by Rob Harper
The republican leaders hoped that their troops would remain as deployed but indiscipline quickly broke out and a large number returned to Châtillon and began looting. The officers were forced to deploy detachments of disciplined troops in an attempt to control the drunken rampage that followed. Westermann also ignored warnings from local patriots that the constant ringing of the tocsin meant the rebels were gathering in strength.
The Vendéen generals had gathered 25,000 men by the evening of 4 July. Setting out from Cholet an hour before dawn they headed south, aiming to attack Châtillon from the west. At Le Temple, around 4km west of Châtillon, the army split into two columns: that on the left under D’Élbée and Stofflet moving directly on Châtillon and La Frerie; and that on the right, under Lescure, La Rochejaquelein, Bonchamps, Marigny and Royrand, advancing on Château-Gaillard.
As this right hand column drew near it split into three further columns with Bonchamps forming the centre. According to Beauvais the covered country enabled this column to move close to the enemy batteries.12
The Marie-Jeanne gave the signal for the attack and Marigny’s infantry, preceding those of Bonchamps, opened the engagement by assaulting the heights.13
Around 11am Aubertin had been invited to dine with Westermann but, concerned about the undisciplined state of the troops, he declined. As he was mounting up he heard gunfire breaking out all around Châtillon. The royalists had crept unseen towards the town through ripe fields of crops.14 ‘It appeared to me that the republicans had taken no precautions and had no outposts,’ recalled Beauvais.15
First Battle of Châtillon.
Westermann was enjoying an old cask of Bordeaux in Châtillon when he heard the gunfire open up on the Château-Gaillard Heights. Jean Pernot, maréchal-des-logis of the artillery of the Légion-du-Nord, recalled, ‘At midday we were attacked. I was between the two mills at one and a half fusils range from Châtillon on the Mortagne road.’16 He was with a 4pdr, had an 8pdr about thirty paces to his left, and an Orléans battalion was about 250 paces away when the enemy attacked:
‘They came at us in ranks with a badly nourished fire-by-file. The battalions fired over fifty shots before retiring on my right: only sixteen or seventeen men stayed with us to support the guns, the rest dispersed…When the enemy appeared I went to warn the battalion saying, ‘Look the enemy!’ Several were lying down, others eating soup…I couldn’t see their leader. They replied that they could see these troops but did not believe they were the enemy. I returned to my guns which I deployed in battery.’
Westermann galloped to the scene of action but when he reached Château-Gaillard his army was already in trouble.17
The rebels seem to have encountered some difficulty fighting over the rudimentary earth ramparts that surrounded the Republican camp on the heights, and could not easily see their enemy, but their screams terrified the Republicans.18
On these same heights a battalion in blue coats faced-green (almost certainly one of the Chasseur Battalions of the Légion-du-Nord) formed square and fired on anyone who dared approach.19
Jean Pernot continued:
‘As they approached and I recognised them I fired grapeshot and pushed them back three times, though they were behind abattis and in a holloway. I fired nearly thirty shots and three of my gunners were shot down. I was also wounded and the fifteen Orléans men who had stayed with us had fled.’20
He claimed that he wanted to fight on but was told to retire.
Occupying terrain covered in high standing crops hindered their manoeuvring and Colson, a Republican gunner, recalled:
‘Fire rapidly took hold, and seeing that it would reach the caissons and blow us up, as well as being assailed by continuous musket fire, we looked for a way to escape only to come up against a very steep descent. The first caisson tumbled over with its horses and drivers, a 4pdr overturned and fell into a pond, as did some others, and others fell into enemy hands as the gunners fled from the flames. We had no officers with us, the chasseurs-à-cheval were camped on the plain and the infantry were in the town. It was presumed we had been surprised because we had not placed scouts.’21
Lieutenant Colonel Friedrichs, commanding officer of the 14th Orléans, was protecting three cannon on the heights and gave a different version of events. He said the rebels advanced unseen up to the 11th Orléans deployed in advance of his position and he summoned the men to arms when a cannon ball landed at his feet. He said the 14th Orléans advanced to support the 11th and these two battalions united and withstood the enemy’s fire for over an hour. They then retreated as neither the general nor any orders arrived and they had taken significant losses.
