Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  15

  D Plus 4

  00:01 to 16:00 Thursday 21 September 1944

  While Kampfgruppen Brinkmann, Knaust and the rest were finally eliminating the British presence at the north end of the Arnhem road bridge, the remainder of the 1st Airborne Division was having a generally quieter time around Oosterbeek. On the western face of the perimeter, the 21st Independent Company, 1st Border, Glider Pilots and Sappers from the 9th Field Squadron spent an uneventful night apart from some nuisance mortaring, although Major Peter Jackson’s E Squadron from the Glider Pilot Regiment’s No. 2 Wing was pulled back from its position in the woods into alignment with F Squadron on the right and the 1st Border’s A Company on the left at 03:30.1 The same was the case on the opposite side of the perimeter, with the 10th and 156 Parachute Battalions and the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron also reporting an uneventful night, while at the south-eastern end 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions spent the hours of darkness digging slit trenches in the waterlogged polder behind a dyke running south-east from the Benedendorpsweg.2

  Not everyone was resting or digging. CanLoan Lieutenant Leo Heaps had attempted to break through to the Arnhem road bridge with a Jeep-load of ammunition in the afternoon of Monday 18 September, and at some point after dark on 20 September he was asked to repeat the feat, apparently by Major-General Urquhart in person. The details of the effort are unclear. According to Urquhart it involved ‘Three Bren carriers…loaded with ammunition and other sorely needed gear’; of these, one broke through the German outer line but failed to reach the bridge, one was knocked out by a shell and the third was obliged to abandon the mission by German fire.3 However, Heaps’ account refers to two Jeeps provided by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Preston, the Division Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General. The vehicles, which were loaded with assorted ammunition, were manned by Heaps, Dutch Captain Martin Knottenbelt, apparently on attachment from No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando, US Lieutenant John Johnson from the 306th Fighter Control Squadron, and two unnamed Glider Pilots. The party left the Hotel Hartenstein at around midnight and headed south toward the 1st Border positions overlooking the Heveadorp ferry, intending to cross the Lower Rhine and approach the road bridge from the south, as driving through the eastern outskirts of Arnhem was, quite rightly, considered impossible. Approaching through dense river mist that reduced visibility to a matter of feet, Heaps discovered that the ferry terminal was undefended and the ferry itself was listing at an angle twenty yards or so out into the river. The two Glider Pilots disappeared while investigating an unexplained noise and a chance encounter with a lone Sapper searching for a wounded comrade explained the lack of defenders. Captain Heggie’s detachment from the 9th Field Company RE had been attacked by a larger German force using the mist as cover only half an hour earlier; the attackers were rebuffed but the fight cost the Sappers around half their strength with at least one man, Sapper Gilbert Gwilliam, killed. Heggie therefore decided to abandon the ferry and withdraw with the eight survivors to the main Company location, where they arrived at around 09:00.4 After climbing out along the cable to examine the ferry and ascertaining that the winding mechanism was jammed, likely beyond repair, Heaps gave up and returned to the Hotel Hartenstein where he reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie at 03:40. The news was relayed to 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ ten minutes later and the ammunition on the Jeeps was issued to the 11th Parachute Battalion instead.5

  While Lieutenant Heaps was being baulked in his mission some units were engaged in more conventional activity. 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ ordered the 11th Parachute Battalion to send patrols toward ‘the road-rail bridge’, presumably the Oosterbeek Laag underpass, at 05:45, although it is unclear if the order was carried out.6 In fact, the bulk of British patrolling activity was centred on the northern face of the perimeter where the 4th Parachute Squadron RE despatched Captain James Cormie and four men on a patrol of unknown duration at 23:30 on 20 September.7 The busiest unit in this regard was the 7th KOSB on the 4th Parachute Squadron’s right flank, however. A programme of local patrols intended to prevent German infiltration between the Battalion’s locations commenced at midnight, backed by fighting patrols from C and D Companies led by CanLoan Lieutenant James Taylor from 12 Platoon and Lieutenant Joseph Hunter from 13 Platoon. Taylor ranged to the south in search of Battalion Medical Officer Captain Brian Devlin and the walking wounded but found no sign of the medical party as they had been captured the previous afternoon while relocating the RAP, unbeknown to the remainder of the Battalion. The patrol did detect enemy activity and preparations for an attack on the Battalion location however, while Lieutenant Hunter’s patrol confirmed that the Germans were also present in strength in the houses and gardens north of the Graaf Van Rechterenweg toward the railway and in the woods on the other side of the line; this information was used to lay down a pre-emptive concentration on the German positions by the Battalion’s mortars and Vickers guns after stand to at 04:30. When no enemy attack was forthcoming, the Battalion was stood down at 06:30 and Lieutenant-Colonel Payton-Reid ordered a one-third-scale ration issue to allow all ranks a hot meal. While this was underway CSM Drummond took a Bren Carrier patrol south along the Stationsweg and ascertained that the route was open to allow evacuation of the Battalion wounded; Drummond was also informed of the fate of Captain Devlin and the walking wounded by an unnamed sniper who had witnessed their capture. A shuttle service was then organised using two Jeeps marked with Red Cross flags to move the non-ambulatory wounded from the Battalion location to the Division MDS at the Hotel Schoonoord, which continued through the day.8

