by Неизвестный
The person in charge of finances will function directly under the head of the network, but will also audit the latter’s expenses. For all these reasons, the person responsible for finances must be extremely steady politically.
The task of the comrade in charge of urban actions extends to all forms of armed action in the cities: elimination of an informer or some notorious torturer or government official; kidnapping of individuals for ransom; sabotage of centers of economic activity in the country, etc. All such actions are to be conducted under the orders of the head of the network. The comrade in charge of urban actions is not to act on their own initiative, except in cases of extreme urgency.
The comrade responsible for sympathizers will have to function in public more than anyone else in the network. This person will be in contact with individuals who are not particularly firm, who clear their consciences by handing over sums of money or extending support while not fully committing themselves. Although these are people who can be worked with, it must never be forgotten that their support will be conditioned by the risks involved. Therefore, it is necessary, over time, to try to convert them into active militants, urging them to make substantial contributions to the movement, not only in money but also in medical supplies, safe houses, information, etc.
In this type of network some individuals will need to work very closely with each other; for example, the person in charge of transport has an organic connection with the comrade responsible for supplies, who will be his or her immediate superior. The person in charge of sympathizers will work with the head of finances. Those responsible for actions and for information will work in direct contact with the head of the network.
The networks will be subject to inspection by cadres, sent directly by our army, who will have no executive function but will simply verify whether instructions and norms are being complied with.
In making contact with the army, the networks should follow the following “route”: The high command will give orders to the head of the network, who will be responsible, in turn, for organizing the task in the important cities. Routes will then lead from the cities to the towns, and from there to the villages or peasant houses, which will be the point of contact with our army, the site of the physical delivery of supplies, money, or information. As our army’s zone of influence grows, the points of contact will get closer and closer to the cities, and the area of our army’s direct control will grow proportionately. This is a long process that will have its ups and downs; and, as in any war like this, its progress will be measured in years.
The central command of the network will be based in the capital; from there other cities will be organized. For the time being, the most important cities for us are: Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, and Camiri, forming a rectangle surrounding our zone of operations. Those heading up work in these four cities should, as far as possible, be experienced cadres. They will be put in charge of organizations similar to those in the capital, but simplified: supplies and transport will be headed by a single individual; finances and sympathizers by another one; a third person will coordinate urban actions; it is possible to dispense with the assignment of information, as this can be left to the head of the network. The coordination of urban actions will increasingly be linked to our army as its territory grows nearer to the city in question. At a certain point, those involved in urban actions will become semi-urban guerrillas, operating directly under the army’s general command.
At the same time, it is important not to neglect the development of networks in cities that are today outside our field of action. In these places we should seek to win support among the population and prepare ourselves for future actions. Oruro and Potosí are the most important cities in this category.
Particular attention must be paid to areas along the borders. Villazón and Tarija are important for making contacts and receiving supplies from Argentina; Santa Cruz is important for Brazil; Huaqui [Guaqui] or some other location along the border with Peru; and some point along the frontier with Chile.
In organizing the supply network, it would be desirable to assign reliable militants who have previously earned a living in activities similar to what we are now asking them to do. For example, the owner of a grocery store could organize supplies or participate in this aspect of the network; the owner of a trucking company could organize transport, etc.
Where this is not possible, the job of developing the apparatus must be done patiently, not rushing things. By doing so we can avoid setting up a forward position that is not sufficiently protected—causing us to lose it, while at the same time putting other ones at risk.
The following shops or enterprises should be organized: grocery stores (La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Camiri); trucking firms (La Paz-Santa Cruz; Santa Cruz-Camiri; La Paz-Sucre; Sucre-Camiri); shoemakers (La Paz, Santa Cruz, Camiri, Cochabamba); clothing shops (the same); machine shops (La Paz, Santa Cruz); and farms (Chapare-Caranavi).
The first two will enable us to store and transport supplies without attracting attention, including military equipment. The shoemaking and clothing shops could carry out the twin tasks of making purchases without attracting attention and doing our own manufacturing. The machine shop would do the same with weapons and ammunition, and the farms would serve as bases of support in the eventual relocation of our forces, and would enable those working on the farms to begin carrying out propaganda among the peasants.
It should be stressed once again that all this requires political firmness and comrades who take from the revolutionary movement only what is strictly essential to their needs, who are ready to devote all their time—as well as their liberty or their lives, if it comes to that. Only in this way can we effectively forge the network necessary to accomplish our ambitious plans: the total liberation of Bolivia.
1.This document was written by Che and given to Loyola Guzmán when she visited the guerrilla camp on January 26, 1967.
2.Established in March 1967 as the National Liberation Army of Bolivia (ELN).
COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 1
TO THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE
Document XVII
Revolutionary Truth against Reactionary Lies
March 27, 1967
The military brutes who have usurped power, after killing workers and laying the groundwork for the total handover of our resources to US imperialism, are now mocking the people with a comic farce. Even as the hour of truth arrived and the masses took up arms, responding to the armed usurpers with armed struggle, they tried to continue with their lies.
