by Rob Harper
Canclaux now arrived with Scherb’s troops and Kléber deployed them on the left of the 4th Haut-Rhin and a battalion of the 62nd Line, with orders to turn the enemy’s right flank. The success of this move caused the Vendéen right to rout, but their left still held firm, even after the château and church towers were seen to be in flames. Seeing the church on fire, Kléber wrote, enraged the ‘fanatics’ who were constantly seeking ways to turn the republicans.
Blosse and the right flank successfully seized some high ground before the rebels could reach it, thereby stalling their advance.
Finally, after two hours of combat, Kléber ordered all the troops to advance and beat the charge all along the line. They moved ‘over hedges and across ditches, using partial then general attacks to the front and flanks; the cavalry also made daring moves.’13 He recalled that both sides were in such a mêlée that cannon could not be used. The Vendéens eventually gave way and withdrew to Tiffauges, but were not pursued.
Beauvais wrote that 2,000 republicans had appeared before the royalist camp at dawn. Although initially exchanging fire, he said many of the Vendéens were taken by surprise and instead of uniting to fight they fled, forcing those who had engaged with the republicans to break away and follow behind.14
The republicans captured two guns and by the end of the battle Kléber’s troops were completely out of cartridges and used bayonets alone.
Having taken the heights, Kléber rallied his men and moved on St-Symphorien. He was starting to march on Tiffauges when Canclaux urged him to pull back to Montaigu as he had received a letter from Aubert-Dubayet suggesting that Charette was attacking from Legé.15
However, Blosse and Targes, with 1,500 men, were ordered to move on Tiffauges, but only take it if the rebels were no longer there and to retire on Montaigu if they encountered resistance. Targes moved on the left and seized a height overlooking Tiffauges. He saw that the Vendéens had rallied at least a part of their army behind entrenchments and had deployed some large-calibre cannon, from which ineffective shots were fired. Blosse had moved on his right, but both then pulled back on Montaigu as ordered.16
Dismissed on the Evening of Victory
Orders for the removal of the ci-devants Aubert-Dubayet, Canclaux and Grouchy arrived that same evening, and to avoid causing any trouble all three quietly departed for Nantes. When it did become known, the troops were furious.
Vimeux, as the most senior in the army, was appointed interim commander-in-chief; Kléber was appointed interim commander of the Army of the Brest Coast; Beaupuy was given the advance guard; Scherb was ordered to take temporary command of the 2nd Division; and both Blosse and Dusirat were given temporary commands in Remouillé and Nantes respectively. For the time being Kléber was effectively in command and would remain so over the next couple of weeks, even after L’Échélle’s arrival.
L’Échélle arrived on 8 October accompanied by Representative Carrier and General Dembarrère. A council of war was held in Montaigu that same evening involving L’Échélle, Dembarrère, Kléber, Vimeux, Beaupuy and Representatives Carrier, Merlin and Turreau. In this meeting Kléber gave an update on the state of the army, and a detailed description of the plans they had been following, using a map laid out on the table.
Kléber noted that L’Échélle said nothing and did not even look at the map during the whole proceedings. When he had finished, the new commander-in-chief simply stated, ‘Yes this project seems to my taste, but I observe that there is the need to march in order, in mass and majestically.’17 With that the meeting ended and Kléber was left wondering what sort of man had been placed in command.
On 9 October the army was reviewed and harangued by Carrier and L’Échélle. As they finished, Kléber could see men in the ranks calling out, ‘Long live Dubayet!’ He was convinced this response fuelled the hatred that L’Échélle now held against the Army of Mayence.18
This reorganisation at Montaigu meant that L’Échélle’s army was only ready to march on Tiffauges on 14 October. Political interference had lost them a week of time.
After the setback at Treize-Septiers, Bonchamps and D’Élbée dug in around Tiffauges and Donnissan was able to send reinforcements gathered in Cholet. However they now received urgent appeals from Lescure and La Rochejaquelein to come to their assistance as they were under attack. Leaving behind a weak force covering Tiffauges, with orders to make the enemy believe the army was still there in force, they slipped away to Cholet during the night of 9 to 10 October.
