The World: A Brief Introduction

by Richard Haass

  Terrorists’ motives vary. Groups in Spain (the Basque separatist organization ETA comes to mind) have fought against the central government, seeking to establish an independent state for the population they claim to represent. Others (such as ISIS) have acted to bring down the existing authority and replace it with their own. An armed guerrilla group in Colombia that used the acronym FARC sought to bring about a different central government with very different policies. Still others (such as al-Qaeda) seem to be motivated mostly by a desire to cause suffering and damage. The evidence suggests that most modern terrorists are motivated much more by political agendas than by a desire to alleviate poverty or economic inequality.

  Terrorists’ methods also vary. The perpetrators of 9/11 used box cutters to immobilize flight crews and take control of aircraft that they either flew into occupied buildings or failed while trying. Other terrorists have used car and truck bombs and guns, driven trucks into crowds, or strapped explosives to their chests. An average of nearly twenty thousand people a year lost their lives to terrorism from 2005 to 2017, including more than twenty-six thousand in 2017 alone. Most terrorists are to be found in the Middle East, South Asia (especially Pakistan), and Africa (especially Nigeria).

  There is concern that future terrorists will not limit themselves to such “conventional” methods and instead turn to what is described as grand terrorism. One possibility is a radiological or “dirty” bomb, which would combine conventional explosives with radioactive material, in the process leaving a defined area uninhabitable for years. Far worse in its effects would be detonating an actual nuclear weapon. Fabricating such a device is almost certainly beyond the capacity of any non-state group, but stealing, buying, or otherwise coming into possession of one is a possibility. Terrorists could also build and use chemical and biological weapons as well as use cyber weapons to disrupt or disable critical infrastructure such as dams, power plants, or water treatment facilities that people in the targeted society depend on.

  Efforts to frustrate terrorists and terrorism are known as counterterrorism. Counterterrorism includes a range of actions that can diminish recruitment of new terrorists or reduce the commitment of existing terrorists. This can be done in many ways, including influencing what is said and taught in classrooms and religious institutions and expressed in social and traditional media. Governments individually or together can also make it more difficult for terrorists and terrorist organizations to acquire the necessary human, financial, and physical resources they require. Other elements of a comprehensive counterterrorism policy include deploying law enforcement and intelligence agencies to collect information on terrorist planning; applying economic sanctions and other pressures against governments to discourage or penalize support for terrorists; and offering negotiations that provide an alternative path for those terrorists who harbor limited aims.

  There is one additional option: to attack terrorists directly. Such attacks can be carried out by law enforcement, military, or intelligence units. They can be preemptive, against terrorists about to launch some specific, imminent action, or they can be preventive, against known terrorists but absent information relating to a specific imminent action on their part. The aim can be to arrest individuals (which has the added advantage of obtaining information and intelligence) or to kill them, as U.S. Special Forces did when they entered Pakistan with the mission of killing Osama bin Laden. Countries can launch weapons from afar, using drones, cruise missiles, or fighter aircraft, or they can insert special operations forces on the ground. Efforts can be small scale and short duration or large scale and long term, much along the lines of what U.S. intelligence and military personnel did in collaboration with local partners against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Cyber-related technologies can also be used to disrupt terrorist planning and operations.

  Much can be done to reduce the potential effectiveness and impact of what terrorists do even if prevention fails. Governments can build their counterterrorism capacity so they can better contend with threats from terrorists, something the United States did in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Governments at all levels can also take steps to make a society less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. This falls under the rubric of defense and embraces law enforcement, the physical and cyber hardening of would-be targets, and the introduction of procedures to make it more difficult for terrorists to succeed. Such steps could include screening and searches at airports, government buildings, and places of work. And beyond increasing protective measures, societies can work to enhance their resilience in order to reduce the effects of successful terrorist attacks. Resilience can include training personnel who would respond to attacks in order to decrease casualties. It can also include stockpiling medical supplies and warehousing spare items that are costly and hard to produce quickly, such as critical electricity grid components, so that they can quickly be replaced following an attack.

  Ending or eliminating terrorism is often articulated by governments as an objective but is impossible to do. It is not only that identifying and arresting or killing known terrorists can be difficult but also that preventing the emergence of new terrorists is impossible. There will always be individuals who are dissatisfied with the status quo and are prepared to employ violence on behalf of their goals. Particular terrorists and acts of terrorism can be stopped, but terrorism will on occasion succeed. It can also be difficult to deter terrorism given the zeal of many individuals and groups, something that can lead them to sacrifice their lives for their cause. The challenge for governments and societies is to reduce the threat posed by terrorism to a level that is not unduly disruptive to a country’s way of life, the safety of its citizens, and its economic well-being. Adding to the challenge is the reality that many counterterrorist actions come at a price, one that can reduce economic growth, efficiency, privacy, and freedom and, in some circumstances, breed more terrorism if what is done (for example, a military attack that kills innocents) persuades some individuals to support the terrorists.

