The Portable Plato - Protagoras Symposium Phaedo The Republic

by Plato

  Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

  But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

  Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.

  Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.

  True, he said.

  Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colours; another will be the votaries of music—poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women’s dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swine-herds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

  Certainly.

  And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

  Much greater.

  And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small nuw, and not enough?

  Quite true.

  Then a slice of our neighbours’ land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

  That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

  And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

  Most certainly, he replied.

  Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

  Undoubtedly.

  And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

  Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

  No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.

  Very true, he said.

  But is not war an art?

  Certainly.

  And an art requiring as much attention as shoemak ing?

  Quite true.

  And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

  Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

  And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill, and art, and application will be needed by him?

  No doubt, he replied.

  Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

  Certainly.

  Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures. which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

  It will.

  And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.

  We must.

  Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and watching?

  What do you mean?

  I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

  All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.

  Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

  Certainly.

  And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

  I have.

  Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

  True.

  And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?

  Yes.

  But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?

  A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.

  Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.

  True, he said.

  What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?

  True.

  He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.

  I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.

  Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.—My friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us.

  What do you mean? he said.

  I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

  And where do you find them?

  Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

  Yes, I know.

  Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

  Certainly not.

  Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

  I do not apprehend your meaning.


  The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and is remarkable in the animal.

  What trait?

  Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?

  The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your remark.

  And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming; —your dog is a true philosopher.

  Why?

  Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

  Most assuredly.

  And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

  They are the same, he replied.

  And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

  That we may safely affirm.

  Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

  Undoubtedly.

  Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.

  Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.

  Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

  Certainly not.

  Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

  By all means.

  And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul.

  True.

  Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

  By all means.

  And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?

  I do.

  And literature may be either true or false?

  Yes.

  And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?

  I do not understand your meaning, he said.

  You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

  Very true.

  That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

  Quite right, he said.

  You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken.

  Quite true.

  And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

  We cannot.

  Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

  Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

  You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

  Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

  Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.

  But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?

  A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

  But when is this fault committed?

  Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes,—as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

  Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?

  First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies, in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him.1 The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

  Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

  Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and great est among the gods.

  I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.

  Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we 1Hesiod, Theogony, 154, 459.

  shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit.48 But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

  There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we answer him?

  I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

  Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

  Something of this kind, I replied:—God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given.

  Right.

  And is he not truly good? and must he not be repres
ented as such?

  Certainly.

  And no good thing is hurtful?

  No, indeed.

  And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

  Certainly not.

  And that which hurts not does no evil?

  No.

  And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

  Impossible.

  And the good is advantageous?

  Yes.

  And therefore the cause of well-being?

  Yes.

  It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?

  Assuredly.

  Then Cod, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

  That appears to me to be most true, he said.

  Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks“Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,”49

  and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two“Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good”;

  but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,“Him wild hunger drives o’er the beauteous earth.”

  And again—“Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.”

  And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus,50 was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus,51 he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that“God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.”