by Rob Harper
Republican moves 21 to 22 October
On 21 October the republicans were deployed as follows: Kléber, with perhaps 4,000 men, was in advance of Nantes at the Camp of St-George; Chalbos and Westermann were in Nantes with around 12,000; Canuel was in St-Florent with 2-3,000 men; Beaupuy was in Angers with 3,000 men, and Olagnier, also with 3,000, was moving west from Angers on the Ancenis road.9 From Nantes and Saumur, Vimeux and Commaire had orders to watch the south bank of the Loire; Marigny was put in charge of troops from Nantes to Paimboeuf, and Blosse was ordered to scour the south bank of the Loire before following Canuel in pursuit of the rebels.
On the next day Beaupuy marched on Candé, Westermann moved on Nort with 2,500 men, and Kléber marched to Ancenis. Along with Canuel and Olagnier, Beaupuy had orders to pursue the brigands relentlessly.10
La Croix-Bataille Night of 24 to 25 October
The Vendéens needed time to rest and reorganise before heading north, but the republicans were closing in. Beaupuy marched from Candé on to Château-Gontier, arriving around 5pm on 24 October, but had received no news of L’Échélle’s movements. Westermann joined him after a long detour and was eager to attack the rebels immediately. As the troops were in need of rest, and Château-Gontier was over 30km from Laval, Beaupuy tried to dissuade him suggesting that they wait until Canuel arrived on the next day, especially as they would be fighting in the dark. Westermann, the senior by length of service, would not be dissuaded and gave orders to march immediately, hoping to repeat his success at Châtillon.
In the late evening the Vendéens heard the sound of distant gunfire, warning them of the approaching republican forces. Towards midnight Westermann and Beaupuy arrived on the heath at La Croix-Bataille with 4,000 men, and it was the sound of gunfire between republican scouts and a Vendéen outpost that alerted the royalist army to their approach.
Forestier and some officers set out to scout the enemy and returned around 1am with news that the republicans were marching straight on Laval. La Rochejaquelein deployed a strong division on the Le Mans road, to cover his left flank, and with the rest of his troops headed south on the Entrammes road, his right protected by the River Mayenne.
With the advantage of surprise gone, Westermann was in the process of deploying Beaupuy’s forces when the Vendéen army bore down on them and a fierce firefight commenced. The rebel forces gradually grew in strength as more arrived from Laval.
The two armies could only distinguish each other by the flashes of gunpowder. The Vendéens were helped by a local guide who was able to lead them by side roads around the heath at La Croix-Bataille to attack the enemy’s rear. The battle degenerated into a confused mêlée at close quarters, with accounts of both sides taking cartridges from the same caissons. Forestier even recalled fighting for several minutes at the side of a republican officer.11
At one point two republican 4pdrs unsettled the royalist ranks and at another their left flank came under severe pressure. Westermann’s cavalry was so badly harassed that they refused to charge after an initial encounter.12 In the early hours Stofflet broke the republican left flank and forced their withdrawal.13 The German and Swiss Companies were especially distinguished in this battle and Chouan bands under Aimé du Boisguy and Jean Cottereau fought courageously alongside the Vendéens.
Westermann had stubbornly refused to retreat until he realised he might fall into rebel hands. Abandoning two cannon he withdrew to the bridge at Entrammes, where Vendéen guns caused further losses to his depleted forces. Westermann may have lost as many as 1,600 men in this battle, although most were probably dispersed rather than killed.14
After this victory the Vendéens returned triumphantly to Laval to the great joy and relief of the refugees.
On 25 October Kléber rallied most of the advance guard at Château-Gontier and held a meeting with the commander-in-chief. He was astonished to see that L’Échélle had failed to deploy the troops in good positions or provide them with food. Kléber moved his troops to Villiers-Charlemagne, 10km beyond Château-Gontier.
Chalbos, with L’Échélle and the headquarters staff, camped at Saint-Germain de l’Hommel, while Westermann, with the Light-Advance Guard under Danican, returned to Entrammes and pillaged its château. Westermann only obeyed Kléber’s order to return to Villiers when he received it for the third time.
