Arnhem
Page 46
Although Hackett’s War Diary account does not reflect it, the peremptory removal of one of his Battalions without consultation appears to have rankled, not least because the order came from an officer of equal standing but less time in rank and technically therefore a subordinate.22 As Hackett was ignorant of Urquhart’s last-minute arrangement for the succession of Divisional command, neither was he obligated to regard Hicks’ orders as binding and his co-operation was again likely due in no small measure to Mackenzie’s powers of persuasion. However, Hackett’s co-operation only appears to have extended to agreeing to the transfer of the 11th Parachute Battalion, and then only after the Brigade had moved from the DZ in its entirety. As he put it himself, Hackett’s initial intention was ‘to move the Bde…in towards the centre of Div activity as quickly as was compatible with the retention of its coherence’.23 This was to be achieved by moving the Brigade along the Arnhem‒Ede railway to the crossing at Wolfheze, where it was to rendezvous with its glider-borne elements and pause for the remainder of the night before pushing on with its mission of securing the high ground north of Arnhem at first light. For its part, the Division HQ War Diary glossed over Hackett’s disinclination to co-operate by noting that ‘He [Hackett] decided…to adhere to his original plan for carrying out his task which remained substantially unchanged.’24 This was not to be the end of Division HQ interfering with the execution of the 4th Parachute Brigade’s plan, as Hackett was to discover.
That lay some hours in the future however, and Hackett’s Brigade HQ moved off at 17:00 as planned to join the 7th KOSB HQ in the south-eastern corner of the DZ.25 The Brigade’s constituent units were also ready to move by or shortly after 17:00. 156 Parachute Battalion moved off from its RV in the north-west corner of the DZ on the hour, led by Major Geoffrey Powell’s C Company. 133 Parachute Field Ambulance was to follow once it was able to move the casualties gathered at the Zuid Ginkel café, protected by the 10th Parachute Battalion. The task of protecting the Brigade’s rear was assigned to the 4th Parachute Squadron RE, which moved to a point on the railway line a mile south of the DZ and established a defensive perimeter to cover the Brigade column from the west; from there Captain James Smith and his twenty-one-strong 1 Troop departed to accompany 156 Parachute Battalion in its role as Brigade spearhead.26 The 11th Parachute Battalion also experienced interference from the scattered remnants of SS Wacht Bataillon 3; Captain Mawson linked up with a small group from HQ Company hunting SS stragglers led by Major Dan Webber. Lieutenant-Colonel Lea had established his Battalion HQ in an underpass beneath a partly constructed motorway using a Jeep bonnet as a map table, while the remainder of the Battalion reorganised in a large clearing on the south side together with approximately forty German prisoners. Mawson found himself treating the Battalion second-in-command, Major Richard Lonsdale, who had been wounded in the right hand during the fly-in. Lonsdale became irate when Mawson suggested he report to the Brigade Dressing Station for treatment and, insisting the wound was ‘only a scratch’, he demanded Mawson ‘Stop flapping around like a wet hen…Bind the blasted thing up now and make me serviceable.’27 It is unclear when the order transferring the 11th Battalion to Lathbury’s Brigade reached Lea, and one source refers to him being summoned to Hackett’s HQ to be briefed by Mackenzie, possibly after Hackett’s HQ moved to the south-eastern corner of the DZ.28 However the transfer order was transmitted, the 11th Parachute Battalion took its place in the 4th Parachute Brigade column at approximately 17:30 for the first stage of its move, with Major David Gilchrist’s A Company in the lead.29
