by Rob Harper
Without doubt the greatest loss to the Vendéens was Cathelineau, who succumbed to gangrene on 14 July.
Westermann’s Advance on Parthenay
In mid-June, aware that Westermann and the Légion-du-Nord were in Vienne, Biron secured permission to incorporate them into his army and deployed them in St-Maixent. When Biron heard that the rebels were planning to move on Parthenay and the flour depots near St-Maixent he authorised Westermann to march against them with part of his légion and a detachment from the Légion-des-Ardennes.124
It will be recalled that after Saumur Lescure had returned to his own territory, but in spite of his poor state of health he was still actively looking for ways to fight the republicans and expand the Rising. The region around Parthenay was alarmed by the number of republican troops gathering to their east and sent messages to him appealing for help. Knowing this area was keen to rise in favour of the royalists Lescure was eager to oblige and ordered an assembly at Amailloux from where he marched to Parthenay.
Parthenay 25 June
On reaching Parthenay Lescure ordered the cavalry to patrol during the night and deployed four guns behind the town’s southern entrance. He also blocked two gates with stone, leaving only the St-Maixent and Thouars Gates accessible. Unfortunately the Vendéens were notoriously lax at patrolling.
Westermann set out from St-Maixent on 24 June and was approaching Parthenay by 2am the following morning. He had been warned that the enemy numbered 5-6,000 infantry and 600 cavalry and had deployed cannon at the town’s entrance.125
The royalists had little warning when, at 3am, Westermann attacked. Lescure woke to the sound of cannon fire and Le Ville-Baugé galloped to the St-Maixent Gate to find the entrance open, the guns abandoned, and republicans entering the town.
Westermann’s account indicated that he marched straight for the St-Maixent Gate, deployed and fired an 8pdr, and ordered his men to assault that entrance. He wrote that the first to enter the gate was his infantry lieutenant colonel who, with sabre drawn, cut down an ‘ecclesiastic’ who was holding a lit wick and was about to fire a cannon. Le Ville-Baugé was wounded as he made his escape.
With republicans pouring into the streets the Vendéens put up little resistance and fled by the Thouars Gate, some being cut down by Westermann’s cavalry who had circled around the town to cut off their line of retreat. Westermann claimed he killed 7-800 men and captured 100.126 The Vendéens admitted to seventy killed, wounded or captured and the loss of four guns.
Westermann wrote his report after the battle with the sound of the tocsin ringing all around and was warned that 10,000 rebels had gathered to march against him later in the day. He boasted that if they did he had confidence his men would hold firm.127 Nevertheless his small army soon dropped back to St-Maixent.
The Army of the Centre and the Battle of Luçon 28 June
While elements of the Army of the Centre had participated in the actions of the Grand Army, their primary concern had been to protect their territory and its exposed southern front. With major republican bases at Niort and La Rochelle, the Bocage was under constant threat, especially from republican posts south of the Lay and above all from Luçon. The Vendéens saw an opportunity to seize this position, a key link between Les Sables d’Olonne and Niort and south to La Rochelle. General Sandoz held Luçon with a garrison of less than 2,000 men.
By 27 June an estimated 7,000 men, including 100 cavalry and three small cannon, had gathered in Chantonnay under Royrand, Sapinaud, Verteuil, Béjarry, Ussault, Baudry d’Asson and Des Hargues.128 Only a small number carried fusils and on the morning of 28 June two Vendéen columns were on the march.
The northern approach to Luçon was largely open agricultural land with a few scattered woods and farms. Although to the north-east of the town was the small Ste-Gemme Forest, overall the Vendéens would have to brave open terrain.
Towards 4pm a lookout in Luçon Cathedral reported large numbers of rebels crossing the Mainclaye Bridge and Sandoz deployed the garrison north of the town. The 5th Charente-Inférieure covered the left flank, the Battalion de l’Union the centre, and the 1st Parthenay the right, each supported by their battalion guns. His cavalry was held in reserve and comprised 160 men, split equally between gendarmes and the 11th Hussars.129 These sparse forces were spread thinly from the Les Sables road to the approach from Ste-Gemme.
