Delphi Complete Works of Varro

by Marcus Terentius Varro

  75. Next I shall speak of a second class of words, in which degrees of comparison are made, like album ‘white,’ albius ‘whiter,’ albissumum ‘whitest,’ in which likewise it is clear that the Regularities are not preserved. For whereas salsum ‘salty’ and caldum ‘hot’ are alike, and from these are made the comparatives salsius and caldius, and the superlatives salsissimum and caldissimum, there should be made from bonum ‘good’ and malum ‘bad,’ since these are alike, the comparatives bonius and malius, the superlatives bonissimum and malissimum. But are not the actual forms in use bonum melius optimum, and malum peius pessimum?

  76. In some words no form is lacking; for example, dulcis ‘sweet,’ dulcior, dulcissimus. In others the first or positive degree is lacking, as peium from peius ‘worse,’ pessimum ‘worst’; in others the second is lacking, as caesior from caesius ‘blue-eyed,’ superlative caesissimus; in still others two are lacking which are derived from the same word, and these in such a way that in some instances the second and the third are lacking, as manius and manissime in connexion with the adverb mane ‘early in the morning’; that in others the first two are wanting, as optum and optius from optimum ‘best’; and that in others the first and the third are lacking, as melum and melissumum from melius ‘better.’

  77. Besides, if they were spoken in like manner, then since macer ‘lean’ and tener ‘tender’ are alike, and their superlatives macerrimus and tenerrimus, there would be no difference in their comparatives macrior and tenerior, nor would some such words have three syllables and others four. And if likeness ruled in such words, then just as we say candidissimus ‘most shining’ and fem, candidissima, pauperrumus ‘poorest’ and fem, pauperrima, so we should say candidus ‘shining’ and fem. Candida, pauper ‘poor’ and fem, paupera. And as we say docius ‘learned’ and fem, docta, doetissimus ‘most learned’ and fem. doctissima, so we should say frugalissumus ‘most thrifty ‘and fem, frugalissima, frugalus ‘thrifty’ and fem. frugala.

  78. And if words were in regular relation to each other, as with one word we call a man and a woman sapiens ‘wise’ and diligens ‘diligent,’ sapientior ‘wiser’ and diligentior ‘more diligent,’ so we should speak in the same way when we had come to the superlative — a thing which we now do quite otherwise: for we call a man sapientissimus and diligentissimus, a woman sapientissima and diligentissima. As for examples of words of this class, there are many still remaining; but those which have been mentioned are enough for the formation of a judgement why in the comparison of words we do not have to follow Regularities.

  79. Whereas there can be a set of three words to indicate size, like cista ‘casket,’ cistula, cistella, in some the middle terms do not exist, as in these: macer ‘lean,’ macricolus, macellus, and niger ‘black,’ nigricolus, nigellus. Likewise in certain words the terms for least size do not exist, such as avis ‘bird,’ avicula, avicella, and caput ‘head,’ capitulum, capitellum. Since in this class of words there are many forms lacking, we must say that in it theory must not be followed rather than usage.

  As to the four classes of common nouns, I have said enough; and it can easily be observed that here usage governs rather than Regularities.

  80. The matter of proper nouns now follows, which differ from common nouns in that they are definite and denote special things, like the names Paris and Helen, while common nouns are indefinite and indicate general ideas, like vir ‘man’ and mulier ‘woman.’ Among these there are some proper names from proper names, like Ilium from Ilus, and Ilia from Ilium; others are from a common noun, like Albius from album ‘white,’ Atrius from atrum ‘black.’ In neither set is Regularity preserved: for inasmuch as from Romulus comes the name Roma, there is not the form which should have come into existence by regular relation, namely, Romula and not Roma.

  81. Likewise, Perpenna ought to be the daughter of Perpennus, not the son of Perpenna. For Perpenna ought to be the name of a woman, and to mean a child of Perpennus; this is like masculine Arvernus, Percelnus, feminine Arverna and Percelna, so also Perpennus and Perpenna. But if Marcus Perpenna is a man’s name and Regularity is to be followed, then Lucius Aelia and Quintus Mucia will have to be men’s names. Likewise the names which they use derived from Rhodus ‘Rhodes,’ Andros, and Cyzicus, are Rhodius ‘Rhodian,’ Andrius ‘Andrian,’ and Cyzicenus ‘Cyzicene’; but if made in like manner the last ought to be Cyzicius, and each name ought to denote a citizen of the place: not as a certain rhetorician is called Athenaeus, although he is not an Athenian by birth.

  82. In this very matter, then, there is no Regularity, because some have names from the towns, others either have names from other sources or have names from towns from which they ought not to get them.

  83. Most freedmen set free by a free town get their names from the town; in this matter, those who were slaves of guilds and temples have not observed the rule in the same way; and the freedmen of the Romans ought to have got the name Romanus, like Faventinus from Faventia and Reatinus from Reate. In this way the freedmen whose parents were state slaves would be named Romanus, who had been set free before they began to take the names of the magistrates who set them free.

