Protagoras and Meno

by Plato

  60. becoming good…‘bein good’ is hard: Socrates offers two interpretations (here, and at 343c – 345c) of an alleged contrast between these verbs. The verbs are probably not contrasted in the song at all. The emphasis in the Greek is quite wrong for that, and the verb taken as meaning ‘to become’ (genésthai) can also easily mean ‘to be’. It's clear (from the several quotations) that Simonides is saying that human beings cannot be perfect (because misfortune will sometimes force us into bad behaviour), and that we should have sympathy for human failings. The contrast between the two quotes, then, may have been something like this: ‘It's certainly hard for a [mere] man to be truly good – i.e. godlike, perfect in every way… But I don't agree that it's hard to be good; if a man does the best he can, he's good enough in my book.’ Socrates is parodying the sophistic style of (pedantic) interpretation. The interpretative claims he makes are, for the most part, deliberately silly. This song only survives in these quotations, and his garbled reading of it makes its meaning (and even the order of the quoted sections) uncertain.

  61. in Crete and in Sparta: Contemporary readers knew full well that Cretans and Spartans had no interest whatsoever in philosophy. Socrates' assertion is like claiming that the English rugby team are closet existentialists. As in all good conspiracy theories, Socrates uses the total absence of evidence for his claim as the best reason for believing it.

  62. Thales… Chilon… group: These are the ‘seven sages’; famous intellectuals, lawmakers and teachers of the seventh and sixth centuries BC.

  63. with the whole of what follows: Literally, ‘as being shifted over’. Socrates (wrongly) wants to take the ‘really and truly’ (alathéos) with the whole sentence, to make it more obviously a response (rather like English ‘Actually, Pittacus…’). It is in an unusual position for that, and so needs to be (mentally) ‘shifted over’ (which is permissible, given the flexibility of word order in Greek).

  64. with the whole sentence: Literally, ‘correctly placed (i.e. taken as if it were) at the end’ (see previous note).

  65. to be a good man… that's impossible: Socrates is saying that Simonides is very pedantically disagreeing with the claim that it is hard to be good on the grounds that it is not merely hard but impossible (and therefore, strictly speaking, not hard).

  66. and takes him down: Simonides is saying that desperate situations can force even the best of us into regrettable behaviour. There is a philosophical disagreement here between Plato and Simonides. Plato believes that truly good people remain good in the face of any sort of disaster or emotion, because true ethical knowledge is invincible. (Aristotle attacks the same song on much the same grounds – see Nicomachean Ethics 1100b.) This strong disagreement with Simonides’ more tragic take on life may explain why Plato chooses this particular song to mangle. (Cf. his all-out attack on tragedy in the Republic). As a joke, Socrates ignores the meaning of the lines and reads the Platonic view into them.

  67. any man… turns bad: Socrates is saying that this means ‘it's impossible to be good,’ as if ‘to be good’ meant ‘to be good all the time’ (which it doesn't).

  68. losing your knowledge: This is a very Platonic sense of ‘doing badly’. Simonides means that even decent people may behave badly when bad things happen to them; that's what he means by ‘when he's doing badly’. For Plato, how well you act depends on your knowledge (or lack of it), and in spite of what Socrates says here, his view is probably that nothing, in fact, can take away knowledge (see, e.g., 352c and Meno 97d), and therefore that nothing can make a truly good man act badly.

  69. the ones the gods love: Simonides means people who are lucky – i.e. being a good person takes luck. Plato doesn't believe this. That may be why Socrates doesn't explain the line.

  70. laying into Pittacus' saying: Socrates' point is that this passage reinforces the claim that being good is impossible (and therefore, pedantically speaking, not hard) by the words ‘that which… cannot be’. Simonides is in fact saying (much more plausibly) that what is impossible is ‘a man completely blame-and-blemish-free’.

  71. the “wilfully… my praise”: Of course, the ‘wilfully’ does go with the ‘so long as he…’ phrase. Socrates assumes, ironically, that Simonides is up to speed with his own famous paradox that ‘no one ever does wrong wilfully.’

