–4; Lambert, ‘Bridgeman’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 59–60; Lambert, Journal of Modern History, LXVII (1995), 599.

  28 Lambert, Journal of Military History, LXII (1998), 54.

  29 Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 414.

  30 Sumida, In defence of Naval Supermercy, 207; Herwig, Luxury Fleet, 59–60; Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 417–18.

  31 David Brown, Warship (1996), 68–72, 76; Lambert, ‘Wilson’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 403; Gordon, Rules of the game, 351, 369; Semmel, Liberalism and naval strategy, 139–40; Lambert, Journal of Military History, LXI (1998), 32–9.

  32 Gordon, Rules of the game, 349; for what follows see also 318–19, 325, 340–7, 349–56.

  33 Ibid. 584.

  34 Lambert, ‘Wilson’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 40.

  35 Gordon, Rules of the game, 189; for what follows see also 193–213, 243–92,300–7.

  36 Ibid. 361.

  37 Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 344, 367–8, 395–400.

  38 Corbett, Some principles, pp. xvii-xxvii, 167,171; see also Semmel, Liberalism and naval strategy, 141–2; Dirks, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 37 (1985), 40; Gray, Leverage of Sea Power, 17–18.

  39 O’Brien, British and American naval power, 30–1, 36, 39.

  40 Gooch, ‘Adversarial attitudes’, in Smith (ed.), Government and the armed forces, 65.

  41 Halpern, Naval history of World War I, 21–2,26; Lautenschläger, International Security, VIII (1983), 18–19; Sumida, Journal of Military History, LVII (1993), 465–7; Lambert, ‘Wilson’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 44–7.

  42 Miller, Superior force, 146; Lambert, ‘Bridgeman’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 63–4.

  43 Marder, From the Dreadnought, i.369–77.

  44 Trebilcock, Vickers, 105–8; what follows relies overwhelmingly on Lambert, Journal of Modern History, LXVII (1995), 595–626.

  45 See, in addition to Lambert, Halpern, Keyes papers, vol. i. pp. xx-xxiv; Marder, Fear God and dread nought, iii. 33–4.

  46 See, in addition to Lambert, Epkenhans, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, 135.

  47 Offer, First World War, 230; for what follows see principally ibid. 218–43, 271–98, but also Bell, History of the blockade, 8–31;Offer, Journal of Contemporary History, XXIII (1988), 99–119;Offer, Past and Present, CVII (1985), 204–26.

  48 Offer, First World War, 232.

  49 Hankey, Supreme command,!. 166; see also Roskill, Hankey.

  50 Paul Hayes, ‘Britain, Germany and the Admiralty’s plans for attacking German territory 1906–1915’, in Freedman et al. (eds.), War, strategy and international politics.

  51 John B. Hattendorf, ‘Battenberg’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 81.

  52 Menning, Bayonets before bullets, 154, 159, 197; Perrins, Slavonic and East European Review, LVIII (1980), 385–90.

  53 Gatrell, Government, industry and rearmament, 199–206.

  54 Stevenson, Armaments and the coming of war, 146–8.

  55 Geyer, Russian imperialism, 260; for what follows see also D. Jones, Military-naval encyclopaedia of Russia, iii. 159–66; Alan Bodger, ‘Russia and the end of the Ottoman empire’, in Kent (ed.), Great powers ; Mitchell, Russian and Soviet sea power, ch. 13; Gatrell, Economic History Review, 2nd series, XLIII (1990), 255–70; Pavlovich (ed.), Fleet in the First World War, i. 1–67.

  56 Gatrell, Government, industry and rearmament, 137–8; Halpern, Naval history, 17; Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian battlefields, 232.

  57 Nekrasov, North of Gallipoli, 11.

  58 Stevenson, Armaments and the coming of war, 149.

  59 Nekrasov, North of Gallipoli, 12–14; Halpern, Naval history, 181.

  60 Peter Winzen, ‘Zur Genesis von Weltmachtskonzept und Weltpolitik’, in Röhl (ed.), Der Ort Kaiser Wilhelms, 191, 196, 198, 215–17; Epkenhans, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, 359; id., ‘Die kaiserliche Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg: Weltmacht oder Untergang?’, in Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg, 323.

  61 Lambi, Navy and German power politics, 395–9, 406–7. In addition to Lambi on German plans, see also Kennedy, ‘Development of German naval operations plans against England,’ in Kennedy (ed.), War plans. Fundamental on the German navy are the works of Herwig, especia
lly ’Luxury’ fleet.

