Protagoras and Meno
Page 17
SOCRATES: So correct opinion is just as good a thing as knowledge [c] and does us just as much good in our actions; and a man with correct opinions will do as much good as a man with knowledge?
MENO: Right.
SOCRATES: And we agreed that that was a characteristic of a good man – doing good?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: So it isn't just knowledge that makes men good, and able to do their cities good, if and when they do; it's also correct opinion. In which case, given that neither one of those things – knowledge or true opinion – arises in people just by [d] nature… or am I wrong about that? Do you think either of them comes to us naturally?
MENO: No.
SOCRATES: So if neither of them comes naturally, it can't be people's nature that makes them good men?
MENO: No, it can't be.
SOCRATES: And since our nature doesn't make us good… the next thing we asked78 was whether being good is something teachable?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Right, and didn't we decide that being good is teachable if it's a kind of wisdom?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And conversely, that it would have to be a kind of wisdom, if it's teachable?
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And that if there are people teaching it, then it's [e] teachable; but if there aren't any people teaching it, then it isn't teachable?
MENO: That's right.
SOCRATES: And we've decided that there aren't any people teaching it?
MENO: We did.
SOCRATES: So that means we've decided that it isn't teachable, and that it isn't a kind of wisdom?
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: But we're certainly agreeing that it's a good thing?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that what's good – what does us good – is the element that guides us and shows us the right way?
MENO: Absolutely.
[99 a] SOCRATES: And that there are only two things that can show us the right way: true opinion and knowledge. At least, that's what a person has to have, to show the way. I don't count things that come out right just by some stroke of luck. That's not a case of anything happening through human guidance.
In any area where people show the way, those are the only possible guides: true opinion and knowledge.
MENO: I think that's right.
SOCRATES: And since being good is something that can't be taught, it's no longer an option that it's knowledge?
MENO: Apparently not.
[b] SOCRATES: So of the only two things that are good, and that enable us to do good, that rules out knowledge: it seems it isn't knowledge that guides people in the civic and ethical sphere.
MENO: I agree.
SOCRATES: So in other words it wasn't through having knowledge, or by being experts, that men like that were able to guide their cities – men like Themistocles and the ones Anytus was talking about. Of course! That's why they couldn't turn other people into the sort of men they were themselves – because it wasn't knowledge that made them the way they were.
MENO: That seems very plausible, Socrates.
SOCRATES: So if it wasn't knowledge that made them the way they were, the only remaining possibility is that it was a sort [c] of knack for having the right opinions. That's what statesmen must use to set their cities on the right path; and that means they're just like fortune-tellers and soothsayers, 79 in terms of how close they are to having knowledge. Soothsayers are the same: when they're ‘inspired’, they say plenty of things that are true; but they don't really know what they're saying.
MENO: Yes, that's probably right.
SOCRATES: And isn't it right to call people ‘inspired’ when they achieve lots of great things by what they say and do, without any understanding?
MENO: Absolutely.
SOCRATES: So it makes sense to call those people inspired: the fortune-tellers and soothsayers; and poets and playwrights, [d] too; and we'd be especially right to call statesmen inspired, and to say they're in a kind of trance, possessed by some divine spirit, when they achieve so many great successes by saying the things they say, even though they don't really know what they're talking about.
MENO: Absolutely.
SOCRATES: And remember that women, Meno, call good men ‘inspired’; and in Sparta, too, the highest praise for a good man is when they say, ‘That man's inzpired.’*80
MENO: And apparently they're right, Socrates. Mind you, [e] Anytus here will probably get annoyed* with you for saying so.
SOCRATES: I don't care about that. We'll talk with him again81 some other time, Meno. As for us, here and now – if we've done a good job of our search for the truth, and if what we've said at each stage of our talk was right, then it turns out that being good is not something that comes to us naturally, or something that can be taught; instead, it seems it arises by gift of god, and without understanding, in the people who have it… unless, that is, there were a man, 82 among [100 a] good statesmen, who could also turn someone else into the sort of man he is himself. If there were such a man, they'd probably speak of him as being up here among the living just what Homer says Tiresias was among the dead. He says,
He alone has sense in the world below;83
the rest are flitting shadows.