On the morning of March 23, troops from the Fourth Division, quartered in Camiri, about 35-strong and led by Major Hernán Plata Ríos, penetrated guerrilla territory along the Ñacahuazú River. The entire group fell into an ambush set up by our forces. As a result of the action, we confiscated 25 weapons of all kinds, including three 60-mm mortars with a supply of shells and other ammunition and equipment.
Enemy casualties consisted of seven dead, including a lieutenant, 14 prisoners, five of them wounded in the clash and cared for by our medics to the best of our capabilities. All the prisoners were freed after explaining the aims of our movement.
The list of enemy casualties is as follows:
Dead: Pedro Romero, Rubén Amezaga, Juan Alvarado, Cecilio Márquez, Amador Almasán, Santiago Gallardo, and an army informer and guide whose last name was Vargas.
Prisoners: Major Hernán Plata Ríos, Captain Eugenio Silva, soldiers Edgar Torrico Panoso, Lido Machicado Toledo, Gabriel Durán Escobar, Armando Martínez Sánchez, Felipe Bravo Siles, Juan Ramón Martínez, Leoncio Espinosa Posada, Miguel Rivero, Eleuterio Sánchez, Adalberto Martínez, Eduardo Rivera, and Guido Terceros. The last five were wounded.
In publicly announcing the first battle of the war, we are establishing what will be our norm: revolutionary truth. Our actions have demonstrated the integrity of our words. We regret the shedding of innocent blood by those who died; but peace cannot be built with mortars and machine guns, as those clowns in braided
uniforms would have us believe. They try to portray us as common murderers. But there never has been, and there will not be, a single peasant who has any cause to complain of our treatment or our manner of obtaining supplies, except those who, as traitors to their class, served as guides or informers.
Hostilities have begun. In future communiqués we will set forth our revolutionary positions clearly. Today we make an appeal to workers, peasants, intellectuals, to everyone who feels the time has come to confront violence with violence and rescue a country being sold off in great slabs to Yankee monopolies, and raise the standard of living of our people, who grow hungrier every day.
National Liberation Army of Bolivia
COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 2
TO THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE
Document XXI
Revolutionary Truth against Reactionary Lies
April 14, 1967
On the morning of April 10, 1967, there was an ambush of an enemy patrol led by Lieutenant Luis Saavedra Arombal and made up mostly of soldiers from the Center of Instruction for Special Troops. In the encounter, the above lieutenant was killed as well as soldiers Ángel Flores and Zenón Prada Mendieta, and the guide Ignacio Husarima from the Boquerón Regiment was wounded and taken prisoner, along with another five soldiers and a lower level officer.
Four soldiers escaped and managed to warn Major Sánchez Castro at headquarters so he was able to send as reinforcements 60 men from a neighboring unit. They, too, fell into another ambush, which cost the lives of Lieutenant Hugo Ayala, non-commissioned officer Raúl Camejo, and soldiers José Vijabriel, Marcelo Maldonado, Jaime Sanabria, and two unidentified others.
In this action the wounded soldiers included Armando Quiroga, Alberto Carvajal, Fredy Alove, Justo Cervantes, and Bernabé Mandejara, who were taken prisoner with the Unit Commander, Major Rubén Sánchez Castro, and 16 more soldiers.
In line with the norms of the ELN, we tended to the wounded as best as we could and set the prisoners free after explaining our revolutionary objectives.
Enemy losses amount to 10 killed, including two lieutenants, and 30 prisoners, including Major Sánchez Castro, six of whom were wounded. The spoils of war were proportional to enemy casualties and include a 60-mm mortar, machine guns, rifles, M-1 carbines, and submachine guns, all with ammunition.
There was one casualty [Rubio] on our side that should be recorded with regret. The disparity in losses is understandable if one considers that it is we who have chosen the time and place of every combat. Moreover, the Bolivian Army is sending off green soldiers, practically children, to be slaughtered.
Meanwhile, back in La Paz, the chiefs invent strategies and pound their chests in fake grief at demagogic funeral services, hiding the fact that they bear the guilt for the bloodshed in Bolivia.
They are now removing their masks and starting to call in US “advisers,” just as occurred in the beginning of war in Vietnam, which has drained the blood from that heroic people and put world peace in jeopardy. We do not know how many “advisers” will be sent against us (although we will know how to confront them), but we warn the people of the dangers of this action by the military sell-outs.
We appeal to all young [Bolivian Army] recruits with the following instructions: when the battle begins, throw your weapons to the ground and put your hands on your head. Remain still in spite of the gunfire, and never go to the front of the column when marching near combat zones. Make the officers who are inciting the conflict take those extremely dangerous positions. We will always shoot to kill the front line, and, as much as it hurts to see the blood of innocent recruits flow, this is one of the imperious requirements of war.