  62 Schulte, Europäischer Krise, 225; Ironside, Tannenberg, 259–65; Halpern, Naval history, 26, 180, 182.

  63 Wegener, Die Seestrategie, 8.

  64 Herwig and D. F. Trask, ‘Naval operations plans between Germany and the U.S.A.’, in Kennedy (ed.), War Plans ; also Gemzell, Organization, conflict and innovation, 70–4; Hadley and Sarty, Tin-pots and pirate ships, 31–47.

  65 Herwig, International History Review, X (1988), 82; see also ibid., XIII (1991), 273–83.

  66 Werner Rahn, ‘Strategische Probleme der deutschen Seekriegführung 1914–1918’, in Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg, 342.

  67 Epkenhans, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, esp. 188–92, 202–11, 234–44, 257–60, 322–3.

  68 Ibid. 93, 98; Stevenson, Armaments and the coming of war, 197.

  69 Volker Berghahn, ‘Des Kaisers Flotte und die Revolutionierung des Mächtesystem vor 1914’, in Röhl (ed.), Der Ort Kaiser Wilhelms, 176; Halpern, Naval history, 4.

  70 Röhl, Historical Journal, XII (1969), 667.

  71 Gemzell, Organization, conflict and innovation, ch. 2; Gordon, Rules of the game, 395–6; Rahn, ‘Strategische Probleme’, in Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg, 343–4.

  72 Dülffer, War & Society, III (1985), 23–43;Offer, First World War, 340–1; Pearton, Knowledgeable state, 130–1; Lambi, Navy and German power politics, 254–5; Baer, ‘Anglo-German antagonism and trade with Holland’, 25–6.

  73 Nicholas Lambert, ‘Economy or empire? The fleet unit concept and the quest for collective security in the Pacific, 1909–14’, in Kennedy and Neilson (eds.), Far-flung lines, 72–3.

  74 Epkenhans, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, 205–6, 326, 393.

  75 Baer, ‘Anglo-German antagonism and trade with Holland’, 51–71; Coogan, End of neutrality ; Halpern, Naval history, 23;Hörich, Deutsche Seekriegführung, 8–17, 21–2.

  76 Weir, International History Review, VI (1984), 174–90; Gemzell, Organization, conflict and innovation, 59–62, 96–7.

  77 Schulte, Europäische Krise, 196–7, 224–6, 281–4.

  78 Epkenhans, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, 404–7.

  79 Gilbert, Churchill, vol. III, Companion pt. 1, p. 9; see also 7–17.

  80 Marder, Fear God and dread nought, ii. 399; see also 419, 421, 424, 439, 443, 479. German sources argue that Callaghan’s replacement by Jellicoe represented a deliberate decision for prudence over offensive-mindedness, but this is not an argument found in the English sources; see Güth, ‘Die organisation der deutschen Marine’, 298, and Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, 48.

  81 Gilbert, Churchill, vol. III, Companion pt. 1, p. 180.

  82 Goldrick, The King’s ships, 86; this is the fullest recent account of the action, and indeed of the war in the North Sea 1914–15. In addition, see Corbett, Naval operations,!. 99–120; Bennett, Naval battles,

  83 Hough, Great War at sea, 29.

  84 Brodie, Sea power, ch. 15; Watts, Imperial Russian Navy ; Gemzell, Organization, conflict and innovation, 59–62.

  85 Marder, Fear God and dread nought, ii. 497, 498.

  86 Goldrick, The King’s ships, 122–33,138; Brodie, Sea power, 358.

  87 Marder, From the Dreadnought, ii. 70–7; Halpern, Naval history, 37–8.

  88 Philbin, Hipper, 22.

  89 Paul Kennedy, ‘Imperial cable communications and strategy 1870–1914’, in Kennedy (ed.), War plans.

  90 Beesly, Room 40, is the major work on British naval intelligence. See also Santorini, Revue internationale d’histoire militaire, 63 (1985), 95–110; Andrew, Secret service, ch. 3; on Germany, Philbin, Hipper, 45–9.

  91 Beesly, Room 40, 37.

  92 Halpern, Naval history, 32.

  93 What follows is largely based on the discussion in Marine-Archiv, Der Krieg zur See: Der Krieg in der Nordsee, ii. 83–108; Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie, 38–68; see also Castex, Théories stratégiques, ii. 208–13;Hörich, Deutsche Seekriegführung.

