by Rob Harper
The representatives, reporting on the defeats in September, claimed that the rebels had around 100,000 men, ‘half are well armed and the rest are composed of enraged fanatics all determined to die’.33
On 4 November 1793 Kléber made clear observations on rebel tactics, with advice on how to face them in battle.34
He observed that their plan of attack and defence was nearly always the same: ‘They constantly expand their line so as to envelop us and throw disorder in our troops.’
He advised that the republicans needed to adopt different tactics depending on whether the rebels were attacking, deployed waiting to be attacked, or when the opposing armies were marching to attack each other. In these scenarios he wrote that the Rebels used little artillery, even less baggage, and engaged in only one way of fighting:
‘When they march to attack us they usually deploy in three columns, irrespective of the terrain; but…their right hand column is nearly always more numerous and formed of their best troops. Their centre column is supported by some cannon fire while the others extend themselves en tirailleurs along the hedges, but the right will always make the main attack.’
When the republicans were marching towards them in a single column, which was often the case, the rebels normally positioned their central column on a height while their flanks occupied advanced positions along the hedges, in ditches, and out of sight. ‘The battle starts in the centre and while we are deploying on our flanks, the enemy line takes us in the flank aiming to cut us.’
When the two armies were approaching each other he indicated that this was more unpredictable, although they always tried to adopt one of the above tactics:
‘Everything depends on the immediacy of the orders of our generals, but always mindful that the enemy will be looking to extend beyond our lines, and will slide along the hedges and through the thickets.’
He also noted that they tended to march in open order, unlike their own closed ranks, which caused the republicans more casualties.
Kléber recognised that fighting the rebels demanded cool officers and disciplined troops.
‘Remember that the enemy’s centre is normally formed from their worst troops, that pikes…are nearly the only defence for their cannons, that all their frightened men are gathered there behind them.’
If marching in a single column, and anticipating that the enemy were near, he advised that the army’s advance guard should be preceded by three to four hundred tirailleurs. These tirailleurs would march on a wide front to spot the enemy, estimate the space they occupied, and report their positions to a dozen or so chasseurs-à-cheval who should be to their rear. On contact with the enemy these scouts were to take hold of a strong position, which could then be secured by the advance guard. The main body of the army would then occupy the advance guard’s previous position and the reserve that previously occupied by the army. ‘In marching thus from position to position you will be able to ensure rallying points and prevent routs.’
The advance guard should be at least 4-5,000 strong, with a 4pdr or 8pdr cannon and a howitzer, and the reserve should be composed of 50 brave cavalry and 4-600 good troops.
In attacking the enemy Kléber proposed two options:
‘When the position of the enemy is known… then the left of our advance-guard will take up a good position before the enemy and hold itself in defence, while our right will forcibly attack the enemy’s left, cut his line and turn him, to take him in the flank and rear. Meanwhile, the reserve…will vigorously charge the enemy’s central column on the road…through which they will then be able to fall on the flanks and rear of the enemy line. This movement, if well executed, will promptly silence the rebel artillery and rout them.’
He added that if the enemy right flank was seen sending men to support their centre, the republican left could press forwards (this manoeuvre could also be applied in reverse). However he stressed it was preferable to force their right flank back, as if it was driven in, the centre and left would soon break.
If engaged in mêlée he indicated that speed was essential, and if possible the rebels should be vigorously charged to cut their lines and cause them to rout.
‘To achieve this, as soon as the battle is engaged with our advance-guard it will be desirable to march…two or three battalions from the main body of the army to their support, who will promptly move to the extremes of our line…if possible to take the enemy in their flank.’
Kléber concluded by noting that if these measures appeared impractical, it would be important to form a square at the extreme of each flank to prevent the risk that a rout might spread among the troops.
The Vendéens did not always consider themselves duty-bound to their officers, rather it was the peasants themselves that chose to fight behind leaders they respected or trusted. The leaders were always expected to set an example and lead from the front. Consequently they were frequently wounded and many were killed.
Ultimately the Vendéens remained a disparate group of armies, without a clear political or strategic plan other than responding to threats to their territory.
Kléber’s tactics for fighting the rebels.
a) The Rebels’ preferred deployment in attack.
b) Kléber’s advice to defend with the left wing and attack in the centre and right.
Chapter 4
‘Running like a Trail of Gunpowder’:
The Rising Takes Hold
At the beginning of March disturbances broke out between Les Sables d’Olonne and La Roche-sur-Yon, between Cholet and Angers and in settlements near Vihiers on the Cholet to Doué-la-Fontaine road.1
On Sunday, 3 March, large numbers of youths gathered in Cholet determined to resist the lottery planned for the following day. True to form rioting broke out on 4 March but was suppressed by a battalion of national guards. However, the rioters gathered in greater strength and, although poorly armed, rushed and routed the national guards. Although suffering around a dozen casualties, they had won and marched triumphantly north to link up with others.2
This success was soon emulated across the Mauges with small numbers of republican troops rushing to quell one disturbance only to find others igniting elsewhere.