  Nuclear Proliferation

  Proliferation can refer to just about anything, from cells to ideas, that is increasing in number. But when it comes to foreign policy and international relations, the term is most often used in the context of spreading military technology or systems. In particular, it refers to weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, which is a category that includes nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons and the means to deliver them, above all ballistic missiles. Nonproliferation refers to policies and tools used to halt the spread of these weapons.

  In principle, countries can proliferate weapons of mass destruction in two ways. They can pursue vertical proliferation, which means adding to their inventory or improving their capabilities. This was the case during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union regularly modernized and increased their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Vertical proliferation also applies now to the nine countries that currently possess nuclear weapons and missiles and to varying extents appear to be modernizing and/or increasing their arsenals.

  Proliferation is mostly used, however, in the horizontal sense, meaning a country or some other actor adding a new class or category of weapons (such as nuclear or chemical weapons or ballistic missiles) to its arsenal. It is horizontal proliferation that most people have in mind when they speak of nuclear proliferation and when they speak of nonproliferation policy—the tools used to halt the spread of these weapons.

  THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD HAS DECLINED

  Number of stockpiled warheads

  Sources: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Federation of American Scientists.

  There is a view that nuclear proliferation is not to be feared and under certain circumstances could or even should be embraced. Behind this thinking is the belief that nuclear weapons helped keep the Cold War from going hot; expressed differently, the fear of a conflict escalating to a nuclear war that would be ruinous beyond beli
ef introduced a degree of caution and restraint that would have otherwise been absent. What helped to keep the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is sometimes argued, could help keep the peace between other rivals such as India and Pakistan, China and Japan, or Israel and Iran. Some prominent scholars have even taken this argument to its logical (if extreme) conclusion, asserting that if more countries had nuclear weapons it would be a more peaceful and stable world, because no nuclear country would attack another one and risk nuclear retaliation.

  This is a distinctly minority view for good reason. The emergence of additional countries with nuclear weapons is far more likely to be dangerous than stabilizing and could lead to conflict, including one where a weapon of mass destruction might be used with horrendous consequences. Creating conditions of deterrence such as existed during the Cold War so that there is no incentive to strike first is difficult because it requires robust arsenals that can survive an initial attack and still be able to deliver a devastating retaliatory response. Absent such qualities, a balance between two nuclear-armed entities would be precarious because there would be great incentive to attack first in a crisis. There would also be an incentive to strike to interrupt the emergence of a capability—something termed a preventive strike—or to attack the site of a weapon of mass destruction just before intelligence suggests it is to be used. This would constitute a preemptive strike. There is as well the danger that nuclear weapons could be used by accident or “fall into the wrong hands,” especially those of terrorists, if custody or control over weapons and materials were to be somehow lost or compromised. Finally, some make the argument that certain regimes cannot be deterred, because they have an apocalyptic or messianic vision of the world and are willing to use nuclear weapons and “sacrifice” themselves in order to realize their vision.

  It was concerns such as these that helped bring about the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, an international agreement that went into effect in 1970. The NPT requires the five countries that possessed nuclear weapons at the time of its signing and that it recognizes as legitimate “Nuclear Weapons States” (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and France) not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist, encourage, or induce any state without them to acquire them. (The Soviet Union’s obligations passed to Russia in 1991.) It also sets forth the principle that these states will avoid a nuclear arms race and move toward ridding themselves of all their nuclear weapons. It asks those states without nuclear weapons not to produce or acquire them. It guarantees access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. And it asks the non-nuclear-weapon states to accept “safeguards,” which are essentially inspections the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carries out to verify they are complying with the treaty.

  The NPT is limited in what it can do, however. No country can be compelled to sign it; in fact, three countries with nuclear weapons—India, Israel, and Pakistan—have never joined the treaty. There is also no penalty for withdrawal, as was made clear when North Korea exited the treaty. Those without nuclear weapons often complain that those in possession of such weapons are not making sufficient progress toward disarmament even though U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles are but a fraction of what they were at the height of the Cold War. The NPT states that all signatories have the right to technology for generating peaceful nuclear energy, which comes close to contradicting its aim of preventing proliferation. Many of the materials that would be needed to develop nuclear weapons are also needed to generate nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Making things even more problematic is that the inspections regime that was established is cooperative, in that the IAEA gets to inspect only those facilities admitted to by the country in question. It is an honor code system in a world where people are not always honorable.