National Liberation Army of Bolivia
COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 3
TO THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE
Document XXII
Revolutionary Truth against Reactionary Lies
May 1967
On May 8, in the guerrilla-held zone of Ñacahuazú, there was an ambush of troops from a mixed company led by second lieutenant Henry Laredo. The above officer and students Román Arroyo Flores and Luis Peláez were killed, and the following prisoners were taken: José Camacho Rojas, Bolívar Regiment; Néstor Cuentas, Bolívar Regiment; Waldo Veizaga, noncommissioned officers school; Hugo Soto Lora, noncommissioned officers school; Max Torres León, noncommissioned officers school; Roger Rojas Toledo, Braun Regiment; Javier Mayan Corella, Braun Regiment; Néstor Sánchez Cuéllar, Braun Regiment—the last two were wounded after they failed to halt when intercepted. As always, prisoners were set free after our goals were explained. Seven M-1 carbines and four Mauser rifles were captured, and our troops escaped injury.
The repressive army has been issuing frequent communiqués announcing guerrilla casualties, mixing truth and fantasy. Desperate because of their impotence, they lie or vent their fury on journalists, who due to their ideological makeup are natural adversaries of the regime, attributing to them all the problems they face.
We want it to be understood that the ELN of Bolivia is the only responsible party for the armed struggle, which its people lead, and which will not stop short until final victory is achieved. We will know how to punish all the crimes that have been committed in this war, independently of any reprisals our military command judges opportune to counter acts of vandalism by the repressive forces.
National Liberation Army of Bolivia
COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 4
TO THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE
Document XXIV
Revolutionary Truth against Reactionary Lies
June 1967
Recently, the [Bolivian] Army has acknowledged some of its casualties, suffered in clashes with reconnaissance missions and claiming, as usual, that they inflicted greater losses than they achieved in fact. Although we lack some reports from some patrols, we can state with assurance that our casualties are quite minimal and we have not suffered from any of the recent actions announced by the army.
Inti Peredo is a member of our army’s general command and occupies the post of political commissar, and recent actions have taken place under his command. He enjoys good health and remains untouched by enemy bullets. The announcement of his death is a palpable example of the absurd lies being spread by the army in its impotence against our forces.
Regarding announcements of the supposed presence of combatants from other countries in the Americas, for secret military reasons and in light of our philosophy, that of revolutionary truth, we will not give figures. We can simply state that any citizen who accepts our minimum program, the liberation of Bolivia, is accepted into the revolutionary ranks with equal rights and duties as the Bolivian combatants, who naturally constitute the vast majority of our movement. Every person who engages in armed struggle for the liberty of our homeland deserves, and will receive, the honorable title of Bolivian, independently of where they might have been born. That is how we interpret genuine revolutionary internationalism.
National Liberation Army of Bolivia
COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 5
TO THE BOLIVIAN MINERS
Document XXV
Revolutionary Truth against Reactionary Lies
June 1967
Comrades:
Proletarian blood is running once more in our mines. Over centuries, the blood of enslaved miners has been alternately sucked dry and then spilled, unleashing protest after protest.
In recent times the pattern has been temporarily broken and the insurgent workers were the main factor in the triumph of April 9.1 This event brought hope of a new dawn, and that finally workers would become masters of their own destiny. But the mechanisms of the imperialist world have been exposed—for those who are able to see clearly: that when social revolution is posed there can be no half measures. Either power is seized or advances are lost, along with so much sacrifice and blood.
The armed militias of the mining proletariat were the only serious force at the beginning. They were then joined by militias made up of declassed sectors and the peasants. But these groups failed to recognize their esse
ntial community of interests and instead fell into conflict, a situation that was then manipulated by anti-plebeian demagogy. In the end, the professional army could reappear dressed in lambskin concealing its wolf’s claws.
That army, small and easy to discount at first, was transformed into the armed instrument wielded against the proletariat and became imperialism’s most reliable accomplice. That is why imperialism gave the go-ahead for the military coup d’état [by General Barrientos in 1964].
Now we are recovering from a defeat provoked by the repetition of tactical errors by the working class, but also patiently preparing the country for a profound revolution that will transform the system from its roots.
False tactics must be avoided at all costs: heroic, yes, but not futile tactics that lead the proletariat into a bloodbath that depletes its ranks and neutralizes its most combative elements.
Over long months of struggle, the guerrillas have shaken the country, producing many casualties and demoralizing the Bolivian Army while scarcely suffering any losses ourselves. After one encounter lasting several hours, in which they emerged victorious, this same army strutted around like a turkey over the proletarian bodies on the battlefield. The difference between victory and defeat depends on the choice of correct or erroneous tactics.
Comrade miner: don’t listen again to the false apostles of mass struggle who interpret this as the people marching forward, in compact formation, against the armed oppressors.