Troops began to rush down the steep eastern slopes in growing numbers, gripped by terror.
Lescure was heading down the Mortagne road and soon arrived at the foot of this steep slope to discover bodies and equipment piled at the bottom. Republicans were running along the riverbank, hoping to cross the causeway at the Moulin-de-Prévie and being hunted down by Renou and the Les Aubiers men.22
Frouchard noted that La Rochejaquelein’s column appeared on the St Amand road further south, with a third column blocking the St-Jouin and Cholet road to the north.23
Marigny and Stofflet had been pursuing fugitives seeking refuge in the town. They penetrated the St-Jouin Suburb and pitilessly cut down their enemy.24 The republicans on the Cholet road, however, were still putting up a fight and Lescure threw himself against these troops. According to Frouchard this might have failed if La Rochejaquelein and Bonchamps (after leaving contingents from Cerizay and La Pommeraye in the town) had not come to his aid.25
Some Republicans attempted to retreat north on the Maulévrier road but were faced by Bonchamps, Lescure and La Rochejaquelein’s men and were forced to break up. Many surrendered.26
Beauvais said the battle lasted about an hour after which the republicans attempted to escape along the Bressuire road to the east and abandoned their guns and baggage; ‘our cavalry held in reserve then advanced.’27 Marigny led this pursuit with Richard, commander of the Cerizay Division. An enemy unit put down their arms as if to surrender, but facing only a handful of rebels they retrieved their weapons and shot at Marigny’s troops: an act witnessed by rebels from the La Pommeraye Parish who massacred these republicans.28 Overcome with rage Marigny returned to Châtillon, gathered up some gunners he had captured, and fully aware that Westermann had massacred the Vendéen wounded left in the town’s hospital, he started to execute them.29
Lescure was informed of Marigny’s action and was already surrounded by numerous captured republicans clinging to his horse and clothing. Arriving at the prison he encountered the grisly sight of Marigny, sabre drawn and covered in blood from the seventy-five republicans he had personally killed. Lescure ordered him to leave, saying he would defend Marigny’s prisoners personally if necessary.30
Westermann was witnessing his army being torn to pieces.
Jean Pernot said he tried to join the cavalry when it appeared to be preparing to attack the rebel horse but, added Aubertin, ‘Westermann’s cavalry, like cowards, abandoned their post… raced into the town and galloped ahead to lead the rout.’31
‘Though vastly outnumbered, the infantry would have been able to retreat if they had been protected by their light cavalry, but seeing that they had been abandoned they threw away their arms and baggage so they could flee as quickly as possible. Many were killed, but some were saved through the humanity of Lescure, D’Élbée and Bonchamps. Nearly all the officers were killed or captured and those mounted formed a platoon and in so doing were able to retreat.’32
Westermann’s cavalry had difficulty escaping when they were cut off by more parishes arriving on the Bressuire road.33
A party of Vendéen cavalry charged vigorously until near Rorthais, and Beauvais recalled:
‘Here we encountered the Légion-du-Nord retiring in mass. I ordered the cavalry to stop to await two cannons and Stofflet and I quarrelled as he wanted to charge the
m, but the arrival of a single cannon ended our dispute as its first shot dispersed the enemy. After crossing the Gué-Paillard I took the Bressuire road and many republicans perished on and around this route.’34
Westermann retreated on Bressuire then Parthenay.
‘I am fairly sure all of Westermann’s infantry, artillery and guns were killed or captured,’ wrote Beauvais.35 Savary said the rebels claimed over 2,000 casualties amongst the republicans, 300 in the battle, 600 on the Rorthais road and the rest in the surrounding countryside. He said the republican cavalry were cut off at Amailloux and partly torn to pieces.36
The republicans admitted to a loss of 1,200, including 200 killed. Béjarry said 3-4,000 enemy troops were killed or wounded, hundreds made prisoner, and nearly all the guns captured.37
Westermann firmly placed the blame for the defeat on the volunteer battalions, above all the 11th and 14th Orléans, and said his légion was reduced to 8-900 men.38
Lieutenant Colonel Friedrichs said his battalion of 469 men was reduced to 17. He reported that no advanced posts had been placed and that both the 11th and 14th Orléans fought bravely. Savary cynically wrote that Westermann was trying to pin the blame for the defeat on a battalion that was nearly wiped out.39
Biron’s Command Struggles July
Biron was informed of the victory at Nantes on 3 July. He now changed his plans and ordered 8-10,000 men to march from Tours and Saumur on Nantes and also ordered Westermann to stop his movements so his troops would be available. Biron was unaware of the disaster that was about to befall Westermann.
