by Rob Harper
Although La Flèche was now in their hands, most of the army was still on the wrong bank and they urgently needed to construct a bridge to escape Westermann’s harassing attacks. La Rochejaquelein had some beams placed across the gap in the bridge to enable the foot and horse to cross. Overnight more substantial repairs were completed under D’Obenheim’s direction, enabling the artillery, baggage, and rearguard to follow. Towards midday on 8 December the alarm was sounded as Westermann’s cavalry and some light infantry appeared near the town.
Piron commanded the Vendéen rearguard and had been holding his own against Westermann on 7 December, but on the following day he was being pushed back. La Rochejaquelein had great difficulty assembling a small core of fighters to go to his aid, although on arrival great cheers of ‘Vive le Roi!’ greeted him. He made the sign of the cross, something he only did when the situation was perilous, and charged into the republican ranks followed by his troops.7 Westermann was soon overpowered and forced to retreat ‘for over a league and a half’.8
D’Obenheim noted that the bulk of the Vendéens followed with great reluctance and at some distance. The lack of close support caused their leading troops to lose courage and, when Westermann counter-attacked, his horse artillery caused the Vendéens to rout. This rout spread to the main column and it was only the huge disproportion in numbers that obliged Westermann to pull back.9
That same evening the Vendéens were again called to arms as troops were seen approaching on the Le Mans road. Although this column was small and quickly brushed aside, its appearance compounded their state of nervous exhaustion.
D’Obenheim observed that many Vendéen soldiers were no longer willing to fight. They seemed to be believing rumours that it was only their leaders the republicans wanted, and that if they were captured without arms they would be spared. Bands of men were also forming up to leave the army and head their own way. The leaders were forced to issue a proclamation at La Flèche announcing that only those men retaining their arms would be fed.10 La Rochejaquelein was furious at the lack of willingness to continue the fight, especially among the officers. In open council he reproached them saying, ‘You contradict me in council and abandon me at the cannon’s mouth!’11
The royalist army remained in La Flèche for two days, gathering whatever arms and provisions they could find and putting some order back into their ranks. Royrand was replaced by Amédée de Béjarry in command of the former Army of the Centre.
Kléber, who had been covering the Loire, headed north when he was advised that the Vendéens had marched on La Flèche. On 10 December he arrived at Baugé and met up with Marceau.
After La Flèche, D’Obenheim indicated that the Vendéen leaders did not know which way to turn. Some were for crossing the Loire between Les Ponts-de-Cé and Saumur, others for crossing at Blois. Some, without rejecting either of those options, wanted first to rest and resupply the soldiers and considered Le Mans to be their best option for that purpose. They also hoped they might receive new recruits in that area. On 10 December they destroyed the temporary bridge behind them and headed for Le Mans.
Clermont 9 December
The loss of La Flèche caused great anxiety in Le Mans. The Sarthe and Huisne rivers were considered too long to defend and had many fords. Nevertheless the old bridge at Pontlieue was cut and the Pont Neuf was strewn with planks covered with spikes and chevaux-de-frise.12
General Chabot was supported by Representative Garnier-de-Saintes and the army at his disposal totalled 4,000 men, although few had experience of fighting the Vendéens. Two thirds of this force were national guards (with many carrying pikes due to lack of muskets), or raw conscripts.13 They included 300 grenadiers from various companies; the Battalion L’Égalité; part of the 4th Sarthe; battalions from Le Flèche, Belesme, Le Mans and Saint Denis d’Orques (probably the national guards); new levy battalions from Fresnay and La Ferté-Bernard; fifty mounted Paris Gendarmes; 100 cavalry from the 7th Chasseurs and 9th Hussars; two companies of gunners from the Armée-Revolutionnaire and about fourteen cannon (all 4pdrs).14
Taking 1,600 men and two guns, Chabot planned a pre-emptive strike on the Vendéens camped at La Flèche and was on the march at 2am on 9 December. Preceded by a strong cavalry picket, the head of the column was formed by the grenadier companies with one cannon, followed consecutively by the battalions of La Flèche, Belesme and Le Mans. The Paris Gendarmes brought up the rear.