Uncoordinated pockets of trouble were spreading like wildfire throughout the region. The obvious targets were the main local towns where lists of those eligible for conscription were held and where the lottery was to be carried out. Patriots were reporting gangs actively operating across the countryside and Nantes was being inundated with urgent appeals for help but had to prioritise its own safety when its communications were cut off both north and south of the Loire.
Day by day and hour by hour rebel numbers grew. Most were armed with farmyard weapons but small numbers of muskets provided some firepower.
On 10 March the District of Clisson, between Nantes and Cholet, was in complete turmoil as rebels were gaining the upper hand. Around 1,000 men gathered in communities 12km south-east of Nantes and disarmed and expelled patriots.3 Recruitment was abandoned in communities near Machecoul as local rebels threatened to ‘smash in the heads’ of anyone attempting to carry out the lottery.4
Machecoul, defended by only 100 national guards and some gendarmes, vainly tried to resist an attack by 3,000 rebels. On its capture, Souchu, one of the rebel leaders, systematically executed around 542 republicans.5
Troubles now escalated significantly in Loire-Inférieure as many towns fell into rebel hands, including Legé and Loroux-Bottereau, and thousands assembled to oppose the authorities in Vallet, 20km east of Nantes.6
By 11 March a small garrison had reoccupied Cholet and reported the tocsin ringing across a wide area.7 On the following day the authorities in Tiffauges, 18km west of Cholet, indicated that the whole district was in open revolt, and Chemillé, a similar distance to its north-east, was urgently appealing for help.8
During the night of 12 to 13 March Challans was evacuated by the local republican authorities.
The Comte de la Boutetiè
re wrote, ‘If you cast your eyes on a map you would see that the insurrection was running like a trail of gunpowder along the parishes bordering the Departments of the Loire-Inférieure and the Vendée’.9
The Recruitment of Leaders
The authorities were losing control within hundreds of parishes and as the open defiance spread the rebels knew the Republic would retaliate. The countless uncoordinated risings led to the creation of numerous small bands of men and if they were going to resist the Republic they recognised the need to be led by experienced military men, or men with clear leadership qualities.
A number of former officers were therefore approached to take command. Many of course were gentry, one of the prerequisites of officer status before the Revolution. They included Couëtus and La Cathelinière, Guerry, Charette and Louise-Marie Roche-Saint-André in the Pays-de-Retz and coastal area; the Royrand brothers, Sapinaud-de-la-Verrie, Sapinaud-de-la-Rairie and Gabriel Baudry d’Asson in the Bocage; Bulkeley near La Roche-sur-Yon; Bonchamps, D’Élbée, La Bouëre, Nicolas and Jacques-Nicolas Fleuriot in the Mauges; and in the Loroux area, Lyrot and D’Esigny. Former NCOs included Joly, towards La Mothe-Achard; Stofflet and Perdriau in the Mauges; and the former musketeer, Laugrenière, in Poitou.
Some had no military experience but were men of high standing or natural leaders, several peasants among them. In the Mauges this included Cady, Cathelineau, Tonnelet and Forestier; in the Pays-de-Retz, Guérin and Lucas Championnière; in the Bocage, Auguste Béjarry, Amédée-Béjarry and Verteuil; towards the coast, L’Abbaye and Guerry-du-Cloudy; and in the south-west, Du Chouppes, Savin and St-Pal. More details on some of these individuals can be found in Appendix 1.
Some of the most influential leaders were of humble origin, completely at odds with republican propaganda. Others joined the Rising later in the spring and summer and their stories will be picked up in due course.
The Escalation of the Rising: Mid-late March
The widespread troubles reported in early March now took a much more serious turn as rebel numbers grew dramatically and they began to show a degree of coordination in their actions. The character of the Rising quickly developed into a series of strategically considered localised campaigns and is best described by each area in turn.
The Mauges
St-Florent-la-Vieil 12 March
Located on high ground on the south bank of the Loire, roughly equidistant between Nantes and Angers, St-Florent-la-Vieil is dominated by its large abbey, from where the town radiates along winding streets of close-packed houses into the surrounding countryside.
On 12 March, 150 national guards with two cannon, moved to St-Florent-la-Vieil to oversee the lottery. They assembled in the town square and covered its approach roads when news that thousands of young men wearing white cockades were marching on the town.10 Some of these young men were armed but most only carried farmyard implements and ahead of them marched a delegation calling for a suspension of the lottery and for the national guards to hand over their weapons.
An initial fracas led to four peasants being killed and many wounded. The furious mob charged, overpowered the national guards, and captured both cannon.
This brief engagement marked the official beginning of the Rising and is celebrated by a plaque in the town square. On the following day Bonchamps agreed to lead these rebels and headed for St-Florent to put some order in their ranks.
