Fighting the French Revolution- the Great Vendee Rising of 1793

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Fighting the French Revolution- the Great Vendee Rising of 1793 Page 27

by Rob Harper


  The number of troops and civilian refugees who fled north of the Loire has been the subject of extensive debate. On balance the men able to fight totalled around 40,000 and they were probably followed by at least 20,000 civilians.91 Several thousand rebel fighters remained in the Vendée, some cut off and others taking the opportunity to head home.

  Chapter 12

  The Coastal Vendée stands Alone:

  October and November

  While the main action was focused on Cholet, the royalist leaders of the coastal Vendée gained some respite.

  The capture of Noirmoutier 12 October

  On 9 October, the day before General Haxo’s column entered Legé, Charette’s 3,000 men had set out south then west, marching via Palluau and Commequiers on St-Gilles. The republican garrison in St-Gilles fired on his column causing him to divert to St-Jean-de-Monts and Bouin, where he camped on 11 October.

  Weilland’s garrison in Noirmoutier consisted of two companies of gunners and the 5th Manche.1 To avoid a repeat of his previous debacle, Charette timed the march on the causeway for 1am on 12 October, just as the tide was beginning to rise and therefore aimed at preventing his men from retreating.

  Charette’s assault on Noirmoutier.

  The republicans held posts to the south of the island at La Bassotière, La Casie, La Masion-Rouge and La Fosse, all supported by cannon, in addition to troops within the town of Noirmoutier itself. As Charette’s advance guard headed for Barbâtre his rearguard seized the guns at La Maison-Rouge. After a desperate fight La Bassotière was captured, followed by La Casie. A final action took place at La Fosse where two guns were posted. By 4am all these posts had fallen and by 5am Charette was ready to march on Noirmoutier.2

  They had to cover around 8km through flat and exposed country, cut up by narrow raised walkways between vast salt marshes. Part of the 5th Manche was deployed with two guns at the bridge south of Noirmoutier, but as the Vendéens approached they fled to the town. Weilland tried to organise resistance but was compelled to seek refuge in the château with many of his men. They surrendered when Charette arrived.3

  The capture of Noirmoutier was a major coup for Charette. He garrisoned the island with 1,500 men under the Chevalier René de Tinguy, supported by batteries and more defences, while he departed for Bouin on 15 October taking the remaining 1,500 men and escorting 300 prisoners. These prisoners were executed on the orders of Pajot, having been implicated in an earlier massacre of royalists in Machecoul.4

  By 16 October Charette was back in Machecoul and would remain there over the following week, during which time he heard of the defeat of Cholet. D’Élbée was taken to Noirmoutier under escort of 1,500 men, in the hope that he might recover from his many wounds. A few weeks later this escort returned to Anjou and must have contributed troops to a small army being formed by Pierre Cathelineau, younger brother of the former commander-in-chief.5

  A new Army of the Centre was also in embryonic form under Prudhomme, one of Royrand’s officers, but did not have the strength to unduly worry the republicans.

  Anjou had been devastated, many people had fled the area and many villages were in ruins. The region was soon placed under military occupation with small republican garrisons in Cholet, Mortagne, Châtillon, Bressuire, Cerizay, Vihiers, Chemillé, Jallais, Beaupréau and St-Florent. Commaire, based in Saumur, was placed in overall command.

  Pierre Cathelineau initially lay low, but had some success against Adjudant General Desmarres, the local commander of the Bressuire and Cholet area. For weeks to come his numbers were rarely above 400 men.6

  The Les Sables Front: November to December

  After Torfou, Joly had returned to his own territory and spent the autumn and winter maintaining pressure on the republicans in and around Les Sables, and harassing the post at Pas-Opton. Most of the time all Joly could do was watch as the republicans embarked on a ruthless campaign to seize crops, cattle and goods from his territory, while he rounded up whatever cattle and supplies he could find.