Around 6am an exchange of cannon fire commenced at the Clermont Hill. The Vendéens sent a large body of troops to cut Chabot’s line of retreat, but spotting the enemy’s tirailleurs the republicans withdrew to avoid being surrounded. La Rochejaquelein had led this attack in person.
Retreating once more on Foulletourte, it was now clear to Chabot that Le Mans was the rebel target, so vedettes were dispatched to watch all the approach roads; a levy battalion was placed with four cannon and fifty cavalry at a redoubt at La Terte Rouge; the Maulny Ford, protected by abattis, was placed in the hands of the Valenciennes Battalion; other Valenciennes troops were placed at La Croix-Georgette, and a masked cannon was deployed in an entrenchment near La Mission. Some defences were also occupied at the L’Epeau Wood.15
This deployment covered the four key southern approaches to the city and, while Chabot’s defeated and demoralised column occupied Pontlieue, the majority of the remaining troops waited in Le Mans. At Pontlieue four guns were placed in one rudimentary redoubt and fifty men in a second.
On the night of 9 to 10 December the defences were completed, albeit not particularly well, and would now be tested by the entire royalist army. Static defences, occupied by 2,000 largely inexperienced troops, in an area covered with hedges and woods, perhaps indicates how poor a general Chabot was.
The royalist army probably numbered 18-20,000 at this date, supported by around 35 guns. They were still encumbered by thousands of refugees and the cold weather, lack of food, and spread of dysentery was causing the army’s morale to plummet. The head of the column, however, was still formed from the hardened elite led by La Rochejaquelein and Stofflet in person.
The Vendéen assault on Le Mans.
Pontlieue 10 December
At 11am on 10 December cannon fire was reported on the La Flèche road, probably when the battalion at La Terte Rouge fled on the first discharge of Vendéen fire. Chef-de-Battalion Houdiard wrote that the engagement started at Pontlieue around noon, others suggest towards 2pm. What was clear, however, is that both Pontlieue and the Mauny Ford were coming under attack, and according to Commissaire Rochelle 1,500 armed inhabitants held well, along with the gunners and the Saint Denis d’Orques Battalion, but after a while they were obliged to retreat. The Fresnay Battalion was also praised for its efforts. Desmarres, commanding the artillery, put up a determined fight but with his gunners being laid low by cannon fire and snipers, he was forced to withdraw.
After the Vendéens seized the bridge at Pontlieue the battle continued in the nearby settlement, until republican defence collapsed around 4pm. The Vendéen cavalry entered Le Mans hot on the heels of the republicans as Chabot and Garnier-de-Saintes fled with the bulk of the garrison on the Alenҫon road.16 The Vendéens now poured into Le Mans, leaving a detachment to cover Pontlieue.
Pontlieue 12 December
Most of the army and the refugees dispersed around Le Mans, in search of food and rest, while the commanders held a council of war at the Hotel de la Biche in the Place des Halles. There was serious disagreement as to whether to take the Baugé or La Flèche roads, between factions under Talmont and La Rochejaquelein, which ominously ended without resolution. All the leaders, however, were well aware that Le Mans was difficult to defend.
The Vendéens had virtually no information on republican movements, their troops were in disarray, and the Place des Halles and Place de I’Éperon were soon crammed with artillery, caissons and wagons.
Kléber marched on La Flèche on 11 December, his advance guard moving as far as Clermont and Mareuil. On that
same day a large body of national guards approached Le Mans from Alenҫon, but were easily repulsed by 1,500 Vendéens.
On the following day Marceau moved to Foulletourte, while towards 11am Westermann’s hussars and chasseurs appeared on the heights facing Pontlieue. He was under strict orders not to engage in a general fight, but once again he disobeyed.
With the alarm raised, La Rochejaquelein, Stofflet and Lyrot managed to assemble 3,000 troops (including 100 cavalry) and raced to the defence of Pontlieue.17 La Rochejaquelein placed the core of his men in the republican redoubts and deployed his tirailleurs in pine covered hills south of Pontlieue. He covered the Tours, Angers and Châteaudun roads and, with the bridge at Pontlieue only 2km from the Place des Halles, it was imperative that this position be held.
