Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  The Airborne response to the German capture of the underpass was characteristically swift and aggressive. Within twenty minutes Lieutenant John Grayburn and his fifty-strong group built around the survivors of the 2nd Parachute Battalion’s A Company had retaken it at cost of several casualties, including Grayburn himself, who had already been wounded on 17 September; he quickly returned to the fray after having his new wounds dressed. With the underpass back in British hands Lieutenant Donald Hindley and five Sappers from the 1st Parachute Squadron’s HQ Troop were able to remove the fuses from the demolition charges, a task Hindley later described as ‘a nerve-racking experience, working a few feet away from a large quantity of explosives which could be fired at any moment’.23 A see-saw battle then developed as the equally determined Germans recaptured the underpass at 10:20 and set about replacing the fuses, prompting another attack by Grayburn and his men forty minutes later, by this time reduced to thirty, again supported by Hindley and three surviving Sappers who were now tasked to remove the demolition charges altogether. It is unclear if this was done, although the fact the overpass remained intact after the Germans recaptured it for the final time at 11:30 with the support of a tank suggests that the Sappers were successful. The Airborne party had no counter to the tank and while some escaped a number were captured, including Lieutenant Hindley – who had been wounded in the face and shoulder – his Squadron Sergeant Major, and another unnamed Sapper. Lieutenant Grayburn was killed by machine-gun fire from the tank whilst standing in the open with his back to the vehicle supervising the withdrawal; his body fell into the Lower Rhine and was not recovered until 1948. He was posthumously awarded the only Victoria Cross awarded to a member of the Arnhem bridge force.24

  Three miles or so to the west of the Arnhem road bridge, Oosterbeek proper had remained relatively calm through 19 September despite the fighting that raged to the north and east, and business thus continued as usual through the night at the various formation headquarters located only 600 yards or so south of the Arnhem‒Ede railway line. 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ, located in houses close to Division HQ, was informed of the contact with the 4th Parachute Brigade’s via a liaison officer from Division HQ at 02:30 and that the 7th KOSB was to return to the Airlanding fold two-and-a-quarter hours later; the latter was presumably relayed by radio, given that the Airlanding Brigade HQ was the only contact Division Signals were able to make, as reported at 02:00 and again at 04:40.25 At 01:40 Division HQ received a message from 1st British Airborne Corps Rear HQ at Moor Park requesting a new location for the Polish Independent Parachute Brigade’s drop, which had been rescheduled for the afternoon of 20 September. The request presumably resulted from Urquhart’s request for a change of venue on the morning of 19 September and four grid references were duly transmitted delineating an area just east of Driel, directly south of Oosterbeek on the opposite side of the Lower Rhine and just under three miles west of the original DZ K.26 Although the Division HQ War Diary makes no mention of it, the idea seems to have been to bring the Poles across the Lower Rhine via the Heveadorp ferry, located at the northern edge of the new drop zone. The ferry was still functional at this point and ferryman Pieter Hensen had been carrying normal Dutch commuter traffic back and forth until at least 18 September, along with Airborne strays from south of the river including one of the RAF early warning radar crews from the second lift; Major John Winchester and a party from his 9th Field Company RE had surveyed the ferry and jetty in the late morning of 19 September while searching for diesel barges for future bridging operations. No barges were found but a group of seven, mainly from the 2nd South Staffords, were brought across from the south bank by a Corporal Hey.27 By the early hours of 20 September the bulk of B Company, 1st Border was dug in on the Westerbouwing high ground overlooking the ferry terminal, with CanLoan Lieutenant John Wellbelove’s 13 Platoon deployed 500 yards to the front straddling the riverside Veerweg; the Platoon Scout Section consisting of Corporal Cyril Crickett, Bren Gunner Private Philip Hulse and sniper Private Thomas McDonald was dug in on the road leading down to the ferry.28