Once the second parachute lift was down and the 4th Parachute Brigade was clear of the DZ, the 7th KOSB’s next mission was to secure the landing zone selected for the third glider lift near the village and farm of Johannahoeve, four miles or so to the east and just across the Arnhem‒Ede rail line from Oosterbeek. To that end 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ issued provisional verbal orders at 15:15 for a move at 19:00, dependant on liaison with Hackett. However, there was some confusion in relaying the order within the Battalion and Major Robert Buchanan’s A Company moved off from its positions near the Planken Wambuis immediately on receipt and had marched two miles or more along the Amsterdamseweg before the error was discovered.30 Interestingly the incident does not figure in the 7th KOSB War Diary, possibly because A Company’s absence contributed to the German penetration onto the north-eastern corner of the DZ. The inadvertent British withdrawal also handed the Germans control of a section of the Amsterdamseweg near Reijersheide and the opportunity to occupy the woods south of the road on the north-east edge of LZ S, and thus within striking distance of the Divisional units concentrated in and around Wolfheze. The War Diary does record Major Buchanan’s Company re-establishing contact with the Battalion at some point between 06:00 and 09:00 on the morning of Tuesday 19 September, however.31 Be that as it may, in the meantime the Battalion had to cover the 4th Parachute Brigade’s move from the DZ and Lieutenant-Colonel Payton-Reid made the most of the enforced delay by ordering his men to prepare a hot meal from their 24-hour ration packs, their first since landing the previous day. While this was underway the Battalion was joined by Lieutenant Charles Doig’s 7 Platoon from B Company and CanLoan Lieutenant Albert Wayte with C Company’s 10 Platoon, which had come in with the second lift.32 They were followed at 18:00 by D Company after its day-long close-quarter fight in the woods led by a slightly wounded Major Sherriff, who reported the death of CanLoan Lieutenant Albert Kipping from 15 Platoon.33 Reorganisation complete and hot meal consumed, the 7th KOSB moved off in the gathering darkness at 19:00 with Major Michael Forman’s B Company in the lead, following the Arnhem‒Ede railway line in the wake of the 4th Parachute Brigade; in the process it encountered ‘considerable congestion’ from the latter’s units and transport in the vicinity of Wolfheze that took several hours to negotiate.34
The 7th KOSB’s march from Ginkel Heath was part of an overall move by the entire 1st Airlanding Brigade to its Phase II locations which began, by design or coincidence, with 181 Airlanding Field Ambulance’s Main Dressing Station (MDS). Originally set up in houses near the 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ in Wolfheze, the volume of casualties had overflowed into a nearby factory by Monday afternoon and the decision was taken to move the MDS to the Hotel Tafelberg in Oosterbeek. Ferrying casualties began at 15:00, using a bus and a captured German ambulance restored to working order by the 9th (Airborne) Field Squadron RE, and continued through the night with ‘no patients being left behind’, although the War Diary suggests that some particularly serious cases may have been left with volunteer orderlies.35 The remainder of the Brigade began the move to their Phase II positions located on a line running from Johannahoeve down to the Lower Rhine at Heveadorp, at 19:00. The northern end was assigned to the 7th KOSB, which was to deploy north of the Arnhem‒Ede railway line to protect LZ L. Lieutenant-Colonel John Place’s battalion-size No.2 Wing The Glider Pilot Regiment, standing in for the detached 2nd South Staffords, occupied the middle section of the line centred on Point 63.5 near a large house or hotel called the Graftombe, leaving the southern sector running down to Heveadorp to Major Cousens and the 1st Border.36 The 1st Border began its move east to the vicinity of Heveadorp by the light of gliders burning on LZ Z with Major Thomas Montgomery’s A Company in the lead, but shortly after moving off Lieutenant Patrick Baillie’s 7 Platoon came under machine-gun fire while crossing a ploughed field. The fire killed at least one man, pinned the Company down and delayed the entire Battalion for around an hour, despite a Sergeant Kerr knocking out two German machine-guns with hand-grenades after his Sten jammed.37 The 7th KOSB’s move to Johannahoeve along the Arnhem‒Ede railway line made good progress until it ran into the congestion near Wolfheze caused by the 4th Parachute Brigade’s transport element and attached anti-tank guns, which delayed the KOSB until after midnight. In contrast to this, No.2 Wing enjoyed an uneventful move of a little over a mile and was in its new location by 20:00.38 Moving with the Glider Pilots and accompanied by Cap
