by Rob Harper
Kléber’s division arrived in the early hours and found Marceau overcome with exhaustion; he was furious that Marceau had shown such reckless disregard for his troops. Kléber had set out from Parigné-le Polin towards midnight, having first spent some time rounding up Muller’s routing column. His arrival enabled Marceau to replace Tilly’s men at dawn with Kléber’s troops. Delaage, commanding the 600 men of the Chasseurs-des-Francs and Chasseurs-de-Cassel, replaced Carpentier’s 1,500 men. Kléber’s other troops took up position in the surrounding area and nearly up to the gates of Le Mans.
The Final Assault Morning of 13 December
Delaage came under attack from some royalists, but three rounds of grapeshot stopped them. He soon overwhelmed them and captured two cannon.
At 7am the charge was beaten all along the republican lines. Delaage had advanced along the Rue de Puits-de-Quatre-Roues. Other columns advanced along the Rues de Saumon and La Perle and managed to cut off those in the Place des Halles from the Place de l’Éperon. Kléber marched his troops towards the Sarthe to seize the bridge and Westermann advanced along the Rue de Couthardy.
After the fall of the Place des Halles some still put up a fight in the Place de l’Éperon. Delaage led the attack on the left and Westermann that on the right by the Rue de la Mission and the Rue de la Couture. This last stand involved hand-to-hand fighting. Scépeaux, personally firing a cannon, declared that while he still had a grain of powder and a cannon ball he would remain. He was wounded at his post. Even at this late stage some royalists managed to escape over the Saint-Jean Bridge, but others fought until they were cut down.39 ‘The enemy no longer held, and then the butchery began,’ Delaage recalled.40
Le Mans was at last in the hands of the republic, but the city now experienced the horror of a town taken by assault. ‘It was no longer a fight, but a bloody orgy,’ wrote Chardon.41
The Cost
‘Never was there a butchery to equal this since the Vendéen War began,’ wrote Prieur de la Marne, Bourbotte and Turreau on 13 December.42
The battle of Le Mans was a decisive defeat for the Grand Army and the pursuit that followed on the road to Laval witnessed the massacre of men, women and children.
Maignon states the Vendéens lost near to 2,300 killed and Gabory claims that between 10 and 12,000 people would be massacred as a result of this catastrophic defeat. Madame de la Rochejaquelein estimated 15,000 casualties, ‘very few of them fighters’.43 Gréau gives the more conservative figure of around 4,000 killed.44 In 2009-10, archaeologists came across nine mass graves in the Place des Jacobins, about 500 metres north of the Place de l’Éperon. These graves contained 159 bodies of men, women and children identifiable as some of the victims from the battle.45
D’Autichamp managed to evade certain death by being merged into the ranks of one of the republican cavalry units. It is suspected that his masonic links, and recognition of a relative in their ranks, may have saved his life.46
Apart from the human cost, the rebels lost around sixteen guns: half of their remaining supply.47
The republicans suffered about 500 casualties.48
Les Mans to Nort 13 to 18 December
On 13 December the last of the Vendéens left Le Mans, and all through that day and into the following they drifted into Laval in complete disarray and haemorrhaging troops on route. Many of those who had joined them north of the Loire were leaving the army.
With Le Mans secured Marceau sent Westermann and Decaen in pursuit at the head of some cavalry and light artillery, supported by Delaage and the Chasseurs Francs-de-Cassel. They headed for Ste-Suzanne, pushing patrols towards Laval. Westermann was struggling with two wounds and asked to be given some time to recover.
Kléber and Tilly’s troops crossed Le Mans and moved to the village of Chassillé later in the day. Muller’s troops, who had taken no part in the battle, remained in Le Mans with orders to march to Saumur and strengthen its garrison, his better battalions (three of Haute-Saône, one of Jura, and one of Vosges) were transferred to Tilly and Klinger. D’Obenheim provided the republicans with valuable information on the state of the rebel army and reported that the rebels still retained 14,000 armed men and about a dozen cannon.