Biron had around 16,000 men of which 13,000 were available for use.40 On the morning of 4 July he set out for Angers leaving Chalbos in charge at Niort. Arriving in Saumur on 6 July he reported to the CPS that he would be marching on Nantes. On 8 July Canclaux reported that he was moving on Ancenis and aimed to meet with Biron at Angers that same night, at which point Biron suggested that they unite their forces, re-establish communications between Nantes and La Rochelle, and then march into the heart of the Vendée.41
Biron ordered Boulard to move up to Machecoul promising that a division would march from Nantes in support. Troops were also to march from Luçon on La Roche-sur-Yon to protect the communications of the other columns. Biron was aiming to personally march through Fontenay, attack Pont Charron, and head for Montaigu, and another column was to leave Niort and move to La Châtaigneraie to protect his communications.42
The representatives did not support Biron’s plan and on 10 July, when he became aware of this, and of Westermann’s defeat, he submitted his resignation once again. He said Nantes was no longer threatened and his health no longer permitted him to remain in command.
In discussion with Canclaux, however, he had decided to march a column to Les Pont-de-Cé then on to St-Lambert, Chemillé and Cholet, while the Niort Division would remain on the defensive.43
On 11 July Biron once again asked the CPS to replace him but since 23 June they had not replied to any of his correspondence. That same day the troops that had set out from Tours, renamed the Division of Angers, camped at Brissac, and Biron received information that the rebels were aiming to march either on Tremont and Vihiers, or on Chemillé and Cholet. He informed the Ministry that he was heading for Niort and from there would try to link the Niort Division with that of Angers.44
On arriving at Niort he counted 10,000 men (including 3,000 untrained recruits) and a further 3,000 at St-Maixent, but for more than eight days he had been running a fever and his requests to be replaced were becoming insistent.45
On 11 July the Ministry had written to the representatives with the Army of the La Rochelle Coast with orders for Westermann to appear before the bar; Sandoz to appear before the Revolutionary Tribunal; Rossignol to be released; and Biron to be sent to account for the mistreatment of this citizen. On 12 July Biron received a letter from the Convention summoning him to Paris immediately and he handed over command to Chalbos and was in Paris eight days later. He was detained in the Abbaye Prison and on 31 December would be guillotined for ‘having participated in a conspiracy against the external and internal safety of the Republic’.46
On 9 July Commissaire Momoro penned a letter to Vincent, assistant to the Minister of War, wondering whether it was deliberate treachery or incompetence that was causing the war to drag on. He singled out Biron and Westermann in his comments and two days later Commissaires Brulé and Besson announced that they were heading to Paris with Ronsin to denounce them in person.47
The representatives at Ancenis, Merlin and Gillet, wrote to the CPS informing them that Ronsin and his emissaries had treated Boulard badly and had caused him to hand in his resignation after four months of faithful and successful service to the Republic. ‘After having disorganised the Army of La Rochelle, Ronsin wanted to disorganise that of Brest.’48 They asked that Ronsin and his cronies be recalled to Paris. On 20 July they added that this crowd of commissaries of the Executive Council, who regarded themselves as the directors of the army, were blaming, censuring or exalting the actions of the generals as it suited them. These men, they wrote, had no military experience yet were being elevated to high rank: Ronsin being made general of brigade and the former comedian, Grammont, adjudant general. They also called for the Minister of War’s replacement, concluding that ‘Bouchotte has been a longstanding friend of Merlin…and will always be an excellent citizen, but he will always be a very bad minister’.49
Rossignol would be freed and promoted general of brigade on 12 July, then on 27 July became general of division and commander-in-chief of the Army of the La Rochelle Coast. Westermann faced and survived the Revolutionary Tribunal, undoubtedly due to his influential contacts, even though he was responsible for a disaster not dissimilar in scale to that of Thouars.