  While the Airborne soldiers on the Oosterbeek perimeter were resting or patrolling their opponents were busy preparing to launch the concentric attacks on the British positions ordered by Obergruppenführer Bittrich at II SS Panzerkorps on 20 September. In light of experience gained thus far Obersturmbannführer Harzer ordered 9 SS Panzer Division’s various kampfgruppen to regroup and form ‘penetration groups’ based where possible around specialist Sturmpionier elements. These were to carry out narrow frontage attacks on the eastern side of the British perimeter with the intention of penetrating the British line under cover of close fire support from Sturmgeschütze Brigade 280’s assault guns and other self-propelled heavy weapons; the attacks were also to be launched in a series of successive echelons to maintain the pressure.9 Harzer’s units also received replacements, although the recipients were somewhat ambivalent about the quality of their new personnel as recalled by Hauptsturmführer Hans Möller, commanding SS Panzer Pionier Abteilung 9:

  On 20 September, the engineer battalion received the promised replacements from the Reichsarbeitdienst [and] the navy and Luftwaffe. The replacements had no combat experience whatsoever and were totally inexperienced in street fighting. Nevertheless we were glad to have them…and in time they integrated completely, becoming good and reliable comrades.10

  The northern and eastern faces of the British perimeter were designated the schwerpunkt of the coming attack under the overall control of Kampfgruppe Spindler, who consequently retained the bulk of the available armoured vehicles. The northern sector was allotted to Kampfgruppe Bruhn, which included Panzergrenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 361 supported by the surviving Sd.Kfz. 250 armoured half-tracks from SS Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 9, up to two Panzerjäger IVs from SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 9 and presumably the self-propelled light anti-aircraft guns from the unnamed SS and Heer flak units drafted in to block the 4th Parachute Brigade’s attack on the Dreijensweg on Monday 18 September; two Möbelwagen anti-aircraft vehicles armed with 37mm FlaK guns from SS Panzer FlaK Abteilung 9 were also available, while a third was detached to support the units attacking the eastern side of the perimeter, Kampfgruppen Harder and Möller.11 The former was to continue to press along the riverside Benedendorpsweg toward the Oosterbeek Old Church and the Westerbouwing Heights overlooking the Heveadorp ferry terminal while the latter, having reorganised after clearing Den Brink and the surrounding ar
ea east of the railway spur, was to advance west down the Utrechtseweg supported by Sturmgeschütze Brigade 280’s assault guns and possibly two Sd.Kfz. 251 armoured half-tracks belonging to SS Panzer Pionier Abteilung 9.12

  On the west side of the perimeter Kampfgruppe von Tettau was also receiving reinforcements, some of which were still en route. After bicycling the seventy-plus miles from Katwijk-am-Zee near Den Haag, Oberleutnant Artur Worrowski’s Bataillon from Luftwaffe Ausbildungs und Ersatz Regiment ‘Hermann Göring’ had spent the night of 19-20 September at Wolfheze before moving up to the British perimeter on the Westerbouwing Heights the following night for example, while Fliegerhorst Bataillon 3 was still en route near Utrecht.13 Von Tettau’s preparations were further complicated by Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Niederlande (Wehrmacht Commander Netherlands) making his formation responsible for preparing defences south of the Lower Rhine to block any Allied breakout from Nijmegen, and to guard against any further airborne landings north of the river. Fliegerhorst Bataillon 2 and Schiffsturmabteilung 10 were therefore detached from Standartenführer Lippert’s SS Unterführerschule ‘Arnheim’ to man the new line located along a canal midway between the Lower Rhine and the Waal running fifteen miles west from Elst to Ochten. The anti-airborne mission was allotted to a newly created Kampfgruppe Knoche made up of the latter’s Sicherheits Regiment 26 reinforced with FlaK Abteilung 688.14 The western side of the British perimeter was therefore set to be attacked by units including Bataillon Worrowski, SS Bataillonen Eberwein, Schulz and Helle from SS Unterführerschule ‘Arnheim’, with Bataillon Krafft in reserve, supported by up to two Panzer B2 (f), fourteen Flammpanzer B2 (f) and a single Panzer 35S (f), all from Panzer Kompanie 224; the latter unit had lost two Panzer B2 (f)s in the attack on C Company 1st Border near the Koude Herberg junction the previous day. Finally, artillery support for the renewed attack was to be provided by the newly created area Artillerie Kommandeur (ArKo), operating from the headquarters of Artillerie Regiment 191, who oversaw a busy night stockpiling and distributing ammunition and co-ordinating targeting priorities in anticipation of the assault, scheduled to begin at 08:00, equivalent to 09:00 Ordinary Summer Time employed by the British.