Westermann’s troops numbered around 2,000 and deployed facing the rebels in woods between the Angers and Tours roads.18 The battle commenced around 1pm with a Royalist attack. Madame de la Rochejaquelein states that the republicans were repulsed after a stubborn fight, which was probably of brief duration. The republicans retreated over a league, with their infantry covered by their cavalry and artillery.19
Muller’s 4,000 men had been called up from Foulletourte to support Westermann but, seeing him retreating, most of his men broke and fled (according to Westermann, after the first discharge of fire). Kléber, then at Parigné-le-Polin, came across Muller and his staff on the Foulletourte road openly blaming Westermann for the defeat.
Not all of Muller’s men fled however, as part of Carpentier’s 3rd Brigade, comprising men from the Haute-Saône Battalions from the former Army of Mayence, had held firm.20 Benaben recalled that they had been marching on poor roads for four or five hours when they arrived on a height covered in pines around a league from Le Mans. Carpentier deployed his brigade and ordered Benaben to move on some woods to the right of a hill where Vendéens’ artillery had deployed (between the Angers and Tours roads). Benaben successfully turned this wood, but suddenly found himself in the midst of a complete rout. Carpentier managed to retain 200 men who came back to Westermann’s support. Westermann, however, now withdrew towards La Terte-Rouge.
The rest of Muller’s men fled south over a wide area, although most were eventually rallied at Foulletourte.21 At long last, and after an abysmal record, Muller was immediately dismissed.
Arnage Mid-afternoon
The republicans were fortunate that many of the royalists, thinking the crisis over, now drifted back to Le Mans, rainfall and the cold weather undoubtedly encouraging them to retire. Only about 400 joined La Rochejaquelein in his pursuit of the republicans, but did so in separate bands and without order.22
At Arnage the royalists came across Tilly’s troops who had been on the march since 8am. Vachot, commanding Tilly’s advance guard, wrote that they formed their two brigades in attack columns, either side of the Arnage road, and a discharge at forty paces stopped the Vendéens in their tracks.23 Some Vendéens who had taken the Tours road found themselves caught in the flank. Charged at bayonet point by the Aunis and Armagnac regiments, the Vendéens fled to Pontlieue, some cut down by Westermann’s cavalry.24
Pontlieue Late afternoon
La Rochejaquelein, Stofflet, Lyrot and Forestier were amongst the elite of the army who now disputed every foot of ground as they once again dug in around Pontlieue. They were heavily outnumbered but sustained the fight for at least an hour, at which point the advance guard of the Cherbourg column, supported by fifty of the 9th Hussars, carried the four enemy entrenchments at bayonet point.25
The royalists immediately rallied across the Huisne, but the head of the Cherbourg column soon seized the bridge. Vidal was forming his men up in the streets of Pontlieue, but his advance seems to have been delayed when he heard that Westermann had crossed the Huisne at a ford and had got into difficulties when attempting to turn the enemy position.26
The Vendéens fought from hedge to hedge as they were gradually forced back towards Le Mans, abandoning two cannon in the process. Stofflet was urging his men on with shouts of ‘victory or death’ as the battle was even now in the balance. By 4pm, with night rapidly falling on a dismal and cold day, they were at last in retreat on Le Mans. La Rochejaquelein may have provoked this retreat when he temporarily handed over command to Allard and Forestier while he returned to Le Mans to find reinforcements. When he arrived at the Place des Halles he soon witnessed troops fleeing from the battle.27
Vidal reached the edge of the city but faced withering fire from the houses and gardens on the outskirts and was forced to pull back to La Mission.28
The assault on Le Mans Night of 12 December
Marceau ordered Westermann to deploy before Le Mans, ready for a general assault the next day, but Westermann said they must exploit the opportunity and assault the town immediately. Taking his hand Marceau promised him support and gave orders for the Cherbourg Column to back Westermann’s attack.29 It was now nearly 5pm.
