by Rob Harper
Kléber recalled that his soldiers were burning with determination to avenge the killing of their wounded and forced the rebels to retreat once more. Kléber’s rearguard was attacked next, as the Vendéens sought to break the column and separate him from Beaupuy and the baggage train.103 They were beaten back, but not before they had seized part of the artillery train and several wagons. Kléber’s light infantry killed many before others slipped into woodland. Kléber now deployed his whole brigade in line alongside the road to enable the baggage train and the troops under Beaupuy and Haxo to move by safely. He now formed a new rearguard.
They reached the camp site at nightfall after eight hours of fighting and on the following day received orders to cross the Sèvre at Vertou. Kléber was instructed to occupy Sorinières and the rest of the column Naudières and all were in position on 24 September.104
Having fought from La Glassonière as far as La Louée, Bonchamps was forced to pull back around 4pm and retired to Vallet.
Madame de la Rochejaquelein wrote, ‘our generals only took or broke 100 wagons but achieved nothing more and were very dissatisfied.’105 However, fighting with 7,000 men against nearly twice their number it is remarkable that the Vendéens only lost 500 men.
Kléber praised the skill of Canclaux and Aubert-Dubayet and the firmness of the troops but admitted that the republicans sustained many more losses.106
The Vendéens had failed in their objective and the blame has been placed firmly in the hands of Charette and Lescure. Beauvais remarked that ‘this one day had perhaps changed the destiny of the Vendée.’107
St-Fulgent 22 September
In accordance with the plan of 3 September Mieszkowski had set out from his headquarters in La Mothe-Achard on 11 September. He did not wait for the arrival of the men from the levée-en-masse and captured Aizenay that same day against limited resistance.108 He then captured Beaulieu and Poiré before marching to St-Fulgent.
Mieszkowski’s column included a handful of regular troops, 200 mounted gendarmes and volunteer cavalry, and about a dozen 4pdrs and an 8pdr. His total force numbered towards 5,000 men. On the night of 20 to 21 September he received Rossignol’s order to pull back, but instead sent Dufour to confer with Canclaux. Dufour arrived as Canclaux was retreating but apparently too late to return and alert Mieszkowski.109
Mieszkowski’s men now faced Charette and Lescure at the head of 15,000 men.110
The republicans were camped on high ground north of St-Fulgent when towards nightfall on 22 September gunfire could be heard from their advanced posts. Mieszkowski quickly deployed his men to either side of the main road just north of St Fulgent, with a number of 4pdr guns in their centre.111
The Vendéens arrived as the sun was setting and their advance guard, under Joly and Savin, deployed their guns and began an ineffective exchange of fire with the republican artillery.112 When one of their guns was put out of action the peasants took shelter in nearby ditches. Charette arrived and urged them to attack straight ahead which they did with some reluctance and little effect.113 They gradually spread out and after Lescure’s men arrived the extent of the line was such that St-Fulgent was at risk of being surrounded.114
Beauvais recalled that in the darkness the Vendéens formed a column on the main road, and to divert enemy artillery fire drummers gathered around 100 paces to either side.115 This column now advanced undisturbed and captured the enemy guns.
With the rebels continually firing into the darkness, and making terrifying cries, the republicans’ morale plummeted and their troops began to pull back.
The Vendéens were approaching the houses when suddenly they heard cries of ‘Advance! Long live the King! Long live religion!’ Charette was spotted on horseback accompanied by lit torches and with a drummer mounted pillion beating away furiously. He was followed by Joly, Savin and around thirty soldiers racing up the main road to the town, soon followed by large numbers of peasants.116 The republicans desperately fought their way to the southern edge of St-Fulgent and took the Les Quatre-Chemins road, abandoning many guns and supplies on route.
