by Rob Harper
The Vendéens claimed the enemy were soon routed and rushed back over the bridge into Granville. They retreated so quickly that they denied Beauvais the opportunity to seize the gates as planned.70 Chief of Staff Coffy reported that after around two hours of fierce combat they had retreated due to the superiority of the enemy’s artillery and their large numbers of cavalry.71 By 3pm they were safely within the town walls.72
The Vendéen advance now came under bombardment from two gunboats in the harbour near Mole-Neuf. Peyre says the principal objective of these gunboats was to sweep the area around the bridge over the Boscq, the shore between that bridge and the old port, and to supress the fire from a Vendéen battery set up near La Haguette.73 Two 18pdrs covered the Rue des Juifs, although these guns reputedly opened up prematurely, killing troops from both sides.74
While this action progressed along the Rue des Juifs, Vendéens were also following other routes to infiltrate the lower town.75 In an astonishing oversight, or act of treachery, no one could find the key to the entrance in the curtain wall between the two demi-bastions on the Isthmus, so the republicans were forced to improvise and block the entrance as best they could.
Peyre reported that he had deployed three 8pdrs and a 12pdr on the jetty of the old port to support the gunboats; the old quay had been fortified to prevent the enemy from seizing the Esplanade de Roc, and the houses of these old quays were occupied by the 9th Manche.76
The first part of the action was over and the siege was now about to commence, but when the Vendéens looked out to sea no English ships could be seen.
The Siege
The Vendéen established their headquarters at La Calvaire and Beauvais indicated that three Vendéen batteries were set up, but they only had 4pdrs, 8pdrs, and a couple of 12pdrs: all too weak for a siege.
A contemporary sketch of the siege shows five guns deployed on high ground west of Grande-Houle, two closer to the town near the west coast, and three north of the Boscq Stream.77 Peyre also mentions two guns on the south-east reverse of the height at La Haguette, two on the site of the old fort of La Roche-Gautier, and two north of the Boscq. In all the rebels only had fifteen guns and Beauvais set up some bellows to produce heated shot.
Although the republicans had a vast superiority in cannon, many would have been in fixed positions facing away from the eastern approach to Granville. There were a number of cannon deployed behind a barbette78 near the main gate at the west end of the Rue des Juifs. This barbette was on a raised earth platform (a cavalier), but as it was overlooked by nearby houses on the Rue des Juifs it quickly became vulnerable to snipers and those manning it took punishing losses.
Having suppressed the fire from this battery the Vendéens focused their efforts towards the nearby battery of Marché, where they were planning to undertake their first assault.79 It was manned by naval gunners and comprised two 24pdrs behind a hastily constructed knee-high parapet.80 Once again heavy casualties were inflicted and by 9pm the Vendéens were infiltrating the lower defences around the Isthmus and north of the Rue des Juifs.
Unperturbed by a fusillade from the ramparts, Forestier led his men in an assault, but came up against walls fifteen metres in height. The ladders from nearby houses were found to be too short and they were forced to use bayonets hammered between the stones to improvise steps. Some managed to climb up and over the ramparts, but Forestier fell wounded and the demoralised attackers withdrew, sliding down the steep banks north of the Rue des Juifs. Near to 300 Vendéens ended up piled in a tangle of bodies in the huge ditch at the bottom.81 Forestier remained unconscious in the ditch for some time before he was evacuated to safety.
The rebels had managed to move onto the covered way near to the demi-bastions and curtain wall on the Isthmus. Rochejaquelein made a tentative attempt to attack these defences but the fighting soon degenerated into an intermittent exchange of gunfire and shouted insults.
After dark the Vendéens attempted to move a 12pdr towards the town gate, but when the limber horses were killed at the bridge they were forced to give up.82
At around 2am Peyre ordered red-hot shot to be prepared and fired into the suburbs to clear the enemy from these positions, but without a furnace to heat the shot it took some time to carry out this order. At 4am he repeated the order in writing. Property near the ramparts eventually caught fire, but at more risk to the republicans as the wind was mainly blowing in their direction.83
The Seige of Granville.
During the night the Vendéens attempted more than one assault on the Isthmus, but a full moon and clear sky meant they could be easily spotted. Beauvais went to the Isthmus at 10pm and found La Rochejaquelein standing upright and exposed, firing on the republicans, until he managed to persuade him to take cover. Beauvais indicated that from the covered way near the demi-bastions the men could open fire on the ramparts, and using this covering fire they could then deploy ladders and storm the defences. By making diversionary attacks elsewhere it was felt this might just succeed, so this was the plan agreed for the following day.84
All through the night Peyre and his staff toured the defences encouraging the men. An intermittent cannonade continued but infantry fire largely petered out and many Vendéens went in search of sustenance and sleep.
15 November
As the second day arrived Beauvais went to the headquarters. The news was discouraging. Although their losses in men were not considered high, they had lost fifteen distinguished officers. Marigny had also been forced to return to Avranches to secure more ammunition, leading to further delays.