Bois-aux-Chèvres 9 October
After the split with Charette, Lescure decided to march on La Châtaigneraie but had insufficient strength to attack it. He did, however, remain nearby for several days, winning a number of skirmishes. Informed that Westermann was assembling in Bressuire he made a vain attempt to attack him before marching from St-Sauveur to Châtillon with his 4,000 men.19
While the Armies of Mayence and Brest Coast had been marching on Tiffauges, Chalbos had been gathering his forces in Bressuire, and also carried out a purge of ci-devant generals. The division in Fontenay was strengthened to 5,000 men, formed in two brigades under Lecomte and Westermann, and set out for La Châtaigneraie on 5 October.20 On the following day they were joined by 6,000 troops from Saumur and camped between La Châtaigneraie and Bressuire.
The day before they left for Châtillon General Rey was dismissed and replaced by Muller.21 News soon spread among the troops that Muller was a former dancer from the Paris Opera, and as the representatives were assembling the Saumur Division, to announce that Muller was their new commander, the soldiers shouted that they would not recognise him and ignored the representatives’ threats. Rey agreed to encourage the soldiers to do their duty and was given a day to sort out the mess.22
The two divisions assembled some distance apart as the terrain prevented a march in parallel columns.23 Chalbos’ division was formed into three brigades: the 1st under Chambon, the 2nd led by Lecomte and the 3rd under Westermann.24
Chalbos’ division was about to set out when they heard that the Army of Saumur still obstinately refused to accept Muller. Rey had to appeal to them again. At last, at 9am on 9 October, Chalbos set out for Châtillon. Approaching Moulin-aux-Chèvres his scouts warned him that the enemy were near. According to his own account he deployed his tirailleurs 500 paces in advance, placed a cannon on high ground, and marched at the head of the centre column which he deployed in line. The Grenadiers of the Convention deployed on his right.25
Lescure had been awaiting the republicans, with around 6,000 infantry and 2-300 cavalry, concealed in the woods on high ground at Bois-aux-Chèvres.26 Both Stofflet and La Rochejaquelein were present.
On reaching Bois-aux-Chèvres the front of the republican column was attacked by rebels pouring out of the woods. The republicans managed to form line while under fire and, in spite of their growing losses, they did not retreat. Chambon was killed early in the action. The two cannon from the 1st Brigade had deployed in broom too far to the right and at that moment were unable to fire. A large number of royalists were heading for these guns and would have captured them but for the 160 Grenadiers of the Convention who withstood the Vendéen assault, but in so doing sustained over 100 casualties.27
Lecomte’s troops now arrived, but as he was deploying his brigade he was mortally wounded and this promising general was to die in Bressuire a few days later.
In spite of their losses the first two brigades managed to form up. Both sides were engaged in an ongoing firefight, with that on the Vendéen left especially intense. Contrary to their usual tactic Lescure had placed his best fighters on the left and not the right; as a result the republican right was suffering badly. The Vendéen right was formed of their newest levies, who were probably instructed just to hold their ground.28
Aubertin recalled that the Vendéen firing was more sustained as their ranks were more numerous and their losses were being replaced by reserves posted in the woods. The rebel lines were also three times as wide as their own.
29
Chalbos found it necessary to deploy the front of Westermann’s Brigade towards his right, but against orders they made a half turn to the left and then a diagonal march towards the royalist right. Westermann was on horseback at the head of his column, urging his men on towards the extreme right of the enemy, apparently not even bothering to check whether all his troops were following.30 Aubertin noted that the royalist centre and right did not take the opportunity to envelop this ‘unwise general’, especially as they heavily outnumbered his spread out and disordered troops.31
Chalbos, who was at that moment with his right wing, spotted Westermann’s manoeuvre and immediately sent Aubertin to order him back to his designated place in the line. A very anxious Aubertin recalled that in this grave situation they still had no idea where the Saumur Division was, and with less than 4,000 men still fighting, ‘all anticipated defeat’.32 When he eventually reached Westermann, the latter, without even stopping, simply told him that he was going straight to Châtillon.33
Remarkably Westermann’s disordered advance had the desired effect and the Vendéen right dispersed, followed by their centre, seemingly to the complete surprise of the rest of the republican army. Lescure was obliged to cover the retreat with his left wing.34
A further encounter followed at Gué-Paillard (Pont-Paillet), but once again the Vendéens were forced to pull back and Lescure was wounded.35 Few Vendéens were killed in this action.