  In addition to the NPT, there are any number of policies and tools employed to discourage proliferation. Some are positive, such as security guarantees. The United States, for example, covers its allies Japan and South Korea under its “nuclear umbrella,” in part so that they do not see a need to develop their own nuclear weapons.

  Most of the policies used to prevent or slow proliferation, however, have been negative in the sense that they are designed to make it difficult for governments to acquire many of the components that go into nuclear weapons. Various so-called supplier groups have been created to prohibit the export of certain technologies and systems or to interdict illegal shipments that are taking place. States have used cyberattacks to infect and thereby disrupt computers running the centrifuges carrying out uranium enrichment. There has also been work toward developing proliferation-resistant reactors that are meant to allow countries to attain nuclear energy without the ability to divert materials toward making nuclear weapons. Also related to nuclear energy are arrangements whereby a country with nuclear power ships out its spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing to ensure that it is not able to covertly enrich it to weapons-grade material.

  Sanctions have also been threatened or introduced to discourage would-be suppliers from providing technology or materials and would-be recipients from accepting them. Arms control has also been a tool to slow or reverse vertical proliferation (for example, involving both the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia) or to prevent horizontal proliferation, most significantly in the case of Iran.

  Iran’s recent history is worth highlighting. The United States, China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and Germany applied pressure on Iran, mainly in the form of economic sanctions, to persuade it to accept limits on its nuclear activities. The limits were detailed in a 2015 agreement (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) by which Iran accepted temporary constraints on its ability to produce and store the fuel needed for a nuclear bomb. In exchange, most of the sanctions that had been put into place against Iran were removed. Iran complied with the agreement, but the United States exited it in 2018 on the grounds that the limits on Iranian activity were of too short a duration and that the agreement did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program or what were seen as its malign activities throughout the Middle East. To be sure, Iran made an open-ended commitment not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, but critical limits on activities associated with producing and storing enriched nuclear fuel were due to expire by 2025 or 2030, after which Iran could amass much of what it would require if it decided to make a sudden, secret dash to produce nuclear weapons and present the world with a fait accompli (known as breakout). It is still unclear if Iran will try to become a country with nuclear weapons and how other countries would respond to its efforts should it proceed. Diplomacy could in principle succeed in establishing new ceilings on Iranian capabilities, denying it a nuclear weapon for a prolonged period or even permanently, although it is far from certain such arrangements could actually be negotiated.

  There are now nine countries in the world known to possess nuclear weapons: the original five countries permitted to do so under the NPT along with India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. States pursue nuclear weapons for a number of reasons, including security and prestige. They are seen as the ultimate security guarantee, because no nuclear state has ever gone to war with another nuclear-armed state. Nuclear weapons also act as a sort of status symbol; it is no coincidence that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council all possess nuclear weapons. It is very difficult to stop a country that is determined to develop nuclear weapons from doing so, especially if it possesses the necessary scientific and industrial capacity and is prepared to pay a price in the form of economic sanctions and a degree of international isolation.

  Once a state develops or otherwise acquires nuclear weapons, there are a number of options for dealing with it. One is to sanction the country to pressure it to give up its nuclear weapons. This is precisely what happened with South Africa, which in the face of sanctions gave up its nuclear weapons program in the late 1
980s. Ukraine voluntarily relinquished the many nuclear weapons it inherited with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Libya and Iraq, which had nascent nuclear weapons programs, also gave up their nuclear ambitions in the face of sanctions and the threat of attack. As already noted, though, a number of governments so value nuclear weapons that sanctions are unlikely to persuade them to give these weapons up. In addition, sanctions can be hard to sustain, because there are almost always competing economic or strategic interests that argue against keeping them in place.

  STOCKPILED NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 2019

  Sources: Federation of American Scientists; Institute for Science and International Security.

  In the case of North Korea, sanctions, threats, and inducements are likely not enough to force it to give up its nuclear weapons. The United States, working closely with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, has sought to persuade North Korea’s government to give up its nuclear weapons and related systems (denuclearize) through a mix of sanctions, threats of military attacks, and economic incentives. Many observers (including this one) are skeptical that North Korea would ever take such far-reaching steps given the prestige and security that nuclear weapons confer. The fact that Ukraine was invaded by Russia and lost Crimea to it despite promises enshrined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States that its security would be respected once it gave up the hundreds of nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union obviously decreases the likelihood that North Korea would follow in Ukraine’s footsteps. This reluctance is further reinforced by the fact that the governments in both Iraq and Libya were removed through foreign intervention in the wake of their having given up their nuclear weapons programs. What remains to be seen is whether diplomacy can limit the scale and quality of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs and, depending on what can be negotiated and verified, how others will choose to react either vis-à-vis North Korea or in terms of their own capabilities.