by Rob Harper
Running low on munitions Menou was let down by his cavalry who instead of charging turned and fled into Saumur, dragging the generals along with them and crying treason as they fled.64 Berthier’s infantry, seeing their cavalry flee, were forced to withdraw and did so in good order along the quay and across the Loire.65 Many republican cannon, however, were abandoned as the gunners were caught up in the general rout. It was now about 8pm.
At Bournan, Coustard had remained undisturbed. Hearing the gunfire fall silent in Saumur he feared that the royalists had won the battle. While he had been marooned within the Bournan Redoubts, Lescure had launched a fresh assault on Pont Fouchard. A republican officer, using two upturned caissons, blocked his path and managed to withdraw four cannon beyond the bridge.66 Nevertheless, Lescure and Duhoux were soon able to lead some of their men into Saumur to lend assistance to the other columns.
In the confused fighting La Rochejaquelein and La Ville-Baugé, both on horseback, had closely followed the retreating republicans and raced on ahead of their troops. They eventually found themselves near the bridge over the Loire where La Rochejaquelein was being handed loaded fusils by La Ville-Baugé, and fired point-blank at fleeing republicans for around a quarter of an hour.67 Running significant risks these leaders were fortunate to escape with their lives when Vendéen troops at last made an appearance. Cathelineau’s column appeared on the quay around this time and at around 9pm Stofflet and Lescure also arrived.
La Rochejaquelein pursued republicans on the Bourgueil road with 150 cavalry, reputedly rounding up thousands of prisoners. As he pulled back on Saumur he removed some timbers from the bridge and deployed two guns.
Bournan was still in republican hands but now came under attack by Fleuriot and Stofflet’s divisions, supported by Marigny. La Rochejaquelein raced to join them only to have a horse killed under him and they all conceded that it was now too dark to continue the battle.
The Republicans fled in several directions and it would take weeks to reorganise them. Menou had been wounded and Representatives Dandenac, Delaunay, Bourbotte, Choudieu, Thibaudeau and La Chevardière, as well as Commissaires Momoro, Saint-Félix, Besson and Minier were all caught up in the rout.68
An hour before the Vendéens entered Saumur around 400 republican troops under Lieutenant Colonel Joly were rushed into the château. This futile attempt to retain a foothold in the town simply resulted in their surrender on the following day.
Coustard, however, extricated most of his troops from the Bournan Heights and retreated overnight along the south bank of the Loire to Les Ponts-de-Cé.69 Berthier also managed to salvage some guns.
In a letter dated 13 June, Commissaire Minier was forthright in blaming the cavalry for the defeat. He said the cavalry of the Légion-de-la-Fraternité were largely composed of Austrian and German deserters and that the 8th Hussars and 19th Dragoons were both newly formed and badly armed.70
During the battle Berthier had two horses killed beneath him and both he and Menou were wounded.
The Vendéens claimed an exaggerated figure of 8,000 prisoners, 1,500-1,900 enemy killed and forty-six cannon captured.71 Only a few prisoners were retained, the rest, once their hair was shaved, were sent away on the Tours road.72 The Vendéens admitted to light losses.73
For his distinguished action Marceau was promoted to Adjudant General Chef-de-Battalion on 15 June and soon took command of the 11th Hussars, formed from the cavalry of the Légion-de-la-Fraternité.74 Troops from this légion did desert to the enemy, as had some of the 10th Dragoons and national guards.75
Reports flooding in to Paris indicated that defeated troops were turning up in towns across a wide area. On 13 June representatives in Le Mans noted the pitiful state of the army, indicating that men in the Orléans battalions no longer wanted to fight the rebels but wanted to return to the frontiers, and that cavalry were selling their horses and men their equipment, leaving troops devoid of effects.76
On 13 June Boudon, Reuelle and Tallien reported that the debris of the army was gathering at Tours and being put through military drill.77
Vendéen Plans after Saumur
The defeat at Saumur provided the rebels with a significant boost to their morale as well as abundant supplies.