Jallais 13 March
Early on 13 March, in the small village of Pin-en-Mauges between Cholet and St-Florent, Jacques Cathelineau heard news of the preceding day’s events. A highly respected local figure he was approached by a group of men and immediately accepted their request to become their leader. The tocsin rang in surrounding parishes and they were soon marching on the republican post at Jallais. Perdriau, who had been present at St-Florent, joined him on route and between them they mustered 500 men.11
Jallais was occupied by some local patriots and thirty-four national guards, supported by a single cannon.12 They were on high alert and had deployed on the banks of the River Evre, 2km south of Jallais.13 Perdriau and Cathelineau marched from Jallais in two columns, and after an initial hour-long firefight some rebels were sent across fords to threaten the republican flanks, forcing them to withdraw. A third rebel column from Le May cut their line of retreat and forced them to disperse.14
After a brief rest to eat and retrieve abandoned weapons the rebels headed for Chemillé, 10km to the east. Their numbers soon reached 2,000 men.15
Chemillé 13 March
Chemillé was defended by 100 national guards, some gendarmes and one cannon, who knew that peasants were approaching on the Jallais road.16
Cathelineau and Perdriau dispersed their men along the banks of the Hirôme before crossing the river and marching uphill towards the enemy.17 Some rebels marched via the town of St-Pierre-de-Chemillé to attack the republican flank.
After a brief cannonade Perdriau and Cathelineau led a charge, captured the cannon and turned it on the Republicans. The peasants continued a fusillade that lasted around an hour, slowly thinning the enemy ranks, while 2-300 men marched into Chemillé from the south.18 Caught on two flanks nearly all the republicans surrendered.
Cholet 14 March
Their next target was Cholet which was now defended by around 1,000 Republicans.19 On the way they were joined by a column under Stofflet who was moving north from Maulévrier and had occupied Vezins on 13 March.
By 14 March the rebels were several thousand strong and supported by two cannon.20 Around mid-morning Cholet received a summons to surrender but rejected it and the troops marched out to face the rebels on the Pagannes Heath, 2km east of the town. As they deployed it began to pour with rain.21
On approaching Pagannes the armed rebels dispersed behind hedges and trees while most of the men and the cannon continued along the main road. They hesitated when they saw that the enemy were in position. Cathelineau soon rushed forwards followed by some of his men, but while republican fire failed to hit them a shot from the rebel guns mortally wounded the Republican commander, the Marquis de Beauvau, and the Vendéens surged forwards and around the republican flanks.22 Some dragoons were ordered to charge but turned and fled from the battlefield and the republican infantry were jostled back into the streets of the town where they in turn were routed.
The château held out for several hours only to surrender when combustible material, gathered and lit on Stofflet’s instruction, spread fire within its walls. The republicans lost 300 killed, 100 capture, and several cannon.23
Coron 16 March
The rebels established a strong garrison in Cholet and on 15 March headed for Vihiers in response to reports that a republican column was approaching from Doué-la-Fontaine. The ever increasing numbers of rebels camped that night in Vezins.
This new republican column, commanded by a Citizen Avril and Chef de Brigade Grignon, was about 2,000 strong and reached Vihiers on 14 March.24 On the morning of 16 March they were spotted east of Coron.
According to Deniau, the rebel gunner Six-Sous deployed cannon on the main road at the eastern edge of Coron loaded with scraps of metal, and Cathelineau, Stofflet and Perdriau spread their men out behind hedges to either side of the guns to await the enemy attack.25
As they advanced the Republicans were preceded by a seventeenth century bastard-culverin. They deployed in line 1km east of Coron and their cannon fired on the Vendéen guns. When Six-Sous responded, thirty-two national guards fell, throwing disorder in their ranks.26 The republicans were in the process of pulling back to reform when rebel tirailleurs leapt the hedges and charged their flanks and the subsequent republican rout only stopped at Doué-la-Fontaine.
Casualties were light but more weapons were captured, including the bastard-culverin which was renamed the Marie-Jeanne. This gun, capable of firing 10 pound shot, became an iconic weapon venerated by the rebels and often seen adorned with flowers. It was frequently used to signal the beginning of battle.
On the follo
wing morning the rebels entered Vihiers, then marched north-west to Chemillé, aiming for the 3,500 strong republican post at Chalonnes.27 On route columns under D’Élbée and Bonchamps swelled their numbers to around 20,000 men, now supported by several guns. On their approach the Chalonnes garrison fled north of the Loire.28
Clisson 11 March
While all this fighting had been underway in the north-east, to the west around eighty national guards in Clisson successfully repulsed three rebel columns, with a combined strength of 3-4,000 men, that approached in succession from the north-west, the north and the south-east.29 Patriots from Pallet, Clisson and Vallet however, retreated to Nantes on 15 March under the protection of national guards.30
The Bocage
12 to 14 March
Near St-Mesmin, around 30km south of Cholet, 2,000 armed patriots marched to confront a similar number of badly-armed rebels led by Baudry d’Asson. The rebels managed to engage in hand-to-hand combat with their farmyard weapons and the republicans fled in a south-westerly direction abandoning their weapons on route.31
Verteuil and the Béjarry brothers overpowered the republican post at L’Oie on 12 March and on the following day Baudry d’Asson routed the garrison at Pont-Charron, seizing this highly strategic river crossing a short distance south of Chantonnay.32