The Vendéens no longer resembled an army; many were in despair, exhausted, sick and hungry. They were facing attacks from locals, who feared the consequences of being seen to collaborate with the royalists. On the morning of 14 December they left Laval, marched through Cossé, and reached Craon that same night. At a council of war it was agreed that they would make an attempt to secure a crossing at Ancenis and set off in the early hours of 15 December.
Marceau was near Le Mans by the evening of 15 December. All garrisons on the Loire had been ordered to firmly hold their positions. Correctly identifying Ancenis as the most likely enemy target, Marceau ordered Boucret to leave Angers, race along the south bank of the Loire, and block the crossing. Marceau’s cavalry reached Château-Gontier that night having marched via Laval. Westermann reached Puancé, followed by Decaen.
Marceau next marched through Laval to Crossé and reached Craon on 16 December, but always a step behind the rebels. Westermann moved forwards to St-Mars-la-Jaille.
On 16 December a Vendéen advance party set out for Ancenis to secure boats, the rest following on behind. As soon as they reached the Loire small groups of Vendéens began the hazardous crossing, but were soon coming under attack from gunboats.
La Rochejaquelein and Stofflet both slipped across in the hope of rallying support for the army, but soon after they reached the far bank republican patrols attacked and forced them to flee inland. Gréau estimates that around 2,000 made the crossing before an assault by Westermann on 17 December, even though repulsed, caused the remaining Vendéens to head towards Nort.49 Marceau reached Châteaubriand that day. The royalists abandoned more guns at Ancenis and avoided Nantes, knowing it to be far too well garrisoned. They reached Nort on 18 December.
Nort to Blain 18 to 21 December
On 18 December Scherb was sent ahead with orders to make for Ancenis as rapidly as possible, but near Saint-Mars-la-Jaille he was recalled as Westermann had reported that the rebels were heading for Blain. Scherb was now directed to Saint-Julien-de-Vouvantes where the bulk of the army gathered. The weather was awful.
Haxo, in Charette’s territory and preparing to assault Noirmoutier, was ordered to divert his troops to cover the south banks of the Loire. On 19 December he was in the process of working out how to cover all the crossings from St-Florent to Champtoceaux when he received a counterorder to proceed with the capture of Noirmoutier.50
Westermann’s relentless pursuit caused more rebel losses between Nort and Blain.
The Vendéens were desperately trying to reach Morbihan, a region known to be fiercely loyal to the royalist cause. On 20 December they held a council of war in Blain and elected Fleuriot as the new commander-in-chief. Talmont saw this as a personal slight and left the army with some of his supporters. The rebels took the precaution of cutting the bridge and took the opportunity to rest for the day.
That same day most of the republican army moved to the area around Derval, and Scherb reached Guéméné-Penfao. Delaage skirmished with the Vendéens at Blain but was repulsed, and Westermann stopped four leagues from Blain to await the rest of the army.
On 21 December the republicans marched on Blain and, as the rebels were still there, they halted a league from that town to eat and unite the different columns. Kléber made a detailed reconnaissance and was advised by a local woman that the rebels were in strong positions, deployed on open ground before the town, and waiting to be attacked.
The troops advanced quickly and when Kléber’s column arrived he deployed them in line. He recalled that a sudden torrential downpour slowed the march of the Cherbourg Division as it moved to turn Blain by the right. They only reached their designated place an hour after nightfall. Westermann was ordered to march on Blain along the Nantes road and the plan was that they would all att
ack at dawn on 22 December.
The March to Savenay 22 December
At dawn a republican reconnaissance found that the town had been abandoned. The rebels had quietly left during the night, heading for Savenay. Forestier, Sapinaud and a small band of followers took the opportunity to leave the army and would later succeed in crossing the Loire.
Fleuriot’s decision to move on Savenay, instead of marching west, may in hindsight have been a serious misjudgement as it limited his options and left the army with its back to marshland.
