Protagoras and Meno

by Plato

  MENO: Yes, I suppose we are. After all, Socrates, doing what's right is the same as being good, isn't it?8

  [e] SOCRATES: The same as being good, Meno? Or one sort of being good?9

  MENO: How do you mean?

  SOCRATES: Just what I'd mean with anything else. Take roundness, for example – I'd say that roundness was one sort of shape; I wouldn't simply say that roundness is the same as shape. And the reason I'd put it like that is because there are other shapes besides roundness.

  MENO: Yes, good point… that's what I meant, as well; I'm saying there are other ways of being good besides doing what's right.

  [74 a] SOCRATES: What are they? Let's hear them. Just like the way I could name you some other shapes if you told me to – do the same for me, and tell me some other cases of being good.

  MENO: All right, then: there's being brave. I think that's a form of being good; and being sensible, and having knowledge, 10 and being generous – and a whole lot of others.

  SOCRATES: The same thing's happened to us again, Meno! We were looking for just one idea of being good, and we've found a whole load of them – though in a different sense from the way we did a moment ago. But we don't seem to be able to hit upon our single idea of being good that can cover all of them.

  MENO: No, that's right, Socrates; I still can't do it the way you [b] want me to. I can't get just one, overall take on what it is to be good, the way I could with those other things.

  SOCRATES: Well, never mind; that's only to be expected. I tell you what – I'll do my best and see if I can move us forward myself. You realize it's the same way with everything? Say someone asked you about the thing I mentioned a moment ago – ‘What is shape, Meno?’ – and you told him, ‘roundness,’ and then he'd said the same as I did: ‘You mean, roundness is the same thing as shape, or one sort of shape?’ You'd probably have said it was one sort of shape.

  MENO: Absolutely.

  [c] SOCRATES: And that's because there are other shapes as well?

  MENO: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And if he'd gone on to ask what other shapes there are, you could have told him?

  MENO: Yes, I could.

  SOCRATES: And suppose he'd asked you in the same way about colour – ‘What is colour?’ – and you'd said, ‘white,’ and then he'd said, ‘You mean, white is the same thing as colour, or just one sort of colour?’ You'd have said it was one sort of colour, because there are other colours as well – right?

  MENO: Right.

  SOCRATES: And if he told you to name other colours, you could have named other colours – colours that are just as much [d] colours as white is?

  MENO: Yes.

  SOCRATES: So suppose his approach to the question was the same as mine, and he said, ‘Look, we keep arriving at lots of these things. That's not what I want. Try to do it like this: since you're referring to these lots of things by one and the same name, and saying that every one of them is a shape (even when they're completely different from one another), tell me what that is – the thing that includes both “round” and “straight”, the thing you're calling “shape” when you say that “round is no more a shape than straight is.” You do [e] say that, don't you?’

  MENO: Yes.

  SOCRATES: So when you put it like that, are you saying that round is no more round than it is straight, and straight is no more straight than it is round?

  MENO: Obviously not, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: No. But what you are saying is that round is no more a shape than straight is, and vice versa?

  MENO: That's right.

  SOCRATES: ‘Well, what's that – the thing that “shape” is the name for? Try and tell me.’ Now if that's what he was asking, [75 a] either about shape or about colour, and you said, ‘I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you want. I don't know what you mean!’, he'd probably have been amazed. ‘You don't understand? You don't understand that I'm just trying to find out what it is that all of them have in common?’ Or even with these examples, Meno, would you have no idea what to say? – if someone asked, ‘What is it in round, and straight, and all the other things you call “shapes”, that's the same in all of them?’ Go on, try and tell me. That way you'll also get a bit of practice for your answer about being good.

  [b] MENO: I've got a better idea. Why don't you tell me, Socrates?

  SOCRATES: You want me to pamper you, do you?

  MENO: Of course.

  SOCRATES: And then you'll tell me what being good is? Will you?

  MENO: I will, I promise.

