The World: A Brief Introduction

by Richard Haass

  The United States was decidedly less successful in dealing with the Gulf War’s aftermath, when Iraqis in the north and south of the country rose up against Saddam Hussein’s brutal rule. Saddam crushed this opposition and retained power because U.S. military intervention was limited to providing humanitarian support in the Kurdish north in order to avoid getting caught up in taking sides in what was seen as a civil war.

  The messiness of the war’s aftermath proved to be something of a harbinger of what was to unfold over the coming years. The most dramatic development that followed involved the former Yugoslavia, a multinational country kept together throughout the Cold War by authoritarian leadership and fear of Soviet intervention. The demise of both led to the country’s violent breakup in 1991 and 1992, a process that caused hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths and required NATO military action to end the fighting and the prolonged presence of international peacekeepers to prevent its resumption.

  It was situations such as these (and even more the Rwandan genocide in 1994, in which 800,000 men, women, and children lost their lives) that in 2005 led to a vote in the UN General Assembly to embrace the concept that sovereign governments must provide a degree of physical and economic security to their own citizens, and that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, other countries (with UN Security Council approval) gain the authority to intervene to protect those citizens and restore order.

  This became known as the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, doctrine. Events over the next decade and a half showed, though, that it made little difference in practice, because countries could not agree on whether intervention was warranted or were unwilling to intervene because of the costs. The one time the doctrine was put into practice was in Libya in 2011, when the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and other NATO members intervened to prevent what they judged to be an imminent civil war in which many civilians would be vulnerable. Once begun, the intervention evolved into a mission to topple the regime in Libya, which led to massive disorder when the United States and its allies decided not to remain involved to stabilize the situation. As a result, in the eyes of Russia and China, two permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power, the R2P doctrine was discredited and seen as little more than a cover for imposing political outcomes. The United States and its European allies, for their part, grew warier of the costs and difficulties of employing the R2P doctrine.

  A decade earlier, on September 11, 2001 (often referred to as 9/11), nineteen individuals from four Arab countries armed only with box cutters hijacked four civilian airliners in the United States. All nineteen men were members of al-Qaeda, a terrorist network based in Afghanistan that had its origins in the struggle against the Soviet occupation there. Two planes were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and a third into the Pentagon, and a fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania when passengers fought back against the hijackers. Three thousand people, mostly Americans but also others from nearly one hundred countries, were killed.

  The attack heralded the arrival of a new age of global terrorism in which people could be inspired over the internet, recruited and funded across borders, trained anywhere, and sent around the world to carry out acts designed to kill civilians for some political purpose. September 11 galvanized increased domestic and international counterterrorism efforts, but such efforts proved costly in terms of dollars spent, police, intelligence, and military assets committed, and privacy compromised. The mission to eradicate terrorism was never completely successful given the diffuse nature and scale of the problem, something that makes “defeating” or eliminating terrorism impossible.

  A second crisis was economic, or to be more precise financial, triggered by years of irresponsible mortgage lending, high-risk investments, and inadequate regulation of banks and other financial institutions in the United States and Europe. These practices came home to roost in 2007 and 2008, and it was not long before the crisis grew dramatically in scope, reach, and impact, morphing into a global recession that eliminated massive amounts of wealth and caused significant unemployment. This recession placed growing economic inequality in the developed world into starker contrast and led to the accumulation of considerable public debt.

  If the crisis began in the United States, so, too, did the response, one that involved substantial government intervention to buttress beleaguered financial institutions, massive fiscal and monetary stimulus to revive economic growth, and the introduction of regulatory reforms designed to make future financial crises less likely. The response was largely a success, although the crisis increased wariness of the United States and set back the pace for economic growth and development everywhere. Middle-class wages largely stagnated, upward mobility for many proved a myth, and inequality increased. The result in the United States and around the world was increased populism and growing disaffection with capitalism.

  POST–COLD WAR CHALLENGES

  A number of other developments and trends need to be highlighted about the post–Cold War era. One feature is the revival of friction and rivalry between major powers, most significantly between the United States and both Russia and China. The cause of the deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations is a matter of considerable debate, with some pointing to a lack of U.S. economic assistance for Russia in its early years as an independent country and to the decision to enlarge NATO, an initiative many in Russia saw as threatening and humiliating.

  Others place the burden of responsibility on Russia and above all on Vladimir Putin, a former intelligence officer who has been ruling Russia as either its president or its premier since 1999. Early on, Putin seemed to conclude that he wanted no part of the U.S.-led liberal world order, seeing it as a threat to his own continued rule and to Russia’s position in the world. Consistent with that conclusion, Putin undertook a number of policies at odds with the interests and values of the United States, such as using force to annex Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and prop up the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The fact that Russia used cyberattacks and a disinformation campaign to manipulate the U.S. 2016 presidential election made a bad situation worse. But whatever the cause or causes of the significant worsening of U.S.-Russia relations, the result was that economic sanctions to penalize Russia, mutual expulsions of diplomats, breakdowns of Cold War–era arms control agreements, and renewed military competition have become staples of the relationship.

