by Rob Harper
Pontorson 18 November
Tribout reached Pontorson on 17 November. Following days of rainfall the roads were in a terrible condition and the fields flooded. There was torrential rain on the evening of 18 November, and as the Vendéens approached Pontorson they soon became aware of the presence of republican troops.
The wider area around Pontorson, south of the famous landmark of Mont-St-Michel, is largely flat. The landscape was broken up into a grid of hedged fields, and the main road to Dol through Pontorson runs east to west and slopes gradually downhill towards the River Couesnon. Beyond the town, to north and south, the landscape dips downhill, providing plenty of opportunity for the rebels to slide unnoticed around the republican flanks.
Tribout had deployed in line behind hedgerows at Caugé, a village close to the eastern edge of Pontorson. He said four of his seven guns were placed on the St James road, one in front of the right of his line and the other two behind the Couesnon Bridge.3 He deployed a long line of skirmishers on the northern and southern flanks of the town and kept small reserves in the town and on the west bank of the Couesnon River.
Vendéen troops under Forestier overpowered a small advance guard sent by Tribout on the Avranches road. Thinking the road ahead was now clear they were surprised to come face to face with republicans deployed in advance of Pontorson. Forestier goaded the peasants into action by saying they had abandoned their leaders at Granville so he wanted to see what they could do now.4
Around 1km from the republicans many of the rebels split into two columns to march around Tribout’s flanks and, following a lively cannonade, some deployed behind an embankment to fire on the enemy.5 After some hesitation they were spurred into action by the appearance of La Rochejaquelein in person and were soon up against the hedgerow screening the enemy.6 The republicans had been outflanked and were now facing a withering fusillade from around 6,000 men of the highly experienced Vendéen advance guard, and during the battle perhaps 2-3,000 more rebels arrived to join in the combat.
The Battle of Pontorson based on a contemporary map.
Tribout claimed that the battle began around 4pm; with sunset around that time, and with clouds overhead, almost the entire battle would have taken place in the dark.7
Unfamiliar with Vendéen tactics, Tribout’s troops formed square to resist the assaults coming in from all sides. In spite of taking heavy losses they hung on until about 7.30pm, by which time their artillery had used up their ammunition and they were forced back.
The Vendéens now closed in and accounts talk of a mêlée lasting for around an hour, until the republicans could take no more and gave way. Many were cut down in the rout that followed.
Some Vendéens bypassed Pontorson and cut off Tribout’s line of retreat at the Couesnon Bridge, leaving part of the republican army encircled within Pontorson itself. Towards 9pm, thanks to moonlight from a break in the clouds, some republicans counter-attacked the Vendéen left flank, causing rebels to take cover behind some hedges. La Rochejaquelein took immediate control and led them back into the attack, although some republicans had managed to escape in the direction of Antrain.8
Tribout’s troops had taken punishing losses and the main road through the town was strewn with their dead. Madame de la Rochejaquelein arrived as the battle ended and before the dead had been cleared off the road. Her coach jolted over their bodies to the sound of breaking bones.9
The Vendéens were delighted to find a large supply of bread, shoes and trousers. They captured all of Tribout’s artillery, several caissons, and some flags. Their own casualties were reported to be light.
Tribout blamed the cavalry for his defeat, saying they deserted the army at the start of the battle and left the rest of his troops exposed. Kléber, however, put it down to Tribout’s incompetence. All Tribout should have done, he said, was hold the line of the River Couesnon, but against ‘all the rules of war’ he deployed where his flanks were exposed and in terrain perfectly suited to rebel tactics. Instead of overseeing the battle, Tribout was reputedly found with his main battery passing grapeshot to his gunners.10
In Tribout’s defence, he had sent urgent messages to Antrain as soon as he became aware that the Vendéens were marching in his direction. Kléber would have heard the sound of battle as he was only 12km away. However Chambertin had been sent towards Pontorson that same morning but fell back due to the awful state of the roads. So either the bad roads, or Kléber’s excessive caution, contributed to Tribout’s defeat.