Kléber now received orders from L’Échélle which indicated that the army would move on Laval ‘majestically and in a mass’. Kléber had no idea what L’Échélle had in mind and no further instruction was given. Both Savary and Kléber thought that the army should regroup and rest for a day or two before pursuing further action. Kléber ordered Blosse and Beaupuy, still in Château-Gontier, to join him, but to leave a strong post at that town’s bridge.
He dined that night with Westermann, Savary, Marceau and Danican. Westermann complained that the army should have advanced to the Entrammes Heights, but Kléber wanted to rest the troops and would have preferred a coordinated attack from multiple points with support from 4,000 troops then at Vitré.15
Entrammes 26 October
L’Échélle ordered Beaupuy to command his column’s advance guard, and gave orders that the army was to deploy only when it arrived on the heath at La Croix-Bataille. Kléber felt these orders demonstrated a complete lack of military understanding and wrote that all the generals were furious. To march an entire army in a single column, without making feints or diversions, left them completely exposed to attack on either flank. They had no option but to obey L’Échélle.
There was an old wooden bridge on stone piers at Entrammes, and a wooden bridge and two fords further to its east. As the banks of the river were steep and rocky they were passable only to infantry and the fields were surrounded by high hedges.
Entrammes is a small stone-built village largely focused on a single street with a church at its northern end. The river valley to its north is quite wooded, and the château is hidden in woodland on the north bank of the river to the west of the bridge. The whole area is claustrophobically focused on the low point by the bridge, tucked down in the valley northwest of the church.
The land between Entrammes and Château-Gontier rolls in long uphill then downhill stretches. The land drops away to either side of the road between these settlements, with the lower ground and river crossings being noticeably woody. The area today still retains many hedges and flattens out around Villiers-Charlemagne.
The opposing forces were of similar strength: roughly 18,000 Vendéens to 19-20,000 republicans, but when the battle began the republicans were spread out over many kilometres. A large part of the Vendéen army remained in Laval protecting the refugees.
With five representatives and several commissaries accompanying him, L’Échélle would have had little freedom of action. His most experienced troops remained the ever-diminishing veterans of the former Army of Mayence, and once again these bore the brunt of the fighting. Yet discipline was beginning to break down amongst Kléber’s troops and over the preceding days he had been repeatedly forced to issue strict orders against pillaging.
Beaupuy led a strong advance guard of around 4,000 men supported by 4 guns; Kléber’s 1st Division totalled around 7,000 and 12 guns, formed from two brigades under Scherb and Damas, and 17 companies of grenadiers under Blosse; Chalbos’ division was also around 7,000 strong, supported by 12 guns, comprising: a light advance guard under Danican, Muller’s Saumur Division, brigades under Canuel and Chabot, and light troops under Westermann.
L’Échélle had specifically ordered the men to march in two files along the road and ignored advice that the army be split in two to use alternate minor roads. Dubbed ‘the Incapable’ by his troops, he seemed to be living up to his name.
The sequence of events in this battle are difficult to unravel as once the fighting began it was fast-paced and eventually spread over many kilometres. Historians have therefore confused a number of events and it is only possible to guess when or where certain stages of the battle t
ook place.
The Battle of Entrammes.
Beaupuy led the advance some way ahead of the other divisions. Kléber came next, then Chalbos, each separated by some distance. Where Westermann and Danican marched is not noted, but they were probably now with Chalbos’ division, as indeed was L’Échélle. Olagnier seems to have received no orders at all and remained in Château-Gontier from where, in the evening, he left for Craon.
Beaupuy was marching straight up the Laval road. According to Gréau, he crossed the River Jouanne and when about 1km to its north he encountered an advance party of La Rochejaquelein’s troops.16
La Rochejaquelein had set out around 9am on news that the republicans were on the march. As a strong contingent of the Grand Army set out from Laval the dangerously ill Lescure wanted to mount up and join them, but was dissuaded by his friends. He managed to gather enough strength to encourage the troops with words and gestures from a window as they filed by.17
For some time the battle focused around two republican cannon deployed by Beaupuy near the Château of La Drujotterie and which had been tearing holes in Stofflet’s ranks. Stofflet managed to seize these guns with a small detachment of cavalry, killing the gunners and turning them on the enemy. His division then repulsed an attempt by 600 republicans to retake them, with even La Rochejaquelein and his staff helping to defend them.18 After this determined fighting the rebels gained the upper hand and forced Beaupuy to pull back and deploy south of the Jouanne River. The Grand Army now deployed their forces on the heights north of the Jouanne River, facing Beaupuy’s troops.