  The Convention were under the illusion that the Vendéen rebels were no longer operating south of the Loire, but Les Sables reported increasing activity in the Challans and La Roche-sur-Yon area.7 Les Sables took the precaution of improving its fortifications and was still receiving reinforcements in early November.8

  St-Gilles 31 October, Joly, Savin and du Cloudy

  Joly’s single significant action in the autumn was an attempt to seize St-Gilles on 31 October in coordination with Savin and Guerry-du-Cloudy with 6-8,000 men. He advanced early that morning via Vie and Pas-Opton to attack St-Gilles with around 5,000 of these men, while another column advanced to attack Croix-de-Vie.9 Adjudant General Charlery was in command at St-Gilles. To cover the town he had constructed earthworks containing ten cannon between the Vie and Jaunay Rivers; a 36pdr, barrier and chevaux-de-frise beyond the cemetery on the Pas-Opton road; an 18pdr covering the Les Sables road; and eight cannon at regular intervals behind entrenchments in a low-lying area of wetlands.10

  Croix-de-Vie was covered by an entrenchment and three cannon and the only route to this settlement was by the Sion road, closed by a chevaux-de-frise and a 36pdr. Two more cannon, at the extremities of the entrenchment, commanded the Sion plain. The road from St-Hilaire had been cut and made unusable.

  The garrison comprised the 9th Gironde, a Lot-et-Garonne battalion and the 5th Charente-Inférieure: totalling 2,000-2,200 men, supported by 250 local patriots.11

  The Vendéens approached in three columns supported by three guns. Joly led a column on the St-Révérend road, Savin led another towards Croix-de-Vie, and a third (mistakenly thought to be commanded by Charette) advanced from Villeneuve to Pas-Opton with all three guns.

  Towards 4pm outposts announced the approach of the right and left columns, while the third was slowed by the tide which blocked the passage at Pas-Opton. 150 men of the 9th Gironde, deployed on the left bank of the Vie, retired in good order on St-Gilles after coming under bombardment. Two of the Vendéen columns merged at La Fenouiller and advanced on St-Gilles at speed and to the beat of drums.

  The attack on St-Gilles and Croix-de-Vie.

  The attack began around 6.15pm, in complete darkness, a gale and torrential rain. Charlery’s tirailleurs pulled back to the town and shut the barrier and a few discharges of grapeshot from the 36pdr was sufficient to discourage a rebel assault.

  The Croix-de-Vie column attacked at the same time but another 36pdr had the same effect. Charlery did not pursue.12

  Build-up of Republican troops

  By mid-November the republicans had gathered 5,000 men in La Mothe-Achard, over 2,000 in St-Gilles, and 2,400 in Les Sables. On 21 November more reinforcements appeared: a 900 strong Orléans battalion, 120 sappers and the Barbézieux Battalion, followed a few days later by 700 men from the 110th Line, who joined the Army when at La Garnache.13

  Haxo verses Charette: November

  The republican priority south of the Loire was to crush Charette, but they were hampered by having to keep an eye on the Loire and the actions of the Grand Army.

  Over the last weeks of October Charette did little from his base at Touvois, simply keeping a close watch on the republicans and gathering supplies. After Cholet, both Haxo and Dutruy were placed under Vimeux’s overall command, operating from his headquarters in Nantes. Haxo was given orders to recapture Noirmoutier, defeat Charette, and re-establish communications between Nantes and Les Sables. Generals Dutruy (Les Sables), Duval (Niort), and Dufour were ordered to cooperate with him. Haxo first planned attacks on Port-Saint-Père and Machecoul, and gathered gunboats, corvettes and a frigate near the mouth of the Loire to assist in the recapture of Noirmoutier.

  With 6,000 men Haxo set out from Nantes on 8 November and met with little initial resistance as he scoured the region for rebels. They occupied St-Philbert and Legé, and crossed the Forêt-de-Prince. On 16 November a small republican force was repulsed at Port-Saint-Père by part of La Cathelinière’s Army.14

 
On 21 November Vimeux ordered Dutruy to begin his offensive and over the next few days he retook La Roche-sur-Yon, Aizenay, Le Poiré, Palluau, Legé and Challans.15 His march had forced rebels from the southern area to join Charette further north.