The Vendéens had recently discovered that the republicans had massacred 800 prisoners and demanded that those captured at Pontorson be put to death. In spite of some resistance, nearly all were executed the next day.11
On 19 November the rest of the Vendéen army arrived from Avranches. Tribout, meanwhile, fell back to Dinan where he would be reinforced by troops from St-Mâlo, but would take no part in the fighting over the next few days.12 After nightfall the Vendéens headed for Dol and drifted in throughout 20 November. The Vendéen artillery train was lined up along the main road and the refugees and troops sought food, shelter, and sleep.
On the march towards Dol, La Rochejaquelein had set out with a handful of men to scout the road ahead. Encountering some enemy cavalry he was forced to cut his way out to escape.13
Dol-Antrain 20 to 23 November 1793
At a council of war on 19 November, Kléber presented a plan that aimed to prevent the rebels obtaining supplies, close in on them using four mutually supporting columns, and throw them on the sea.14 The representatives accepted this plan, and orders were being issued, when an emotive letter arrived from Westermann announcing that he was marching to attack the Vendéens who were reported to be in a terrible state in Dol. He claimed that if he was supported by a column on the Antrain road, Dol would become ‘the last tomb of the rebels’. The representatives enthusiastically acted on this letter, immediately cancelled Kléber’s plan, and at midnight ordered Marceau to prepare to march on Dol.
The Terrain
The weather compounded terrain already difficult for artillery, cavalry and regular manoeuvres. The approach to Dol from Pontorson was formed by a series of hills and valleys with most of the country broken up into small irregular fields. The Antrain road, although less hilly, was not dissimilar in the area west of Trans. The valleys were generally wooded and marshy, and the only open land consisted of patches of heathland on high ground. However, although this type of terrain favoured the Vendéens, Dol was the last town before the wide plain to the sea.
The series of engagements over 20-23 November make up the greatest single battle of the counter-revolution in the west of France and witnessed some of the most ferocious fighting of the revolutionary war. The chronology below highlights the key phases and demonstrates the fighting skills of the Royalist elite, honed over eight months of continual warfare. The accounts by Kléber and Savary are particularly valuable and many of the place names they describe have been identified in Jamaux’s work on the battle.
Night of 20 to 21 November
Between 6 and 7pm Marigny and Decaen, with 400 cavalry, 300 infantry, three cannon and a howitzer, launched a surprise attack on Dol from the Pontorson road. They were quickly beaten back but had now warned the Vendéens that the enemy were on their way. Towards 10pm part of their army marched out and deployed near the eastern edge of Dol: Stofflet, D’Autichamp and Talmont with 3,000 men and thirty cannons on the Antrain road, and La Rochejaquelein, probably with a similar number, on the Pontorson road.15
Westermann and Marigny now linked up near Begauds to await Marceau’s approach on the Antrain road. Possibly provoked by the Vendéens, Westermann’s troops advanced around 1am and encountered La Rochejaquelein’s forces close to Dol, but quickly retreated to Baguer-Pican against overwhelming numbers. Westermann now deployed near large bivouac fires at Tremehen, but these fires only served to illuminate their positions. By 3am they were in full retreat eastwards, closely pursued by some Vendéens under La Rochejaquelein. Wester
mann eventually rallied at around 6am, about 2km west of Pontorson, having lost an 8pdr and two howitzers.
The landscape for the Battles of Dol-Antrain.
Around 3am Stofflet began to advance on the Antrain road and about an hour later encountered Marceau’s troops marching through Pont Galou.16 Quickly deploying into line, Marceau would fight for around three hours shrouded in darkness and thick fog.
Daytime 21 November
Towards 7am La Rochejaquelein returned to his original position, followed by successive detachments. He now moved to support Stofflet.