Once across the Mainclaye Bridge Royrand formed three columns and advanced rapidly. The left, under his personal command, moved on the Ste-Gemme Forest; the centre, under Verteuil, marched on the Mareuil road; and the right, under Sapinaud, headed for the Les Sables road. The battle began between 5 and 6pm when the Vendéens were within a few hundred metres of the town.
Sandoz believed he was being turned on both flanks and issued orders for the army to fall back to Luçon, but only his left flank received the order and duly complied. Unaware that this flank had withdrawn, the centre and right fought on and successfully held the Vendéens in check. Meanwhile the rebel right-wing reached the Les Sables road and was approaching the undefended west side of Luçon when it suddenly came to a halt. Their hesitation was provoked by the appearance of enemy troops approaching from the west, comprising 2-300 men detached from the Vengeur Battalion who had been at Port-la-Claye and were now marching to the sound of the guns.
First Battle of Luçon.
In the ranks of this rebel column were around 100 deserters from the Regiment de Provence who took the opportunity to desert back to the Republic, causing the column to rout to cries of betrayal. This state of panic spread to the rest of the army which soon broke off the action and retreated in disorder. The republican cavalry was ordered to charge and a furious Sapinaud valiantly, but fruitlessly, endeavoured to cover the rout. Sandoz claimed to have caused 2-300 rebel casualties and captured two cannon.
The Les Sables Front
Throughout June the Republic had been building their forces in Les Sables d’Olonne, but the political troubles in Paris were echoed amongst the troops and politicians in that area and broke out in frequent brawls, resulting in six deaths in the Paris battalions, who it was claimed supported Marat’s politics, while the Bordeaux battalions supported the Girondist views of Brissot.130
Only minor actions occurred on this front in June, including at the important post of Pas-Opton, when on 15 June 800 Vendéens attacked republican advanced posts but were repulsed.131
On 20 June 1,500-1,800 rebels, under St-Pal, attempted a surprise attack on the 1,000-1,200 men garrisoned in Talmont. Knowing this attack was coming 120 republicans moved forwards to Les Moutiers, deploying in a garden in advance of the town. The Vendéens attacked at 10am but after only fifteen minutes they retreated with the loss of fifty-one killed.132
Boulard was well aware that his priority was to cover Les Sables and remained very much on the defensive.
Chapter 8
The Sans-Culotte Army
The Republic had survived June but July was to shake it once more. On 12 July Toulon opened its port to the English and declared for the royalists and on 13 July Charlotte Corday, a young woman from Normandy and ardent Federalist, gained access to Marat and stabbed him to death in his bath. Both actions handed more power to the extreme elements within Paris. The Vendée also witnessed the escalation of conflict between the different factions represented amongst the generals, troops and local authorities, and Federalist support within Nantes now came to the fore.
As June moved into July the high hopes of the Vendéens, with their remarkable successes at Fontenay and Saumur, drifted back towards a fight for survival against republican columns infiltrating the region and gathering on the borders.
D’Ayat left for another command, leaving Biron with only one divisional general on the southern front: Chalbos. On 1 July the Army of the La Rochelle Coast had a mere 40,000 undisciplined and inexperienced troops covering a line at least 250km long, while at the same time a great expectation was placed upon them to enter the Vendéen heartland.
&n
bsp; After his arrest Rossignol had been transferred from Niort to Paris to account for his conduct, but he had nothing to fear from his friends at the Ministry of War. For his actions at Luçon, Sandoz was replaced by Tuncq who was placed under Boulard’s orders.
The Federalist Coup in Nantes
On 3 July Canclaux left Nantes to scout the Nort and Ancenis roads and secure news of Biron’s movements so he could work in concert with him. He regretted that he did not have fresh troops with which to pursue the Vendéens after his victory at Nantes.
Having arrived at Nort with 2,200 men, accompanied by two commissaires of the Convention, he heard that the Nantes authorities had issued orders on 5 July to oppose the entrance into Nantes of all commissaires sent from the Convention. Beysser, who had remained in Nantes, adhered to this order and Canclaux was invited to do the same. In his reply of 11 July Canclaux refused outright. That same day the representatives gave Beysser a window of opportunity to formally disavow the order of 5 July and appealed to his loyalty and character but, as he did not respond within the required timescale, he was dismissed for revolt and treason.