The Vendéen cavalry bypassed the town and charged Mieszkowski’s column, and although they were repulsed they captured two more guns. Using their customary tactic the Vendéens were sliding alongside the republicans concealed by the hedges and continually firing on them. Baudouin, the military administrator of the army, recalled that the troops became disordered, no longer obeyed their leaders, and used the cover of darkness to run away. However, the Vendéens had blocked the roads and were butchering troops.117
The Comte de la Bouëre recalled:
‘It was difficult to explain the impression that our near continual cries…had on the Republicans. The many hills in this area echoed with cries of ‘Vive le Roi!’ such that the enemy felt they were being attacked from all sides by huge numbers; and while this had a terrible effect on the enemy, it gave great confidence to our soldiers…’118
The pursuit continued overnight and they rounded up 700 prisoners.119 Although Royrand did send some cavalry they arrived too late to block the vital junction at Les Quatre-Chemins.
The republicans limped into Luçon with 2,000 men and six guns and Mieszkowski was back in Les Sables on 24 September. He denounced the performance of the mounted gendarmes saying that after retreating in good order to La Mothe-Achard ‘they then fled, cutting their way through their comrades to escape more quickly’.120 Mieszkowski was dismissed in early October and was fortunate to escape the guillotine. He was replaced by Dutruy.
From 5 to 22 September the Vendéens fought fifteen battles against numerous columns advancing from the north, south and east. The fact that they survived this onslaught is clear evidence that the disorganised rabble of March had developed into armies capable of defeating an all-out assault on their territory.
Canclaux only found out about the routs at Pont-Barré and Coron because Representatives Richard and Choudieu wrote to their counterparts in Nantes who in turn notified him on 21 September.
These numerous defeats should have led to Rossignol’s dismissal and Representative Philippeaux was outspoken in his attack on his incompetence. Ronsin, however, leapt to his defence and the Hébértists were too powerful for action to be taken against him.
To demonstrate that this retreat had not broken the morale of his troops or his confidence in their ability as a fighting unit Canclaux ordered a new advance on 25 September. As one tumultuous campaign ended so another would immediately begin.
Disunity in the Vendéen Armies
Detachments from the Grand Army returned home after the Battle of St-Fulgent and the failed attempt to crush the Mayence column. They stopped on route at Les Herbiers to gather supplies before marching on to Châtillon.
Charette also withdrew in that direction, but on reaching Les Herbiers found that nearly all the supplies had gone. On 24 September a furious Charette set out for Montaigu with a strong escort to claim what he believed was his rightful share of captured supplies, but once again he found little available. This was too much for this prickly character and giving no warning he broke with the Grand Army and left for Legé, in spite of having made arrangements to attack Chantonnay with Lescure and La Rochejaquelein on 25 September. So when Lescure turned up at the agreed rendezvous, Charette’s troops were not there.121
Cooperation now completely and irreparably broke down. When Charette’s men reached Legé on 26 September they found it largely destroyed and were forced to disperse to find food and rest.
The attack on Noirmoutier 29 September
Shortly after his arrival in Legé, Charette heard that Noirmoutier was being held by a single battalion and a few cannon. Capturing Noirmoutier might enable him to establish communications with the English and receive much needed supplies. So on 28 September he gathered 2,000 men and marched to Machecoul, then towards Noirmoutier via the Île-de-Bouin on the following day.122
Charette aimed to attack along the causeway using local guides and disguised a number
of his men as fishermen who were sent on ahead to land at La Maison-Rouge. Charette was at the causeway for 1.30am (low tide being 3am) and as they marched along it they came under fire from a battery on Noirmoutier and a nearby gunboat. His troops panicked and fled and could not be rallied and those landed at La Maison-Rouge had to escape as best they could.123 By 3 October he was back in Legé.
Chapter 11
‘The rebels fought like tigers and our
soldiers like lions’
The Cholet Campaign
Following the succession of defeats, reprisals inevitably followed, and the political situation in Paris would directly impact on military appointments and strategy over the weeks to come. Ronsin, responsible for the debacle at Coron, was not a man to be crossed, and orders to remove ci-devant officers were about to be enacted. Representative Philippeaux who had denounced Ronsin as the cause of the disasters would end up being guillotined.1
Back in Nantes on 24 September, Canclaux prepared a new plan of campaign with the support of the local representatives and communicated this plan to both the CPS and Rossignol.