As Royalist cavalry scouted the republican positions they deployed artillery along the heights and formed up in three main bodies: to the left Forestier, Royrand, Des Essarts, La Ville-Baugé, De Hargues and the Chouan contingent; in the centre, Stofflet, Fleuriot, Duhoux, and Marigny; and on the right, Talmont and Lyrot. Perrault commanded the artillery.19
La Rochejaquelein allowed Beaupuy to deploy unmolested, aiming to pin him while he infiltrated around his flanks. At around 11am he gave the signal for the artillery to open fire.
Marceau was with Beaupuy in person and had sent a message to Kléber urging him to race to their support and was undoubtedly relieved to see his column appear around this time. Kléber deployed to left and right of the road (probably on Beaupuy’s flanks) and in turn sent a message to L’Échélle asking him to send Chalbos’ troops to outflank the enemy left. As Chalbos was still several kilometres to his south this was a futile request.
Perrault deployed four 12pdrs and was causing increasing losses in the Mayence ranks, when he was wounded and replaced by La Ville-Baugé. With the cartridge bags nearly exhausted Royrand galloped away in search of more and on his return was seriously wounded when a musket ball struck him in the head. Royrand’s wavering troops were steadied by La Rochejaquelein.20
In spite of the overwhelming enemy numbers Beaupuy held his ground for a couple of hours. Gréau21 indicates that towards midday La Rochejaquelein launched an attack with his right flank, crossing at the Châteliers Ford to attack Beaupuy’s left and his centre pressing forwards under Stofflet’s lead. Forestier meanwhile moved forwards with the left. The republicans were being turned and, in spite of the efforts of Beaupuy, Kléber and Marceau, they had no option but to pull back as best they could; some fell into disorder and some formed square to fend off the rebels.22 If Gréau is correct, they managed to organise some limited resistance on high ground around La Bétonnière, between Entrammes and the Ouette Bridge, supported by six guns deployed by Representative Merlin.
Beaupuy and Marceau, with the support of Merlin and Turreau, wanted to rally the fugitives on the Ouette Heights south of the bridge and Kléber dispatched his two reserve battalions to secure the crossing.
Chalbos had set out from St-Germain-de l’Hommel around midday and sometime after 3pm his column reached the Ouette Heights. As the Vendéens appeared, Chalbos’ men, formed in mass on the main road, found it impossible to deploy in the difficult terrain and many simply fled.23 The Chouan leaders, Jean Chouan and Boisguy, used minor roads to march around the republican right flank and appeared towards their rear, undoubtedly provoking this rout. Having witnessed the rout of Chalbos’ column, Kléber’s men ‘fled like a flock of sheep’,24 abandoning their cannon along the way, cannon that were now turned on them once again.
A republican soldier named Broussais recalled, ‘Each feared to be wounded, knowing that if they suffered this misfortune no one would have the humanity to help them escape.’25
By 4pm the republicans were in full retreat.
At some point in the flight Representatives Merlin and Turreau rallied a few hundred men and used an abandoned baggage train as an improvised fort, until weight of numbers forced them to make their escape.
Beauvais said, ‘several of their corps fled to left and right, saving themselves in the countryside; their main body retreated on the great road with their artillery and baggage, which soon fell into our hands.’ He recalled that they were unable to fire grapeshot on the republicans for fear of hitting their own men and that the fight was so closely engaged that they were seizing republicans by the scruff of the neck and using the bayonet.26
Prior to the battle La Rochejaquelein issued strict orders that the Vendéens were not to disperse but to fight in massed columns close to their leaders. This decision had a telling effect and whenever the republicans tried to make a stand the rebels simply swarmed around them.