  72. ain't no shame in it: In the context, it is clear that Simonides means that when there is no great shame in peoples' mistakes and failures, we should tolerate and accept them; the implication is that people will often fail under extreme pressure, and that there is no great shame in that. This is an idea Plato objects to because of his belief in a kind of ethical knowledge that is invincible. (See 352ff.)

  73. Divers: Athenians used to put jars of wine and oil into wells in summer, for refrigeration (see, e.g, Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 1002, Plutus 810; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 3.98). In some cases, ‘divers’ (presumably household slaves) would have to dive down to the bottom of the wells to deposit and retrieve the jars. This rare sense of the term is recorded in Hesychius' lexicon (kappa 3398): ‘divers: people who bring up jars from wells’.

  74. People like that are crazy!: And therefore not brave. In the Laches, Plato has Socrates arguing (with obvious reference to this discussion in the Protagoras) for the exact opposite view – i.e. that out of those who undertake these (same) dangerous tasks, the ones who have no idea what they are doing obviously have to be much braver than the trained experts.

  75. things that are honourable: I.e. ethically acceptable things. Protagoras thinks that pursuing pleasure as a unique goal may conflict with ethical considerations (a very reasonable idea). In what follows, Socrates conspicuously ignores this worry. Note that he makes no mention of ‘honourable things’ in his reply. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ in his answer are not ethical terms. They just mean ‘good for us’ and ‘bad for us’. Ethical questions appear only much later in the discussion (at 358b; see n.82).

  76. power over other countries, and wealth: Socrates' list of good things is very unsocratic. In other dialogues he often claims that power and wealth have little value alongside being a good person and having a good soul (see Meno 78 – 80). Recall, though, that at this point he is, by his own admission, filling out what he takes to be the view of ‘most people’, not his own.

  77. Or are they worth it?: The line of thought is a little confusing. The example of smoking provides a good illustration: smoking is among ‘things that are bad’ – i.e. it is, overall, bad for the smoker. Some people smoke, even though they know it's bad for them, ‘because they can't resist the pleasure.’ But Socrates has shown that the pleasure (that they get out of it) is just some quantity of good. So they're now left saying that ‘they smoke, knowing that it's bad, because they can't resist what's good [about it].’ This is meant to sound absurd, given that the good (that they get out of it) doesn't outweigh the bad, and isn't worth the bad. I.e. the good of smoking is not worth the damage it does to your health.

  78. Obviously… wouldn't be making a mistake: Continuing our illustration: if the ‘good things' that came from smoking (the pleasure) outweighed the ‘bad things’ that came out of it (poor health), then, in choosing to smoke, you would not be making a mistake (smoking would not be a mistake). So, if smoking is (overall) bad, and is a mistake, then the ‘good things’ that come out of it ‘obviously’ (i.e. ex hypothesi) aren't worth it.

  79. greater amount of bad… smaller amount of good!: E.g. accepting severe illness (greater amount of bad) for the pleasure of smoking (the much smaller amount of good). Socrates is making such a choice sound completely unintelligible by reducing it to a straight, simultaneous and open-eyed exchange, exactly like paying fifty pounds for a ten-pound note.

  80. that obviously… pains: With our example, we started with ‘I smoke, which I know is bad for me, because I can't resist the pleasure.’ With this second substitution, this becomes ‘I smoke, which I know is painful, because I can't resist the pleasure.’ This sounds absurd. Strictly speaking
, it means this: ‘I know it's painful (overall), but I can't resist the pleasure (that it gives me now).’ So Socrates adds the point that the pleasure does not outweigh the pain. The pleasures of smoking are obviously not worth the pains (or it would not be painful, or bad, overall).

  81. right or wrong?: So far Socrates has been filling out a view he attributes to ‘most people’; here (with obvious flattery) he gets the sophists to adopt the same (hedonist) view. Note that he still avoids saying that he holds the view himself. He may well do. (His own comment to Protagoras at 333c is perhaps the best approach here: ‘I don't care whether you actually believe what you're saying or not. It's the idea itself I want to examine.’)

  82. aren't all such actions honourable?: Socrates has argued that only pleasurable things are good (for us), and only painful things bad (for us); he has left ethical questions, up to this point, carefully to one side. This claim appears to be a brand new, hedonist take on what should count as ‘honourable’ i.e. ethical, or ethically acceptable: ‘Whatever leads to pleasure we (hedonists) shall deem honourable.’