  The trajectory of Sino-American relations has been different, in no small part because China took a different path from Russia. Unlike Russia, China embraced integration with the global economy, emphasizing both trade and investment, although on terms consistent with its state-led economic model and in ways that advantaged Chinese manufacturers and exporters. China also sought a good relationship with the United States because access to the American market and to American technologies and a stable and predictable international environment were deemed essential for China’s development. Toward that end, China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping avoided direct challenges to U.S. alliances in Asia and more broadly to U.S. primacy.

  By the end of the new century’s second decade, though, the U.S.-China relationship came to be characterized much more by competition than by cooperation. Hopes that China’s participation in the global economy would lead to a more market-oriented, democratic, and restrained China were not realized. The problem was not with integrating China, but was rather with the lack of subsequent follow-up to ensure that China was meeting the obligations it had agreed to when it was granted entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). For example, China still designates itself as a developing country in the WTO and continues to receive World Bank loans even though it is the world’s second-largest economy, is investing billions of dollars in advanced technology, and is funding infrastructure projects all over the world. At the heart of the deterioration of the relationship has been American frustration over trade, especially Chinese theft and forced transf
er of American intellectual property as well as Chinese barriers to American exports. There is also concern that China is forging ahead (in no small part because of large government subsidies) in the competition to produce next-generation technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G. China’s more assertive foreign policy, especially in the South China Sea, which it declares control over despite competing claims and an international tribunal’s ruling to the contrary, has also contributed to heightened tension. Finally, other policies associated with China’s president Xi Jinping, including the abolition of term limits on his tenure, repression of the Uighur minority in western China, a crackdown on autonomy in Hong Kong, heightened censorship of the internet, and more restrictive policies toward nongovernmental organizations, have also increased friction.

  As a result, many observers now openly raise the prospect of a cold war between the two most influential countries of this era. But if such a relationship materializes, it will be different in fundamental ways from the Cold War that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union in that China, unlike the Soviet Union, is an economic powerhouse, one highly integrated into the world economy. Containing a country such as China, one that boasts many forms of power beyond its military might, will often prove impossible. It will often prove undesirable as well, because Chinese cooperation will be essential if the world is to contend successfully with global challenges such as climate change and nuclear proliferation that have the potential to affect the interests of every country, including the United States, for the worse. Developing and implementing a foreign policy that pushes back against selected Chinese practices at home and abroad but at the same time leaves open areas for cooperation will be as vital as it will be difficult.

  An important characteristic of this post–Cold War era has also been the emergence of a significant number of global challenges along with a large gap between the scale of the challenges and the world’s willingness and ability to meet them. The phrase “international community” is often used, but the harsh reality (with partial exceptions, such as combating terrorism) tends to be that there is little sense of community when it comes to dealing with some of the most pressing problems.

  A prime example is climate change. Ambitious attempts to forge a global “cap and trade” agreement involving negotiated ceilings that would limit the amount of gases that cause the earth’s temperature to rise came to naught. The same was true for taxes proposed on carbon meant to discourage the emission of carbon dioxide. Instead, governments agreed in Paris in 2015 to set a goal for how much the world’s temperature should rise over the century, with each government setting a goal for its own country’s output over the following five years.

  The good news is that international agreement was reached. The less-than-good news is that even if the global goal were to be met, climate change would still have advanced significantly. Making matters worse, it is almost certain the target will not be met. When the United States under President Donald Trump announced its intention to withdraw from the agreement, a bad situation became even worse. Meanwhile, the effects of climate change are increasingly obvious given the rise in temperatures and sea levels and the increasing frequency of severe weather events.

  Another global challenge that largely remains unmet as the post–Cold War era unfolds involves cyberspace. Virtually all domains (including the oceans and outer space) are to a degree regulated. What sets cyberspace apart is that it is largely unregulated at the same time that it is so central to the functioning of modern societies, economies, governments, and militaries. There are few rules that are widely observed, a near absence of formal arrangements, and no mechanisms for enforcement.

