Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  Just three miles to the east of the supply drop’s target, events at the Arnhem road bridge were ratcheting down to what was becoming an inevitable conclusion. By the afternoon of Wednesday 20 September the bulk of Frost’s much reduced force was hemmed into three adjacent locations around the northern ramp. The 2nd Parachute Battalion’s B and Support Companies occupied the buildings and gardens inside the angle of the Eusebiusbinnensingel and Weertjesstraat, along with their Battalion HQ and 1st Parachute Brigade HQ, elements of a variety of support units and over 200 wounded gathered in the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) in the cellar of the Brigade HQ building. On the opposite side of the Weertjesstraat toward the Lower Rhine the survivors of the various elements driven back from east of the bridge including personnel from the 2nd Battalion’s A Company, Brigade HQ, Signals and RAOC detachments were sheltering in the area between the bridge underpass and the Kadestraat. The only British presence remaining east of the ramp was the Van Limburg School held by elements of the 1st Parachute Squadron RE and the 3rd Parachute Battalion’s C Company.

  At around 13:30 Frost was discussing organising a fighting patrol to extend the perimeter northward toward the prison with Major Douglas Crawley in the back garden of the house occupied by the latter’s B Company on the Weertjesstraat. Both men were felled by a mortar bomb; Frost was badly wounded in the right shin and left ankle whilst Crawley was hit in both ankles and the right arm.146 They were evacuated to the relative safety of Major Logan’s RAP and command of the bridge force devolved to Major Gough on Brigade Major Hibbert’s recommendation and with Frost’s agreement.147 Interestingly, Gough must have been responsible for contacting Division HQ at 14:40 to request information regarding ground relief and the arrival of the Polish Brigade before informing them of the change of command just over an hour later; these contacts appear to have been made via the civilian telephone line, given that Division Signals reported its Base set unusable owing to jamming at 14:00.148

  The Germans meanwhile renewed their effort to eradicate the approximately thirty-strong British force holding the Van Limburg School. At 14:00 a Tiger I, possibly accompanied by a 105mm self-propelled gun, approached the school from the north-east. This may have been Feldwebel Barneki’s vehicle although two more of schwere Panzer Kompanie Hummel’s Tigers had reached Arnhem by this point; all three had been assigned to Kampfgruppe Knaust.149 Whoever commanded it, the Tiger began to systematically pump shells into the school’s upper storey from a range of eighty yards. One of the first projectiles detonated beneath the upper-storey room where Major Lewis and Lieutenant Wright from the 3rd Parachute Battalion were resting, wounding the former in the left shoulder and thigh and giving the latter traumatic amnesia, presumably from the concussion.150 Within ten minutes the school was on fire in four separate locations and the entire south-east corner and much of the south and east faces had been demolished, and by 14:30 the whole of the two upper storeys were ablaze.151 The able-bodied defenders moved down to the cellar, taking the wounded including Major Lewis with them, although Captain Mackay was determined to continue the fight as recalled by one of his men, Lance-Sergeant Norman Swift: ‘Captain Mackay told me to gather together any Gammon bombs the lads had left and he and I would try and get the Tiger tank under one of the school walls. To my relief, after collecting together a few bombs in a canvas bucket, when we were going up the main staircase the ceiling of the landing collapsed putting a stop to that idea.’152 The school had thus become untenable but even in these dire straits the unexplained antipathy between Major Lewis and Captain Mackay continued, and the latter unilaterally decided it was time to leave and continue the fight from elsewhere. He ordered the wounded brought up from the cellar, the non-ambulatory cases on doors or mattresses pressed into service as makeshift stretchers, and organised a covering group armed with four Bren guns under Lieutenant Denis Simpson.