Looking across the port, Beauvais noticed that the tide was out, and suggested crossing this area to attack the town from the high ground at Le Roc. They decided to carry out this attack immediately. Experience had taught them that their men were not intimidated by cannon fire and, once they were at the base of Le Roc, Beauvais believed they would be under cover. He also mistakenly thought the area would only be lightly defended. Stofflet was put in command of this attack, with Beauvais accompanying him to help identify the easiest route. The men assigned to this task were assembled at the battery at Lude.85
Unknown to Beauvais, there was no access from Le Roc to the town, which was also defended by outworks and ramparts. D’Obenheim was familiar with the town’s defences so must have known this, so his loyalty to the Vendéens was evidently questionable.
When the troops selected for this attack were pulled back from the front line, others thought they were retreating and took flight. This flight left the selected troops thinking an enemy army must be approaching, only adding to the panic. Beauvais said he retained fewer than 100 men to make the attack.86 This small group began their advance and confronted the 9th Manche dug into the houses along the quay. Facing artillery, infantry, and gunboats this was a pointless enterprise and they were forced to take cover behind grounded boats. When at last they managed to reach Le Roc it became evident that it would not be easy to climb its steep slopes.
The Vendéens had been unnerved by troops seen approaching Granville earlier in the day. They turned out to be levies from surrounding communes who withdrew once they realised the size of the royalist army. However, with no sight of the English Fleet, a lack of siege equipment, and the failure of the first day’s attacks, the troops were demoralised and began leaving in large numbers.
Rumours had spread that Talmont and other officers were aiming to take ship to England, and that is why they had marched to Granville. With the command structure breaking down, La Rochejaquelein conceded to the inevitable and ordered the retreat around 1pm.
The batteries at La Calvaire and on the old Coutances road continued to fire until 5pm to cover the withdrawal of the army.87 As night fell on 15 November the republicans in Granville were content to sit tight.
Béjarry and his men had not been made aware of the army’s retreat and discovered at 10am on 16 November that they were alone before the town. Setting off at some risk, they eventually caught up with the army when it reached P
ontorson.
Losses totalled around 400 republicans killed and wounded and 600 Vendéens killed.88 Beauvais regretted the loss of several cannon that were abandoned in the hasty retreat.
Where were the English?
The failure of the English to appear has been the cause of acrimonious debate. They are blamed for having betrayed the rebels and missed a perfect opportunity to come to their aid. Unfortunately the promises given by the émigrés were exaggerated and the English were far from ready to offer the required support as quickly as the rebels were led to believe.
While the Siege of Granville was underway the Earl of Moira was about to be appointed commander of the planned expedition. He was in Portsmouth on 24 November, nine days after the siege had ended, when he received his orders and was appointed major general of forces destined for the expedition. These comprised four brigades of infantry, totalling less than 6,000 men, supported by ten cannon. They were to be reinforced by a Hessian contingent, totalling a further 3,500 infantry and 500 cavalry, but on 24 November these Hessians were still with the Duke of York on mainland Europe.
On 31 November, Admiral McBride passed through the Needles and out into the Channel.
Lieutenant Charles Stewart of the 28th Foot picks up the story:89
‘2 December: At daylight was off Cherbourg… the admiral sent the Druid and Eurydice frigates close under the land…in hopes that the royalists might have possession of some tenable port, or to receive and answer concerted signals, but instead the frigates were fired on from two small batteries close on the shore. We have since learnt that the carmagnoles were much alarmed at so unexpected a visit as we were. Along the shores of a rich and fertile looking country we could perceive the signals of alarm spreading from one post to another; being thus disappointed we shaped our course for Guernsey at 12 o’clock.’
He summed up what seemed a half-hearted attempt at an invasion as follows:
‘Thus ended…the Expedition for the Coast of France…an expedition which upon its departure from England the greatest advantages were hoped for…, there remains but little doubt that the royalists of France were too sanguine in their expectations, and represented to the government of Britain the situation of their affairs in a far more flattering and forward state than what they actually were.
‘It requires not one moment’s reflection to decide on the impossibility of eleven British battalions and five thousand Hessians, the latter of which had not at this time arrived, attempting an invasion without prompt, united, and vigorous assistance from those to whose aid they had come…they possessed not a single port upon their coast, and along the whole shore from Cherbourg to St-Mâlo, nothing was observed but the tricolor flag…and moreover it was said, that there reigned in the army of the royalists that spirit of equality so destructive of good order and military discipline; their chiefs were even afraid to promise the intended succour from England and lead them to the coast lest should the British forces not that moment be in sight they might fall victims to the fury of their soldiers, as men designed to betray them.’
On 16 December Moira advised McBride that they had received news of the royalists’ retreat on the Loire.90 Although he remained in the Channel Islands until the end of the year, still hopeful of being able to provide some assistance, on 17 December the expeditionary force set sail and returned to Spithead.
The commander of the British forces in the Channel Islands questioned the credibility of Monsieur de Solérac, suggesting he had betrayed the royalists at the attack on Granville.91
This whole debacle was caused by a failure of the British government to fully comprehend, or be fully convinced by, the news filtering across the Channel. When at long last an expedition sailed, it was already three weeks too late. In the circumstances the conclusions penned by Lieutenant Charles Stewart could deservedly be met with derision by the Vendéens.
