Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  Over on the western side of the Division perimeter some of the other elements of the 1st Airlanding Brigade enjoyed a generally quieter Tuesday morning. Brigade HQ was scheduled to move from the Hotel Bilderburg to a new location 800 yards to the south-east at Valkenburg on the outskirts of Oosterbeek, which was reconnoitred by a member of Brigade staff at 05:00. This proved unnecessary however, as Brigadier Hicks selected a different site shortly after resuming command of the Brigade at 07:30. This was within Oosterbeek proper, just south of the Utrechtseweg and a few hundred yards south of the Hotel Hartenstein, proximity to which probably influenced Hicks’ decision. The Brigade HQ column was packed and ready to move from the Hotel Bilderburg by 08:00 when the area was strafed by a number of German fighter aircraft, but the column escaped unscathed and the HQ was established in its new location by 09:00.97 It was joined shortly thereafter by Major James Dale DFC and C Squadron from the Glider Pilot Regiment’s No. 2 Wing, which had passed the night dug in with Lieutenant-Colonel Place and the rest of No. 2 Wing around Point 63.5, just south of the Arnhem‒Ede railway line. The Glider Pilots had spent ‘a disturbed night with considerable firing coming from direction of railway line, but no attack developed’. C Squadron was detached to provide security for 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ at 09:00, while the remainder of No. 2 Wing began moving to a new location in the outskirts of Oosterbeek thirty minutes later, also enduring an apparently ineffectual strafing by German fighters en route. Place’s force was reduced again following receipt of an urgent instruction from Division HQ, which led to Major Anthony Murray and F Squadron being detached at 11:00 to establish a standing patrol along the edge of a wood north-east of the Hotel Hartenstein, presumably as a security measure for Division HQ.98

  The 1st Border had a less easy passage to its Phase II locations. The Battalion’s dusk withdrawal from LZ Z was stymied shortly after moving off when A Company ran into German machine guns emplaced across the Battalion route. The contact delayed the withdrawal for around an hour and although there was no further enemy interference when the advance was resumed after full darkness, moving tactically through three miles of largely wooded terrain in the inky blackness proved to be a time-consuming business. As a result the 1st Border was not dug in on its new locations until 05:15, nine hours after moving off.99 Battalion HQ was located only 800 yards or so west of the Hotel Hartenstein, which allowed runners, notably signaller Private George Attenborough, to get around the ongoing radio communication problems.

  Major Cousens’ force was swelled by the arrival of two 17-Pounder and five 6-Pounder anti-tank guns. Precisely when these weapons arrived is unclear, as is the provenance of the former, although they were reportedly from 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ; the 6-Pounders were presumably those sequestered from the South Staffords’ second lift column by Division HQ at 17:30 the previous day, and were returned to their parent Battalion at 11:15.100 The Battalion frontage remained quiet, although Brigade HQ relayed reports of large numbers of German troops moving through Heelsum and other points west of the Battalion location at 09:45, and at 11:00 an NCO from 156 Parachute Battalion reported the presence of two armoured vehicles near the Arnhem‒Ede railway line just north of A Company’s location. In addition, C Company came under mortar fire at some point, which reportedly killed Lieutenant Alan Roberts’ batman, a Lance-Corporal King, and wounded several other men.101

  Not all of the 1st Airborne Division’s units in and around the Divisional area were holding fast or moving east however, for Brigadier Hicks had tasked the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron to scout west toward Heelsum and north to the Amsterdamseweg to ascertain German strengths and locations; this was the source of the information received by the 1st Border from Airlanding Brigade HQ. To this end the Squadron left its overnight harbour area near the Hotel Hartenstein at 06:30 and headed west along the Utrechtseweg in the pre-dawn darkness with Captain Michael Grubb’s A Troop in the lead, followed by Captain John Park’s D Troop and then Squadron HQ and Support Troop. Captain Allsop established a Tactical HQ on the Utrechtseweg shortly after 07:30, 500 yards or so west of the junction with the Wolfhezeweg and just forward of the 1st Border’s outposts while A and D Troops continued west and then south into the Doorwerthsche Bosch forest to commence their work.102 Within three hours, details of German activity were being relayed from the individual Sections manning an observation line established just west of the Breedeweg around 1,000 yards short of Heelsum, with A Troop covering the northern section running between the Utrechtseweg and the Van der Molenallee and D Troop from the latter to just south of the Koninginne Laan. The line was established without incident apart from an exchange of fire between Lieutenant Douglas Galbraith’s 2 Section and a reported Panzer IV at around 09:00 just north of the Utrechtseweg, although the Tactical HQ party was alarmed into a ‘spirited siting of defensive pits’ by a passing RASC soldier who claimed large numbers of German troops were approaching. In the event the HQ party escaped unscathed with the exception of Trooper Andrew Auld, who was wounded in the leg, and the German advance along the Utrechtseweg failed to materialise, although the Squadron’s Polsten Gun Section was deployed as a precaution.103 Radio reports of German movements in the area of Renkum were being received by 10:00, which appear to appear to have prompted Allsop to move his Tactical HQ back to a new location near the Hotel Bilderberg, adjacent to the gun pits occupied by the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s 1 and 2 Batteries.104

