by Rob Harper
As they approached the Layon the Grand Army split into three columns. Stofflet led the left, aiming to capture and outflank the Les Rochettes position and cross the river north of Concourson; Bonchamps’ division (under Fleuriot) formed the right and aimed to defeat and outflank the Republican positions at Verchers; and Cathelineau was to attack the centre at Concourson.
The Battle of Doué-la-Fontaine.
Towards 10am the commander of the Les Rochettes Camp reported brigands appearing in several columns ‘on the right and by a plain that was between the Bois-de-Vallier and Les Rochettes’.17 He pulled back to high ground east of the Layon.
At that same time Verchers came under attack, and when Leygonier joined them to assess the situation he saw large numbers of enemy deployed on high ground west of the Layon, advancing to cross the river and spreading out to outflank his right.
Leygonier immediately ordered the army to fall back to positions closer to Doué: the right at Soulanger, the centre and cannon at the lime kilns of Minières, and the left around Dauces. His reserve would be placed in Doué.18
He planned to deploy his troops in succession. The artillery deployed first, followed by the Somme Battalion and then the two Orléans battalions posted in Soulanger.
Cathelineau had been awaiting developments on the flanks before launching a direct assault on the bridge at Concourson. With 200 infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a few guns he soon secured the crossing.19
The 3rd Paris, 14th Charente, 4th Orléans and 12th République were covering the retreat of the other units, and were withdrawing towards their new positions in square. They became disordered when they saw their right wing in Soulanger routing, having been outflanked by the rebels. These four battalions were subsequently overwhelmed. Leygonier said his right flank had mistaken these battalions for the enemy, and noted that troops that had not yet been engaged in the battle also routed.
The republican left had been successfully resisting Fleuriot and Duhoux, even pushing them backwards, but seeing their rear threatened by Cathelineau and La Rochejaquelein they retreated on Dauces abandoning cannon and caissons on the way.
The engagement spanned several hours and the republicans only rallied near Saumur thanks to the intervention of General Menou and some representatives.
Leygonier complained that his advanced posts were slow to warn him of the enemy’s approach, although he proudly claimed that he had saved the artillery, magazines and equipment (later admitting to the loss of two guns).20 His army suffered 4-800 casualties and a further 1,200 captured.21 It is suggested that 500 offered to serve in the royalist ranks.22 No details of Vendéen losses survive.
Leygonier despaired over the quality of his troops, complaining that some battalions had fewer than half the men armed (excepting the Paris battalions), and that the civilian drivers cut their traces and fled the battlefield.23 He reported that émigrés had seeped into his units and deserted to the enemy during the battle, highlighting desertions from the 8th Hussars and the Légion-de-la-Fraternité in particular. The day before the battle, reports were already circulating that deserters were fighting with the rebels in small engagements at Martigné and Aubigné.24 He countered accusations that he had deserted the army during the battle, indicating that he had been abandoned several times by the hussars and cuirassiers and could not get them to charge the enemy.25
Leygonier tendered his resignation and left the army. Arrested the following February, he survived the Terror and was released in January 1795. His troops now fell under Duhoux’s command, but as Duhoux was wounded Menou took charge.
Montreuil-Bellay 8 June
On 8 June the Grand Army assembled at Doué to consider their next move and after some hesitation they agreed to attack Saumur. Donnissan knew the area well and considered a direct assault along the Doué road too risky as it would expose their flank to republican troops operating in the Thouars area under Salomon. A move on Montreuil-Bellay, then a march north on Saumur, would outflank the republican position on the Bournan Heights near Saumur, allow troops to hold Montreuil-Bellay, and cover the army’s rear. This, therefore, was the agreed plan.
Montreuil-Bellay was entered unopposed and Lescure, La Rochejaquelein and Stofflet reached St Just and even crossed the Dive without encountering any republicans. Bonchamps’ division, and at least part of Cathelineau’s, remained in Montreuil-Bellay.
At 2pm on 8 June Salomon received orders to make for Saumur as quickly as possible and only two hours later he left Thouars heading for Montreuil-Bellay. He halted 3km to its south at La Charpentière, where the road narrowed and entered marshland as it led through Lenay to Montreuil-Bellay.