Around midday L’Échélle had sent orders to Blosse to march north from Château-Gontier on Villiers, but when they eventually set out, his grenadier companies collided with the troops leading the republican flight, L’Échélle amongst them. Blosse tried to block their path but was forced back by weight of numbers.
The pursuit continued for six hours as La Rochejaquelein drove the republican flight on Château-Gontier. Here Kléber, Marceau, Blosse and Beaupuy attempted to organise serious resistance. It was probably after 10pm and in complete darkness that the Vendéens approached this town.
Château-Gontier is split by the Mayenne River. The old walled town is on the western bank, on ground rising up from the bridge to the church, with a suburb on the east bank. Once again accounts are confused but in the darkness some events can be pieced together. Stofflet, at the head of his tirailleurs, is said to have slid behind an enemy column, driving them back onto the Mayenne, drowning some and forcing 300 Mayenҫais to swim for their lives.27
The royalists were temporarily held back by two guns that Blosse deployed on high ground overlooking the approach to the bridge, and they found some republicans dug in along the opposite river bank. Kléber desperately tried to organise resistance at the bridge but only 100 men rallied to him, supported by others in surrounding houses.
Surprised that the bridge had not been cut, and fearing a trap, the Vendéens hesitated. At great personal risk La Rochejaquelein seized a standard and led the assault, reputedly crying out, ‘Advance my friends, advance! Will you let these men who chased you from your country escape?’28 Storming over the bridge they seized some cannon and a confused melee developed. La Rochejaquelein called for artillery support and Beauvais appeared with four 4pdrs, two being directed on the Lion d’Angers Gate and two on the church.29
Blosse and a handful of chasseurs-à-cheval made a futile attempt to recapture the bridge at the cost of their lives. Thus, said Kléber, ‘one of the most brilliant and valiant officers in the army perished.’30
Beaupuy reputedly led some regiments towards the bridge but was seriously wounded by a shot that cut through his body. ‘I have been unable to gain a victory for the Republic,’ he is reported to have said, ‘but at least I die for her.’31 His bloody chemise was taken to his grenadiers to inspire revenge and they placed themselves in ambush in the roads and houses beyond the bridge, firing into the Vendéens from the windows and causing them to hesitate. Kléber joined these troops and the Vendéens at one point wavered but were stabilised by La Rochejaquelein and St
offlet. The ever increasing tide of rebels kept pressing forwards and a separate body appeared and captured the gate on the Craon road, possibly helped by locals.32 The republicans could take no more and were seen to be routing in several directions. Those on the Lion d’Angers road were pursued until around 11pm.
The Vendéens discovered that their wounded, left behind in Château-Gontier only a few days previously, had all been massacred. There was therefore no appetite to take prisoners.
The Vendéens had achieved an overwhelming victory. The republicans admitted to losing nineteen cannon and plenty of supplies. When they eventually managed to reorganise their army there were only 16,000 in their ranks, implying they suffered around 4,000 casualties. By contrast the Vendéens lost an estimated 400 killed and a further 1,200 wounded.33
For the time being the republicans were broken as a fighting force and were scattered far and wide. Only 7,000 were rallied behind the Oudon River by Kléber on the day after the battle. On that same day Kléber wrote to the CPS and acknowledged the outstanding quality of Henri de la Rochejaquelein:
‘We faced their truly admirable impetuosity and élan communicated to them by a young man. This young man was Henri de la Rochejaquelein, who was made their general-in-chief after the crossing of the Loire… He demonstrated in this unfortunate battle a military science and aplomb in manoeuvres that we have not seen with the brigands since Torfou.’34
‘L’Échélle the Incompetent’ was sent on leave to Nantes, purportedly to recover his health, but only to take ill and die on 11 November.
The representatives invited Kléber to take command, but he deferred to the more senior Chalbos who became interim commander-in-chief while more formal arrangements were considered.
On 29 October the republicans held a Council of War at Lion d’Angers. Merlin, Turreau and Dembarrère were amongst those eager to strike back at the rebels in Château-Gontier, but it did not take Kléber long to convince them that the army was in no fit state to fight and needed to fall back to Angers to reorganise and be resupplied. The debris of the army therefore pulled back to Angers on 30 October.