  Surprisingly, the decision to change the Polish Brigade’s drop zone has attracted little comment despite the fact that it amounted to delivering Sosabowski’s men onto an unsurveyed, unmarked and unprotected DZ and hoping for the best – the Polish Brigade had no organic Pathfinder capability and the 21st Independent Parachute Company was unable to reach the proposed landing area. Perhaps more importantly, neither Urquhart nor Moor Park had any idea of the conditions of the ground or enemy dispositions south of the river and they could therefore have been delivering the Poles squarely into the lap of a fully prepared enemy. Urquhart can perhaps be excused given his proven dearth of airborne experience and increasingly desperate need of reinforcement, but the staff at Moor Park ought to have known better, and should arguably have been looking to cancel the Polish drop unless, or until, more favourable conditions prevailed. Such a cancellation would likely not have gone down well with the keyed-up Polish paratroopers, but that would have been preferable to sacrificing their lives on the altar of wishful thinking. As it was, 1st Airborne Corps was merely channelling Browning’s arrogant and vindictive attitude toward the Poles, prompted by the Polish Government-in-Exile’s stubborn refusal to cede control of Sosabowski’s Brigade to him for the two years before March 1944, and which was to find even more blatant expression at the end of Operation MARKET GARDEN.29 Be that as it may, the change of drop zone was relayed to Sosabowski at his HQ at Stamford in Lincolnshire at 08:45 by the Brigade Liaison Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Stevens, along with orders to move to the north bank of the Lower Rhine via the Heveadorp ferry; the ferry was to be secured by the 1st Parachute Brigade, which was also to protect the crossing and provide guides. Consequently, the ‘many days and nights of staff work, the map studies, and the briefings, were all thrown out the window’ and within thirty minutes Sosabowski had drawn up a hasty plan and was briefing his Brigade staff officers. By 10:00 the staff officers were passing on the briefing to unit and stick commanders at Saltby and Spanhoe; the lift had been scheduled to begin taking off at that time, but poor weather had again prompted a three-hour postponement.30

  Having successfully sealed off the British outpost at the Arnhem road bridge and fought the relieving force to a standstill doing it, the Germans now turned their attention to eradicating both. Heeresgruppe B ordered the total evacuation of Arnhem’s civilian population on 20 September, informing the city’s mayor that this was to be completed from south to north in four-day increments; the only exceptions were police, fire service and hospital personnel, and non-ambulatory sick and wounded. The decision was prompted in part by the fact that the sizeable civilian presence was a drain on the German supply chain, not least because the city had been without water or electrical power since 18 September, and because the Germans were aware that elements of the civilian population were openly aiding the British. More pertinently from an operational perspective, measures were also implemented to streamline the rather convoluted command and control arrangements. Hitherto Heeresgruppe B had been obliged to communicate with 9 SS Panzer Division via Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich’s II SS Panzerkorps, and with Kampfgruppe von Tettau via Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Niederlande, frequently utilising the Dutch telephone network owing to a shortage of radios. Feldmarschall Model addressed these cumbersome arrangements by subordinating von Tettau’s command to II SS Panzerkorps and establishing a direct link between Obersturmbannführer Harzer’s 9 SS Panzer Division HQ and Heeresgruppe B. This permitted reinforcements to be despatched directly to the fighting front from Germany, among the first of which were Festung MG Bataillon 37 and MG Bataillon 41; the former had only been raised at Wandern in Germany on 10 September.31 Heeresgruppe B also offered 9 SS Panzer Division the services of Artillerie Regiment 191 providing it could provide transport to move its twenty-four 105mm guns from its refitting area at Zutphen, twenty-five miles north-east of Arnhem. Harzer swiftly arranged a relay with his ha
ndful of vehicles and he also elevated the Regiment’s HQ to Artillerie Kommandeur (ArKo) status, with responsibility for all artillery units operating in 9 SS Panzer Division’s area in the same way FlaK Brigade von Svoboda had been given control of all anti-aircraft assets the previous day. With his reinforcement and support needs thus at least partially addressed, Harzer set about organising attacks against the Oosterbeek pocket in line with orders from II SS Panzerkorps on 20 September, scheduled to commence on Thursday 21 September; the delay was to permit Kampfgruppen von Tettau and Spindler to close up to the western side of the coalescing British perimeter.32