  The plan appears to have been to evacuate the wounded to the Red School building on the bridge ramp twenty yards or so north of the Van Limburg School, which had been occupied briefly by Captain Mackay and his A Troop in the late evening of Sunday 17 September; for some reason the Sappers appear to have referred to the building as the library.153 This involved not only manoeuvring the makeshift stretchers across the open ground between the building but also lifting them over the brick wall that surrounded the Red School. At least two casualties were killed in this process, a C Company paratrooper by mortar bomb shrapnel and a Sapper by machine-gun fire. A third man, possibly a helper rather than a casualty, was also killed by a gunshot wound to the head whilst climbing over the wall. According to the 1st Parachute Squadron War Diary the move was complete by 14:45, cost four dead and raised the number of wounded to thirty-five, while a further two men from Lieutenant Simpson’s covering party were also killed by mortar fire. It is unclear if all the wounded were evacuated by the time Captain Mackay returned to the Van Limburg School to collect Lieutenant Simpson and his rearguard. The German fire grew heavier and Simpson and some of his men were wounded outside the school as they began their move; Mackay then ordered Simpson to surrender with the wounded and led nine unwounded Sappers to the houses on the east side of the Eusebiusbuitensingel. The escapees included Lance-Corporals Arthur Hendy and Joseph Malley and Sapper Ronald Emery, who were aided in their dash by the Tiger tank briefly turning its attention to other buildings to the west.154 The decision to abandon the wounded did not go down well with all Mackay’s men, one of whom later recalled: ‘Some of us felt that was the time an officer should have stayed with his men, and I was one of those who stayed with the wounded. It had reached the stage where each individual had to decide whether to stay with his wounded comrades or clear off.’155

  At around this point Major Lewis announced it was time to raise the white flag, prompting his second-in-command Captain Wilfred Robinson to ask if the able-bodied paratroopers could make a break for it rather than surrender; when Lewis concurred Robinson also led a small group east across the Eusebiusbuitensingel, although it is unclear what became of them. Major Lewis then made a brief speech congratulating the surviving defenders on their steadfast performance but insisting the situation made surrender inevitable. He then despatched a Sapper onto the bridge ramp with a white flag, who was promptly felled by a burst of machine-gun fire across the legs. The Germans accepted the surrender at around 15:10, allegedly after the errant machine-gunner was summarily executed by his commander for firing on the white flag, and one badly wounded Sapper being despatched by his captors as a mercy killing.156 The British wounded and those who chose to remain with them were on their way into captivity by 20:00.157 By that time the Sappers who had escaped across the Eusebiusbuitensingel had also been captured. Lance-Corporal Arthur Hendy was taken after routing a group of SS in a brief firefight following which he ‘started moving through the back gardens only to run into a group of SS soldiers who didn’t run away! I was soon taken prisoner.’158 Captain Mackay and five of his men ran into another group of German infantry gathered around Kampfgruppe Knaust’s other two Tiger tanks in the streets east of the Eusebiusbuitensingel at around 15:15 and after a skirmish during which one of the Sappers was killed, Mackay ordered his party to split up and make their own way back to the British enclave west of the bridge ramp. The tactic proved of little use however, for the Germans began to systematically quarter the area in search of any Airborne fugitives. Lance-Sergeant John Humphries and Corporal Charles Weir were taken together, and Mackay was discovered by a party of SS whilst asleep under a rose bush whilst awaiting darkness. The irascible Captain played dead when kicked in the ribs but erupted in anger when one of the SS men bayoneted him in the buttocks, and he narrowly avoided being shot after brandishing his empty Colt .45 automatic whilst berating his captors with the immortal words ‘What the bloody hell do you mean stabbing a bayonet into a British Officer?’ All the evaders had been rounded up by around 15:45.159