  The German preparatory bombardment commenced up to three-and-a-half hours before the attack, with timings staggered to fall on different sections of the British line. The 1st Border’s entire frontage was hit first, just after dawn at 05:30, with the bombardment falling especially heavily on A and C Companies and Battalion HQ astride and north of the Utrechtseweg.15 The 9th Field Company RE, dug in south of the road between C and D Companies, came under fire markedly more accurate than that of the previous day at around the same time, which destroyed a parked Jeep and trailer at 06:00, while the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment’s gun positions in the vicinity of the Oosterbeek Old Church came under increasingly heavy mortar fire from the same time.16 Similarly accurate fire from mortars and nebelwerfer rocket launchers began to fall on the Divisional area from 06:50, with Division HQ and HQ Royal Engineers at the Hotel Hartenstein referring to the ‘morning hate’ beginning at that time.17 The nearby HQ RASC received a direct hit at 07:00 that killed two men and the Glider Pilot Regiment’s B Squadron lost Sergeants Dennis Andrews and Denis Raggett killed and Captain Angus Low, Staff-Sergeant Watt and Sergeants Consterdine and McCarthy wounded; the fire prompted the Glider Pilots to reinforce slit trenches with overhead cover during the course of the day.18 The German mortar and artillery fire also began to fall on the units defending the east side of the perimeter at around the same time; 156 Parachute Battalion reporting its forward platoon on the Stationsweg‒Dennenkampweg junction being heavily shelled at 07:00 while further south on the Benedendorpsweg the 1st Parachute Battalion also referred to the ‘morning hate’ commencing at 07:30.19 The bombardment eased somewhat on the 1st Airlanding Brigade HQ location at 10:00, allowing the 9th Field Company to complete a temporary slit trench command post with overhead cover for use while more permanent accommodation was prepared in a nearby outhouse cellar. The Division HQ area continued to be hard hit through the day however, and an ammunition dump near the Hotel Hartenstein was set ablaze at 10:05.20

  The German bombardment provided a backdrop to Major-General Urquhart formalising his own defensive dispositions via an O Group called at 09:00, although the 1st Airlanding Brigade War Diary erroneously refers to the meeting taking place at 07:30; the timing may refer to the time Brigadier Hicks left his own Brigade HQ in the woods south of the Hotel Hartenstein, rather than the time of the actual meeting.21 The precise list of attendees is unclear but presumably included Brigadiers Hackett and Hicks and representatives from the various Divisional units, attachments and detachments such as the commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment’s No. 1 Wing, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray.22 By the morning of Thursday 21 September Urquhart was compelled finally to acknowledge that the operation had no prospect of achieving his Division’s specific objectives. The only remaining option was to maintain a foothold on the north bank of the Lower Rhine, in the hope 30 Corps would be able to close up to the river and establish a crossing before the 1st Airborne Division was totally overwhelmed. What remained of the Division was corralled into a thumb-shaped perimeter projecting north just over a mile from the Lower Rhine. The base of the perimeter ran for just under a mile west from the Oosterbeek Old Church along the Benedendorpsweg paralleling the riverbank 500 yards or so to the south, with a bulge westward to include the Westerbouwing Heights overlooking the Heveadorp ferry. The western side of the perimeter was predominantly wooded and ran almost directly north along the Van Borsselenweg to the junction with the Utrechtseweg, before veering north-east to the Ommershof at the western end of the Graaf Van Rechterenweg. The apex ran east for approximately a quarter of a mile along the latter to the junction with the Stationsweg, paralleling the Arnhem‒Ede railway line just a few hundred yards to the north. The eastern side of the perimeter then ran south through the houses and other buildings that formed the centre of Oosterbeek, following the Stationsweg south to, and across, the Utrechtseweg, where it became the Pietersbergseweg, on to the Weverstraat and south to the junction with the Benedendorpsweg just east of Oosterbeek Old Church. The pocket, which the Germans were to dub the Hexenkessel (witches’ cauldron), contained a mixture of woodland, built-up terrain, gardens and parkland ‒ along with approximately 3,600 Airborne soldiers, around a third of whom were infantrymen, and 2,500 Dutch civilians.23