  The Squadron’s secondary mission of reconnoitring north to the Amsterdamseweg was allotted to Captain John Hay’s understrength C Troop, as it had scouted the area around LZ S the previous day. Leaving the harbour area at 06:30 with the remainder of the Squadron, C Troop then branched north-west up the Wolfhezeweg, passed through Wolfheze, crossed the Arnhem‒Ede railway line and reached the junction with the Amsterdamseweg without incident. Further progress was then blocked by German mortar fire that forced a hasty independent withdrawal, during which Captain Hay’s Jeep became briefly bogged down and some vehicles were strafed by Luftwaffe fighters. After reorganising in Wolfheze the Troop moved off along the Duitsekampweg running across the bottom of LZ S toward the Hotel Buunderkamp, in order to approach the Amsterdamseweg further west through the woods near Planken Wambuis. In the process Lieutenant Cecil Bowles’ 9 Section successfully stalked, captured and interrogated three stray Germans spotted near the Buunderkamp before passing them back to Hay’s HQ Section, which in turn somewhat hopefully despatched them back unescorted toward British lines. The dense woodland obliged the Jeeps to move in column behind scouts on foot, passing through a culvert under the incomplete motorway paralleling the railway and a number of abandoned construction huts before finally approaching the Amsterdamseweg. Lieutenant Hubert Pearson, who had been assigned from HQ Troop to make up for Sunday’s casualties, climbed a tree to gain a view of the main road and discovered that, ‘as far as he could see, enemy armoured vehicles were moving slowly from the west in the direction of Arnhem.’ Hay was unable to report this because while the remainder of the Squadron were enjoying unexpectedly clear communications, C Troop had lost radio contact shortly after turning onto the Wolfhezeweg. The volume of German traffic on the Amsterdamseweg precluded that route and it was also becoming increasingly apparent that they were not alone in the woods. Lance-Corporal Albert Palmer and Trooper Jimmy Cooke had detected signs of recent German presence at the motorway culvert whilst scouting ahead of the main column, and stealthy movement was becoming audible to the rear. C Troop therefore had little choice but to hold quietly in place and await developments.105