The numbers remaining with the Vendéen army were now down to around 6,000 men capable of bearing arms, and ten to twelve guns, but more significantly there were still thousands of refugees entirely dependent on their protection.51
The republican pursuit was hampered by heavy rainfall that swelled a ford between Blain and its château and the troops were forced to unload the caissons and wade across the river carrying ammunition above their heads.
Lyrot and the royalist advance guard brushed aside some republicans encountered between 6 and 7am at La Moëre, and the Vendéens arrived at the small town of Savenay around 9am.52
The troops deployed north of the town and immediately set about preparing defences as best they could. They were helped by three areas of woodland which provided them with excellent cover. Lyrot deployed to the north-east, forming the right of the line, and his men took advantage of the cover of the Touchelais Wood. To the west Laugrenière grouped his men in the Matz Wood, and Fleuriot deployed in the centre and towards the town, using the Amourettes Wood.
The remaining Vendéens cannon were deployed on the main approach roads, two being placed on the Guérande road and two in the centre on the road next to the Amourettes Wood.53 Even at this late stage locals from surrounding parishes came to fight with the rebels.54
Refugees crammed into the small town, although some began to retreat even further west.
Kléber recalled the march on Savenay being extremely gruelling, along difficult roads, and in terrible weather. Marceau and Kléber set out in advance to join Westermann, closely followed by the advance guard under Scherb.
Westermann’s troops and Kléber’s advance guard arrived towards 11am and deployed on a hill facing the rebels. Their small force comprised a party of grenadiers, an 8pdr, Westermann’s cavalry, and twenty hussars led by Kléber’s ADC.55 They were content to unlimber the 8pdr and fire on the enemy.
A sudden rebel onslaught from the woods pushed Westermann’s troops back as far as the stream at Le Pont Bouvronnais, causing him some losses.56 The royalists now returned to their original positions, probably thinking they only had Westermann to contend with.
The Battle of Savenay based on a contemporary plan.
Kléber arrived in person later that morning and reconnoitred as far as the village of La Serlais in the hope of discovering a good road for the artillery. Shots from Vendéen snipers forced him to dive for cover when a musket ball pierced his hat. Kléber wrote:
‘I sensed then that they [the Vendéens] had not thought through their plans, as they needed to hold the heights occupied by our cavalry ready for the battle the following day. I thus made 300 of Blosse’s grenadiers advance, as well as the 8pdr. I split them into two bodies and ordered Chef-de-Battalion Duverger to attack in the front, while I put myself at the head of the others. I turned the wood from where the enemy had set out.’
This manoeuvre was successful and the rebels were forced to pull back towards Savenay, abandoning the woods of Touchelais and Matz. Marceau reported that an 8pdr was captured on the great road to Savenay.57
Kléber had succeeded in securing the high ground commanding the town and towards midnight the rest of his troops arrived.
The Republicans deployed as follows:
• Westermann was to the west of the Blain road with his cavalry and Blosse’s 300 Grenadiers (commanded by Verger);
• Legros commanded the Orléans formation to the right of Westermann;
• two battalions of the 31st Regiment (part of Tilly’s column) formed up in a second line in support;
• the light artillery was to their north-east, near the Blain road;
• Scherb formed up in the centre and was in command of the advance guard comprising the 32nd Line, a detachment of the 13th Line, parts of five battalions of Haute-Saône, and three cannon;58
• Canuel deployed east of the Blain road, with a detachment of the 9th Hussars covering his flank. His command is unknown but a contemporary plan of the battle suggests four battalions or formations (it seemed to be common practice in the Vendée War to merge smaller battalions into larger formations to retain some cohesion in unit size);
• A further cavalry detachment, including more of the 9th Hussars, covered the right wing;
• Marceau and Kléber deployed in the centre and were accompanied by the Légion-des-Francs and Chasseurs-de-Cassel, both placed in the front line.
The Vendéens were deployed in a more constrained arc facing the republicans: the left holding the exits from the Matz Wood, the right facing the Touchelais Wood, and the centre supporting itself on the Amourettes Wood.