The walled town of Montreuil-Bellay is perched on high ground overlooking the River Thouet to its west. South of the town is a long east-west ridge which dropped to marshland and fields cut up by numerous water-filled ditches.
Salomon’s recently formed brigade was 3,600-4,000 strong.26 Around 7pm they were spotted by the Vendéens who had deployed among trees and behind hedges at the foot of the ridge south of Montreuil. The front of the republican column was hemmed in by the narrow road as they approached the rebel position, when they suddenly came under attack on their front and flanks.27 Salomon was able to deploy some troops but the marsh restricted his men and exposed them to gunfire. He managed to deploy artillery on the road, and while Rossignol held that position Salomon attempted to deploy his cavalry on the plain to their right. But bombardment from the Vendéen artillery, and the nature of the terrain, meant the cavalry had difficulty forming up or manoeuvring.
As the battle drifted into darkness the fighting became chaotic and it was only with the arrival of royalist reinforcements that their weight of numbers began to tell. In the dark these reinforcements initially exchanged fire with Fleuriot’s troops.28
Donnissan had deployed cannon loaded with grapeshot behind the Porte St-Jean.29 When the republicans reached this gate the doors were swung open and a withering fire tore into their ranks, following which the rebels charged and ‘tore them to pieces’.30
Running low on ammunition, and with their position being turned, Salomon ordered the retreat back to Thouars, covered by the 35th Division Gendarmerie.31 Rossignol reported that the civilian drivers left their wagons on the road, cut their traces and fled. The battle had lasted for three to four hours.
Salomon claimed he had faced 12-15,000 rebels, although in the dark it would have been impossible to know with any accuracy. The Vendéens probably began the battle with around 8,000 men, later reinforced by several contingents, although it is not entirely clear which leaders provided this support.32
Salomon’s column was back in Thouars at 4am on the following morning and subsequently retreated via Parthenay on Niort.33 He admitted to 200 killed and wounded, although the Vendéens claimed 800 republicans killed, 900 captured, two guns and plenty of supplies.34 Salomon reported his strength to be 3,200 men when billeted in towns north-east of Niort, suggesting overall losses of perhaps 800.35
There are no figures for Vendéen losses, although Deniau suggests they were less than those sustained by their adverseries.36 Bonchamp’s division was so exhausted that they took little active part in the forthcoming battle at Saumur.
The Battle of Montreuil-Bellay.
This third Vendéen victory in four days had succeeded in preventing Salomon uniting with the republicans in Saumur.
Saumur 9-10 June
Insubordination and disorder in republican ranks was such that Menou had difficulty extracting the Paris battalions from Saumur’s taverns, yet with the support of the representatives he was determined to hold the town. General of Brigade Berthier also received orders to assist the representatives in planning the defence of Saumur.37
Two redoubts had been prepared on the Bournan Heights, covering the Doué and Montreuil roads, and a third at Varrains east of the River Thouet. Rudimentary entrenchments were also constructed immediately south of Saumur along the Nantilly front.
; According to Dupont the republicans distributed their formidable artillery as follows: on the Bournan Heights two 12pdrs were placed on the Montreuil road and two 4pdrs on the Doué road; east of the River Thouet three guns were deployed at Nantilly; pairs of guns were deployed on the Loudan and Chaintres roads, at the Vigneau Mills and at Notre-Dame-des-Ardilliers; six guns were deployed behind the mills near the Château, to enfilade the Fontevrault road; and nine in the Château itself. Around twelve guns remained with their battalions.38
The republicans had scraped together at least 8,000 men to cover Saumur.39 Both Berthier and Coustard arrived the night before the battle and neither knew the terrain nor the troops they were to command. Santerre only arrived on the morning of battle itself.40
As the rebels approached the republicans were deployed as follows:
• General of Division Coustard St-Lô held the Bournan Heights with 2,200 infantry, 7-800 cavalry and 6 cannon.41
• General of Brigade Berthier covered the south-eastern approach to Saumur with four battalions and 80 cavalry (in total between 1,800 and 2,100 men). His infantry comprised the 2nd and 4th Orléans, 36th Division of Gendarmerie, totalling 1,200 men, and a battalion of Saumur Volunteers.42 He deployed some of his infantry in the Aunis Farm, his artillery on the heights to his rear and 250 Saumur Volunteers in the church of Notre-Dame-des-Ardilliers. Two Saumur companies were stationed in the Varrains Redoubt.43
The Battle of Saumur.