  While the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron had been settling into its night harbour area near the Hotel Hartenstein, the 7th KOSB had finally broken clear of the congestion caused by the 4th Parachute Brigade’s transport echelon near Wolfheze at 01:00. The Battalion then moved in column along the track paralleling the north side of the Arnhem‒Ede railway line with B Company in the lead, trailed by D Company, Battalion HQ and Support Company with C Company brin
ging up the rear. Tasked to protect LZ L for the third lift, the Battalion’s initial objective was the farm and village of Johannahoeve at the south-east corner of the zone and a mile or so north-west of Oosterbeek. From there B Company were to move north-east and secure a road junction on the Dreijenseweg 1,000 yards north of the Oosterbeek Hoog railway crossing while C Company occupied Point 565 in the woods midway between B Company and the railway line. B Company’s advance was somewhat cautious until Lieutenant-Colonel Payton-Reid went forward and directed Major Forman to speed up and the Johannahoeve objectives were then reached and secured without incident, although the Battalion War Diary referred to ‘a certain amount of enemy MG and gun fire’ and ‘air strafing’; 4th Parachute Brigade HQ also referred to encountering ‘hostile bombing during the night with flares’.106 Matters proceeded less smoothly thereafter, however. Major Dinwiddie and C Company pushed on and were climbing the wooded slope leading to Point 565 when they bumped into dug-in German machine guns; unable to locate them in the darkness, Dinwiddie elected to establish a temporary perimeter and resume the attack after daybreak. B Company ran into similarly ‘stiff opposition’ en route to the Dreijenseweg junction at around 04:00 and suffered a number of casualties in repeated but vain efforts to outflank the German positions; the casualties included the commander of 5 Platoon, Lieutenant Donald Murray, who was posted missing.107 At that point Colonel Payton-Reid intervened and ordered Major Forman to withdraw to Johannahoeve, around which he had established a loose Battalion perimeter by first light, with Major Sherriff’s D Company dug in just to the north and C Company still holding its position near Point 565. At some point after 06:00 the Battalion was rejoined by Major Buchanan and A Company, which had become separated following a misunderstanding the previous afternoon; it is unclear where the latter were deployed on rejoining the Battalion, but the War Diary suggests it was in the 500-yard-deep strip of woods separating the Amsterdamseweg and LZ L.108

  In the event, Colonel Payton-Reid’s decision to set in at Johannahoeve proved fortuitous, for at 08:00 the 7th KOSB was officially transferred to the 4th Parachute Brigade and Brigadier Hackett visited Payton-Reid’s HQ at around the same time to announce the transfer and deliver new instructions.109 The 10th and 156 Parachute Battalions were scheduled to advance and secure the western end of the Koepel ridge in the course of the morning, and Hackett therefore ordered Payton-Reid to maintain a firm base for the parachute Battalions to manoeuvre around in tandem with the 7th KOSB’s existing mission to protect LZ L for the third lift. In line with the latter D Company was redeployed to the north-west corner of the LZ with A Company on its left flank, while B Company and Battalion HQ at Johannahoeve protected the landing area from the south and east. C Company was to hold in place near Point 565 while 156 Parachute Battalion moved through to secure the height en route to Koepel and then follow in the paratrooper’s wake to secure their gains, and Payton-Reid was also instructed to maintain close contact with both parachute units and to ‘assist them in any way possible’. Once its redeployments were complete the 7th KOSB remained in place, although its positions appear to have been noted by enemy observers on the high ground to the east. All the Battalion’s locations were heavily shelled in the course of the morning, which set fire to most of the houses in Johannahoeve village, and the Battalion also attracted the attention of German fighter aircraft, which made a series of strafing attacks at around 11:00 that inflicted at least seven casualties on a KOSB patrol caught moving on the LZ.110

  On returning to the Hotel Buunderkamp from Division HQ at 01:30, Hackett had spent the next few hours drawing up orders to conform with Hicks’ instructions for an advance eastward between the Arnhem‒Ede railway line and the Amsterdamseweg. Employing the track paralleling the north side of the railway line as the Brigade axis, Hackett’s new objective was to secure the Koepel ridge and establish a firm left flank anchored on the main road, with the 4th Parachute Squadron continuing as Brigade rearguard. 156 Parachute Battalion and its attached Troop from the 4th Parachute Squadron RE was tasked to secure the Koepel ridge while the 10th Parachute Battalion set up the firm flank astride the Amsterdamseweg approximately 1,000 yards west of the junction with the Dreijenseweg. The unforeseen problem with this plan would be co-ordination, for 156 Parachute Battalion was occupying a firm base in woods 800 yards short of Johannahoeve and around two miles further east than Hackett was expecting. The discrepancy was due to Lieutenant-Colonel Des Vœux ignoring Hackett’s instructions to halt at dusk the previous evening in favour of pushing on along the Arnhem‒Ede railway to within 400 yards of the Oosterbeek Hoog station. There the Battalion’s lead element ran into the same well-sited German positions that were to stop the 7th KOSB securing Point 565 and the south end of Dreijenseweg six hours or so later; Des Vœux was unable to inform Brigade HQ of the situation or his actual location because communications with Brigade HQ had broken down. For its part, the 10th Parachute Battalion had set in for the night near Hackett’s Brigade HQ just off DZ Y, and was consequently looking at an approach march of at least three miles to its assigned location astride the Amsterdamseweg. This meant that 156 Parachute Battalion would be operating without support until the remainder of the 4th Parachute Brigade closed up from its overnight positions west of Wolfheze.