A man like that would be the same thing here: something real, among mere shadows of what it is to be good.
MENO: I think that's quite right, and very nicely put, Socrates, [b]
SOCRATES: So by our line of reasoning, Meno, it appears that being good is a quality that comes to people, when it does, by gift of god. Of course, we really won't know for sure until we set aside the question of exactly how it comes to people and first try to find out what being good is, in itself.
But now it's time for me to go. And as for you, try to convince your host Anytus here about the things you've been [c] convinced about yourself – try to calm him down. If you can do that, you may well be doing Athens a favour.84
Appendix
This translation follows Burnet's text of both the Protagoras and the Meno, except in the following few places. Most of these slight changes come from other editors (four, in the case of the Meno, I take from Bluck); none is of any philosophical importance, except perhaps Protagoras 355d, where, although I am not happy with Burnet's text, I still follow the majority view as to the basic sense of the sentence.
Glossary
This Glossary lists some of the important words and phrases used in the two dialogues. It is aimed at students of ancient philosophy who are reading other Greek texts and works of scholarship on those texts, as well as at people learning ancient Greek. It shows how I have translated some of the key terms, and gives various other possible translations in each case and, where applicable, the traditional translations, which are widely used. The words in bold on the left (in Greek) all appear in the Protagoras or the Meno (or in both). On the right, the words or phrases in italics are the ones actually used in this version; the others are other ways in which the terms have been, or might be, translated (in the Greek of this period, dialect and context), including the traditional terminology. Only a small number of terms are unambiguously part of the latter category; for the great majority of these words there has always been variation in how they are translated. Translations also marked with an asterisk are ones that I myself consider to be inaccurate. The accents marked on the transliterated Greek words are a very approximate guide to pronunciation: they may be treated as marking the stressed syllable of the words. I have not distinguished between long and short vowels.
agathós (I) good, i.e. a good man; good person (2) good at [something]; a good [something, e.g. carpenter]
(ta) agathá (1) good things; things that are good for us (2) the good things [under discussion]
– (ta) kaká (1) bad things; things that are bad for us (2) the bad things [under discussion]; evils*
ágnoia ignorance; [state of] not knowing
aidós (poetic/archaic term) feeling of shame; reverance; em
barrassment; sense of wrong
amathía ignorance; stupidity
anamnesis remembering (n.); recollection
– anamnesthénai to remember; to recollect
– anamnestón [something that] can be remembered; rememberable; recollectable
andreios brave; courageous
andreía (i) bravery; being brave; courage (2) enthusiasm; energy
aphrosúnë foolishness; stupidity; being stupid; folly
aporeín (1) to have no means (2) metaphorically: to have no idea what to do; to have no clue; to be puzzled; to be baffled; to be perplexed
aporía (1) lack of means; poverty; [state of] having no means or provisions (2) used as opposite of póros: non-getting; [instance of] not acquiring anything (3) metaphorically: [state of] having no clue, no means or way of finding the answer; hence [state of] being clueless, being baffled; bafflement; puzzlement; perplexity
areté (see agathós) (a) general: (1) being good, i.e. the state/quality of being good, esp. of being a good man; being a good person; goodness; virtue; excellence* (2) being a good [something, e.g. carpenter]; being good at [something] (see below); virtue*; excellence. [Use (2) is rare; there are three examples in the Protagoras, none in the Meno.] (b) particular: way/form/manner of being good; hence a good quality, esp. of character, i.e. an ethical quality; a virtue. [In the Meno only.]
