Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  At this point, with the GARDEN ground force passed through the US sector of the Airborne Corridor and across the River Waal, we shall leave the US Airborne formations. It was certainly not the end of the matter for them. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment retook Beek on 21 September after a day-long fight and a resupply drop at 15:00 that day alleviated the supply situation somewhat. Overall, the 82nd Airborne Division remained in place in the area between the River Maas and River Waal until it was finally withdrawn from Holland on 11 November after fifty-six days of continuous action during which it suffered a total of 1,432 killed, wounded and missing. To the south, the 101st Airborne Division was kept extremely busy maintaining its sector of the Airborne Corridor, repeatedly attacking northward toward Schijndel and Koevering to keep the enemy off balance and away from the road to Grave, with Sergeant Patrick McCrory’s mobility-impaired Sherman from the Irish Guards Group again rendering assistance to the 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment on 21 September. On the morning of Friday 22 September a two-pronged German attack near Veghel succeeded in cutting the road, which by this time the men of the 101st Airborne Division had dubbed ‘Hell’s Highway’, and the traffic flow north was stopped until midnight. The constant German attacks along the 101st Airborne Division’s sector obliged the various Regimental commanders to juggle their units constantly in reaction to the latest threat, a process Major-General Taylor referred to as ‘Indian fighting’. The Division moved north to man a sector on the Lower Rhine on 3 October and remained there until finally withdrawn at the end of November after seventy-two days in the line, during which time the Division lost a total of 2,118 men killed, wounded and missing. All that lay in the future however, and the focus will now be on events north of the River Waal.

  ***

  By midday on Wednesday 20 September the 1st Airborne Division’s most westerly element was the remnants of Brigadier Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade, located just a few hundred yards west of the Division perimeter. Having performed a fighting withdrawal across LZ L north of the Arnhem‒Ede railway the previous evening, Brigade HQ, the badly depleted remnants of the 10th and 156 Parachute Battalions and the isolated B Company 7th KOSB had spent a relatively undisturbed night in the woods east of Wolfheze. However, continuing their withdrawal to friendly territory the following day led to them becoming entangled with SS Bataillon Eberwein as it closed up on the British perimeter from the west. Major Michael Forman and B Company 7th KOSB remained in place near the Hotel Wolfheze awaiting orders, where they were joined in the course of the morning by a stray party from 156 Parachute Battalion led by Lieutenants Dennis Kayne and Jeffrey Noble from 8 and MMG Platoons respectively. After becoming separated the previous day the paratroopers had spent the night in the nearby woods before being driven out earlier in the morning by German tanks. They were accompanied by a number of wounded including 156 Battalion’s second-in-command Captain Hector Montgomery and Lieutenant Ronald Wood from 6 Platoon; their arrival boosted B Company’s strength to around 130 men.

  With nothing heard by early afternoon Major Forman decided to strike south-west on his own initiative, and thus unwittingly began moving directly into Kampfgruppe von Tettau’s concentration area. The British force covered less than a mile through the woods before finding itself surrounded by two full companies of fresh German troops equipped with mortars while crossing a large clearing. Forman immediately set about organising an attack to fight his way out of the trap but changed tack when a check revealed that his men had virtually no ammunition:

  The options left to me were to cross 200 yards of open heather under fire from the Germans, being shot at from behind, losing half the men going across the open and with the prospect of heavy hand-to-hand fighting with the Germans if we did get across – or to surrender. I decided not to say ‘every man for himself’ but to tell them to surrender, which I did, making it my responsibility.56

  Lieutenant Kayne just had time to relay the news to his men and discard his identity discs to conceal his Jewish faith before the Germans ‘came up to us and we laid down all our arms on the ground. It was a terrible feeling to realize that this is what it had come to, that first-class troops had come to this. There were at least 200 Germans, looking quite fresh and smart and well armed.’57 Although the decision appears to have been generally accepted as the correct course in the circumstances, not everyone concurred, as noted by Lieutenant Noble:

  I personally didn’t agree to the surrender and took to the woods again with some of my parachutists. But the Borderers surrendered, and that was probably the right decision, because some 130 men lived to see the end of the war, whereas if we had fought it out most of them probably would have died. I don’t think it would have affected the Battle of Arnhem, because we were completely isolated. It wouldn’t have had any impact on anything at all.58