Beysser issued a proclamation to the people of Nantes saying his ‘crimes’ were saving Nantes from the rebels and their accomplices the Montagnards, recognising the sovereignty of the people that the ‘maratists’ wanted to destroy, and for adhering to an order from the Nantes authorities conforming to the people’s voice: namely to distance the Department from the ‘dangerous envoys sent to ignite discord’.1 Yet on 15 July Canclaux was able to announce that Beysser and the Nantes authorities had retracted. They were ordered to the bar of the Convention and somewhat surprisingly Beysser was neither imprisoned nor guillotined, and although placed under surveillance he was sent to hunt down Girondist deputies hiding in the departments of Normandy, La Sarthe and Britanny.2
On 18 July Canclaux advised Boulard that he had swept along the north bank of the Loire and communications between Nantes and Paris were now open.
It was in July that Wimpffen, commanding in Calvados, openly declared for Federalism but his shambles of an army, totalling 5,000 men, was routed over 13 to 14 July around Pacy-sur-Eure by General Sepher and soon ceased to exist.
All these actions heightened the pitch of paranoia among the Montagnards, who were fighting both the Federalists and the upsurge of influence held by the Hébértists.
Towards the end of June it will be recalled that troops in Tours, now under Labarolière, were sufficiently reorganised to march on Saumur. On arrival they awaited further orders from Biron.
The Châtillon Campaign
The most immediate threat to the rebels, however, was from General Westermann. A close friend of Danton, and involved in many famous events within Paris, Westermann was determined to make a name for himself. His force comprised the Légion-du-Nord supported by four further battalions: in all between 2,700 and 3,000 men. On 28 June he set out again from St-Maixent, heading for Parthenay. Prior to departure these troops were reviewed by Biron who was impressed by their discipline and quality. However, Aubertin, who commanded part of this column, recalled the air of trepidation as they set out for the heart of rebel territory.
Westermann was to gain a reputation for burning and destroying settlements wherever he marched, but he did take the precaution of advancing cautiously and with light cavalry covering his flanks. On 2 July his column left Parthenay for Bressuire and aimed to seize Châtillon-sur-Sèvre on the following day, recognising the symbolic significance of seizing the town where the Vendéens had established their Supreme Council. Biron indicated that he would deploy troops in Parthenay and Coulanges to act in support and ordered Labarolière to send 3,000 men to join Westermann.
Bois-aux-Chèvres 3 July
At 6am on 3 July Westermann’s infantry were on the march, with the bulk of his artillery following two hours later under cavalry escort.
Between Bressuire and Châtillon were the woods of Bois-aux-Chèvres, at the entrance to which was a large opening forming a long square which tapered away in the distance. It is thanks to Aubertin that we have a detailed account of the action that followed.
At around 11.30am, just after the two Chasseur battalions of the Légion-du-Nord had moved into the open space at the entrance to this woodland, musket and artillery fire opened up on their front and flanks. Having succeeded in keeping order in the ranks Westermann managed to form his men in line with a company of Belgian tirailleurs (probably the fifty-six men of the Légion-des-Ardennes) deployed along the front.3
A second body of troops was led by Aubertin and formed up on Westermann’s left towards the edge of the wood, and then began to advance under fire. Westermann’s third body of troops formed up on his right.
On this right flank Westermann deployed two 4pdrs facing a holloway which led up from the woods. A captain of grenadiers from the 11th Orléans noticed a large body of Vendéens advancing at speed along this holloway, clearly aiming to seize the guns. By a quick and skilful manoeuvre (which unfortunately is not described) he forced them to pull back into the woods.
The republicans were now deployed across fields of crops between the woods. Royalist snipers seemed to be taking pleasure in picking out targets, and Aubertin, who had already lost a number of men, deployed numerous tirailleurs who moved into the woods to put an end to the enemy firing. This manoeuvre was copied by Westermann’s centre and right and caused the royalists to give up the fight and disperse.