– andrós areté being a good man; man's virtue; manly virtue
– gunaikós areté being a good woman; woman's virtue
– politiké areté being a good citizen; civic virtue; political virtue*
– areté tektoniké being a good carpenter; skill as a carpenter*
– aretés didáskaloi teachers of being good; teachers of virtue; people who can teach [us] how to be good/about being good
– didaktón he areté being good can be taught/is teachable; you can make people good by teaching them
– mía areté one [idea of] being good; single/universal [concept of] being good; one virtue; single virtue
– mórion aretés part of being good; part of virtue [often used as an equivalent to ‘particular’ areté]
– ten aretén paradidónai to pass on/hand over [the quality of] being good; to pass on what it is that makes you good; to impart virtue; to bestow virtue
– tí estin areté? what is being good?; what is virtue? aulós flute; mijwiz; arghoul
deilía cowardice; being a coward
deilós a coward; cowardly
dialégesthai to talk; to talk [things/something] through; to have a conversation or discussion
dialektikóteron more talk-through-ishly; in a more talk-it-through kind of way; more dialectically (coined by Plato)
diálogos a talk; a discussion; a talking through; a dialogue; a conversation
díkaion right; ethical; just
– ádikon wrong; unethical; unjust (action)
dikaíos (διxαiως) according to what's right; rightfully; ethically; justly
– adíkos (άδixως) wrongfully; unethically; unjustly
dikaios (δixαιoς) ethical [person]; [someone who] cares about what's right; someone who does what's right; righteous; just (person)
– ádikos (άδιxoς) wrongdoer; criminal; unethical; unjust [person]
dikaiosúnë respect for what's right; doing what's right; [state of] being righteous; [state of] being ethical; righteousness; morality; justice*
– adikía disregard for what's right; injustice*; wrongdoing; unrighteousness; immorality; [state of] being unethical
– adikeín (1) to do wrong; to wrong [someone]; to commit an injustice (2) to commit a crime
dike (poetic/archaic term) right (n.); righteousness; sense of right
dóxa opinion; belief; view; what you think is the case
– dóxa alethés true opinion; true belief
– orthé dóxa correct opinion; correct belief (= previous)
epimeleía care; concern; care and effort; care and attention; diligence
– aretés epimeleisthai to care about being good
epistémë knowledge
(ta) hedéa pleasurable things; things that are pleasurable
hedoné pleasure
– hettásthai hupó ton hedonón lit. to be defeated by pleasures (?); to be unable to resist pleasures; to be overcome by pleasures
– to hettó eínai ton hedonón lit. to be less than pleasures; to be unable to resist pleasures; to be overcome by pleasure (= previous)
hegeísthai to lead; to guide; to show the way
– hegeisthai orthós to guide right; to show the right way; to show the way (i.e., by implication, the right way)
hósion (of things/actions) required by religion; permitted by religion; pious; holy; halal
– anósion (of things/actions) against religion; irreligious; unholy; impious; sinful; haram; heinous
hósios (of people) religious [person]; pious; holy
hosiótës being religious; religiousness; piety; holiness
kakía being bad; badness; vice (opposite of areté)
kalós, kalón (1) beautiful; fine (in old sense) (2) honourable; ethical; noble; ethically acceptable; fair; right; fine (modern sense); okay
– aischrós, aischrón (1) ugly (2) disgraceful; shameful; unethical; wrong; reprehensible; unacceptable; foul* (3) insulting; shaming
kalós k'agathós good and decent [man]; decent; a gentleman
kithára guitar; lyre; krar
lógos (1) a thing said/claimed; a claim; an idea; a proposition (2) an argument (3) a speech (4) an account (5) reason; rationality
lúpe pain
– ta luperá (= ta aniará) painful things; things that are painful
manthánein to learn
máthesis learning (n.)