  At the same time the 10th and 156 Parachute Battalions were losing two-thirds of their strength in their effort to reach the Division perimeter. While the 10th managed to reach safety just after midday via a last-ditch bayonet charge, the 156 Battalion and 4th Parachute Brigade HQ remained caught up around a track junction on the Breedelaan 500 yards west of the 1st Border’s lines. 156 Battalion led a withdrawal north-east from the junction at 13:00 and as soon as the paratroopers were clear Hackett called down a ‘troop stonk’ on either side of the new Brigade axis from the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment via the Regiment’s second-in-command, Major George de Gex, who had been with Brigade HQ since the previous day; the shelling was repeated and reportedly achieved ‘good results’.59 Despite this, the constant German small-arms fire, already heavy from the south and south-west, increased in intensity and wounded a number of men. Brigade Major Bruce Dawson was hit in the right shoulder and Lieutenant-Colonel Derick Heathcoat-Amory from GHQ Liaison Regiment sustained serious wounds to the shoulder and leg. Ironically, the latter had taken two days’ leave to participate in the operation as an unofficial Liaison Officer. Brigadier Hackett later drove the Jeep carrying his stretcher to safety when an adjacent vehicle loaded with mortar bombs caught fire.60 Lieutenant-Colonel Des Vœux reported the approach of tracked vehicles and Hackett was somewhat discomfited to discover from Major Annesley Haynes, commander of the 2nd Airlanding Anti-tank Battery, that there were no 6-Pounder anti-tank guns available because they were either ‘hopelessly stuck’ or had been abandoned as no tow vehicles had been available during the withdrawal from LZ L; the only anti-tank weapon to hand was a single PIAT with one bomb.

  The 156 Battalion War Diary refers to being ‘encircled by S.P. guns and motorised infantry’ 600 yards or so from the start point, while Hackett suggests there were two or possibly three vehicles, tentatively identified as Panzer IIs. One closed to within 400 yards before being driven off by intense small-arms fire, and a second that ventured closer had a track blown off by a No. 75 Hawkins Grenade. According to Hackett the vehicles were ‘rather windy’ but their accompanying infantry were not, and numerous close-quarter fights whittled away at the British strength. Brigade Major Dawson was killed while rallying men scattered by the German vehicles, along with Brigade Intelligence Officer Captain George Blundell. Colonel Des Vœux lost his second-in-command Captain Thomas Wainright wounded and Adjutant Captain Michael Gibbs missing.61 Despite this, the column continued moving until confronted by a ‘cup shaped depression containing up to 30 Germans’; the hollow was approximately thirty yards across and roughly circular.62 Hackett promptly summoned Major Geoffrey Powell to an impromptu conference standing upright behind a tree despite small-arms and mortar fire and, after giving Powell a brief précis of the situation, ordered him to take the hollow despite the situation meaning no covering fire could be provided. Although he kept his views to himself, Powell was less than enthusiastic about his new task, not least because by this point his C Company had been reduced to around twenty-five men with him as the sole officer. This paucity of numbers was alleviated somewhat when Major Michael Page insisted on accompanying Powell with the dozen or so survivo
rs from his HQ Company, and the attackers were also joined by a group of unknown size from A Company.63

  The charge was successful as the German defenders withdrew without a fight, abandoning their wounded in the process, although Powell was obliged to appropriate a German sub-machine gun of some description to replace his Sten after it jammed in the heat of the action. While this was going on the remainder of the stalled column was being dismembered and overrun by German infantry supported by up to three tanks, leaving Hackett to rally those survivors able to reach the hollow. Colonel Des Vœux was mortally wounded in the attempt, as reported by Sergeant Andrew Thorburn who came upon him leaning against the base of a tree. When asked if he needed assistance the badly wounded officer responded ‘No. Move forward. The enemy is in front of you; they need you there.’64 Approximately 150 men succeeded in reaching the hollow, drawn from 156 Battalion’s A, C and HQ Companies, various elements of Brigade HQ and a group from the 10th Parachute Battalion.65 According to Hackett the latter group was twelve strong. The overall total included around thirty men from 156 Battalion including Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Piers St. Aubyn, along with Majors Page and Powell (the latter elevated to command of 156 Battalion), Captains Reginald Temple and Peter Barron from Brigade Staff and the 2nd Airlanding Anti-tank Battery respectively, Brigade Staff Captain Hubert Booty and Major George de Gex from the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, who was appointed acting Brigade Major. Ammunition was short and in some instances weapons too, with some including Hackett utilising captured German weapons.66 The paratroopers nonetheless withstood constant German fire and repeated attacks through the course of the afternoon involving a single armoured vehicle, although the Germans were leery of coming within grenade range. The paratroopers launched a number of counter-forays that inflicted numerous casualties and reportedly netted forty German prisoners, with Hackett leading at least one charge against a German machine-gun position wielding a rifle and bayonet.67 The constant German pressure reduced the British strength by around half, the dead including Major Page, who was shot peeping over the lip of the hollow whilst attempting to pinpoint a troublesome German position.68