Châtillon-sur-Sèvres 11 October
On arrival in Châtillon, Westermann’s troops wasted no time in burning the town. The rest of the division only arrived on 11 October, in company with the Army of Saumur and its new general.36 Their combined strength totalled 10-11,000 men with 14 guns of varying calibre and the generals were confident the royalists would not attack such a strong force.37
However, the Vendéens called for urgent help and managed to gather around 18,000 men to launch a counter-attack.38 Crétineau-Joly lists Bonchamps, La Rochejaquelein, Stofflet, La Bouëre, Beauvais, Du Chaffault, D’Élbée and Talmont amongst those coming to Lescure’s aid.39
The Vendéen Assault
Early on 11 October Westermann received orders to reconnoitre towards Mortagne and set out with part of his brigade.40
Towards 1pm the troops in Châtillon heard cannon fire in the distance. Sending an officer to find out what was happening, Chalbos was informed that Westermann said it was nothing but asked for a small reinforcement and two guns. As a precaution Chalbos called the men to arms.
Beauvais wrote that the Vendéens assembled in Cholet and repulsed some enemy tirailleurs at Temple as they marched on Châtillon. They then formed into two columns as they continued towards Châtillon.41
The gunfire grew in intensity and was approaching the town. Chalbos and his staff mounted up and moved to the foot of the height on the Mortagne road (almost certainly the Château-Gaillard Heights). A battalion was under arms in a small a field to the right and extending along the road.42
Westermann’s column suddenly appeared, retreating at speed and being pursued by the Vendéens.
‘Everywhere the soldiers were fleeing in disorder, pursued by Westermann galloping behind them; he had removed his habit, and the right sleeve of his shirt was rolled up; he sabred both republicans and royalists; one of the latter managed to seize his horse’s tail, trying to stop it; Westermann, seeing him, sabred him several times to make him let go.’43
The Vendéens now appeared in great numbers and were moving fast.
Beauvais, with the left-hand column, recalled the enemy being deployed in line in a good position on the heights before Châtillon. An exchange of artillery fire achieved little, he said. The Vendéen soldiers were heading down the road to Châtillon, ‘making for the left and marching in closed columns as far as the river’, but were exposing themselves to fire as they moved to outflank the enemy’s right.44 They crossed the river at a ford with arms held high and rushed on the enemy, firing as they ran.
Bonchamps and the right wing also raced into combat and the republicans were soon overpowered all along the line.45
Aubertin, who was with Chalbos and the staff, recalled,
‘The battalion under arms, the staff and cavalry escort all looked to Chalbos for orders, but to the great surprise of all none were given; he about-turned and re-entered Châtillon. The rout then became general. We abandoned cannons, caissons, baggage, causing an indescribable blockage in the middle of Châtillon…We had put 2 guns in battery on the Bressuire road, which served to cover the retreat of our troops…The Republicans were overlapped to either flank by hundreds of tirailleurs.’46
D’Élbée ordered Beauvais to pursue the enemy on the Rorthais road. Beauvais wrote,
‘I had dislodged the enemy from some houses and hedges on the road where they had dug in, and I returned with everyone satisfied that I’d completed my task, when Beaurepaire and Richard made the few cavalry we had charge.’47
They continued the pursuit for a considerable distance when suddenly they came under fire, were charged by hussars, and retreated in disorder ‘throwing trouble amongst our infantry and causing everyone to flee’.48 Being on foot, Beauvais was forced to run for over two leagues. At Gué-Paillard he successfully rallied the men thanks largely to the small numbers in pursuit.