• General of Brigade Santerre was given command of two battalions of national guards and 400 gendarmes-à-pied and deployed in entrenchments in advance of the Nantilly Suburb, stretching from the Marais-du-Roi to the Vigneau Mills.44 These were supported by 250 cavalry (possibly some of the light-cuirassiers of the Légion de la Fraternité).45
• General of Division Menou held a reserve of troops in Saumur under his immediate orders. Its composition is not detailed but it probably numbered towards 2,000 and included both infantry and cavalry.46
Vendéen tradition suggests that on 8 June La Rochejaquelein reconnoitred Saumur in disguise and reported back that an attack was worthwhile due to the undisciplined state of many republicans. Whether this happened or not the bulk of their army did proceed to cross the Dive and gathered on the Saumoussay Heights, while 700 men were left to cover the St-Just Bridge in case of retreat.47
Fleuriot’s division formed a reserve guarding the prisoners and baggage, although some of his men may have received orders to distract Coustard by moving north along the Doué to Saumur road to keep him from moving off the Bournan Heights. Columns were formed under Cathelineau and La Rochejaquelein (right), Stofflet and Des Essarts (centre) and Lescure and Duhoux d’Hauterive (left) and between them they mustered 20-25,000 foot, 1,200 horse and 24 guns.
Towards 3pm Menou was advised that the enemy were near and his deployment indicates that he expected the main thrust to be on the Bournan Heights.
The column on the Vendéen left had both cavalry and artillery support, and received orders to cross the River Thouet at the Chacé Ford, advance between the town of Bagneux and the Bournan Redoubts, seize Pont Fouchard and cut Coustard off from Saumur. The centre would march directly towards the Nantilly Suburb and the right would make for the Fontevrault road and attack along the south bank of the Loire.
Soon after 3pm Lescure was preparing to charge Pont Fouchard when he was struck by a bullet in the left arm just below the shoulder, causing his men to become disordered. Lescure improvised a sling, rallied them, and with cavalry support went on to seize two cannon blocking the bridge.48
Coustard ordered two battalions to retake the bridge but the 5th Paris refused to move, even threatening the general’s life.49
Dommaigné’s location in the battle differs between accounts, some placing him on the east side of the Thouet and others on the west.50 According to Savary and Dupont, he was moving forwards on the Varrains road when he was charged by some of the cuirassiers under Colonel Chaillou. Dressed in the red uniform of an officer of the Maison du Roi, Dommaigné presented a conspicuous target and was killed when his cavalry were thrown back after a fierce mêlée, reputedly shot by Chaillou in person. These cuirassiers were then forced to retreat as a large body of Vendéen tirailleurs moved on their flank.
Deniau suggests Dommaigné actually charged some cuirassiers as he came to the aid of Lescure’s troops west of the Thouet. Wherever it took place, both accounts indicate that Dommaigné was defeated and killed. Deniau adds that Marigny, with infantry and artillery support, outflanked the cuirassiers in the ongoing fight west of the Thouet. Lescure’s men now reoccupied ground they had lost, but not the bridge.
With his infantry refusing to move unless cavalry led the attack, Coustard ordered Weissen, with some of the light-cuirassiers, to seize an enemy battery near the bridge. Weissen was successful and the Vendéen infantry found their weapons had little effect against the unusual armour worn by these cuirassiers (See Chapter 2). However, this cavalry was not supported by their infantry, even though the commander of the Chasseurs of the Légion-de-la-Fraternité beat the charge for a quarter of an hour.51 The cavalry therefore fell into a trap: as they charged the enemy infantry the Vendéens opened their ranks and leapt onto the flanks of the horses to unsaddle, and then kill, the cuirassiers. Weissen extracted himself with a handful of men and retreated to the Bournan Heights covered in wounds.52
While this confused battle was underway the rest of the Vendéen army continued its march on Saumur.