tain Roger Binyon’s No.1 Platoon from 9th (Airborne) Field Squadron RE and a Troop from the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, Brigade HQ also had an uneventful move to the Hotel Bilderburg, a few hundred yards west of the Graftombe, where it was happily ensconced by 20:00. The disadvantages of the hotel ‒ being an obvious target, constructed largely of glass and located on the forward edge of the Brigade line ‒ appear to have paled into insignificance in view of the fact it was ‘in true Airlanding Brigade tradition…the most luxurious building in the area’.39
The 4th Parachute Brigade’s Main HQ was also supposed to move from DZ Y at dusk to a house near the Wolfheze crossing, while the Brigade Tactical HQ consisting of Hackett, Brigade Major Dawson and a signals element remained at the DZ. At around 18:00 Hackett was joined by the Brigade HQ motor transport element guided by Lieutenant Frederick Lock from the Divisional Provost Company, who had jumped in with the 4th Parachute Brigade’s Advance Party the previous day.40 In the meantime the Main HQ relocated instead to the Hotel Buunderkamp, located in the woods south-east of Ginkel Heath, 500 yards or so north of the Arnhem‒Ede railway line on the fringe of LZ S. The reason for the change of venue is unclear and may have been due to congestion on the track paralleling the north side of the railway line but whatever the reason, Hackett and his Tactical HQ also moved to that location at 18:45.41 It is worth noting at this point that Hackett had done an exemplary job of commanding the 4th Parachute Brigade in the face of an opposed landing and the onset of darkness, especially in comparison with Lathbury’s performance in the relatively benign conditions prevailing the previous day. The most far-flung element of Hackett’s Brigade appears to have been Sergeant W. Griffiths and 3 Platoon from A Company, 156 Parachute Battalion, which remained at the Zuid Ginkel café protecting a party of non-ambulatory casualties, while Lieutenant-Colonel Alford and 133 Parachute Field Ambulance were ordered to move on to Wolfheze and join 181 Airlanding Field Ambulance operating from the sanatorium there. Alford’s men were shepherded clear of the landing area by Colonel Smyth’s 10th Parachute Battalion, which was then ordered to set in for the night in the woods just off the south-eastern corner of DZ Y near the Main Brigade HQ at the Hotel Buunderkamp. It is unclear whether this was due to the difficulty of moving through the wooded terrain in darkness or to reinforce the 4th Parachute Squadron RE as Brigade rearguard. The fact that the 10th Battalion deployed initially north of the Amsterdamseweg before moving to the overnight position, and that Smyth was tasked to resume his advance along the Brigade axis toward Arnhem in the early hours of the following morning, suggests the latter.42
Whatever the precise reason for its location, the 10th Parachute Battalion did not passively occupy its overnight position, for Colonel Smyth ordered an intensive programme of patrols to dominate the area around it. This was a wise precaution given the confused situation and because there were many Germans in the surrounding area, not all of them survivors of the collapse of SS Wacht Bataillon 3. Sergeant Banwell was reconnoitring the area around 4 Platoon’s initial location with Corporal George Cuthill when they happened upon a laagered German armoured vehicle with a sentry maintaining an ineffectual watch while the remainder of the crew cooked a meal.43 The paratroopers stealthily obtained a PIAT and knocked the vehicle out, presumably killing or dispersing the crew in the process. Nor was the patrolling restricted to senior NCOs. Banwell was leading 4 Platoon south across the Amsterdamseweg to the Battalion overnight position when ‘He stumbled on a strange sight ‒ in the woods, Lt. Col. Smyth, surrounded by twenty men of the 10th, was arguing violently with a German officer and a similar number of enemy troops. The two patrols had come face to face so suddenly that not a shot was fired. In excellent English the German stated “I consider you our prisoners!” Colonel Smyth was just as vehement in his counter-claim. Suddenly both patrols dispersed their own way.’44