  84. From this practice came also such names as Lesas, Ufenas, Carrinas, Maecenas; since these are from the place of origin, like Urbinas, alongside Urbinius, there should from them have been formed, after the likeness of our names, the names Lesius, Ufenius. Carrinius, Maecenius....

  BOOK IX

  1.... They are a prey to extraordinary error, who prefer to teach what they do not know, rather than to learn that of which they are ignorant. In this position was the famous grammarian Crates, who placed his reliance on Chrysippus, a man of great acumen who left three books On Anomaly, and contended against Regularity and Aristarchus, but in such a way — as his writings show — that he does not seem to have understood thoroughly the intent of either. For Chrysippus, when he writes about the Inconsistency of speech, has as his object the showing that like things are denoted by unlike words and that unlike things are denoted by like words, as is true; and Aristarchus, when he writes about the Consistency of the same, bids us follow a certain likeness of words in their derivation, as far as usage permits.

  2. But those who give us advice in the matter of speaking, some saying to follow usage and others saying to follow theory, are not so much at variance, because usage and regularity are more closely connected with each other than those advisers think.

  3. For Regularity is sprung from a certain usage in speech, and from this usage likewise is sprung Anomaly. Therefore, since usage consists of unlike and like words and their derivative forms, neither Anomaly nor Regularity is to be cast aside, unless man is not of soul because he is of body and of soul.

  4. But that what I am about to say may be more easily grasped, first there must be a clear distinction of three sets of relations; for most things are said indiscriminately in two ways, and of them some ought to be referred to one principle and others to other principles. First, the distinction of the relations of nature and use; for these are two factors which are diverse in the goals toward which they direct themselves, because it is one thing to say that Regularities exist in words, and another thing to say that we ought to follow the Regularities. Second, the distinction of the relations of extension and limitation, whether the use of the Regularities should be said to be proper in all words, or only in a majority of them. Third, the distinction in the relations of the speaking persons, how the majority of persons ought to observe the Regularities.

  5. For some words and forms are the usage of the people as a whole, others belong to individual persons; and of these, the words of the orator and those of the poet are not the same, because their rights and limitations are not the same. Therefore the people as a whole ought in all words to use Regularity, and if it has a wrong practice, it ought to correct itself; whereas the orator ought not to use Regularity in all words, because he cannot do so without giving offence, and on the other hand the poet can with impunity leap across all
the bounds.

  6. For the people has power over itself, but the individuals are in its power; therefore as each one ought to correct his own usage if it is bad, so should the people correct its usage. I am not the master — so to speak — of the people’s usage, but it is of mine. As a helmsman ought to obey reason, and each one in the ship ought to obey the helmsman, so the people ought to obey reason, and we individuals ought to obey the people. Therefore, if you will take notice of each principle on which I shall base my argument in the matter of speaking, you will appreciate whether Regularity is said merely to exist, or it is said that we ought to follow it; and likewise you will appreciate that if the practice of speech ought to be reduced to Regularity, then this is meant for the people in a different sense from that in which it is meant for individuals, and that that which is taken from the entire body of speakers is not necessarily meant in the same form for him who is only an individual in the people.

  7. Now I shall speak first in support of Regularity as a whole, why, as it seems, it not only should not be censured, but even should in practice be followed in a certain measure; and secondly, concerning the several charges against it, I shall give the arguments by which the objections can be refuted, arranging them in such a way that I shall include, item by item, those which have been narrated in the previous book and also those which can be presented but were passed over by me in that place.

  8. First, as to their alleging that he who wishes to speak well ought to observe usage and not the theory of likenesses, because if he disregards the former he cannot do so without giving offence, and if he follows the latter it will not be without incurring rebuke: they are mistaken, because he who in speaking follows the usage which he ought to employ, is following it also without disregard of the theory.

  9. For we see that nouns and verbs which we inflect in similar ways are in general usage, and we compare others with this usage, and if there is any error we make the correction with the help of usage. For if those who have arranged the dining-room have among the three couches set one that is of a different size, or among couches that match have brought one too far forward, or not far enough, we join in making the correction according to common usage and to the analogies of other dining-rooms; in the same way, if in speech any one in his utterance should so inflect the words as to speak irregular forms, we ought to revise his mistake according to the model of other similar words.

  10. Now there are two kinds of wrong forms in inflection; one, that which has been erroneously accepted into general usage; the other, that which is not yet so accepted and may be called incorrect. The latter they grant ought not to be said, because it is not in usage, but as for the former they merely do not admit the propriety of saying it in this way; so that when they do this it is just as if they should grant that the boys ought to be corrected in case any of them in wilfulness begins to manage his feet awkwardly and to imitate the bowlegged, but should refuse to grant that one should be corrected if he in his habit of walking has already become bowlegged or knock-kneed.

  11. Does it not follow that they act foolishly who fasten splints on the knees of children, to straighten their crooked leg-bones? Since even that physician is not to be censured who makes a healthier man out of one who has been ill as a result of a long-continued bad habit, why should he be blamed who brings into better condition a way of speech which has been less effective on account of bad usage?