  83. people who can keep on going: See 349e.

  84. just a case of ignorance: I.e. people never do things that they ‘believe are frightening’ (here, things they think are bad); they only do bad things through not knowing (or thinking) that those things are bad (i.e. not truly fearing them).

  85. we agreed that… good for us: Socrates means the claim he made at 358b: that (1) all actions that lead to pleasure are honourable (see n. 82). The claim here, that (2) all honourable actions are good for us (and hence, as he adds shortly, pleasurable), is a different claim. This looks like deliberate sleight of hand. Here's the difference: on the earlier (properly hedonist) view, if, e.g., running away is more pleasurable, then running away is to be deemed honourable. By this new claim, since staying and fighting is (traditionally) honourable, it must be pleasurable. The new claim is rather implausible. It is the claim that any act of bravery (even, e.g., one that leads to an agonizing death) is pleasurable. Perhaps there are arguments for such a view (Aristotle tries out some at Nicomachean Ethics 1169a). But Socrates certainly did not present any in his earlier defence of hedonism. He never showed how traditional honourable actions are supposed to be pleasurable. (He never even mentioned bravery, for instance.)

  86. when they are afraid of something: He means, for example, that a brave person will be ‘afraid of letting down his friends, or of doing something shameful, or of treating other people wrongly etc. There is no shame in being afraid of that kind of thing.

  87. their lack of fear is shameful: Cowards aren't afraid of doing wrong, or of dishonour, or of letting down their friends etc. It is shameful for them not to be afraid of those things. Reckless and crazy people aren't afraid of taking pointless risks, which is also shameful.

  88. a result of ignorance: The idea is that if only they knew that cowardly actions were in fact more painful, they would act bravely. But what if a coward really and truly enjoys being a coward (even enjoys it overall) ? It is only in a very strained sense that he ‘doesn't know’ that cowardice is ‘in fact’ painful. His failure seems also to lie in a feature of his emotions – in what he enjoys – not simply in his intellectual grasp of what is good (and pleasurable). That seems to be strongly implied by the role of pleasure in the account, even if it is denied by Socrates’ conclusion. Aristotle makes this point about these claims in the Protagoras (see Nicomachean Ethics 1144b); and it seems that his overall view (that good people are those who have a grasp of what is good, and take a corresponding pleasure in the right things) is strongly influenced by this text in particular.

  MENO

  1. being good: I.e. areté. See Glossary.

  2. Aristippus: A Thessalian aristocrat who had political ties with Persia. Xenophon (Anabasis 1.1.10, 2.6.28) tells us that Meno led a group of mercenaries, originally lent to Aristippus by Cyrus (the younger brother of Artaxerxes, the Persian King), in Cyrus' failed attempt to overthrow his brother (in 401 BC). Meno was captured, and executed, by Artaxerxes (Anabasis 2.6.29). His talk with Socrates takes place just before he left to join Cyrus (he set out in 402 BC, and probably died in 400 BC).

  3. Gorgias: (c. 485 – 380 BC) A famous sophist and teacher of public speaking from Leontini in Sicily. See Plato, Gorgias.

  4. help out your friends and hurt your enemies: This is the common-sense Greek account of doing what's right (of dikaiosúne: see Republic 332 – 6). I.e. it is meant to describe ethical behaviour; it is the universal ‘tit for tat’ ethic: ‘treat people well, as long as they treat you well (and punish them when they exploit you).’

  5. some single form: Socrates wants to find what it is that all the different cases have in common. This is typical of the ‘Socratic method’ of ethical inquiry in Plato's earlier dialogues (e.g. Euthyphro 5c; Laches 191e; Charmides 159a; Republic I, 331c.) He is not strictly interested in what absolutely all the uses of the term areté have in common. He ignores non-human cases (e.g. ‘being a good horse’, ‘being a good dog’) and non-ethical human cases (e.g. ‘being a good carpenter’). Perhaps to avoid confusion, no such uses of the term appear anywhere in the Meno.