  SOCRATES: Well, I better give it a try, then – that's quite a bargain.

  MENO: It certainly is.

  SOCRATES: All right, let's see then; let me try and tell you what shape is. See if you accept this as a definition: let's say that shape is… the only thing that colour always comes with.11 There. Is that good enough for you, or are you looking for [c] something different? I'd be very happy if you gave me a definition of being good along those lines.

  MENO: But that's a silly definition, Socrates!

  SOCRATES: What do you mean?

  MENO: Well, a shape – according to your idea – is ‘the thing colour always comes with’. Fine. But what if someone says they don't know what colour is? What if they're as baffled about that as they are about shape? What kind of an answer do you think you'd give them?

  SOCRATES: Well, one that's true, at least. And if the man who'd asked the question was one of those expert quibblers, 12 who just want to ‘win’ arguments, then what I'd say to him is this: [d] ‘Look, I've made my claim. If what I'm saying isn't right, that's your problem: it's up to you to question me and prove me wrong.’ But if the two of us were friends and wanted to talk things through with one another – the way you and I are doing now – then I'd have to go a bit easier on him and answer in a more talk-it-through kind of way.13 And I suppose ‘a more talk-it-through kind of way' means not just giving an answer that's true but also only answering by way of things the other person admits he knows, when you ask him. * So I'll try to tell you what a shape is that way. Tell me – do you know what an edge is? I mean, in the sense of a border, [e] or an outline? I'm treating all those as meaning the same thing – Prodicus14 might disagree with us; but I assume you talk about things having a border or coming to an edge? That's the kind of thing I mean. Nothing fancy.

  MENO: Yes, I do. I think I understand what you mean.

  SOCRATES: And you talk about surfaces, and also solids? As [76 a] in, those things you find in geometry?

  MENO: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Well, you're already there, then: you can use those to understand what I mean by shape. Because here's what I'm saying holds true for every shape: I'm saying that a shape is the thing that borders a solid. So I could say, in short, that a shape is a border of a solid.

  MENO: And what's your definition of colour, Socrates?

  SOCRATES: Show a little respect, Meno! Look at you, pestering a poor old man with all these questions; meanwhile you refuse to remember, and tell me, what Gorgias says being [b] good is!

  MENO: But I will, Socrates – just as soon as you've told me what colour is.

  SOCRATES: Even with a blindfold on, Meno, anyone could tell just from talking to you that you're beautiful, and men still fall for you.

  MENO: Why's that?

  SOCRATES: Because you're always so bossy in conversation! And that's what people do when they're spoiled – spoiled from being treated like royalty while they're young and sexy. Plus you've probably noticed I can't resist beautiful people. [c] All right, I'll pamper you and answer the question.

  MENO: Yes, good idea. Pamper me.

  SOCRATES: So do you want me to answer the way Gorgias would? That'll make it easiest for you to follow.

  MENO: Well, of course.

  SOCRATES: All right. So do you two talk about ‘out-flowings’ from things, the way Empedocles does?15

  MENO: Now you're talking!

  SOCRATES: And ‘channels’, into which, and out through which, t
he ‘out-flowings’ pass?

  MENO: Absolutely.

  SOCRATES: And of these out-flowings, some of them fit some [d] of the channels, while some are too big or too small?

  MENO: That's right.

  SOCRATES: And you know what I mean by ‘sight’?

  MENO: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Well, from all of that you can ‘throw together what I mean’, as Pindar says. Because here's what colour is: a sight-fitting, perceptible out-flowing from shapes.

  MENO: I think that's a fantastic answer, Socrates!

  SOCRATES: Maybe that's because it's in the sort of language you're more used to; plus, I suspect you realize you could [e] also use it to say what sound is, and smell, and lots of other things like that.

  MENO: Absolutely.

  SOCRATES: It's a theatrical answer, 16 Meno. That's why you like it more than the one about shape.

  MENO: I do.