  Collinet recorded on 24 November that there were now 18,000 Republicans on the march from Paimboeuf, Nantes, Montaigu and Les Sables.16

  Aubertin was back in command of the 11th Orléans and had been relocated to Les Sables by 18 November. He formed part of Dutruy’s force and on 23 November they linked up with Haxo’s men at Legé. The 11th Orléans now fell under Adjudant General Guillaime’s command and on 24 November they were camped near Touvois. On the following day, when near Paulx, he heard that Haxo had established his headquarters in Machecoul to coordinate the assault on Noirmoutier. On that same day Aubertin took temporary command of Guillaime’s troops and camped half a league from Machecoul near the Challans road, in company with other troops.

  Around 25 November the 8th Bas-Rhin, forming part of Jordy’s command, captured Port-Saint-Père by rowing across the river under enemy fire. This action forced La Cathelinère to abandon his artillery and retire on Ste-Pazanne.17 When Jordy pursued him he came under attack from Guérin’s cavalry and was forced to pull back to Port-Saint-Père.

  La Garnache 27 November

  Charette, now joined by Joly and Savin, failed to reach Machecoul before Haxo, and seeing republicans on the Challans to Machecoul road he took up position at La Garnache.

  On 27 November, in freezing weather, Aubertin and Jordy were marching south on the Challans road. Aubertin’s column consisted of a single 4pdr and about 1,200 men, of whom 255 were from his battalion and the rest a mix of numerous detachments (including part of the 110th Line, 109th Line and Grenadiers-Réunis from the Army of Mayence). Jordy’s column was of similar strength.18

  Aubertin was constrained by strict orders not to engage in combat when encountering the enemy. Somewhere near La Garnache he spotted Charette’s army, which he overestimated to be 8,000 strong. Following orders he hastily withdrew, but this emboldened the Vendéens to attack, and to avoid a panic he deployed his men by sections in a closed column (this being the only formation the width of the road allowed). He placed tirailleurs at the front, masking and protecting the 4pdr behind them. Marching at the pas de course they managed to secure some high ground between the opposing forces and, although heavily outnumbered, they unmasked the cannon and the tirailleurs spread out to act in support. The Vendéens spread to right and left but then dispersed towards Challans.

  Aubertin was unable to pursue as he had no cavalry, although he did follow them and camped on high ground just outside La Garnache. It is unclear whether Aubertin had repulsed Charette or, as seems more likely, the royalists simply withdrew to gather at St-Gervais.19

  On 27 November Jordy seized Ste-Pazanne and then marched on Bourgneuf and Beauvoir to support an attempt to destroy La Cathelinière’s Army. On 2 December the Forêt-de-Prince was scoured and rebel supplies seized. Although the Republicans were closing in on La Cathelinière, Charette, Joly and Savin, they were finding it impossible to pin them down.20

  Chapter 13

  The March on Granville

  The campaign north of the Loire is commonly known as the Virée de Galerne, from a name of Celtic origin used to describe a variable west and north-west wind, and used to symbolise the nature of the campaign as the armies marched and counter-marched in different directions.

  Map for the campaign north of the Loire.

  General Fabrefond, responsible for holding the north bank of the Loire, had failed to stop the Grand Army and when L’Échélle’s army approached St-Florent they were surprised to be met by the freed republican prisoners marching south, and even more surprised to see that their prey had eluded them.

  A council of war in Beaupréau concluded that they must protect Angers and Nantes in anticipation that the rebels would attempt to seize either city in a bid to re-cross the Loire, in addition to covering the more direct crossings. On 19 October Beaupuy force-marched to Les Ponts-de-Cé via St-Florent to reinforce the republicans in and around Angers under Olagnier’s command. On 20 October, the Luçon column, temporarily under Canuel’s command, received orders to cross the river at St-Florent and track the enemy. Representative Merlin moved to cover Ancenis while the rest of the army marched to Nantes.

  On 19 October the Vendéens were still in Varades. The senior officers considered Lescure to be their new commander by right, but as he felt his wound would prove mortal he asked that they support La Rochejaquelein instead and this request was accepted.

  The 21-year-old La Rochejaquelein accepted the role with great trepidation, but would be ably supported by Stofflet who was now confirmed as his second-in-command. Their first priority was to find food, rest and reorganise the army, but with republican advanced posts appearing in St-Florent they had to move quickly.