  6. a matter of… other people: I.e. a good person is one who has what it takes to exercise authority well. Not, in my view, a culturally specific idea. Cf. the quip attributed to Abraham Lincoln: ‘Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power.’ (Its ancient equivalent, Bias' saying that, ‘power will reveal the man’, is discussed by Aristotle; see Nicomachean Ethics, 1130a.) Of course, Meno's view also flatters the prejudices of the ruling class to which he belongs.

  7. still be a slave… ruling: He wouldn't be a ‘good slave’, but why shouldn't he be a good man (who happens to be a slave) ? When Diogenes (the Cynic) was being sold as a slave, he was asked if he had any special expertise. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘I know how to rule people' (Diogenes Laertius, 6.29).

  8. doing what's right… being good: I.e. dikaiosúne is areté. See Glossary. Meno is expressing a standard Greek view (see, e.g., Republic 335c; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1130a). He had also already implied it in his first definition (at 71e).

  9. The same as being good… Or one sort of being good?: This is neater with the traditional terminology: ‘Virtue, or a virtue?’ The term areté can also be used for a particular good quality. The question means: ‘Is respect for what's right all there is to being good, or just one good quality among several?’

  10. having knowledge: I.e. sophía; see Glossary.

  11. that colour always comes with: Literally, ‘that always follows along with colour’. I.e. whenever there's a colour, there must be a shape – i.e. a shaped object (?) or surface (?) of some kind.

  12. expert quibblers: Translates eristikoí. This refers to sophists and rhetoricians who engaged in devising ingenious arguments for deliberately absurd, or paradoxical, claims as a form of competition or entertainment. Plato's Euthydemus provides a vivid illustration of their method. They aim to force people to contradict themselves or to accept absurd conclusions. The general public – inexplicably – tended to confuse ‘quibblers’ with philosophers.

  13. a more talk-it-through kind of way: Literally translates the adverb dialektikóteron. Socrates is advocating discussion-based philosophy, the method he always applies to ethical questions. It implies reflecting upon, and building upon, what we already understand. It is therefore also connected in Plato's mind with the acquisition of a priori knowledge (knowledge of necessary truths that can be grasped by pure reflection); hence the analogy (in the Meno) between mathematics and ethics. I have translated a slightly altered text here (like most editors); see Appendix.

  14. Prodicus: (Active c. 440 – 410 BC); a sophist and (apparently) a friend of Socrates’; the point is that he likes to insist on tiny and pedantic distinctions between words. See Protagoras 337, 341.

  15. Empedocles: (C. 493 – 433 BC); a philosopher, scientist, poet, statesman and mystic from Akragas in
Sicily. His theory of ‘out-flowings’ (aporrhoaí) was connected with an explanation of the mechanisms of perception. Epicurus gives us a fairly detailed later version of it (in his Letter to Herodotus, 46 – 53).

  16. a theatrical answer: In Greek, tragiké – i.e. ‘tragic’ – but in the sense of ‘from the stage,’ and hence ‘bombastic’. Socrates means that the definition contains (in his view) pretentious jargon: ‘scientists and their big scary words’. Plato has philosophical objections to mechanistic and scientific explanations (see Phaedo 96 – 9); they are empirical rather than a priori, and they do not, in his view, explain why things are the way they are.

  17. the Mysteries: I.e. the Eleusinian Mysteries, a secret religious ceremony connected with the cult of Demeter and Korë (Persephone), held twice a year at Eleusis near Athens. Most Athenians would go to Eleusis during the festivals (a kind of religious pilgrimage) to take part. It offered some sort of spiritual enlightenment. Socrates is comparing that to the effect of doing philosophy. (See also Phaedo 69c).

  18. Rejoicing… being able: Line from an unknown song. The poet means that being good is a matter of having a decent character (rejoicing in what is ‘fair and fine’ – i.e. kalá: ethical, honourable) and being capable at such things – i.e. able to do them. (This is similar to the Aristotelian view of what it is to be good; see, e.g., Ethics 1099a, 1179b; Politics 1340a). Meno and Socrates (wrongly) take ‘fine' to mean simply ‘good’ – i.e. good for us – or at any rate assume that the one amounts to the other.

  19. loser: Translates áthlios; often translated ‘wretched’, ‘pitiful’.