D’Élbée arrived in Saumur on 12 June and Cathelineau was elected the first commander-in-chief of the Grand Army: an army commanded by a peasant elected by nobles. His character, bravery and the confidence the soldiers had in him made him the obvious choice. To quote Deniau, ‘The Republic spoke of equality but did not provide it; the Vendée did not speak of it, but put it into practice.’78
The 18-year-old Forestier, also of humble birth, was the preferred choice to replace Dommaigné at the head of the cavalry, but the arrival of the high ranking noble, the Prince de Talmont, meant the rebel leaders felt obliged to offer him the post instead. Forestier was appointed his second-in-command.
There were now significant opportunities for the rebel army to exploit this victory, but it led to serious disagreement over where to march next. Stofflet and La Rochejaquelein favoured a march on Tours then Paris, gathering support on route and striking at the heart of the regime. There were few troops in a fit state to intervene and even Napoleon would later say:
‘Nothing would have stopped the triumphant march of the royalists. The white flag would have been flying on the towers of Notre-Dame before it would have been possible for the armies on the Rhine to race to the aid of their government’.79
Lescure, recognising the reluctance of the troops to march far from their territory, suggested they march on Niort and then seize La Rochelle and Les Sables to gain access to the sea. Cathelineau suggested they march on Nantes to provide them with a major port and enable Britanny, Maine and Normandy to rise up and join them.80
One account suggests that the hot-headed Stofflet became so agitated that he drew his sword on Bonchamps and challenged him to a duel, which Bonchamps politely declined saying only God and the King had the right to take his life.81 Bonchamps, still badly wounded, had arrived in Saumur on 13 June so this may be fictional, but the story does reflect divisions that were to simmer over the months ahead.
It was eventually agreed that Nantes would be the next target and that they would march on 16 June. The Vendéens knew there were significant political divisions within Nantes and with royalist sympathisers in this unfortified city they may have anticipated an easy victory.
La Rochejaquelein was left in Saumur with a garrison of 2,500-3,000 well armed men.82
Recruits had been rallying to the Grand Army in Saumur and some able men joined the Vendéens at this time, including D’Autichamp, who became second-in-command in Bonchamps’ division; Piron, who had been fighting north of Nantes; and Beauvais who would serve in the artillery and left a detailed account of the war. Small bodies of rebels also made raids as far as Chinon, La Flèche, Loudon and Bourgueil, encountering little opposition.
Many troops headed home for a few days while plans were in preparation for an attack on Angers and the march on Nantes. Lescure’s wound, however, was more serious than initially thought and he left the army to recuperate.
The Republicans in chaos
On news of the disaster at Saumur Biron raced from La Rochelle to Niort, arriving on 13 June. However he remained on the southern front and was adamant that an invasion by sea posed the greatest threat. The Bordeaux battalions were also demanding to return home and an anxious Biron put this down to the known Federalist bias of the Gironde.
Biron was immediately working on new plans but the state of the troops, their low morale, and lack of transport hampered any immediate action.83 Reinforcements arriving from the Army of the North turned up poorly dressed, recruits were arriving untrained and unarmed, and the men raised through the lottery were demanding to go home.
The situation along the southern front was certainly precarious and Boulard did not have enough men to contemplate an offensive along the coast, with posts from Luçon as far as St-Gille
s continually under threat. Furthermore Machecoul was isolated and Nantes unable to take any risks.
On 13 June the representatives and generals in Tours authorised the evacuation of the administration and troops in Angers, while Berthier was tasked with reorganising the debris of the Saumur Army in Tours.
The next few weeks were fraught with internal strife as the disaster at Saumur caused underlying tensions between the political factions amongst the representatives and within the army to come to the fore.
Berthier reported an urgent need for a new and properly organised staff. On 14 June Duhoux was named second-in-command of the Army of the La Rochelle Coast, Chabot, Joly and Descloseaux were all provisionally named generals of brigade, and Burac and Beffroy were confirmed in that rank.
Fearing an advance in their direction the Central Commission in Tours ordered Biron to march on Saumur, but he refused. He was adamant that the army did not have the resources they needed to advance and could not risk leaving La Rochelle and Rochefort exposed by marching north.84
On 18 June Biron wrote to the Ministry of War and the CPS indicating that he had visited all the posts from Marans to north of Les Sables and found them in a better state than he had feared. He reported that the Bordeaux battalions would not stay beyond 25 June and feared their example would be emulated by others.85 He also reported that the requisitioned national guards were leaving in large numbers in spite of the efforts of the representatives. His aim now, he said, was to re-establish communications between La Rochelle and Nantes in coordination with Canclaux.