He advised that they form two large bodies of troops, one in Nantes and the other in La Châtaigneraie, and march them rapidly into the heart of the Vendée where they would link up. The plan was accepted, and although part of the Army of the La Rochelle Coast was in no fit state to fight, a considerable body of troops would form up under Chalbos and would cooperate.2
Early on 25 September the Army of Mayence and part of the Army of the Brest Coast were on the march. Their advance guard was ordered to move to Remouillé and their main body to Aigrefeuille. They were to remain in these positions until 27 September when the advance guard was moved to between Ste-Hilaire-du-Loulay and Montaigu. The headquarters was established at Ste-Hilaire-du-Loulay, where it would remain until 30 September, and Kléber was ordered to Montaigu with his Light Advance Guard.
Kléber’s command was reinforced at Montaigu by the seventeen companies of grenadiers under Blosse, the 4th Rhin, a battalion of grenadiers from the Army of Mayence and the 32nd Line. He was now over 3,000 strong.
On 28 September Canclaux and Merlin marched with a demi-brigade towards Clisson and brushed aside a small Vendéen post.3
Although Chalbos remained in La Châtaigneraie for the time being, Westermann was ordered to make a reconnaissance on Réaumur. Towards 11am on 30 September he set out from La Châtaigneraie with his Légion-du-Nord and a detachment of infantry from the battalion of Haute-Vienne.4 On the road near Réaumur a brief combat ended with his men ‘forced to retreat with the resolve of true republicans’.5 In reality some of the republican infantry threw away their weapons so they could flee more quickly. The Légion-du-Nord held firm and were soon reinforced, but as night was falling nothing more occurred.
The Reorganisation of the Army
Chaumont had been sent to examine the extent to which ‘suspects’ had infiltrated the army staff and on 30 September he ordered Aubert-Dubayet to report on the state of affairs in the Vendée. Savary indicated that this was simply a pretext to give Chaumont sufficient time to organise the replacement of officers that had already been determined.6 On the same day, General L’Échélle, who had recently replaced Verteuil as commander of the 12th Military District, was ordered to report to Nantes. L’Échélle was an unknown quantity as far as military talent was concerned but he was considered a true sans-culotte.
On that same day orders were initiated to suspend Salomon, Rey, Gauvilliers, Grouchy, Mieszkowski, Beffroy, Nouvion and Burac. Menou and Duhoux had already been removed. Turreau left the Vendée, Adjudant General Muller was promoted to general of division, and Canuel was made general of brigade.
On 1 October L’Échélle was appointed commander-in-chief of the newly designated Army of the West, which combined the Army of the La Rochelle Coast, the Army of the Brest Coast south of the Loire, and the Army of Mayence under a single overall commander. Rossignol was given command of the Army of the Brest Coast north of the Loire and Canclaux was left without a post. Prieur, member of the CPS, was dispatched to Nantes to explain the intentions of the Committee.7
On 1 October Rossignol wrote to Canclaux setting out the orders determined by a council of war held in Saumur on that day (neither general being aware of the changes about to come). In summary they were as follows:
• The divisions commanded by Rey, Salomon and Chalbos were ordered to merge as a single army at Bressuire on 7 October then march on Châtillon.
• Chalbos was ordered to La Châtaigneraie, and Rey to Thouars, for 5 October. Salomon was ordered to leave Doué on 4 October. Lecomte’s men, and troops in Parthenay, were also ordered to join Chalbos.
• Beffroy and Mieszkowski were ordered to remain on the defensive to protect Luçon and Les Sables.
• Once in Bressuire, Chalbos, Rey and Salomon were to await further instructions.
On arrival at Bressuire, Rey and Salomon would leave the army, to be replaced by Muller. Beffroy was replaced in Luçon by Bard, but Mieszkowski was yet to receive notice of his dismissal. Similarly Canclaux continued his movements.8
The Vendéens had lost valuable time in recriminations following the failure to crush the Army of Mayence and as the republicans marched into their territory at the beginning of October the unity evident weeks before no longer existed.