  12. The painters Apelles and Protogenes, and other famous artists are not to be blamed because they did not follow the ways of Micon, Diores, Arimmas, and even earlier craftsmen; then must Aristophanes be condemned because in some things he followed reality rather than usage?

  13. But if the wisest men have been praised because both in warfare and in other things they had dared do much that was against old usage, then they must be despised who say that usage ought to be considered as better than good theory.

  14. Or when a person has been accustomed to do something wrong in civil life, shall we not only not tolerate him but even visit him with punishment — and yet if a person has the habit of saying a word wrong, shall we not correct him, when this may be done without actual punishment?

  15. And these men who send their boys to school to learn how to write words which they don’t know — shall we not likewise instruct these men, bewhiskered adults as they are, who do not know how the words ought to be spoken, that they may know by what logical theory they may properly be pronounced?

  16. But as the nurse does not with suddenness tear her nurslings away from their wonted method of feeding, when she changes them from their first food to a better, so we ought to go gradually and judiciously in matters of speech, in changing older persons from less suitable words to those which accord with logical theory. Since among the illogical words which are in common usage there are some which can easily be eliminated, and others of such a sort that they seem firmly fixed, it is proper to correct at once in the direction of logic only those which are lightly attached and can be changed without giving offence; but those which are such that for the present you cannot make the correction so as not to speak them thus, these you ought, if possible, to refrain from using. For thus they will become unwonted and afterward, when already blurred to the memory, they can be more easily corrected.

  17. Such new inflectional forms as are introduced by logical theory but are rejected by the speech of the forum, these the good poets, especially the dramatists, ought to force upon the ears of the people and accustom them to them. For the poets have great power in this sphere: they are responsible for the fact that certain words are now spoken with improved inflections, and others with worse. The usage of speech is always shifting its position: this is why words of the better sort are wont to become worse, and worse words better; words spoken wrongly by some of the old-timers are on account of the poets’ influence now spoken correctly, and on the other hand some that were then spoken according to logical theory, are now spoken wrongly.

  18. Therefore those who summon us to obey usage, we shall follow, if it be to a correct usage. For in this also there is the principle of Regularity: if they invite us to that usage which is perverted and irregular, we shall not follow it unless it becomes necessary, any more than we follow bad examples in other things; for we do follow them too, though against our inclinations, when some force bears down upon us.

  And in fact Lysippus did not follow the defects of the artists who preceded him, but rather their artistry; just so should the people do in their speech, and even the individuals, so far as it may be done without offence to the people as a whole.

  19. There are some persons who not only hunt for lost articles, but even of their own initiative give any information which they may have: do the same persons, if something has been lost from speech, not only not exert themselves in hunting for it, but even fight against the informers, to keep it from being put back into its place?

  20. As for a word that is new and has been introduced according to logical theory, we ought not for this to shun giving it a hospitable welcome.

  For long-standing custom is not a hindrance to novelty in garments, buildings, and utensils, when it is a question of use; what victim of a habit does the love of that habit rather keep in rags, when the love of novelty is leading him toward new garments?

  Are not old laws often annulled and succeeded by new laws?

  21. Have not the forms of the old-fashioned pots and cups been swept into oblivion by the unfamiliar shapes of the vessels recently brought from Greece? Shall they then, on account of old-time habit, be unwilling to use these unsullied forms of words, which good reason has taught them? And do they claim that there is such difference between the two senses, that for their eyes that are always seeking some new shapes of their furniture, but they wish their ears to have no share in similar novelties?

  22. Out of how many slave-owners is there now one who has slaves bearing the ancient names? What woman calls her outfit of clothing and jewelry by the old words? But it is not so much at
the unlearned that anger must be felt, as at the advocates of this perversity.

  23. For if there were Regularity in no place at all, then it follows that there would be none in words either; not that when it is everywhere present (as it is in fact), there is none in words.

  For what part of the world is there which does not have countless Regularities? Sky or sea or land, what Regularities are there in these?

  24. As in the sky there is a division from the Equator to the Tropic of Cancer, and from there to the Arctic Circle, is not also its counterpart, extending from the Tropic of Capricorn in the other direction, likewise divided into equal sections? Is it not a fact that as far as the North Pole is removed from the Arctic Circle and this from the Tropic of Cancer, around which the sun travels when it comes to the summer solstice, so far the South Pole is from that Circle which the astronomers call the Antarctic, and this from the Tropic of Capricorn? Is it not true that in the fashion in which each constellation has risen in the sky this year, in just the same fashion it rises each and every year?

  25. The sun does not come in one way from the Tropic of Capricorn to the Equator, does it, and on the other hand, when it comes to the Tropic of Cancer, return in a different way to the Equator and thence to Capricorn? The moon, when it goes away from the sun to the north and returns from there into the same path which the sun pursues, goes on from there to the south and comes back again in just the same way, does it not? But why should I speak further of the stars, in the case of which there is unusual difficulty in finding any irregularity which exists or takes place in their motions?