  By 16:30 the position had become untenable and Hackett decided on a dash for the Division perimeter at 17:00, taking the lead himself, accompanied by Major de Gex. The tactic worked and approximately seventy men reached the section of the Divisional perimeter held by A Company, 1st Border, losing around six men in the retreat.69 The paratroopers appear to have come in near the Sonnenberg, given that Hackett’s account refers to reorganising in positions occupied by Major Æneas Perkins and part of the 4th Parachute Squadron RE.70 According to Powell, one of the first 1st Border officers he came across while rallying the survivors of 156 Battalion was concerned lest the battleworn appearance of the paratroopers affect his men’s morale and requested Powell to ‘Please move your filthy lot away from here.’71 The ‘filthy lot’ numbered just fifty men and three officers. By 18:30 Powell had overseen a resupply of weapons and ammunition and reorganised them into two composite platoons.72 Hackett reported to Urquhart in person at the Hotel Hartenstein at 18:50, where he also linked up with his Brigade RASC Officer, Captain Colin Harkness, with an undetermined number of men. According to Hackett’s account Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth and approximately forty men from the 10th Parachute Battalion were also at Division HQ, although both Urquhart’s and the 10th Battalion’s semi-official accounts suggest that by this time Smyth and his men had been despatched to occupy houses at the Utrechtseweg‒Stationsweg crossroads. Whichever, Hackett was instructed to take command of the eastern side of the solidifying Division perimeter effective from the following morning and in the meantime to ‘take a night’s rest’. This he did in the Hotel Hartenstein after visiting 156 Battalion, possibly to relay orders from Urquhart, and establishing his Brigade HQ in a wooded section of the hotel grounds.73

  While SS Bataillon Eberwein was busy harrying the 4th Parachute Brigade into Oosterbeek, other elements of SS Unterführerschule ‘Arnheim’ were preparing to continue the assault on the 1st Border’s C Company at the Koude Herberg junction, where the glider soldiers were reorganising after driving off the German morning attack. The reorganisation had its lighter moments. CSM Leslie Fielding and an ammunition resupply party from HQ Company came under ‘vigorous attack’ from a pair of belligerent geese en route to C Company’s location, and despite the near-constant mortar fire the ammunition party were reportedly ‘far more intimidated by the birds than by the enemy’.74 The renewed SS attack at 15:00 pushed at least part of C Company out of their positions with the assistance of two ex-French flame-thrower tanks attached from Panzer Kompanie 224, their shock value prompting a number of C Company men to abandon their positions and withdraw to D Company’s location to the south. They were pursued, rounded up and led back to their positions by an irate Lieutenant Alan Roberts from 16 Platoon, while CSM Stringer was obliged to retrieve boxes of small-arms ammunition from the Company ammunition reserve after a mortar bomb set the dump ablaze. Major William Neill rallied the Company and launched a counter-attack that regained the lost ground, and when the Flammpanzer B2s attempted to outflank the reoccupied position they were attacked with a PIAT and grenades by a Private Webster.75 Both tanks were subsequently knocked out, one outside a restaurant on the Koude Herberg junction by a direct hit on the front plate from one of the Battalion’s organic 6-Pounders attached to C Company; the crew appear to have escaped. The other tank attempted to sidestep C Company’s position through the trees to the north of the Utrechtseweg and reached the Sonnenberglaan, only 500 yards or so from the Hotel Hartenstein. At that point it was hit by a 17-Pounder gun from Lieutenant George Paull’s X Troop, 2nd (Oban) Airlanding Anti-tank Battery. The projectile sparked a catastrophic explosion that severed the vehicle’s left track, unseated the turret, blew off the engine compartment covers and presumably killed the crew.76 The 17-Pounder was directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Loder-Symonds, the 1st Airborne Division’s Commander Royal Artillery, who left his HQ dugout nearby in the grounds of the Hotel Hartenstein to assist.77 The Germans attacked again at 19:30 but were beaten off, presumably because they lacked armoured support, and C Company enjoyed a quiet night apart from ‘occasional mortar fire of nuisance value only’.78

  Matters also remained quiet on D Company’s frontage apart from the persistent mortar fire, but the fight on the Utrechtseweg prevented Captain Hodgson from evacuating his wounded up the Van Borsselenweg to the Battalion RAP; in addition, the front differential on the Company’s stretcher-carrying Jeep was damaged by a hit of some description, making it almost impossible to steer. The driver had to return the load of casualties to his start point and a temporary aid post was established in the cellar of D Company HQ. The exception to this relative calm was the experience of Lieutenant Jack Bainbridge and 19 Platoon, who were maintaining the standing patrol-cum-observation post at a junction on the Van der Molenallee several hundred yards in front of the main D Company positions. Bainbridge remained in place until late afternoon, despite his attached signallers being unable to establish contact with D Company HQ on their No. 18 set. At that point 19 Platoon’s location was unwittingly approached by a group of German bicycle troops accompanied by an armoured car; the car was knocked out by a well-placed PIAT bomb and small-arms fire scattered the bicycle troops into the woods. With his location compromised and unable to pass reports back to Company HQ, Lieutenant Bainbridge decided to carry out a phased withdrawal, placing half the Platoon under Sergeant Thomas Northgrave. However, the groups lost contact with the onset of darkness and then became further scattered by contact with German troops also moving through the woods. Many of the patrol were killed, captured or lost as a result although some did reach safety; the attached radio men, Signallers Ronald Graydon and Ernest Hamlet, struck off on their own and reached C Company’s location without incident, for example. For their part Lieutenant Bainbridge, Sergeant Northgrave and Corporal Atherton spent two days dodging the enemy, at one point almost
being stepped on by an enemy patrol, before spotting a maroon beret through the foliage and making a dash for safety.79