  SOCRATES: But what it isn't, son of Alexidemus, is a better answer. I'm convinced the other one was better. And I believe you'd come to think so too, if you didn't have to leave town (as you were telling me yesterday) before the Mysteries17 – if only you could stay and be initiated.

  [77 a] MENO: I would stay, Socrates, if you told me lots more things like that last one!

  SOCRATES: Well, I'll certainly try to. I'll do my very best, for your sake and my own. But I may not be able to come up with many more ideas like that one. Anyway, come on, it's your turn now: you've got to try to keep your promise and tell me what being good is, as a whole. Stop ‘making lots of things from one’, as the jokers say to someone who's smashed a plate. Just leave it whole, and in one piece, and tell me what [b] it is. You've got your examples from me now.

  MENO: All right, Socrates. I think that being good, as that poet says, is a matter of

  Rejoicing in all that is fair and fine, and being able.18

  That's what I say ‘being good’ is, as well – wanting fine things and being able to acquire them.

  SOCRATES: By ‘someone who wants fine things’ you mean someone who wants things that are good?

  MENO: Yes exactly.

  SOCRATES: You mean, as if some people want bad things, and only some of us want good things? Don't you think that [c] everyone wants what's good?

  MENO: No, I don't think so.

  SOCRATES: What – people sometimes want things that are bad?

  MENO: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Because they reckon the bad things are good, you mean? Or do they realize they're bad and want them anyway?

  MENO: [Thinks it over for a moment.] Both, I think.

  SOCRATES: What? You really think, Meno, that a person can realize bad things are bad and want them anyway?

  MENO: Definitely.

  SOCRATES: When you say someone can ‘want’ bad things, you mean, want to get them?

  MENO: Yes, to get them. What else?

  SOCRATES: Why? Because they reckon these bad things benefit [d] whoever gets them? Or do they realize that bad things always harm whoever's got them?

  MENO: Well, in some of these cases, people think the bad things are doing them good, but in other cases, they know they're doing them harm.

  SOCRATES: And, in your view, do the people who think bad things are doing them good realize the bad things are bad?

  MENO: No, I certainly wouldn't say that.

  SOCRATES: Well, clearly those people don't want bad things (the people who don't realize that they're bad). They want [e] things that they thought were good – it's just that those things are, in fact, bad. That's to say, if they don't realize these things are bad, and think they're good, then it's clear that what they actually want is what's good. Don't you see?

  MENO: Yes, that's probably right – in their case.

  SOCRATES: And what about the ones who do want bad things – you say – and at the same time believe that bad things harm whoever gets them? Presumably they're aware that they're going to be harmed by the things they want?

  [78 a] MENO: Yes, they must be.

  SOCRATES: And don't these people think that being harmed makes you, to the extent that you're harmed, a loser?19

  MENO: Yes, they must think that, as well.

  SOCRATES: And don't they think that losers are sad and pathetic?

  MENO: Yes, I suppose so.

  SOCRATES: So does anyone actually want to be a sad, pathetic loser?

  MENO: No, I suppose not, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Well, nobody wants bad things, then, if we're sure that nobody wants to be someone like that. I mean, isn't that just what being a loser is – wanting bad things and then getting them?20

  [b] MENO: You're probably right, Socrates; I guess no one wants bad things.

  SOCRATES: Right. So were you saying just a moment ago that being good means ‘wanting good things, and being able…’?

  MENO: Yes, that's what I said.

  SOCRATES: So out of that definition, the ‘wanting’ part already applies to everyone from the start21 – so in that respect no one's a better person than anyone else?

  MENO: Apparently not.

  SOCRATES: So if anyone's a better person than someone else, it's obviously because of the ‘being able’ part?

  MENO: Exactly.

  SOCRATES: So that means that the quality of being good, on [c] your definition, is just the ability to acquire good things?