Aware of his precarious position, Marceau skilfully pulled back to better positions behind the Guyoche. Unknown to Marceau the fog now helped him as Stofflet’s force had mistaken its own cavalry, returning to Dol for munitions, for the enemy’s and most of his men broke and fled to Dol. Talmont, 400 Chouans and a handful of cannon held their ground along the west bank of the Guyoche and were reinforced at around 7.30-8am by La Rochejaquelein with perhaps 700 more troops.17
La Rochejaquelein was in despair over the army’s predicament and began to advance on a causeway between the opposing forces, intent on dying in battle. He was restrained and went on to lead 300 men in the capture of two 12pdrs that blocked this causeway. Then, still hidden by fog, he moved north along the west bank of the Guyoche and after some skirmishing launched an assault on Marceau’s larger force. The 12pdrs had been turned on the Republican left and rallied Vendéen troops had by now increased La Rochejaquelein’s strength. Around 10am Marceau faltered under the onslaught, but stabilised his line a mere 150 paces further east.18
Both sides increased in numbers as the Vendéens rallied more men and Muller’s division arrived to support Marceau. Muller, arguably more incompetent than L’Échélle and Santerre, was drunk, and his division blundered into Marceau’s position causing complete chaos. Around
11.30am Kléber and Rossignol arrived and issued orders to pull back to better positions further east. This time the fog appears to have hidden the Republican vulnerability from the Vendéens.
Kléber had already deployed 4,000 men at Pont Allan, but on seeing troops retreating in their direction, these troops routed. Some Vendéens cautiously followed but stopped in the vicinity of Pont du Gruer around 4pm.19 Kléber managed to rally the army and ordered Chambertin to replace Marceau’s tired brigade.
Night of 21 to 22 November
During the night, the Vendéens drifted back to Dol. Thousands had earlier retreated west of the Dol, in company with many of the refugees, and also returned to the town. While celebrating their survival there was a brief panic when outlying troops from Klinger’s column were spotted some distance south of Dol. They had probably been deployed to block the rebels’ line of retreat in that direction rather than engage in any aggressive action.
A more defensive plan was now put forward by Kléber, and agreed, but while Kléber and Prieur de la Marne issued orders in the early hours for all forces to fall back on Antrain, Westermann was advancing once again, this time supported by Marigny and Amey.
Marigny’s advance guard, followed some time later by Westermann and Amey, left Pontorson at 10pm and occupied Baguer-Pican at 4am. At 4.30am his scouts prudently advanced on Dol and were surprised to hear the call to arms being beaten. This was Stofflet calling everyone to assemble ready to leave Dol. They were led by the elite troops, followed by the artillery, the non-combatants, and finally a rearguard under Marigny. Around 7.30am the Vendéens set out on the Antrain road, unaware of the enemy’s proximity. At 8am, with their advance guard around the Clos du Gibet, they were suddenly ordered to halt as reports arrived that Westermann was on their northern flank.20
While the bulk of the Vendéens remained on the Antrain road, La Rochejaquelein peeled off with some of his best officers and a body of troops. Towards 8.30am Vendéen cavalry threw panic among the republican scouts and Amey’s troops fled on sight of the enemy. This rout was emulated by the other republicans, who failed in an attempt to rally north of Baguer-Pican, and were now pursued beyond Pontorson. The republicans on this flank lost all their cannon and both Marigny and Westermann narrowly avoided capture.
Daytime 22 November
Around 8.30am the main republican army at Trans was preparing to retire on Antrain when they heard the cannonade at Baguer-Pican, but with the staff, generals and representatives split between Trans, Antrain and elsewhere it took some time to agree what to do. Around 10am Kléber set out with sixty hussars to scout towards Dol. Stofflet, meanwhile, had deployed the bulk of their army on the spine of high ground amidst the scene of the previous day’s battle.
At about 10.30am Kléber scouted their position and decided it was safer to deploy further east. The Vendéens were content to follow the hussars (who were deliberately slowing their advance) while Kléber sent orders to Chambertin to deploy at Pont Allan.
By 11.45am this deployment was complete, but the subsequent encounter did not last long. The Regiment la Reine refused to fire and fled. Nattes, attempting an outflanking manoeuvre on the Vendéen left, was also abandoned by his troops. The republicans had in fact been outflanked by a body of cavalry on their right, while Chambertin’s left flank was threatened by Vendéen tirailleurs. Kléber immediately set about delaying the Vendéen advance while calling up more troops, this time aiming to deploy near the Callouet Ford.21
Canuel’s experienced troops arrived first and Kléber deployed them to cover the successive deployment of the rest of the army. Stofflet and Talmont spread out opposite and harangued their troops.