  94 Gemzell, Orgnization, conflict, innovation, 138.

  95 Marine-Archiv, Krieg in der Nordsee, ii. 106.

  96 Philbin, Hipper, 38; Gemzell, Organization, conflict, and innovation, 139.

  97 Müller, The Kaiser and his court, 39, 42–5.

  98 Corbett, Naval operations, ii, 4–10.

  99 Hiley, Historical Journal, XXVIII (1985), 856–60; Andrew, Secret Service, 59–61.

  100 Philbin, Hipper, 50–1.

  101 Corbett, Naval operations, ii. 43.

  102 Müller, The Kaiser and his court, 54; on Zenker’s proposals, see Marine-Archiv, Krieg in der Nordsee, iii. 155–9;Hörich, Deutsche Seekriegführung, 95–8.

  103 Goldrick, King’s ships, 255. Goldrick’s is the most recent account of the battle; see also Marder, From the Dreadnought, ii. 156–68; a German perspective, and especially on Blücher, Philbin, Hipper, 104–12; the fullest account is Marine-Archiv, Krieg in der Nordsee, iii. 189–249.

  104 Corbett, Naval operations, ii. 91, says Derfflinger was left undisturbed, and this would accord with Derfflinger’s, good practice on Lion. But Marine-Archiv, Krieg in der Nordsee, iii. 210, says Moltke was spared, and Marder, From the Dreadnought, ii. 160, agrees.

  105 Gordon, Rules of the game, 383, 591.

  106 Philbin, Hipper, 52.

  107 Lambert, Journal of Military History, LXII (1998), 32–42.

  108 e.g. Goldrick, King’s ships, 306–9, 311–15; Roskill, Beatty, 117–20; Sumida, In defence of naval supremacy, 298–9. On gunnery, see also Hough, Great war at sea, 140–1.

  109 Gilbert, Churchill, vol. III, Companion, pt. 2, p. 454.

  110 David (ed.), Inside Asquith’s cabinet, 207.

  111 Halpern, Naval history, 36; Barry Gough, ‘Fisher’, in Murfett (ed.), First Sea Lords, 25.

  112 Epkenhans, ‘Die kaiserliche Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg’, in Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg, 332–3; Herwig, First World War, 304.

  113 Philbin, Hipper, 117.

  114 Hörich, Deutsche Seekriegführung, 57, 63.

  115 Müller, Kaiser and his court, 61.

  116 Werner Rahn, ‘Strategische Probleme’ der deutschen Seekriegführung, in Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg, 351–2.

  117 The argument as developed is that presented by Wegener in 1929 in Seestrategie des Weltkrieges ;it was originally formulated in spring and summer 1915 and had a wide circulation: see Gemzell, Organization, conflict, and innovation, 215–25, 228–33; Herwig, ’Luxury’ fleet, 191. Its evolution can be traced in the English edition edited by Herwig, which publishes the original memoranda of February, June, and July 1915.

  118 Gemzell, Organization conflict, and innovation, 142–4,184–6.

  119 Philbin, Hipper, 96.

  120 Castex, Théories stratégiques, ii. 224.

  1 Public Record Office, ADM/8386/213.1 am grateful to Dr Maurice Pearton for this reference.

  2 For a fuller development of these themes, see Offer, First World War, esp. 81–90, 244–69.

  3 Marder, From the Dreadnought,!. 54–6.

  4 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 17–18; also Nish, Alliance in decline.

  5 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 267–93; Nish, Alliance in decline, 62–3;Offer, First World War, 164–209.

  6 Moses, War & Society, VII (1989), 56–76; Overlack, ibid., Χ (1992), 37–51; Overlack, ‘Australasia and Germany’.

  7 McGibbon, Path to Gallipoli, 167; for Australia, see Wilcox, Australian Journal of History and Politics, XL (1994), 52–4.

  8 McGibbon, Path to Gallipoli, 174–5.

  9 Ibid. 175–9; Gordon, Dominion partnership, 223.

  10 Nicholas Lambert, ‘Economy or empire? The fleet unit concept and the quest for collective security in the Pacific, 1909–14’, in Kennedy and Neilson (eds.), Far-flung lines, 55–76.

  11 Nicholas Lambert, ‘Economy or empire? The fleet unit concept and the quest for collective security in the Pacific, 1909–14’, in Kennedy and Neilson (eds.), Far-flung lines, 62–3.

  12 Gordon, Domini
on partnership, 248.

  13 Hadley and Sarty, Tin-pots and pirate ships, 1–29, 55–74.

  14 Meaney, Search for security, 159–92, 208–60.

  15 Nish, Alliance in decline, 97.