While the 10th Battalion’s patrols were clashing with the Germans around their overnight perimeter, Major Gilchrist and A Company were leading the 11th Parachute Battalion east to join the 1st Parachute Brigade. Having trailed 156 Parachute Battalion from the DZ, Lieutenant-Colonel Lea struck off on his own after linking up with the 11th Battalion’s glider-borne transport and a detachment of anti-tank guns from the 2nd (Oban) Airlanding Anti-tank Battery near LZ S. Heading for Division HQ, which had relocated to the Hotel Hartenstein in Oosterbeek at 17:00, the Battalion column crossed the Arnhem‒Ede railway line at Wolfheze, where the inhabitants again lined the road to greet their liberators.45 As Captain Mawson recalled:
The faces of the younger women and children were bursting with smiles and cheers and laughter…The road was strewn with trampled flowers, and dogs and little children ran beside the column…They pressed upon us cups of water and rosy apples…and everywhere the Churchill ‘V’ sign was used as a currency of friendship and greeting.46
The Battalion marched on south-east along the Wolfhezeweg past the Hotel Wolfheze and then east along the Utrechtseweg into Oosterbeek where matters devolved to ‘sitting on our backsides for several hours on a grassy bank near the [Hotel] Hartenstein’ as the commander of the lead Company put it;47 interestingly the delay is not mentioned in the Battalion War Diary, which merely details the Battalion order of march and that it ‘marched all night’.48 The reason for the delay is unclear, with one source suggesting it might have been due to Hackett arguing with Hicks over the deployment of his Brigade. This is doubtful however, given that the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s 3 Battery reported the 11th Battalion passing its location near the riverside Oosterbeek Old Church at 22:00, and that Hackett did not visit Division HQ at the Hotel Hartenstein until after 23:00.49 The delay was therefore more likely due to the need to brief Lieutenant-Colonel Lea and to give the Dutch Underground time to organise local civilians to guide his Battalion.
The third of Hackett’s Battalions was also pushing on into the gathering darkness. 156 Parachute Battalion linked up with its glider-borne element near the Wolfheze railway crossing at some point before 20:00, minus two Jeeps lost in a Horsa that had force-landed in the sea, and then moved off eastward along the track paralleling the railway line.50 Hackett had instructed Lieutenant-Colonel Des Vœux to halt for the night at around 18:30, to permit pre-dark reorganisation in readiness to resume the advance along the railway at first light.51 Des Vœux had his own ideas however and, apparently encouraged by the lack of opposition, resumed the advance at 20:00 with Major Powell’s C Company still in the lead. The unopposed progress continued for the hour or so it took to cover another two miles, although warning of what was to come was received from an unnamed 7th KOSB officer in the process. Presumably a member of an advance party given the timings, he informed the paratroopers that the Germans had set up a ‘strong outpost line’ ahead in the vicinity of the Dreijensweg which ran north for roughly a mile from the Oosterbeek Hoog railway crossing to the Amsterdamseweg. At 21:00 Sergeant J. R. Black’s 10 Platoon ran into an ambush approximately 400 yards short of the Hoog crossing, which scattered and pinned down the platoon in the darkness; the ambushers may have been from SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 9, and a stray round from the firefight killed A Company Clerk, Private George Tansley, further down the Battalion column.52 Major Powell promptly despatched Lieutenant Brian Willcock and 11 Platoon to carry out a left-flanking movement, but when Willcock was also halted by heavy fire Powell deduced that the enemy line was too strong to be carried by an impromptu night attack. Colonel Des Vœux concurred with this assessment when he came forward to investigate the hold-up and ordered a general withdrawal to a wood a few hundred yards west of Johannahoeve to await daylight. Hackett’s HQ could not be informed of 156 Battalion’s unilateral advance and subsequent check or its post-withdrawal location owing to a communications breakdown of some kind, an omission that was to cause some confusion the following day.53