Prieur, Turreau and Bourbotte now arrived and were astonished that the advance guard did not attack immediately. They had the drums beaten and called on the troops to advance. An urgent council of war was held and Kléber discreetly told Marceau that they must not attack until the following morning when all the troops would be rested and in position. He did not want another carefully considered plan compromised by a sudden impetuous one. Westermann was not helping as he was in vocal agreement with the representatives.
Exasperated with Prieur in particular, Kléber quietly said to Marceau, ‘If you don’t stop this lawyer’s ranting, tomorrow we will be in Nantes with the enemy following behind us.’59 Marceau tactfully asked the representatives to leave the front line for their own safety, and fortunately for the republican troops they did.
In a moving account Madame de la Rochejaquelein recalled how Marigny seized the bridle of her horse, urging her to flee immediately on the Guérande road. ‘We are lost,’ he said, ‘It is impossible to resist tomorrow’s attack, in twelve hours the army will have been exterminated; I hope to die defending your flag. Take flight and save yourself this night, Adieu! Adieu!’60 He was carrying the flag she had made. Her father, Donnissan, also urged her to leave and she was never to see him again.
The rest of Tilly’s Cherbourg Division arrived around 2am and initially formed up behind the centre, but in the morning deployed on the right wing towards Matz.
Marceau’s forces now totalled around 10,000 troops, but they were exhausted, wet and cold, with many poorly clothed and without shoes. Nevertheless they must have recognised the significance of the moment and the opportunity at long last to destroy the Vendéen army once and for all.
All night Marigny and Lyrot walked through their ranks encouraging the men and, according to Béjarry, although sombre and silent, the men remained resolute.61 Sporadic cannon and musket fire continued to be heard through the night.
Monday 23 December
The Vendéens must have realised that this was a battle they could not win and they fought with a mixture of despair and desperation. A breakthrough could mean some might be able to join with Chouan bands in Britanny, or even escape to the Vendée. Some must have fought to enable as many refugees as possible to escape on the Guérande road.
Kléber wrote:
‘At dawn, when everyone was still resting, I mounted my horse and with Westermann and Canuel carried out a reconnaissance around the town and indicated to each the roads they should use for the attack. Having completed this reconnaissance, the cannonade and fusillade began.’
At 8am the Vendéens launched a sudden surprise attack on the Touchelais Wood, which had been occupied by Verges’ troops during the night.62 Even the Royalist wounded who could bear arms joined in this attack. They overpowered the republicans, and pushed them back from the area around the Château de Touche
lais, capturing two guns in the process.63
Arriving at the scene of the attack Kléber found Duverger and his grenadiers fleeing. Duverger cried out that they had no more cartridges, to which Kléber replied that they should use their bayonets and ordered them back to the charge. He promised them support, and immediately ordered the 31st Regiment to advance, even though they were not part of his command. The Vendéens were now pushed back to their original positions.
With Canuel marching to turn Savenay by its left, Kléber advised Marceau that it was time for the centre to charge. He also sent an ADC to order the Cherbourg Division to charge on the right. But as he did not command that division, and as Tilly was absent at that moment, he ordered the ADC to say to the leader he found in command that Kléber would hold them responsible for any hesitation in carrying out his orders.
The fight along the edge of the Matz Wood was hard going, as the Vendéens were clinging on defiantly. Tilly split his troops into two bodies, ordering Debilly to take one on the Guémené road while he led the other around the Matz Wood moving on Savenay by the Pontchâteau road.64
In the centre Marceau was commanding the Chasseurs-de-Cassel and 14th Chasseurs-à-Cheval in person, and Kléber was following a little to his left with the Légion-des-Francs. Weight of numbers pressed the Vendéen centre back, until their two guns stalled the republican advance. These now became the focus of a bitter struggle. Eventually the royalists were again forced to pull back, but succeeded in withdrawing these guns.
Canuel had bypassed the Touchelais Wood and passed through La Serais, detaching some men to continue along that road, while he continued on to L’Aumônerie. He detached more troops to take the Point du Jour road, then with what he had remaining he marched further south still to assault Savenay from its eastern side.65