While Biron gave one account of the state of the army, and on 23 June asked to be replaced, the Montagnard Representative Choudieu, then in Tours, gave a contradictory account. He falsely claimed that Biron had 25,000 men (of which he said 16,000 were good troops), Boulard had 12,000 disciplined men, and they had organised 25,000 men in Tours.86
The representatives in Niort shared Biron’s concerns and highlighted the trouble being caused by Ronsin’s agent, Musquinet Saint-Felix. The ‘Society of the Friends of Liberty’ of Les Sables indicated that two agents had led the respected General Boulard to hand in his resignation. On 21 June Goupilleau of Fontenay, one of the representatives in Niort, was tasked with reporting the truth to the National Convention.
To prove beyond doubt that Biron had lost control of the army, the representatives, generals, assistants to the Minister of War, and commissaires of the Executive Council in Tours, issued the following orders on 25 June:
1. All generals who think they are sufficiently armed and organised should immediately march to the aid of Nantes, threatened by the rebels.
2. The generals ordered to march on the right bank of the Loire are to march in a single mass with a small body of light cavalry acting as flankers.
3. Biron is ordered to cover Tours and make sure this plan succeeds.
Representatives in Tours sent a message to Biron, ‘in the name of the CPS’, making it clear that it was his responsibility to act as instructed and come to the aid of Nantes.87
The generals in Tours separately contacted Biron indicating that in his absence, and due to the threat to Nantes, they had no choice but to act as instructed. Biron accepted their actions and indicated he was sending 3,000 men to cover Tours and would retain 12,000 in Niort. He still felt it imperative to protect the southern front and noted that the departure of the Bordeaux and Midi troops had forced him to abandon his plan to re-establish communications between La Rochelle and Nantes.88
Biron now directly challenged the authority of the Central Commission, stating that he would only march on Saumur if given a direct order by the Ministry. Whatever now occurred, he said, was the responsibility of the commissaires and the Central Commission, not that of the generals.89
Hearing that Saumur had been evacuated by the rebels, part of the republican advance guard set out in that direction on 27 June, followed by the rest of the army three days later.
The CPS was astonished by the tone of Biron’s letters and in their reply of 28 June they refused his request to resign and ordered him to take control of the plans to save Nantes. Ronsin and his assistants had been recalled to Paris and the Minister of War promised Biron the officers and staff he needed. The CPS also advised Biron that the Convention had now fixed the number of representatives with each army and that their role was to inspire confidence, establish order, and ensure the troops obeyed the generals. However, while Ronsin lost his title as Assistant to the Minister of War, he immediately became an officer under Rossignol’s orders.
Rossignol had recently arrived in St-Maixent and was accused of trying to turn the Légion-du-Nord against its leader, Westermann, reputedly saying that if they were true republicans they would not obey him. A municipal officer separately reported that when Rossignol marched through St-Maixent he instructed his gendarmes to forcibly demand wine from a number of houses and had even chased citizens from their properties so he could billet his troops.
Westermann accused Rossignol of undermining Biron when he was in Niort by telling the troops not to obey him, that he was a ci-devant, and that it was imperative to stop the plans of someone so dangerous. Westermann, therefore, had Rossignol arrested and transferred to Niort to be judged ‘with all the rigors of the law’.90 However, Rossignol’s arrest played into the hands of the Hébértists and would accelerate Biron’s fall.
The Coastal Vendée June
Boulard had pulled back from La Mothe-Achard to Olonne at the end of May and only maintained a few posts before Les Sables, while Baudry covered L’Aiguillon, Vairé, St-Gilles and the La Chaize Bridge. Charette, therefore, seized the opportunity to move on the lightly-garrisoned town of Machecoul.
Machecoul 10 June
The rebel column set out early on 10 June and to ensure speed Charette took no artillery. Vrignault, La Cathelinière, Joly, Savin, Du Chaffault, Couëtus and Pajot all joined him and they gathered on the Touvois road with 12-13,000 foot and 200 horse.91
The Battle of Machecoul.