  To the contrary, what we are witnessing is a gradual breakdown of what little order there is. Rather than an open, peaceful internet operating according to rules agreed to by scientists, technology companies, and internet users, what has emerged is an internet increasingly influenced by governments. We see a greater censoring of content deemed politically dangerous (China’s “Great Firewall”) or morally offensive (European governments acting to stop pornography). The internet has also been used as a weapon to slow nuclear weapons proliferation (as the United States and Israel reportedly did against Iran), to retaliate for actions deemed hostile (as North Korea did when it hacked Sony Pictures in response to a satirical film that poked fun at its leader), and to shape political outcomes (as Russia did against the United States to affect the outcome of the 2016 presidential election).

  Then there is space, a domain that hosts the satellites essential for communication of all manner: the global positioning system that helps you get from one place to another, weather forecasting, and military operations. There are nearly 2,000 active satellites in orbit as well as an inordinate amount of debris that, if collided with, could render any satellite useless. There is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but this only prohibits weapons of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or on the moon and other celestial bodies. There is nothing that precludes the placement in space of anti-satellite weapons, which as their name implies can be used to destroy satellites. Nor is there any protocol governing potential mining of asteroids and other bodies for valuable minerals. The result is that space is another largely unregulated realm of growing economic and military competition, something underscored by the U.S. decision in 2018 to establish a Space Command as a sixth branch of the U.S. armed forces.

  REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

  Progress at the regional level in this post–Cold War era has been uneven. The most successful part of the world, by most measures, has been the Asia-Pacific. This is a region characterized by high levels of economic growth and stability between and within countries. China’s rise thus far has been largely peaceful. The biggest shortcoming in security for the Asia-Pacific has been the failure to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

  The least successful region has been the Middle East. It was the venue of the first challenge of the era, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Saddam Hussein’s aggression was repelled, but he remained in power, as did autocrats in nearly every other country of the region. Efforts to promote peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians mostly failed. Iran expanded its reach and influence throughout the region as its long-term rival Iraq was weakened as a result of America’s 2003 war that removed Saddam Hussein and resulted in a country at war with itself.

  Starting in late 2010, the Middle East experienced the Arab Spring that, after a period of protest, left many countries in a state of prolonged civil war (often exacerbated by outsiders) or once again ruled by authoritarian regimes. The human suffering is enormous and has taken place in a region that was already lagging behind much of the world in measures of development.

  Europe, for the opening decades of the post–Cold War era, appeared to be another successful region of the world: at peace, democratic, and economically developed. The European Union not only expanded (from a dozen members when the Cold War ended to more than twice that number over subsequent decades) but also introduced a shared currency (the euro) and elements of a common foreign policy.

  In the second decade of this century, though, “Euro-optimism” receded. Growth rates slowed, and Europe’s share of global GDP shrank. A populist nationalist party helped to form the government in Italy, illiberal parties came to power in Poland and Hungary, and a populist movement threatened the government in France. The European Central Bank made monetary policy for those countries using the euro, while governments retained control over their individual budgets, leading to unsustainable fiscal deficits in Greece, Italy, and a number of other countries. Russia reintroduced military conquest to the Continent with its annexation of Crimea. Immigration from the Middle East stimulated the rise of right-wing nationalist political parties, including in Germany. A narrow majority of the British electorate voted in favor of Brexit, which started the country on a course to leave the EU. Traditional cen
trist parties that had dominated the European political landscape for more than half a century were increasingly losing out to smaller parties on both the left and the right. Europe’s bright future suddenly seemed much less certain.

  For Latin America, this has been an era of democratic consolidation in many countries (including Mexico) that had long been run by a single party. It has also been a time in which a number of civil conflicts have been brought to an end, most notably in Colombia. But democracy and populism remain in tension in both Brazil and Argentina. Elsewhere, a number of weak governments, in particular those of the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) and Mexico, could not maintain order within their countries. In Venezuela, once the richest country in Latin America, the government’s heavy hand drove millions of people out and decimated its economy. The result has been a more unsettled region. Africa, too, experienced both progress and frustration, with gains in democracy, economic growth, and life expectancy offset by civil conflicts, authoritarian rule, corruption, sizable population increases, and disease outbreaks.

  South Asia has also had an uneven post–Cold War experience. There is sustained tension between India and Pakistan as both have increased their nuclear arsenals; terrorist attacks on India mounted from Pakistan have nearly brought the two nations to blows. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban (a movement of Sunni fundamentalists who have used terror and waged war against the government in Afghanistan for years) added to problems in the region and at home as Pakistan itself has increasingly been the target of terrorist violence. Meanwhile, India has had some good news in its improved economic record, although it is held back by corruption, a large bureaucracy, widespread poverty, a large and still growing population, and questions surrounding the willingness of its Hindu majority to coexist with its large Muslim minority at a time of increased Hindu nationalism and heightened Muslim identity. Central Asia for its part has been relatively quiet, a mixed blessing that reflects the near-term stability of authoritarian political systems and, in several cases, oil-dependent economies.