  La Rochejaquelein wanted the army to make an attempt on Angers or Nantes. Lescure, in agonising pain and barely conscious, urged them to stick close to the banks of the Loire.1 At this critical moment an émigré, Le Haye-Sainte-Hilaire, was presented to a council of war with important information. He had travelled from England with news that the British government was prepared to intervene and provide the Vendéens with military support.

  This decision by the British was made with some reticence and following long debate as to how they should support French opposition to the Revolution. There was division over whether they should focus their energy on the campaign in the Low Countries, support the émigré army in the field or, with recent evidence suggesting that the Vendée Rising was far more extensive than they had originally assumed, support the rebels directly. There was also long discussion over whether they should allow the Comte d’Artois to lead the rebels in person, which was his professed wish.

  A handful of émigrés lobbied the Vendéen cause, and a report by Tinténiac, who had returned to England from a visit to rebel headquarters in September, convinced the British government that they merited support. The Comte d’Artois wrote to the Vendéens on 7 October indicating that he had the blessing of the Prince Regent and asked that they now regard him as their leader and companion-in-arms.2

  The scale of the Rising came as a complete surprise to the British and a plan to send an army to their support was now put into action. However, time was slipping by, and communication between the rebels and England was painfully slow. To achieve a successful landing the rebels would need to control a port and Dundas favoured St-Mâlo. La Haye-Sainte-Hilaire conveyed this news to the rebel leaders and indicated that the English fleet was ready to sail but securing a port was imperative.

  This news convinced them that they must march north. They decided to head for Talmont’s homeland centred on Laval, to gain recruits, secure supplies, and put some distance between themselves and the enemy. Being in Laval also kept their options open: to move on Rennes, march back to the Loire, progress north, or move into Britanny.

  On 19 October they were on the march, led by an advance guard of cavalry and light guns. Stofflet commanded the rearguard as their lumbering column marched via Ingrandes and reached Candé that same day, having brushed aside republican detachments on route. The following day they gathered supplies and on 21 October marched in pouring rain to Sergé then Château-Gontier. The republicans in the area dared not attack such a large column and a feeble attempt to resist them at Château-Gontier was beaten off with ease. The following evening they set out once again and reached Entrammes towards midnight.

  Laval 23 October

  The Vendéens approached Laval towards 8am on 23 October and at the entrance to the town came up against 5-6,000 republicans behind improvised defences and supported by two guns.3 These troops were nearly all national guards and levies and the Vendéens immediately attacked. First they obliterated a barricade with their light guns and then their cavalry moved into action. At risk of being outflanked the republican commander, Adjudant General Letou
rnoult, gave orders to retreat on Mayenne.4 The battle was brief and republican losses may have been as high as 600 men.5

  Beauvais wrote that the Vendéen advance guard was formed from their best soldiers and was around 6,000 strong. With the bulk of the army providing support to their rear, they marched on the enemy with bayonets fixed. The Vendéen cavalry pursued on the Mayenne and Craon roads and had orders to spare the levies, identifiable by their civilian dress.6

  Laval was largely sympathetic to the Vendéen cause and, with Talmont being an influential figure, Chouan bands began to arrive over the following week. Madame de la Rochejaquelein wrote that they called these men the Petite-Vendée, recognisable by their clothing which was generally black or formed from hairy goat skins.7

  Talmont was responsible for their organisation and appointed the former head of Laval’s National Guard, Besnier-de-Chambray, as overall commander. Besnier had been in hiding having declared for the Fédéralist cause at the start of June. The Vendéens had already received 200 recruits when they reached Château-Gontier and at Laval bands under Jean Cottereau, Aimé de Boisguy, Louis de Hercé, Lecomte, Allard and Louis Hubert brought their numbers up to around 1,500.

  The contingent, under the former salt smuggler Jean Cottereau, better known as Jean Chouan (the name by which many bands north of the Loire came to be known), only recognised Talmont’s authority and did not want to be seen as part of Besnier-de-Chambray’s command.

  The recruits who joined the Vendéens north of the Loire seem to have numbered only 3-4,000.8 However, these troops were considered wellarmed, performed a vital role in the battles, and often acted as rearguard.

 

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