Bittard-des-Portes, the best source on this battle, indicates that Machecoul was garrisoned by Chef de Brigade Prat with four battalions, five companies, two platoons of cavalry, two 8pdrs, and a mix of thirteen 4pdrs and 6pdrs. In all he commanded 1,300 men, deployed in defensive positions and entrenchments around the town. One battalion occupied the west and northwest; six guns deployed at the junction of the Fresnay and Nantes roads; two cannon and three volunteer companies were deployed at the post of Deux-Moulins; one battalion guarded the château; two companies were at the hospital and the calvary; and two small battalions, seven guns and the cavalry deployed immediately south of the town north of the Falleron Stream.
La Cathelinière commanded Charette’s advance guard and, skirting around the southern and western defences, he deployed on the Nantes road at 2.30pm. Some republican cavalry made a feint against his column and unmasked two guns but were forced back by rebel gunfire. La Cathelinière’s men now advanced under cover of some quarries and forced the republicans to evacuate the post of Deux-Moulins. Meanwhile Savin twice failed in attacks on the château.
Charette deployed most of his force along the southern approach to Machecoul and attracted fire from infantry and artillery at Les Moulin-des-Chaume. In spite of casualties his men forced two battalions to fall back to a small hill topped by windmills.
Vrignault’s men assaulted this position, but under intense fire Vrignault fell dead and a counter-attack by the republicans caused his men to rout. Charette and Joly now gathered all the cavalry and with sabres drawn moved on the right of this hill to fall on the left flank of the enemy artillery, just as the men of Loroux charged these same cannon. The gunners were cut down and the battery was turned on its supporting infantry who were now forced back into Machecoul by weight of numbers. The battle soon degenerated into desperate house to house fighting.
Savin attacked the château once more, crossing the moat, and climbed its walls to cut down the defenders, some escaping to re-join their c
omrades in the town.
After four hours of battle, and with ammunition running low, the republicans knew they must cut their way out if they were to escape. Prat hoped to move north on the Nantes road but found this barred by La Cathelinière’s men, so headed for the Saint-Même road, doing so through difficult terrain and pursued by cavalry.
At 11pm he reached Port-Saint-Père having lost almost half his force and all his cannon. Next day the Port-Saint-Père garrison and Prat’s men withdrew to Nantes. The Vendéens claimed to have killed or captured 750 men and taken 10 guns, 9 caissons, and 20,000 cartridges.92
The Vendéens soon retook most of the Pays-de-Retz and Charette’s influence in the region greatly increased. He now set out plans for its defence with La Cathelinière at Port-Saint-Père, Couëtus at St-Philbert and Eriau at Machecoul. Barteau was tasked with holding Sorinières, towards Nantes, and to coordinate action with Lyrot.93
On 20 June Lyrot fought a small battle at La Louée where he defeated part of the Légion-Nantaise, pursuing them for three hours back to Nantes.94 Cambronne, of Waterloo fame, distinguished himself in this action, the first by this newly formed légion.
The Nantes Campaign
The Grand Army congratulated Charette on the victory at Machecoul and asked if he would cooperate in the planned assault on Nantes. Charette replied positively and Donnissan was sent to discuss the plans and offer him powder and cannon.
While the Grand Army marched on Nantes, Royrand was to make a diversionary attack on Luçon, La Rochejaquelein was meant to remain in Saumur, and Lescure was in Châtillon, these latter two keeping watch on Republicans to the east.
The March on Angers
Angers had been held by 4,000 men under General Barbazan.95 When Saumur fell, Ladouce and Talot were in St-Lambert with 2,500 men covering the approaches to Angers, and Gauvilliers was holding the line of the Loire between Nantes and Angers with 1,500 men.96 However, all troops around Angers had now been withdrawn to Tours. In the chaos that went along with this withdrawal those in Angers abandoned their heavy artillery, munitions and provisions, but did manage to drag away twenty-two cannon.97 Gauvilliers’ men were ordered to pull back to Lion d’Angers.98 On 13 June, therefore, Angers had been abandoned.