Moving cross-country in a north-easterly direction Cathelineau was heading towards Beaulieu, and Stofflet’s column moved along the east bank of the Thouet towards the Nantilly entrenchments.53 La Rochejaquelein had been split from Cathelineau’s column and ordered to move more towards the enemy centre. Judging by the timings he may have been some way to the rear struggling along narrow country roads and through vineyards.
These moves support Madame de la Rochejaquelein’s recollection that the Vendéen attacks were initially badly coordinated and the columns were some distance apart.54
Around 4pm Cathelineau’s men had gathered on the heights around Beaulieu and the Fontevrault road. Berthier let Cathelineau’s men approach within grapeshot range before opening fire from the guns deployed behind the mills.55 This stopped the Vendéens in their tracks, and as Berthier led his Orléans battalions in a charge the Vendéens retreated in disorder. Cathelineau’s men went to ground behind stone walls and in vineyards, ignoring appeals from their leaders to return to the fight.56
Berthier, however, was prevented from exploiting his success as his cavalry refused to charge. He was forced to halt his infantry and bring up a third battalion to act in support, but the battle on this flank had reached stalemate and little would change over the next two hours.
Stofflet probably also came into action around 4pm and found his march hampered by republican outposts taking advantage of abattis and stone walls, and by the openness of the marshy valley which unnerved his men. At the head of his cavalry he jostled them forwards but as they came under bombardment from cannon in the château and on the nearby hills casualties started to build and some of his men broke and fled. Stofflet was forced to draw his sword, block their way, and threaten to smash in the skulls of the first Vendéens who did not return to the fight.57
Cathelineau sent urgent orders for La Rochejaquelein to attack the Varrains Redoubt and towards 6pm he appeared before that position.58 The two Saumur companies stubbornly resisted as La Rochejaquelein attacked the east side. Eventually he took a gamble: he threw his white plumed hat into the redoubt and challenged his men to retrieve it. His men now surged over the defences behind him and soon captured the redoubt. Madame de la Rochejaquelein added that her father and a reinforcement of 600 men also attacked the camp. With this small detachment La Ville-Baugé crossed the surrounding ditch, broke down a wall that defended the entrance, and caused the defenders to rout.59 La Rochejaquelein now marched on Nantilly and the Vigneau Mills.
The seq
uence of events is confused but it is clear that the rebels were employing flexible tactics as their large columns probed republican defences looking for weak points.
Menou sent reinforcements to support Santerre and made great efforts to repulse the rebels, but his best troops had been neutralised on the Bournan Heights, and the main rebel assault marched in overwhelming numbers against the rest of his army who could not withstand the pressure and were being forced back on the town.60 The Vendéens were also using the cover of the vineyards, walls and hedges to infiltrate his positions.
Cathelineau was now receiving support from La Rochejaquelein’s column as it gradually came into position to his west, and Berthier was forced back as the Vendéens used minor roads to bypass republican positions around the Vigneau and Château Mills. Santerre was being outflanked on his left by La Rochejaquelein and on his right by La Ville-Baugé, who had slid alongside the east bank of the Thouet, and large numbers of rebels were soon descending into Saumur’s suburbs.
On the Fontevrault road the republican post at Notre-Dame-des-Ardilliers put up little resistance and fled, although Berthier stalled Cathelineau’s advance with some support from the reserve.
Menou sent the 12th République to support Santerre, but this battalion panicked when they saw the Vendéens and soon fled, causing others to follow their example.61
Berthier’s Orléans battalions deployed under the château walls and he tried to bring some of the reserve artillery on the quay into action.62 The 36th Division Gendarmerie continued to support his troops while Menou and Berthier assembled some cavalry to launch an assault. The fight was so desperate that both Bourbotte and Choudieu found themselves in the front ranks urging the men on. Probably around this time Marceau, an officer in the Légion-de-la-Fraternité, personally rescued Bourbotte as his horse was killed beneath him and Vendéens flooded around.63