As a final painful reminder of the pitifully sluggish response by the British it was only on 4 January 1794 that the convoy from Ostend carrying the Hessian troops anchored in Spithead.
Mutiny
The Siege of Granville had failed and on 16 November elements within the royalist army mutinied. A breakdown of trust was already evident before Granville and may have influenced the decision to keep a large part of the army at Avranches during the battle. Some Vendéens were even boasting that they could have taken Granville but decided not to because they believed the rumours that their leaders would then desert them with their ‘fine ladies’.92
Small groups of peasants began to march south, and while a level of order was restored thanks to the intervention of Abbé Bernier, the bulk of the army refused to follow an order by La Rochejaquelein to march on Caen and remained in Avranches on 17 November.
In spite of this disobedience, La Rochejaquelein, Stofflet and D’Autichamp set out in the direction of Caen, but followed by less than 1,000 men. Stofflet, furious with this setback, was nevertheless determined to head for a port and had his eyes on Cherbourg. They managed to reach Villedieu, and while La Rochejaquelein returned to Avranches that same evening and re-joined the troops in time to lead them into combat at Pontorson, Stofflet only pulled back on the following day. This was crucial for what now followed, as he was in Avranches when news came in that a mounted party led by Talmont was reportedly heading for the coast.
Talmont and a group of around twenty men, women and children, instead of marching south with the army, did indeed head towards the coast west of Avranches between midnight and 1am on 19 November. Talmont appears to have prearranged transport to Jersey.
It is true that Talmont, being from the high nobility, would have made an excellent ambassador for the Vendéen cause. This had been considered at the council of war in Fougères, but the aim had also been to transport the refugees to safety at the same time.93
Stofflet managed to seize them before they could escape and, although there is some doubt over what followed, one source suggests that Talmont was brought before Stofflet and accused of cowardice and treachery and told he would be put on trial. Marsonnière may even have drawn his sword and advanced towards Talmont declaring, ‘If it wasn’t for respect for your bloodline, I’d run you through with my sabre.’94
Talmont had gained a reputation as a womaniser which, according to Madame de la Rochejaquelein, dishonoured the Catholic cause and he now lost what respect he had left. However, whether he was aiming to desert or, as he claimed, simply escorting others to safety, he was to play a crucial role in saving the army over the next few days.
Stofflet led the rearguard out of Avranches early on 19 November and with the republicans closing in, the Vendéen leaders had to urgently regain control of their men if the army and refugees were to survive the trap closing around them.
Chapter 14
The Race to the Loire
While the Vendéens were before Granville, republican forces had indeed been closing in. Rossignol’s army reached Rennes by 15 November where orders were given to merge the troops in Rennes with his own.
Rossignol’s army was now reformed under Divisional Generals Kléber and Muller, and brigades under Marigny, Marceau, Boucret, Legros, Westermann, Canuel, Chambertin, Amey and Klinger: in total 21,000 men. Chalbos was granted a period of sick leave and Kléber confessed to being in despair having ‘never seen a collection of men with such little ability to lead troops’.1
Informed that the rebels were before Granville, they were ordered to march on the Fougères and Antrain roads (the stronger column, the Army of the West, taking the Antrain road). Sepher was instructed to move on Viré and Ville-Dieu; Tribout was ordered to hold Dol; and General Cadene, with 2,500 troops and support from local national guards, was ordered to take command in St-Mâlo. General of Division Tribout was currently in Dol and Dinan with 4,400 men, and Sepher was approaching Coutances with 6,000 men.
Kléber reached Saint-Aubin d’Andigné on 16 November in dreadful weather. On news that the Vendéens had failed in their assault and were moving back
on Avranches, a large part of the republican army concentrated around Antrain on 18 November: Marceau at Tremblay; Chambertin at Sacey; Marigny’s cavalry at Montanel, and his infantry at Saint-Ouen-de-la-Roërie.
Rossignol’s aim was to cover Antrain and enable the army to scout in the direction of Avranches. He sent troops to check the roads towards Pontorson, the Selune crossings, and bridges at Bault, Ducey and Pontaubault. The Pontaubault Bridge had been partially broken by the rebels, so engineers were dispatched to report on the state of alternative routes.2 General Marigny used the opportunity to distribute printed proclamations amongst troops from the former Légion-de-la-Fraternité who had left rebel ranks. These men were now returned to the Vendéen army to lure more men to desert.
On 18 November Rossignol sent Canuel and Amey on the Fougères road to cover St-James, march around the rebel left flank, and hinder any attempt to move in that direction. With Tribout holding the enemy’s western flank, he was ready to march on Avranches on the following day.
The Vendéens were evidently marching into a trap. Apart from 10,000 republican troops in the vicinity of Antrain, Tribout was approaching Pontorson with 4,400, Peyre was in Avranches with 5,000, Sepher was at Coutances with 6,000, and 8,000 were covering the Fougères road under Amey and Chambertin: in all around 34,000 men. However, although Sepher had marched towards Granville on 16 November, on news that the siege had lifted, he was ordered back to Coutances to cover Cherbourg and would remain there until 23 November. Only then would he march on Avranches.