Following the earlier retreat from Arnage, panic began to spread amongst the refugees. The commanders had not considered which road they would take if forced to retreat and did not have a plan on to how to defend Le Mans. La Rochejaquelein now had to give urgent priority to both, but faced with complete confusion in the darkness he was overwhelmed by the gravity of their situation.30
Towards 4pm, even while fighting was still underway south of Le Mans, the rout from the city began. The roads from the southern side of Le Mans, however, converged on a single three-metre wide bridge across which they could escape on the Laval road, and the tortuous and narrow roads in Le Mans were difficult to navigate in the dark.
Chardon described the chaos that followed as a ‘Dantesque scene which defies all description’.31 Thousands of people, wagons, limbers and even cattle were crammed into the roads down to the bridge. People were being crushed, cannons and limbers overturned, and the wounded abandoned. The shouts of the leaders had little effect and both Stofflet and La Rochejaquelein were swept along in the rout, over the bridge, and away from the battle: neither returned.
Plan of the southern part of Le Mans showing the final area of combat.
Blavette wrote that the republicans split their troops into two bodies, to enter the town via the Rue de la Couture and the Rue de Puits-de-Quatre-Roues, and hard fighting was soon underway along both roads.32
The Vendéens had thrown up an entrenchment with four cannon at a crossroads on the Rue de Puits-de-Quatre-Roues (also known as Rue des Quatres-Roues), but after fierce resistance the republicans captured the position.33 The defenders dispersed into surrounding buildings and poured down such withering fire that republican progress stopped.34 The Vendéens had also deployed artillery enfilading all the roads leading to the Places des Halles. When Westermann’s cavalry and a small body of infantry appeared in that square, they came face to face with deployed artillery and were forced to retreat.35 The republicans were also stopped twice in the Rue Basses, having evidently not cleared all the buildings of rebels.
The Vendéens were still able to call on enough men to hold their enemy back and secure more time for fugitives to escape, and the republicans were being forced to take one house at a time. At one point they captured all of the Place des Halles, but were expelled by a counter-attack and pushed back beyond the entrenchment in the Rue de Puits-de-Quatre-Roues, losing an 8pdr in the process.36
The entrenchment in the Rue de Puits-de-Quatre-Roues was recaptured towards 10pm, by which time the royalists had again been forced back to the Place des Halles, and had lost the Rue de Couture and exits to the Champ des Casernes.37 All of these exits, however, were covered by royalist artillery, barricades and wagons.
With his losses increasing, Marceau decided to dig in to his position on the Rue du Puits-de-Quatre-Roues and await Kléber’s reinforcements. His aim was to blockade the Vendéens in the Place des Halles and turn their position by blocking all the roads between that square and the rest of the city. Marceau did send a column to seize the Paris road while We
stermann held all the approaches to the Place des Halles. For the rest of the night the two sides exchanged occasional artillery fire, and there was some fighting in the Rue Marchande and Rue de la Barillerie as the republicans tightened their grip on the eastern side of the two squares.
Towards midnight the Vendéens were reported to be infiltrating towards the rear of Marceau’s position. Lacking troops, Marceau feared the rebels might launch an assault on his flanks or rear at any moment, and only had the main Le Mans to Pontlieue road secure as a line of retreat.
D’Obenheim, who slipped away from the royalists during the battle, recalled that the republicans were in a very dangerous predicament as there were Vendéens in several roads to their rear, still holding out in a number of buildings.38 It would have been easy for them to swamp Marceau’s positions if they had the leadership to coordinate such an assault, but neither Stofflet nor La Rochejaquelein were present, and Marigny had also abandoned the artillery and followed the flight.
Kléber received desperate orders to race to Marceau’s support.
Le Mans midnight to dawn 13 December
Some of the Vendéens were unaware that many of the refugees and most of the army had retreated. In command of those still fighting were the Vicomte de Scépeaux, Allard and Duhoux, with perhaps 6-700 troops.
Beauvais was overcome with exhaustion by 11pm but his servant kept him up to date with developments. At 1am he heard that most of the caissons and cannon had been withdrawn from the Place des Halles and then departed on the Laval road. Some artillery had been moved back to the Place de l’Éperon, from where it continued firing during the night, to fool the republicans into thinking that the army was still present.