– mathetón learnable
– didaktón teachable; can be taught
nárke numbfish; electric ray; torpedo fish
opheleín to do [someone, us] good; to benefit
ophélimon [something that] does us good; good for us; beneficial; esp. in very broad sense: [something that] does us good in life
ophélimos [a person who] does good; beneficent; beneficial
phrónesis understanding, esp. of practical and ethical kind; wisdom; prudence; practical wisdom
phrónimos wise; prudent
pólis city; society; state
– ta tes póleos city stuff; affairs of the city; public matters
polítes (1) citizen (2) fellow-citizen; fellow countryman
– ta politiká citizens' stuff; civic affairs; the city's affairs; civic and ethical matters; politics
– politiké areté being a good citizen; civic virtue; political virtue*; political excellence*
– politiké práxis civic activity; civic action; the civic and ethical sphere [of action]
– politiké téchne citizen's know-how/skill/craft; civic and ethical know-how; ethical know-how; political art*; the art of politics*; the art of citizenship; knack of living as fellow-citizens
– politikós statesman; politician; political man
– sképsasthai to look at; always metaphorical, in sense of to look into; to investigate; to examine
– diasképsasthai to look into thoroughly; to get to the bottom of; to investigate
sophía (1) knowledge; expertise; the [state of] having knowledge; [state of] being expert; wisdom* (2) intelligence; cleverness (3) philosophy
sophístës public intellectual; professional philosopher; sophist
sophós (1) (colloquial) clever; smart; intelligent; skilled; wise* (2) knowing (adj.); knowledgeable (3) (as a noun) an intellectual; an expert; a wise man*
sóphron sensible; moderate; restrained; temperate*
sophroneín to be sensible; to act sensibly (i.e. (1) to be moderate (2) to be reasonable/rational); to act temperately*
sophrosúnë [state of] being sensible; good sense; moderation; self-control (at Meno 88b); temperance*
sumphorá event; disaster; catastrophe; a toug
h break
– améchanos sumphorá a tough break that there is no way of coping with; a tough break that beats every move you make
tharrein to be unafraid [of something]; not to be afraid of [something]; to be confident*
– phobeísthai to be afraid [of something]; to fear
– ta tharraléa (= ta me deiná) things that are not frightening; things that are [objectively] not frightening; things you should not be afraid of
– ta deiná things that are frightening; things that are [objectively] frightening; things you should be afraid of
– hoi tharraléoi people who are not afraid; the confident
– thársos, thárros lack of fear; fearlessness; boldness; confidence
zeteín (1) to search; to look for; to try to find (2) metaphorically: to look for an answer to a question; to try to find out [something]
– zetetikós eager to find out [things]; try-to-find-out-ish (coined by Plato)
Notes
PROTAGORAS
1. There you are, Socrates: In a public place, Socrates meets a friend (or friends) to whom he narrates the conversation he has just had with Protagoras. This outer dialogue lets Plato insert descriptive and dramatic detail (in the form of Socrates' commentary as narrator).
2. Alcibiades: Alcibiades (c. 450 – 404 BC) was the ward of Pericles, talented, charismatic and famously beautiful. He had a spectacular but chequered political career. It is a running theme in Plato's dialogues that Socrates is in love with him (see Symposium 212d – 23b, Gorgias 481d, Alcibiades I 103a), as is implied here by the unnamed friend. Plato depicts their relationship in detail in the Symposium and is at pains to deny that it was conventional (i.e. sexual).
3. the charm of youth: Quoted from Iliad 24.348 and Odyssey 10.279. The friend's point was that since Alcibiades is growing his first beard, he is past the age of being a suitable object of male desire.
4. boy: A slave, not a boy. See note on the slave in the Meno (at 82b).
5. Hippocrates… Apollodoros… Phason: Probably real people but otherwise unknown to us. Hippocrates is a young and ambitious Athenian drawn to the teachings of the sophists, especially the training they offered in public speaking, which was such a valuable tool in public life in democratic Athens. His horsey name (‘Hippocrates' means, roughly, ‘horsepower’) is very upper-class.