The march of the Angers Column
Although Westermann’s assault had been crushed, the Vendéens were barely given time to draw breath before reports arrived of further enemy activity to the north-east.
General Labarolière, who replaced Duhoux, had at long last moved to Angers. A detailed return produced by Berthier on 21 June indicates that at that time the Tours troops totalled 16,375 infantry and 1,848 cavalry (see Appendix 2).
Labarolière’s division had been rebuilt into brigades under Santerre, Joly, Chabot and a large advance guard under General of Division Menou (this advance guard being led by Fabrefond, Dutruy, Barbazan and Gauvilliers). His cavalry totalled 1,600 men and included elements of the 8th and 9th Hussars, 16th and 19th Dragoons, 24th Chasseurs and Mayenne Volunteers. Labarolière detached 3,000 troops to cover Saumur and Angers and set out from Angers on 11 July with 11,000 men and reached Brissac later that same day. He reported that he would move to the banks of the Layon on 14 July and noted that the enemy were holding the west bank in strength. However, he expressed concern over the indiscipline and insolence of his troops and, having served for thirty-six years with honour, he asked to be replaced.50
Ronsin had risen through the ranks with astonishing speed. Within the first four days of July he was promoted from the rank of captain to that of general of brigade. The Hébértists now seemed to be in complete control of military action.
Martigné-Briand 15 July
Labarolière did not attempt to cross the Layon in the presence of the enemy. Having heard of Westermann’s defeat he decided to march further south to skirt rebel territory and camp between Chavagnes and Martigné-Briand.51 His progress was so slow that Bonchamps had time to assemble 16,000 rebels at Chemillé and marched to face this new threat.52
At 3am on 15 July Bonchamps advanced to attack Labarolière knowing the republicans were very strung out, but with dawn the temperature rose rapidly on what was to be an extremely hot day. Both Bonchamps and Lescure aimed to take the most direct road until persuaded by an old veteran officer, who reputedly knew the area well, to make a wide detour to surprise the enemy.53 Under a scorching sun they reputedly marched for six hours to cross the Layon at the Rablay Bridge.54
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Towards midday they were informed of the enemy positions and according to Beauvais, instead of halting to form up, their column stretched out even further as they rapidly moved towards the enemy.55
Labarolière’s troops were spread across a distance of about 7km. His advance guard was at Aubigné, his centre and headquarters at Fliné, and the rear in Chavagnes. Bonchamps was leading the advance of the rebel army and immediately saw an opportunity in this undulating and covered country to break through the middle of the enemy position. He left the other leaders the means to mask or reduce Chavagnes as he raced on ahead along the Layon, climbed the vine covered slopes, and appeared near Noyers.56 Deploying artillery he broke the enemy centre and forced them back towards the Vihiers road. Beauvais recalled that Bonchamps was unable to restrain his troops as they believed themselves invincible, and the battle was already underway when the other leaders arrived.57
The Vendéen left took up position on the Jouhannet Heights and bombarded troops in Chavagnes, while their right assaulted and seized Château Fliné, causing the republican headquarters’ staff to flee. The Vendéens were close to cutting the enemy in two as the northern part of the republican army was thrown back on the Angers road and the southern on that of Vihiers.58
The republican generals managed to summon fresh troops from Aubigné and reformed their lines behind the Vilaine. They also succeeded in slowing the Vendéen offensive, helped by cannon deployed near the Millé Windmills and counter-battery fire aimed at the rebel artillery at Jouhannet.59
The initial royalist success continued when General Danican led a cavalry charge at great cost to his regiment.
The Battle of Martigné-Briand.
Beauvais was considering moving his six guns to a better position and ordered a reserve of 800 cavalry and 2,000 infantry nearby to cover this redeployment. He took this precaution having spotted some hussars leading a considerable body of enemy cavalry to his right. This cavalry approached to within half range of his guns but dispersed when he fired on them.60 Marigny joined him to find out what he was doing and told Beauvais he only needed the infantry to cover this move, then set out with the cavalry to charge the enemy’s left flank. Hearing that Santerre was in the enemy ranks Marigny was eager to capture him ‘and parade around in a cage, as a trophy of war, the man who presided at the execution of the King’.61