  There was to be no respite for the British in the interim however, for just after 07:00 the Germans commenced a bombardment of the entire British Divisional area with mortars, artillery and rocket launchers which Urquhart described as ‘the heaviest mortar stonk yet’.33 The bombardment coincided with a conference at the Hotel Hartenstein HQ at 08:00, although precisely who attended is unclear; the primary sources only refer specifically to the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Iain Murray from the Glider Pilot Regiment’s No.1 Wing and Captain David Allsop from the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron.34 Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson from the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment also attended and was formally placed in charge of THOMPSON Force, as the ad hoc grouping he had rallied to protect his guns down on the Benedendorpsweg the previous afternoon was dubbed; he may have been accompanied by Majors Richard Lonsdale and John Simonds, the 11th Parachute Battalion’s second-in-command and commander of the 2nd South Staffords’ HQ Company respectively, who had been assigned to Thompson the previous afternoon.35 According to the latter, the conference ‘mainly dealt with supplies’ but given the intent to shuttle the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade across the Lower Rhine, the Heveadorp ferry also likely featured in the discussion. As it did not figure in the original briefing material passed to the 1st Airborne Division, Urquhart only appears to have become aware of the ferry’s existence after his return to Division HQ on 19 September, likely via the Dutch Resistance; this presumably prompted the survey of the ferry and landing stage carried out by Major Winchester and his party from the 9th Field Company RE the previous day.36 The only interruption to Urquhart’s conference appears to have come from Major Gough’s 08:20 telephone call from the Arnhem road bridge. Others were not so lucky. A German salvo straddled the nearby building occupied by 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ and at least one projectile scored a direct hit on the room where Brigadier Hicks was holding his own conference; Hicks was unhurt but Staff Captain Edward Moy-Thomas, Brigade Intelligence Officer Captain Raymond Burns, Brigade Signals Officer Captain Stuart Blatch and Lieutenant Antony Thomas, commander of the Brigade HQ Defence Platoon, were all killed.37 The culprit was likely a 150mm nebelwerfer rocket launcher from SS Werfer Abteilung 102; half an hour before the incident the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron reported two such weapons firing from the north-east.38

  Down on the lower Benedendorpsweg road the forward elements of what was to become THOMPSON Force spent a largely uneventful night in its Battalion positions around the Acacialaan junction. According to the 3rd Parachute Battalion War Diary, the night was ‘reasonably quiet and most men were able to obtain a few hours badly needed sleep’.39 Not everyone was asleep. At 03:30 the 11th Parachute Battalion despatched a patrol to investigate the Oosterbeek Laag underpass, which ascertained that it was held by a German mobile patrol; it is unclear if the information was obtained by contact or stealth.40 All that changed abruptly at 08:00 when Kampfgruppe Harder resumed the attack along the Benedendorpsweg, hitting the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalion positions straddling the road, in the former instance against the sector held by Lieutenant Leslie Curtis and S Company, and across an area of open ground to the east of the 11th Parachute Battalion’s position on the Acacialaan.41 The attackers were initially concealed by a combination of thick river mist and dust and smoke from the bombardment, and were accompanied by at least two vehicles from Sturmgeschütze Brigade 280, again misidentified as tanks. The Germans doubtless expected the assault guns to be their trump card again but that did not prove to be the case, in part because the reduced visibility prevented the StuGs identifying the British positions and standing off out of PIAT and Gammon bomb range as they had done on the Utrechtsestraat and Den Brink the previous day. There was also the presence of two alert and fully manned 6-Pounder guns located at the Acacialaan-Benedendorpsweg junction commanded by Lance-Sergeant John Baskeyfield from the 2nd South Staffords Anti-tank Group. The guns appear to have been deployed close together with Baskeyfield’s piece covering both roads while Lance-Sergeant Mansell covered the Benedendorpsweg. Baskeyfield and his crew waited until the lead vehicle was within 100 yards’ range before pumping at least six rounds into it. This brought the vehicle to a halt by blowing off the right gear differential and subsequent hits set it ablaze; the second StuG appears to have decided discretion was the better part of valour and turned right off the Benedendorpsweg accompanied by its covering infantry.42

  With their armoured support removed, the burden fell on the German infantry and the restricted visibility sparked a series of close-quarter encounters such as that experienced by Private James Gardner from the 1st Parachute Battalion:

  They came at us with all the fury they could muster. We got out of our trenches to meet the infantry…we could not see one another after a while – it was a mixture of dust, smoke and fog. I felt oddly alone, when out of the smoke…a figure emerged with rifle and bayonet out in front of him. I waited a while to be sure who was there. At about four to five feet I could see by the helmet that he was one of ‘theirs’. I turned to face him, but he stopped in his tracks and, realizing who was confronting him, turned and scarpered back into the smoke.43