While Charette had been attacking Noirmoutier, Royrand was busy covering the southern front. Lescure and La Rochejaquelein meanwhile protected Châtillon by positioning themselves at Bois-aux-Chèvres and only Bonchamps and D’Élbée rallied their men at Cholet and marched on Tiffauges then Treize-Septiers in response to news that the Army of Mayence was once more on the march.
On 1 October Kléber wrote that the Light Advance Guard was at St Georges-de-Montaigu, with the bridge and ravines guarded by Blosse, and the 1st Division and Reserve near Montaigu.
Targes attacked the Vendéen advanced posts on the following day. Canclaux ordered Marigny’s Light Advance Guard to march at 2am on 3 October and clear the route to St-Fulgent as he still feared an attack by Charette. Canclaux, Kléber, Beaupuy and Merlin accompanied this expedition and were present as the Château of La Chardière was captured and burnt after fierce resistance by its small garrison. With Canclaux and Beaupuy returning to Montaigu, Merlin and Kléber continued on to St-Fulgent where Marigny attacked and repulsed a Vendéen rearguard.
Some inhabitants informed them that a republican column was at Chantonnay, and Marigny set out with a handful of cavalry to make contact, reporting to Canclaux that he had found them at Mouilleron.
Before hearing of the deliberations of the latest council of war, Canclaux had endeavoured to coordinate movements with Mieszkowski and Beffroy in Les Sables and Luçon. Mieszkowski declined any involvement saying his troops were completely disorganised, a third were sick, and he could not risk the threat to Les Sables by advancing. Beffroy wrote that 3,000 men from his division were currently with Chalbos and others were in Les Sables and had largely been replaced by raw and unarmed soldiers. He was also exhausted after fifty years of military service and still suffering from a wound received in May. His suspension was about to be announced.
On the south-eastern front General Lecomte had been summoned by Chalbos to La Châtaigneraie with a large part of the Luçon Division (the rest remaining under General Bard and Adjudant General Marceau’s command).
All this confirmed that Canclaux could expect little immediate help from this area, except from Bard’s column now with Marigny. Even this limited contribution encouraged him to order Kléber to march on Tiffauges at midnight on 5 October with instructions that if forced to retreat he was to pull back towards the rest of the army deployed to his rear.9
Treize-Septiers 6 October
Bonchamps and D’Élbée had gathered 10-12,000 men, but appeals to Charette proved fruitless.
Beauvais had been in the process of trying to organise a body of disciplined troops and found himself with the Compagnie-Francaise in Tiffauge
s at dawn on 6 October. He was about to march to join Bonchamps and D’Élbée at Treize-Septiers when he heard feeble gunfire in the distance.10
At 11pm on 5 October Kléber formed his men in three columns. He commanded one column in person and Targes and Blosse led the others. Canclaux and Merlin sent him two cannon from the horse artillery and provided Scherb’s 1,200 men to act as reserve and cover his line of retreat if that proved necessary.
When Kléber’s column arrived at the height of Treize-Septiers they were greeted by well executed enemy fire. Targes also clashed with rebel advanced posts and when he pursued them he discovered their Army on the heights. Kléber ordered him to deploy and await the arrival of Blosse, who subsequently formed up on his right.
Kléber was determined to make up for the defeat at Torfou and when his men called out to him that they had no cannon, he replied that they could go and recapture those they had lost at Torfou: a response that was greeted with cheers.11
With Targes on the left, Blosse on the right, and the rest of his men in the centre, Kléber now advanced. They encountered the Vendéens moving down from the heights and in positions behind hedges and broom firing at the republicans from all along their line. Kléber immediately deployed eight grenadier companies in line with their left flank facing some thick woodland to counter any attempt to turn them. The other battalions remained in column by platoons, ready to move wherever they might be needed.
Just as these dispositions were completed some of Targe’s light infantry were seen retreating, but they rallied when they saw the advance guard deployed ready to support them.12 These same chasseurs now raced towards the Vendéens at bayonet point causing the rebels to give way. Kléber advanced his grenadier battalion to support this attack and deployed the rest of the battalions in column ready to move on the enemy’s left.