  It took 156 Parachute Battalion until 03:00 to disengage and reorganise in the firm base west of Johannahoeve, and Hackett’s new orders for the seizure of the Koepel ridge were received ninety minutes later.111 Lieutenant-Colonel Des Vœux’s consequent plan envisaged securing this objective in three bounds and gave Major Geoffrey Powell’s C Company responsibility for securing the ridge surmounted by Point 565 as the first bound, supported by Major John Waddy’s B Company. The second bound tasked Major John Pott’s A Company to move around Powell’s left flank, advance up the wooded incline and across the Dreijenseweg to secure the Lichtenbeek feature, after which B Company was to push on and occupy the Koepel ridge. It is unclear when the attack began but C Company had secured Point 565 without encountering resistance by 07:00 although B Company, deployed in support south of the railway line, fired on German troops and armoured vehicles spotted near the south end of the Dreijenseweg.112 The 156 Battalion War Diary surprisingly makes no mention of the 7th KOSB’s C Company, although A Company’s commander noted their presence on the left flank.113 Colonel Des Vœux and Major Pott then came forward to Powell’s location in an effort to spy out the ground for the next bound but the foliage was too dense for effective observation.114 They were joined briefly at this point by Brigadier Hackett, who stressed the urgent need to break through to Frost’s beleaguered force at the road bridge, before departing for his HQ. Major Pott returned to brief his platoon commanders, Lieutenants Lindsay Delacour and Stanley Watling and Captain Ian Muir from the Glider Pilot Regiment. The latter had been attached to A Company with his thirty-strong 22 Flight from D Squadron as compensation for Sergeant Griffiths’ 3 Platoon, which had been detached to protect casualties on DZ Y. A Company also had a 6-Pounder attached; it is unclear whether the gun came from 156 Battalion’s Support Company or H Troop, 2nd (Oban) Airlanding Anti-tank Battery, assigned to support the Battalion. The briefing does not appear to have included the previous night’s warning that the Germans had established a ‘strong outpost line’ along the Dreijenseweg from the stray KOSB officer or that B Company had seen armoured vehicles moving on the southern end of the Dreijenseweg.115 Presumably it was discounted due to C Company’s easy passage and Hackett’s urging haste. Major Pott began his move around C Company’s left flank at 08:30, following a firebreak angling through the trees toward the Dreijenseweg.116

  The German positions which had blocked the advance of 156 Parachute Battalion and the 7th KOSB during the night of 18-19 September were actually defensive outposts dubbed sicherungen (literally, ‘fuses’) deployed to cover likely avenues of attack; another sicherung located at Johannahoeve farm appears to have withdrawn without making contact. The outposts were intended to hold in place lon
g enough to divine enemy intentions before withdrawing to the main sperrlinie or blocking line, which followed the course of the Dreijenseweg with positions on the roadway and further uphill, notably along a stretch flanked on its eastern edge by a by a ten-foot bank. The line was manned primarily by Panzergrenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 361, a Heer replacement training unit based at Wuppertal commanded by Hauptmann Hans Bruhn, a Knight’s Cross holder who had lost a leg on the Eastern Front in 1942. Despatched by Wehrkreis IV, Bruhn’s 525-strong Bataillon arrived in Arnhem on 18 September after a 100-mile journey by road and rail. II SS Panzerkorps then assigned it to Sturmbannführer Spindler, who in turn directed it to the Dreijenseweg sector. There Bruhn also took command of the detachment from SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 9 and Hauptsturmführer von Allwörden’s SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 9 which had been deployed along the Amsterdamseweg since the early evening of 17 September. This added ten assorted armoured half-tracks, two Panzerjäger IV self-propelled guns, several towed anti-tank guns and three infantry companies totalling in excess of 120 men to Bruhn’s strength. The vehicles were sited among the trees concealing the defensive positions to cover the approaches to the Dreijenseweg or in some instances patrolling back and forth along the roadway, while one of von Allwörden’s Panzerjäger IVs was stationed at the junction of the Amsterdamseweg and Dreijenseweg along with a PaK 40.117