This battle began at about 12.30pm (around the time La Rochejaquelein was entering Pontorson). The Vendéens now faced their greatest test as cannon bombarded their dense ranks. Their own artillery replied in kind but the battle appears to have reached a stalemate. After around three hours the republicans were sufficiently confident to deploy, ready to charge in with the bayonet. With perfect timing, La Rochejaquelein, Forestier, and 2,000 troops now appeared on the republican right flank and took them by complete surprise. The Vendéens may have simultaneously attacked their enemy’s left flank (possibly under Marigny). When some battalions were being moved from their front to redeploy against La Rochejaquelein others mistook this for a retreat and panic set in. Their subsequent withdrawal was covered by a combined grenadier battalion.
Night of 22 to 23 November
The Vendéens pursued into the night, with the grenadiers stubbornly fighting swarms of enemy tirailleurs until they were thrown into disorder around 9pm.
As Chambertin’s Light Advance Guard rallied at La Vaulée, Kléber gave orders to hold that crossing for half an hour to enable the army to escape, but two 8pdrs deployed by La Rochejaquelein soon broke them up. By 9.30pm the republicans were routing through the Forest of Villecartier.
The bulk of the republican army retreated beyond Antrain. Marceau, however, assembled a mixed body of infantry from various units on the banks of the Couanon, replacing Canuel’s troops who had withdrawn from that position without orders. A fierce fight now developed in the early hours of 23 November around the various entrances to Antrain, involving perhaps 4,000 Vendéens and Chouans against a few hundred republicans. Before Forestier could get into position to block the enemy’s retreat however, other Vendéens stormed into Antrain and routed the republicans.
By 2am the battle was over and a half-hearted pursuit began on the Rennes road, petering out towards 3am. During the night Dol was evacuated by the Vendéen rearguard and refugees, and by noon on 23 November the last rebel troops drifted into Antrain.
The republicans probably suffered in excess of 5,000 killed or wounded and the Vendéen victory is all the more remarkable considering their desperate plight.
The Vendéen march on Angers, and reorganisation of the Republican Army
The republican army took the road south, cutting the bridge at Romazy behind them, and reaching Rennes on 23 November. That same day the Vendéen advance guard arrived in Fougères, followed by the rest of their
army on 24 November.
Rossignol tendered his resignation but it was refused. At a council of war it was agreed that the wounded would be evacuated to Nantes and the arsenal in Rennes moved two leagues in that direction. Kléber recalled with distaste that Prieur de la Marne philosophically announced that each republican defeat increased rebel losses and, as they had less opportunity to replenish their ranks, this could only benefit the republican cause.22
Rossignol wrote to the commanders in Laval (Danican), Coutances (Sepher), Granville (Peyre), Dinan (Tribout), Angers (Fabrefond), Saumur (Commaire), Le Mans (Chabot) and Nantes (Vimeux). He informed them of the recent defeat and ordered them all to be ready to stop the enemy.
Having made preparations to cover the approach from Antrain to Rennes, the republicans held a further council of war on 25 November. Following Kléber’s advice the army’s command structure was changed to ensure a single overall commander, and generals in command of the infantry, cavalry and artillery. Another general was made responsible for the Rennes garrison and local policing. Under Rossignol’s overall command Marceau was assigned the infantry, Westermann the cavalry, Debilly the artillery and Damas the Rennes garrison. Kléber, Marceau’s friend, recognised that Marceau had the charisma, courage and ability, to which he might add his own coolness of character and calming influence.23 It is curious that throughout his time in the Vendéen War Kléber repeatedly declined the most senior roles, always finding an excuse for others to be promoted in his place. Self-preservation seems the only logical justification for his actions.
When Sepher arrived in Rennes he was immediately dismissed for having failed to support Rossignol at the Battle of Dol-Antrain and would be replaced by Tilly. A further council of war was held on 28 November, following news that the rebels seemed to be heading for Angers, and orders were issued for the army to march on Châteaubriand. When Tribout arrived in Rennes he was ordered to remain there with his troops, while Tilly and Westermann were dispatched to Châteaubriand two days behind the main army. To gauge the tension at Republican headquarters, Prieur loudly proclaimed that even if Rossignol lost twenty battles he would remain ‘the cherished child of the Revolution and elder son of the Committee of Public Safety’.24 Yet Rossignol did not march with the army but remained in Rennes.