  At 11:00 the StuGs renewed the attack, possibly encouraged by improved visibility and three vehicles broke through into the 1st Parachute Battalion’s sector on the British right flank. At least one and possibly more appear to have fallen victim to Lance-Sergeant Baskeyfield’s 6-Pounder despite most of his and Lance-Sergeant Mansell’s gun crews having been killed or wounded in the course of the morning, and he also accounted for a half-track mounted 20mm gun from SS FlaK Abteilung 9 that was rash enough to show itself by the demolished railway bridge.44 A number of German infiltrators succeeded in penetrating the 1st Battalion perimeter under cover of the armoured attack, and Lieutenant Curtis and HQ Company’s second-in-command Lieutenant Albert Turrell led patrols to clear them.45

  Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson was at this time rationalising his command arrangement. Major Simonds was set to organising a new defensive perimeter just east of Oosterbeek Old Church, initially using the fifty or so 2nd South Staffords deployed to protect the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s gun positions; this force was subsequently augmented with the remaining hundred or so South Staffords under Major Cain deployed on the Benedendorpsweg, which came under Simonds’ command at 10:30. Cain was ordered to move his men to a building dubbed the Laundry just north of the Oosterbeek Old Church, with the exception of the South Staffords’ MMG and Anti-tank elements, which remained at the Acacialaan position. Their place was taken by a party from the 11th Parachute Battalion which had withdrawn into Oosterbeek proper the previous day, with the changeover complete by midday.46 The withdrawal to the new line was not quite the soft option it appeared, for the area around the Oosterbeek Old Church was far from quiet. The Light Regiment’s gun positions had been subject to heavy mortaring throughout the morning from 07:00 with 3 Battery’s Command Post receiving a direct hit from a 150mm nebelwerfer rocket at 11:00, fortunately without casualties, and 1 Battery was similarly hit later in the day.47 Back at the Benedendorpsweg‒Acacialaan junction Major Lonsdale took over command from Major Buchanan and the units defending the line there then became part of LONSDALE Force. The precise time Lonsdale assumed command varies between unit accounts, simply because it took time for him physically to get around the unit HQs to inform them of the new arrangement; the 11th Parachute Bat
talion reported the handover taking effect at ‘around 12:00’, the 3rd Parachute Battalion 12:30, and the 1st Parachute Battalion 14:00.48

  Matters took a similar turn at the north side of the Division perimeter, where a defensive line had been hastily erected just south of the Arnhem‒Ede railway during the previous evening. Initially manned by his 21st Independent Parachute Company, the line was commanded by Major Bernard Wilson from his HQ in the Ommershof, a large house set in parkland on the south side of the Graaf Van Rechterenweg.49 The line had been augmented by a number of units from 18:00, starting with the 4th Parachute Squadron’s No. 1 Troop and part of No. 3 Troop commanded by Captain Nigel Thomas; the remainder of the Squadron was dug in near the Sonnenberg on the west side of the Division perimeter.50 Major Peter Jackson and E Squadron from the Glider Pilot Regiment’s No.2 Wing arrived next at some point before 20:30, and Jackson was subsequently reinforced with an additional sixty Glider Pilots, thirty drawn from C Squadron and thirty strays from No. 1 Wing who had failed to locate their parent unit after coming in with the second lift; the newcomers were tasked to fill the gap on E Squadron’s flank and maintain contact with the 1st Border’s A Company.51 Lieutenant Eastwood and No. 1 Platoon regained the 21st Independent Company fold at the Ommershof after dark. Last to arrive was Lieutenant-Colonel Payton-Reid and his depleted 7th KOSB. Major Coke, the Battalion second-in-command, was waiting with orders in the vicinity of the Hotel Hartenstein, which were confirmed by a Staff officer from Division HQ in person, presumably because the KOSB were still technically under 4th Parachute Brigade command. Carrying out a preparatory reconnaissance of the proposed new position, liaising with Major Wilson and then moving the tired glider soldiers proved to be a long business and it was midnight before the 7th KOSB was digging in at its new location.52