  MENO: Yes! I like the way you're thinking, Socrates: that's my view exactl!22

  SOCRATES: All right then, let's look at what you're saying and see if you're right. You may very well be on to something. You're saying that being good means being able to acquire good things?

  MENO: That's right.

  SOCRATES: And by ‘good things’ you mean things like health and money? Right?

  MENO: Yes – gold and silver; that's what I'm talking about; and obtaining positions of power and honour in your city.23

  SOCRATES: I see. So there's nothing else you're thinking of as good, besides those kinds of things?

  [d] MENO: No. All the things I'm talking about are like that.

  SOCRATES: Right. So being a good man means acquiring loads of gold and silver, according to Meno, special family friend of the Great King!24 And are you including with this idea of ‘acquiring things’, Meno, that you have to do it according to what's right, and with respect for religion? Or doesn't that matter? Are you just as happy to call it ‘being good’ even if you acquire things wrongfully?

  MENO: No of course not Socrates.

  SOCRATES: You'd call that being bad?

  MENO: Well, obviously.

  SOCRATES: So it looks like this ‘acquiring’ business also has to involve respect for what's right, or moderation, or religiousness, or some other part of being a good person. [e] Otherwise, it won't count as being good, even if it does

  supply you with lots of good things.

  MENO: Of course. How could it possibly count as being good without those?

  SOCRATES: And what about not acquiring any gold or silver, either for yourself or for someone else, when it isn't right to do so? Won't that count as being good – that particular case of not acquiring anything?

  MENO: Yes, it seems so.

  SOCRATES: So in other words, being good isn't a matter of acquiring those sorts of good things any more than not acquiring them. It looks like acquiring things will only count as being good when it's done with respect for what's right; but when it's done without anything like that, it'll be a case of being bad. [79a]

  MENO: Yes, I suppose that must be right.

  SOCRATES: So, weren't we saying just a little while ago that each of those things – respect for what's right, and moderation, and so on – is part of being a good person?

  MENO: Yes.

  SOCRATES: I see, Meno – you're playing games with me, are you?

  MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?

  SOCRATES: Well, look; just a moment ago I asked you not to split up the idea of being good – not to break it into little pieces; I even gave you examples of ho
w you were supposed to answer. And without paying any attention to that, you're now telling me that being good means ‘being able to acquire [b] good things with respect for what's right' – which you say is part of being good.

  MENO: Yes, that's right.

  SOCRATES: So it turns out, from all the things that you're agreeing to, that being good just means doing – with some ‘part of being good’ – whatever it is you're doing. Because that's what you're calling respect for what's right (and each of those qualities): ‘part of being good’.

  MENO: So what's your point?*

  SOCRATES: My point is, I asked you to tell me what being good is, as a whole; and without even coming close to telling me what it is itself, you're now saying that any action counts as being good as long as it's done with one of the parts of being [c] good – as if you'd already told me what being good is as a whole and I'm going to have any idea what you're talking about when you go and chop it up into parts! So it looks to me like you'll have to go back and answer the same question, Meno. What is being good – granted that ‘any action that's done with a part of being good counts as being good’? Because that's all we're saying when we say that ‘doing anything with respect for what's right counts as being good.’ Or am I wrong? Don't you think we need to ask the same question? Do you think anyone's going to know what a part of being good is if they don't know what being good is, itself?25

  MENO: No, I suppose not.

  SOCRATES: No. And in fact, if you remember, when I gave you [d]

  that answer about shape, a little while back, 26 we rejected that way of answering – I mean, where you try to answer a question by using things that are still being figured out and haven't yet been agreed on.

  MENO: And we were right to reject that way of answering, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Well, stop doing it yourself, then! If we're still trying to find out what being good is, as a whole, don't go thinking that you'll be showing anyone what it is if you talk about parts of it in your answer (or that you'll ever explain anything if you make your claims that way). We'll just need [e] to go back and ask the same question: you're talking about ‘parts of being good’, but what's that? What is being good? Or do you think I'm talking nonsense?