Most of the republican troops, Aubertin wrote, had not panicked when they retreated and felt completely let down by their generals. ‘One could only attribute the loss of the beautiful artillery, the caissons, and all of the équipages of the two divisions to the incompetence, inability and cowardliness of General Chalbos.’49
Counter attack 11 October evening
Aubertin and Nouvion were busy reforming the two divisions around Bois-aux-Chèvres when men began demanding that they march back to Châtillon to catch the royalists by surprise.50
The Chef-du-Battalion of the 9th Orléans, furious that Chalbos was not responding to his soldiers’ demands, seized the battalion flag and cried, ‘To Châtillon! To Châtillon!’, a chant ‘taken up by 2-3,000 brave men who raced towards the rallying sign’.51
The representatives and Chalbos, seeing the resolution of the troops, agreed to risk a detachment of 6-700 men for this expedition under Westermann’s command.52
Beauvais noted a sense of panic amongst the Vendéens that only increased after nightfall. Racing back to Châtillon he told the senior leaders that less than 100 Republicans were in pursuit and would be able to chase them all from the town while the men were so fearful. He urged them to deploy cannon and soldiers at the bridge of Gué-Paillard, but ignoring his advice they just sent a post.53 The Vendéen soldiers had become undisciplined, barrels of brandy had been broken open, and many fell asleep. None were expecting further trouble.54
An hour before nightfall Westermann’s detachment received orders to march in complete silence. When they encountered the enemy advanced posts, in response to the challenge ‘who goes there?’ they called back, ‘Armée d’Anjou, Vive le Roi!’ and charged on.55
Less than half an hour after Beauvais had given his warning, the Vendéen army was routing. Beauvais, with fifty cavalry and some infantry, re-entered Châtillon in the dark and witnessed the town being ransacked and burnt, before pulling back. Westermann’s troops were committing atrocities and may have killed over 2,000 Vendéens.56
On 12 October, instead of advancing further, the republican army returned to Bressuire to be reorganised and recuperate. L’Échélle now sent orders to Chalbos to cooperate with his movements, and the Vendéens, rallied by their leaders, reoccupied Châtillon.
The 3,000 infantry and 330 cavalry under Bard and Marceau had seized St-Fulgent and Les Herbiers and approached Mortagne against little opposition. Royrand had retreated as they advanced, moving north through Mallièvre and reaching Mortagne on the 14 October. His men were exhausted and Royrand sent warning to the Grand Army that the enemy were close on his heels. Considering Mortagne too difficult to defend, Royrand and Sapinaud headed for Cholet where the
y united with the Grand Army.
La Tremblaye 15 October
On the night of 14 October Kléber camped north of the Sèvres near Tiffauges. On the following day he marched on Mortagne. On route he scoured a wide area, encountered and repulsed some Vendéens in La Romagne, and marched on through Langeron to Mortagne which he entered unopposed.57
Events were moving rapidly as the republicans closed in on Cholet from the south, west and east. The Vendéens, by a supreme effort, managed to assemble 30,000 men in Cholet. They headed south-west on the Tiffauges road, believing the republicans to be in that direction.58 Towards La Romagne they were informed of the enemy’s march on Mortagne so retraced their steps and near Cholet split into two columns. The left column under D’Élbée, Stofflet, Royrand, Forestier and Marigny returned to Cholet then headed straight down the Mortagne road, deploying 2km to its north along high ground at La Renardière. The right column under Bonchamps, Lescure and La Rochejaquelein, seem to have initially moved towards La Séguinière and La Romagne, and although some enemy were encountered, Bonchamps and a few thousand men then returned to Cholet.59 Meanwhile Lescure, in command of the rest of this column, made for St-Christophe-du-Bois and occupied high ground around Le Grand-Chambord, northwest of D’Élbée’s column.
The republicans were feeling their way forwards in search of the Vendéens. In Mortagne, Kléber and his officers were told the enemy were more to the north. They spotted Bard’s column moving on Mortagne, and L’Échélle urged them to march straight on for Cholet, promising him support from Kléber’s troops.60