After this action Westermann’s artillery and cavalry arrived and he continued his march on Châtillon.
Mercier-de-Rocher, who was not present, indicated that Westermann had encountered 10,000 rebels supported by ten cannon on a height before La Sauzelière. He wrote that Westermann attacked them, became encircled, but at bayonet point forced the enemy to retreat, capturing six guns and killing 2,000 brigands in the pursuit (undoubtedly a gross exaggeration).4
The eye-witness account by the royalist artillery officer Poirier-de-Beauvais describes a different part of what was evidently a series of ongoing actions that stretched from Bois-aux-Chèvres to Châtillon.
On hearing news of Westermann’s advance Beauvais was ordered to take two cannon and deploy them on high ground overlooking the Gué-Paillard Bridge east of Châtillon, supported by a large body of infantry.5 On the morning of 3 July the Vendéen numbers were enhanced by men from surrounding parishes and with these reinforcements they marched on the enemy and encountered them at the Bois-aux-Chèvres, a few hundred metres east of Gué-Paillard. Initially the combat went in the Royalists’ favour and caused the republicans to abandon some cannon, but, on seeing two Vendéen cannon being redeployed further from the republicans, the troops nearby mistook this for a retreat and routed. The rest of the troops soon followed and only stopped once across the Gué-Paillard Bridge.
Beauvais was determined to deploy some guns in this excellent position and at first the peasant-soldiers seemed willing to remain, but as soon as the first enemy squadron appeared they broke once more and only stopped in Châtillon. He was quick to point out that many of the troops had not seen action before.
On the Rorthais road east of Châtillon the rebels deployed several guns, with others on a road to its north. The republicans were advancing slowly and cautiously, and Lescure, La Rochejaquelein, Stofflet and the Bishop of Agra were amongst those who did all they could to inspire the troops to fight, but to no avail.6
With bullets from republican tirailleurs whistling around, Beauvais advised Lescure that the cannon were at imminent risk and should be harnessed up. La Rochejaquelein, he suggested, could mask this action by making a feint with the cavalry. This manoeuvre was successfully executed but, Beauvais wrote, La Rochejaquelein’s ardour got the better of him and some infantry were inspired to join him in his advance.
As Lescure and Beauvais were on their way to harness the guns on the road to the left they noticed that the republican artillery fire had become more intense. Beauvais went to find out what was happening and when he arrived
at the eastern edge of Châtillon he discovered that the cannon and the army had vanished. Spotting a single cavalryman approaching he asked how long ago La Rochejaquelein had left, only to be told he was still up ahead in the action.
By his presence La Rochejaquelein had caused the enemy tirailleurs to retreat and had advanced to within close range of the republican guns located in a dip in the ground and out of sight of the town. He was accompanied by a handful of cavalry and a few infantry deployed to either side of the road in the broom. Beauvais warned him that the artillery had left and that he was exposing himself to no avail, and La Rochejaquelein agreed to retire once the wounded had been evacuated.
On that same day Biron advised Westermann that he had placed at his disposal 1,900 men in Parthenay and 1,200 infantry and 150 cavalry in Coulanges.7 The Parthenay troops joined Westermann on 4 July, bringing his numbers up to about 5,000 men.8
Châtillon-sur-Sèvres 5 July
After entering Châtillon most of the republican troops deployed as follows: the Chasseurs of the Légion-du-Nord were posted in the town; the cavalry on the edge of the town on the Mortagne road; a pair of 4pdrs were deployed on the Bressuire road; four battalions were placed in an irregular line facing Mortagne on the Château-Gaillard Heights; and ten guns were placed to their north, on a track leading to some woods on these same heights. Above St-Jouin, in a cemetery on the Cholet road, were more troops supported by some cannon, and in the château and abbey were 2,000 raw levies armed with pikes.9
The Château-Gaillard Heights was a dangerous position for a camp, being very steep on its eastern side.10 Beauvais added that the north side was also quite steep and although their right flank was safe their line of retreat was poor and the position was surrounded by plenty of cover.11