  While the Germans were dealing with the Van Limburg School, the British to the west of the bridge ram
p were busy regrouping all able-bodied defenders in the area around the Brigade HQ building bounded by the Eusebiusbinnensingel, Weertjesstraat and Prinsenhof. Major Tatham-Warter and his trademark furled umbrella therefore braved the 100-yard journey across the bullet- and shrapnel-swept Weertjesstraat to the group sheltering in the area between the bridge overpass and the Kadestraat. It is unclear precisely how this was communicated, but he ordered them to run the gauntlet of the Weertjesstraat and regroup in the gardens behind the Brigade HQ building. Some, like Signalman George Lawson, made the passage safely, albeit with some delay: ‘I heard the shout “Every man for himself”. A group of us made a dash for it. We had to go through a mortar barrage first; that’s where young Waterston got hit…Several of the others were hit, too; I was hit in the face by shrapnel…A group of us then tried to cross the open road, but four or five were mown down by machine-gun fire. I turned back and took refuge in one of the burnt-out buildings – how long for, I don’t know, but I was forced to get up because my gas cape and my smock were burning from the hot stone; my arse was almost on fire.’160 Others, like Private Kevin Heaney from the RAOC Ordnance Field Parks detachment, were less successful:

  I reached the corner of a garden and had to negotiate a wall. I saw several chaps being picked off as they went over. I remember one hit in the forehead and one in the chest…A hand-grenade came over the wall and exploded; the chap behind me had a great big hole in the neck and blood was gurgling out. I put my field dressing round his neck…I managed to make my way into the rubble of the houses nearby; six of us gathered in the remains of a hallway.

  The group attempted to surrender using Private Heaney’s vest as a makeshift white flag but four were mown down after emerging; Heaney and one of the wounded ‘got back into the house and sat in the rubble. We could hear mortar fire on the nearby houses, walls falling, heard our own men trapped, calling for help. We were there about two hours…Later on, the Germans came in, rescuing the trapped men and taking them prisoner, and this great big German came and took the two of us also.’161

  Most of those who reached the relative safety of the rendezvous area north of the Weertjesstraat were set to occupying or digging slit trenches sited to allow fire between the buildings onto the bridge ramp, alongside other able-bodied defenders not occupying the Brigade HQ and adjacent buildings. Private Henry Sullivan from the 2nd Battalion’s A Company discovered a cache of bottles whilst digging in, some full of wine and others containing two Guilders and a half; the former was quickly consumed and one coin was retained as a souvenir.162 The Germans appear to have maintained the pressure on the western British enclave with mortar and artillery rather than small-arms or direct assaults for much of the afternoon as they concentrated their efforts on the Van Limburg School, and the British were able to maintain contact with the main Divisional area at Oosterbeek. As we have seen, 1st Airborne Division HQ was informed of Frost’s wounding, Major Gough’s accession to command and that ‘the [bridge] party can hold out until tomorrow’ at 15:45, and ninety minutes later that the fuses had been removed from German demolition charges at the north end of the bridge; the final message reporting ‘4 Tiger Tks and one Recce crossed main br from NORTH to SOUTH at 1815 hrs’ was received at the Hartenstein ten minutes after the event.163 The latter report is curious as German sources do not refer to schwere Panzer Kompanie Hummel or Kampfgruppe Brinkmann crossing the bridge until the morning of Thursday 21 September, and because Major Munford’s final transmission to the Light Regiment’s HQ at the Oosterbeek Old Church at 19:00 reported that the bridge was ‘blocked with German half-tracks, armoured cars etc’.164 It is unclear whether the reports were transmitted via the civilian telephone network or via radio, although at least two sets belonging to the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s 3 Battery were still operating from the Brigade HQ building by the late afternoon of 20 September; Bombardier Leo Hall’s jury-rigged No. 22 and No. 68 radio sets from E Troop in the attic and a No. 22 set from 3 Battery HQ on the floor below manned by Gunner Dennis Bowles.165 There was also a third No. 22 set belonging to 1st Parachute Brigade HQ with which Major Hibbert made brief contact with 30 Corps during the morning, although it is unclear if that set was still functioning by late afternoon. There was possibly another radio that may have belonged to the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron; Private James Sims reported seeing a ‘powerful radio transmitter’ set up at the bottom of the stairs when he was assisted up from the RAP in the cellar to use the toilet. As Major Gough was operating the set it may have been a No. 76 transmitter removed from a Reconnaissance Squadron Jeep.166

  By the late afternoon/early evening the Germans renewed their assault, with Rottenführer Rudolf Trapp’s party from Panzergrenadier Regiment 21 closing up to the western face of the British perimeter. Their gains may have included the Mortar Platoon house on the corner of the Prinsenhof and Weertjesstraat, given that Trapp referred to being close enough to hear shouted entreaties from German prisoners incarcerated in the cellar of the Brigade and 2nd Battalion HQ buildings.167 More importantly, all the British 6-Pounder anti-tank guns had either been knocked out or rendered u/s by small-arms fire – Private James Sims recalled seeing one badly damaged gun and its dead crew in front of the Brigade HQ building – and the supply of PIAT bombs had run out the previous day. This permitted German tanks to motor back and forth at will.168 One, likely a Tiger I from schwere Panzer Kompanie Hummel, repeated the drill used against the Van Limburg School as described by Brigade Major Hibbert: ‘The tactic was to fire high explosive into the sides of the building to break the wall down then fire smoke shells through that, and of course the smoke shells have got phosphorus in them, [and] the phosphorus sets light to anything inflammable in the house.’169 Being set back from the Eusebiusbinnensingel, the Brigade HQ building had enjoyed a degree of protection from the buildings to each side, but the Germans were now able to bring their direct fire weapons to bear with impunity. Gunner Dennis Bowles was in contact with 3 Troop at the Oosterbeek Old Church from the top floor when the shelling began: ‘There was a big bang and a lot of dust, and that put the wireless out of action. Back at the battery they heard the set go dead in the middle of my transmission and when they returned to England they reported that I was “missing presumed killed”.’170 The ‘big bang’ may have been from a 150mm field gun that Brigade Major Hibbert had seen being brought into action protected by German tanks, and Bowles may have been in the process of calling down fire upon it, given that Hibbert referred to the radio link with the Airlanding Light Regiment at the Oosterbeek Old Church breaking down before the request was complete.171 The field gun reportedly pumped three rounds into the attic and may have prompted Major Munford’s final transmission to 3 Battery at 19:00, which reported his being ‘blown off the top storey’.172 The same flurry of shelling may also have brought Bombardier Hall’s occupancy of the Brigade HQ attic to an end:

  Suddenly Munford appeared in the Attic; it would be late afternoon, Wednesday... ‘Come on!’ he said; ‘We’re evacuating the building.’ I got up. ‘What about the set?’ I asked. His reply was terse and unmistakable: ‘Fuck the set!’ But I turned back to switch it off to save the battery…Suddenly, everything happening within a second, a shell-burst fragment caught my hip, flinging me into the down-well of the stairs. My right leg and buttock were paralysed, useless; warm blood trickled down the lower sensitive parts. Munford and two others carried me down into the cellar for a dressing and eventual placing alongside the other wounded.173

  The severe constriction of the British perimeter made abandoning burning buildings a perilous rat run, and in the case of the Brigade HQ building this was made so much worse by the position of approximately 300 wounded in the RAP in the cellar, as it became apparent that the fire could not be controlled. A start on evacuating the casualties to the building held by Captain Gell and his RASC party adjacent to the prison appears to have been made, which was the only British-held building not burning; but progress was slow, as reaching it involved traver
sing the entire width of the backyard area under heavy mortar fire.174 Captains Logan and Wright appear to have broached the idea of arranging a truce to permit an evacuation with Colonel Frost when the building came under direct fire. The walking wounded were moved out of the cellar before the fire reached critical proportions.175 When Captain Logan returned and warned that the expanding fire meant something would have be done ‘fairly quickly’ to assist the non-ambulatory cases remaining in the cellar, Frost ordered he and Gough to make the necessary arrangements. Logan made contact with the Germans by the simple and courageous expedient of unbolting the Brigade HQ building’s imposing front doors and walking into the open under a flag of truce; it is unclear whether this was a Red Cross or white flag. Despite Gough’s fears that the SS would simply open fire irrespective of the flag, the ploy worked and a two-hour truce was arranged at approximately 20:00.176 Private James Sims heard one of the medical officers explaining the gravity of the situation to a German officer at the cellar entrance, and witnessed what followed including a potentially catastrophic incident as the first German descended the stairs: