Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  The 43rd Reconnaissance Regiment’s A and C Squadrons had pushed north from Slijk-Ewijk through light resistance from German rear echelon troops to reach the Lower Rhine at Randwijk, just west of Heteren, while B Squadron set up midway and cleared the area around Zetteren. As a result ‘the main axis of the [43rd] Division through Valburg could therefore be considered as reasonably secure at last light.’147 By this point the GARDEN advance was over ninety hours behind schedule, and despite the passing of twenty-four hours since British lead ground elements had reached the Lower Rhine, there had been little progress in getting succour to the embattled 1st Airborne Division fighting for its life on the north bank.

  The imminent arrival of the 43rd Division in the vicinity of Driel did permit Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, the 1st Airborne Division’s Operations Officer, to proceed with his mission of impressing the urgency of the situation in Oosterbeek upon Browning and Horrocks in person. Mackenzie, it will be recalled, had crossed the Lower Rhine to Driel with the Division’s Commander Royal Engineers (CRE), Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Myers in the early afternoon of 22 September but they were unable to proceed as the Germans were still blocking the way to Nijmegen. However, the mist and rain on Saturday morning encouraged the commander of one of the Troops from the 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment in Driel, Captain Lord Richard Wrottesley, to risk a run back the eighteen miles or so to the Nijmegen bridgehead. Captain Wrottesley’s decision may also have been influenced by the arrival at Driel of a Captain Watson from Browning’s Forward Airborne Corps HQ at 09:00.148 According to his account, Major-General Sosabowski was not overly impressed with Watson’s questioning, on the grounds he had ‘sent plenty of information already’. The relayed instructions from Browning for the Poles to lead a third attempted river crossing that night did not go down well either, although he kept his reservations to himself and agreed, providing more boats were forthcoming, along with a resupply of food and ammunition. Watson responded with assurances that as many boats as needed would be provided by the 43rd Division, along with support from long-range artillery.149 Sosabowski was also mollified to learn that his missing 1st Battalion had returned safely to the UK when its transports had been recalled on 21 September and would be delivered to Holland as soon as possible; as we have seen, Major Tonn and his men were to be delivered to US DZ O near Grave, south-west of Nijmegen, at around 16:43.150

  Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie’s passage back to Nijmegen, possibly travelling on the back of one of Captain Wrottesley’s Daimler Armoured Cars, was eventful.151 The convoy of two armoured and two scout cars made good progress until reaching a crossroads partially blocked by a wrecked German armoured vehicle, possibly De Hoop crossroads where the 5th DCLI had carried out its successful tank ambush the previous night. Captain Wrottesley had dismounted from the lead Armoured Car and guided the driver around the obstacle when a German tank reported as a Tiger approached the junction. The second Daimler Armoured Car carrying Mackenzie exchanged shots with the tank but overturned whilst reversing as the road verge collapsed beneath its seven-ton weight. The tank then withdrew but the approach of German infantry obliged Captain Wrottesley to make a dash for Nijmegen for help while the two Daimler Scout Cars, one of them carrying Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, withdrew the way they had come, also in an effort to summon assistance. Mackenzie and the two crewman from the overturned vehicle, armed with a single Sten gun between them, hid under a pile of cuttings in an adjacent turnip field. There they managed to evade the searching Germans despite one enemy soldier approaching to within feet of their hiding place, only to come under fire from friendly troops when Wrottesley returned accompanied by British tanks. The friendly fire was fortunately poorly aimed and Mackenzie and Myers were then delivered to Browning’s Forward Corps HQ without further incident. The HQ had been located in a ‘large and comfortable house’ in the southern outskirts of Nijmegen from the afternoon of Wednesday 20 September, and a thoroughly wet and frozen Mackenzie was provided with a hot bath by Browning’s chief-of-staff, Brigadier Gordon Walch.152

  The bath and short stay in the warmth and safety of the Forward Corps HQ does not appear to have been of much restorative benefit, given that Browning described both officers as ‘putty coloured, like men who had come through a Somme winter’.153 According to Lieutenant-Colonel Walch and his staff Browning was ‘disgusted’ with the 43rd Division’s tardy performance and with Major-General Thomas in particular, and was anxious to hear Mackenzie’s report because his knowledge of events and conditions north of the Lower Rhine was ‘apparently very vague’. The records show, however, that Urquhart’s communications had been relaying the deterioration and urgency of his situation quite clearly; Browning’s avowed, ‘public’ dismay was therefore due at least in part to the growing realisation that his exercise in self-promotion to shore up his Airborne credentials was turning into a monumental failure.154 Mackenzie obliged with a full and frank account of events and current conditions at Oosterbeek, which ended: ‘if there’s a chance of the 2nd Army getting to us we can hold – but not for long. There isn’t much left.’ Browning reportedly listened in silence before assuring Mackenzie that he had not given up hope and that plans were being implemented to get reinforcements and supplies across the Lower Rhine during the coming night. According to Brigadier Walch, Browning went on to temper this encouraging news: ‘I do remember Browning telling Charles that there did not seem to be much chance of getting a good party across,’ although it is unclear on what, if anything, this assessment was based (and what a ‘good party’ would represent).155

  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mackenzie left Browning’s HQ with the feeling that he had failed to convey the gravity of the 1st Airborne’s situation properly, partly because ‘a messenger bearing bad news is always presumed to be exaggerating’. He was also struck by the ‘ambivalence of thinking there’.156 To be fair, there was not much Browning could do officially, given that Lieutenant-General Horrocks and 30 Corps had assumed control of operations on reaching Nijmegen, with decision-making powers thus passing to Horrocks and the commander of the British 2nd Army, Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey; on the other hand, there is no evidence of Browning actively promoting the needs of his formation fighting on the other side of the Lower Rhine either.157 Mackenzie’s disquiet was shared by Myers, and both men were additionally concerned over the marked lack of urgency they saw on display on their subsequent visits to 30 Corps and 43rd Division HQs. Mackenzie went on to attend an Orders Group at 130 Brigade HQ at Homoet at some point before 19:00, after which he appears to have returned to Driel.158

  With the cessation of the crossing effort at 04:00 Sosabowski’s 3rd Battalion had returned to its positions in Driel, with Lieutenat Smaczny’s 8th Company being initially replaced by men from Captain Siudzinski’s Transport and Supply Company, augmented with some HQ personnel. Lance-Corporal Boleslav Kuzniar returned to find his former slit trench had been replaced by a shell crater, the shell having killed the man who had taken over the trench on his departure. Kuzniar set about digging a replacement and then prevailed upon the Dutch family in a nearby farmhouse for hot water to allow him to wash and shave.159 The arrival of the 43rd Division in the vicinity appears to have mitigated the threat of ground attack, although a German patrol probed the 4th Company’s positions, reportedly using a Dutch civilian as cover for its withdrawal.160 At least one German fighter strafed the Polish positions, shooting up a farm building occupied by signaller Privates Adamowicz and Wawiorko; neither man was injured but Wawiorko was badly shaken up. There was no let-up in the German artillery fire. 2nd Lieutenant Jozef Kula’s platoon from the 1st Battalion was relocated into an orchard to further reinforce the 8th Company gap and came under nebelwerfer fire whilst digging in. The paratroopers were presumably spotted by SS Werfergruppe Nickmann, located just across the river behind the Oosterbeek Laag railway embankment, and repeated salvoes of 150mm rockets drove the paratroopers back into the orchard, partly demolished a barn and wounded at least one man; he was saved
from being killed by a pair of heavy-duty wire cutters attached to his webbing, which partly deflected a large piece of shrapnel.

  The German shelling paid particular attention to the Driel church tower, which the Poles were using as an observation post, and a sustained barrage scored twenty hits on the building in quick succession, killing a member of a Polish burial detail.161 The paratroopers enjoyed a measure of respite and revenge in the afternoon with the arrival of the Allied fighter-bomber cover for the Oosterbeek resupply drop, which prompted the German artillery to cease fire to avoid attracting attention. The Poles climbed out of their slit trenches for a better view of RAF Typhoons strafing Sperrverband Harzer’s positions behind the Arnhem‒Nijmegen railway embankment with rockets and cannon fire; as Major-General Sosabowski recalled, ‘the fighters emptied their cannons at every likely target; the noise was horrific and dust drifted over the whole area, choking the men and obscuring the view.’162 The Poles also watched helplessly as the tail end of the RAF resupply flight flew into the unsuppressed German anti-aircraft fire. They gathered in some supply containers that dropped short into the Driel perimeter; signaller Private Wawiorko recalled sorting through ration cans in search of corned beef and being disappointed to find only Canadian-made potato soup and some kind of pudding. The respite from the German artillery fire was short-lived, and resumed with greater intensity at around 16:30 once the fighter-bombers had made way for the supply drop and the latter was complete.163 On a lighter note, 23 September was the third anniversary of the formation of the Polish Parachute Brigade in 1941. Major-General Sosabowski had understandably forgotten the significance of the date but his staff had not, and he was waylaid into a room by an aide to find them ‘gathered around an iced cake commemorating the Brigade Anniversary. I was deeply touched and surprised that they had remembered in the midst of battle.’164

  Following his discussion with Captain Watson and the orders for the Polish Brigade to lead a third river crossing that night, Sosabowski called a staff meeting at 10:00. It is unclear if Watson was still present, but an RAMC Brigadier from Browning’s Corps HQ who arrived in Driel with or after Watson discussed obtaining medical supplies and evacuating the Polish wounded with the Brigade Medical Officer, Major Jan Golba.165 Sosabowski then despatched his Chief of Staff, Major Ryszard Malaszkiewicz, to chase up the boats and rations pledged by Captain Watson using a Jeep supplied by the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards; according to one source the vehicle and driver was the first direct assistance the Polish Brigade had received from the 43rd Division since the 5th DCLI had reached Driel at 20:00 on 22 September.166 Major Malaszkiewicz made his way over the four miles or so to Homoet ‒ driving cross-country over tulip fields at one point to avoid a trio of dug-in German tanks reported by medical troops encountered en route ‒ to Brigadier Walton’s 130 Brigade HQ. On arrival he was shocked by the contrast between conditions at Driel and the British HQ, which had ‘so many telephone lines and tents, it looked like a peacetime maneuver’. Malaszkiewicz was more impressed with Brigadier Walton, the Polish officer found him ‘combative…and wanting to continue the advance’ but lacking the orders to do so.167 The talks between the two officers regarding boats, artillery support and supplies proved to be both cordial and fruitful, although it is unclear if the discussion was part of or separate from the 130 Brigade Orders Group attended by Lieutenant-Colonels Mackenzie and Myers.

  Major Malaszkiewicz reported back to Major-General Sosabowski at Driel at 19:00, informing him that Brigadier Walton would provide twenty-four large assault boats capable of carrying between sixteen and eighteen men apiece, which would be delivered to Driel by 20:30.168 According to the British official records the vessels were to be handed over ‘with personnel to operate them’ and the 43rd Division’s semi-official history specifies men from 204 Field Company RE and the 5th Dorsets Regiment, while Cholewczynski refers to ‘Canadian sappers attached to the Wessex division’.169 There is some confusion here, for despite the unequivocal evidence from the War Diary of the RE unit involved, Major Malaszkiewicz clearly reported that the Poles would have to provide crews for the assault boats themselves, as cited in the Polish Brigade War Diary; Major-General Sosabowski also referred to receiving the ‘rather surprising news that we would have to supply the crews as well’.170 Whatever the rationale for that, artillery support would be provided by guns from the 43rd Division and 30 Corps controlled from the riverside dyke at Driel, and an issue of rations was to be delivered in the course of the evening.171 Sosabowski promptly called a staff conference also attended by Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, an unnamed Royal Artillery officer from 30 Corps, and possibly Lieutenant-Colonel Myers; the three may have travelled back from Homoet with Major Malaszkiewicz. Captain Budziszewski’s Engineer Company was tasked to organise the crossing and man the assault boats, and a warning order was issued to the remainder of the Brigade to sort men into boatloads of eighteen with ammunition, heavy weapons and other equipment spread across the groupings to expedite rapid loading and unloading and to offset the impact of possible boat losses. The outlook for artillery support was less positive, with the RA officer from 30 Corps stressing that supporting fire would have to be restricted due to a shortage of ammunition; he later expressed concern that artillery fire was likely to be ineffective owing to the close proximity of friend and foe, after observing the lower portion of the Oosterbeek perimeter from the south bank of the Lower Rhine.172 Sosabowski held a commander’s briefing at 21:30 where he laid out the Brigade’s order of embarkation for the crossing. The remaining elements of the 3rd Battalion were to cross first, followed by Brigade HQ, the various Brigade specialist elements, the 2nd Battalion and finally the Engineer Company bringing up the rear; the commanders were then dismissed to brief their men.173 On returning to the 3rd Battalion area, temporary commander Captain Ignacy Gazurek informed 2nd Lieutenant Kula that his misplaced party from the 1st Battalion would be accompanying his men on the crossing and rounded off with the cheery observation that ‘across the river our skins will be better thrashed than here’.174

  With his commanders dismissed, Sosabowski continued to discuss the situation with an unknown British officer according to 2nd Lieutenant Szczesny Relidzinski, who had been sleeping in the attic above the meeting room. The unknown British officer may have been Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie given the timings, and according to Relidzinski the Polish Brigade commander expressed serious concern about his troop’s tiredness, and lack of ammunition and food: ‘Unless supplies come today, it’s difficult to even talk about crossing. The soldiers cannot go hungry…we cannot even guess about anything on the other side.’ The very tired-sounding British officer responded by assuring Sosabowski that the promised supplies would arrive as arranged.175 Assuming the anonymous British officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, the overheard discussion must have taken place shortly before he returned to Oosterbeek at 23:00 via a boat organised by Major John Winchester from the 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE and again rowed by Lieutenant Storrs.176 On arrival at the Hotel Hartenstein at 23:45, Mackenzie opted to keep his disquiet over Browning’s poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency displayed by 30 Corps and the 43rd Division to himself, a somewhat presumptuous action in the circumstances and one that was arguably beyond his remit as Divisional GSO1. He restricted his report to detailing the imminent second attempt to ferry the Poles across from Driel that night and that the 43rd Division were planning to establish a brigade bridgehead on the north bank of the Lower Rhine to allow the Royal Engineers to construct a bridge for reinforcements.177 His moral dilemma aside, Mackenzie was likely relieved to regain the relative quiet and safety of the Oosterbeek perimeter after a day that had involved having an armoured car topple from under him and subsequent near capture by German infantry, meeting with two Corps, one Division and one Brigade commander, smoothing over a potential Anglo-Polish dispute and crossing a wide and fast-running river in pitch darkness under enemy fire.

  Meanwhile Captain Budziszewsk
i’s Engineers were busy organising the Polish Brigade’s crossing of the Lower Rhine. A concentration area was established in an orchard set back behind the tall riverside dyke with paths to two embarkation points around 300 yards beyond the dyke across the mudflats at the water’s edge. One crossing point, which had been employed the previous night, was controlled by 2nd Lieutenant Mieczyslaw Grünbaum and 2nd Lieutenant Stanislaw Skulski, while the other, 500 yards to the west, was controlled by Lieutenant Jan Dawidowicz. Lieutenant Wieslaw Szczygiel, who was in overall charge of the crossing, oversaw the laying of white tapes to mark the paths after dark, and had some men wade out into the river at the crossing points to check the depth while Captain Budziszewski established his Company Command Post in a shell-damaged house north of the dyke.178 The remainder of the Brigade had by now withdrawn from its positions and concentrated in Driel proper in anticipation of the arrival of the assault boats at 20:30 and while they did not appear as scheduled, the promised ammunition and rations were delivered at around 21:00.179 The food appears to have been a mix-and-match effort using emergency rations; Lance-Corporal Kuzniar from the 3rd Battalion reported being issued with a can of sweets of unknown provenance, a bar of US D Ration chocolate and a cube of pemmican dried meat.180 If Kuzniar’s experience was typical it suggests that the victuals were emergency rations hastily gathered in by 43rd Division QMs, augmented with what were described as ‘locally canned preserves’, which the paratroopers picked through for the most edible; it is unclear if the local produce came up with the emergency rations or had been procured by the Poles themselves. Many of the heavy cans were abandoned unopened in the streets of Driel as the paratroopers sought to minimise their burdens, which suggests that Sosabowski may have been overcooking his men’s hunger, so to speak.181 With the rations distributed the bulk of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade moved off for the orchard concentration area at some point between 22:30 and 23:00, leaving behind a small party to guide the assault boats forward when they finally arrived.182 Sosabowski’s men were thus poised to make their third consecutive attempt to bring a measure of relief to the embattled 1st Airborne Division on the north bank of the Lower Rhine.