  This then was the place where Urquhart and the 1st Airborne Division were to fight a conventional defensive infantry battle while awaiting relief. Ideally, the perimeter would have included the north end of the Heveadorp ferry as the metalled roads running to both terminals made it an ideal location for erecting a Bailey bridge or similar. This would at least have been in line with the 1st Airborne Division’s general mission to ‘establish a sufficient bridgehead to enable the follow-up formations of 30 Corps to deploy north of the Lower Rhine’.24 Having not known of the existence of the ferry earlier, Urquhart was by this point well aware of its importance. This is clear from his specific reporting of possession of the northern terminal to 1st Airborne Corps Rear HQ at Moor Park in the mid-afternoon of Wednesday 20 September. Urquhart has been criticised subsequently for failing to ensure that the ferry terminal was included within his defensive perimeter.25 This specific criticism is unjustified, however. The western side of the perimeter was on the line of the Divisional Phase II plan, and had settled there as the Division’s planned move into Arnhem was stymied. The east side congealed where the remnants of the 1st Parachute Brigade regrouped after being driven out of the western outskirts of Arnhem, and the northern face settled in a similar manner following the 4th Parachute Brigade’s rebuff on the Dreijensweg north of the Arnhem‒Ede railway line. The 1st Airborne Division’s location was thus shaped by circumstances, if not actually dictated by enemy action, largely because Urquhart had ceded the initiative through his needless absence from the levers of command for the first forty hours of the operation. He t
herefore had little if any input into where his Division was finally brought to bay.

  Even if this had not been the case, the ferry terminal could not have been included in the perimeter without moving the west side forward a considerable distance, which was simply not feasible against the ever-increasing strength of Kampfgruppe von Tettau, and its location on the south-western fringe of the perimeter was not really defensible either. In order to stand against the armoured vehicles the lightly armed Airborne troops required buildings to use as strongpoints, but the terrain in the vicinity of the terminal consisted of woods and open polder, the only defensible feature in the immediate area being the Westerbouwing Heights, which overlooked the ferry from several hundred yards to the north. The fact that the 1st Border’s B Company were driven off this feature by a combined tank-infantry assault during the course of the day proves the point.

  Urquhart decided to retain his HQ at the Hotel Hartenstein, protected by Lieutenant Alfred Butterworth’s Division HQ Defence Platoon, Lieutenant Donald Edwards’ 17 Platoon from C Company 2nd South Staffords, and B and G Squadrons from No. 1 Wing The Glider Pilot Regiment led by Majors Iain Toler and Robert Croot respectively; G Squadron was deployed on the eastern side of the Hartenstein grounds, which by this point also formed the eastern sector of the main Divisional perimeter.26 The Glider Pilots had been withdrawn to the Hotel Hartenstein from the western side of the perimeter the previous day to form an emergency reserve, apart from Captain Terence Miller’s 3 Flight from B Squadron deployed with the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment on the high ground near the Oosterbeek Old Church, which Urquhart also chose to leave in place; he later referred to the Glider Pilots ‘performing magnificently as infantry’ in his account of the battle.27 Responsibility for the Divisional perimeter was divided in two, with the 1st Airlanding Brigade being allotted the western sector, a logical arrangement given that the bulk of that formation was already defending the Phase II line along the Van Borsselenweg. To defend his sector, which also included the northern stretch of the perimeter along the Graaf Van Rechterenweg, Brigadier Hicks thus had command of the 1st Border, the 9th Field Company RE, the elements of the 1st Parachute Squadron RE that had not reached the Arnhem road bridge, No. 2 Wing The Glider Pilot Regiment, the 21st Independent Parachute Company, the 4th Parachute Squadron RE, the 7th KOSB and the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron.