Arnhem

67. Testimony from Lieutenant David Russell, commanding 7 Platoon, C Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion; cited in Middlebrook, p.160

  68. Quoted from ibid., p.161

  69. See David Truesdale, Brotherhood of the Cauldron, p.101

  70. See Frost, pp.214-216

  71. Testimony from Lieutenant Robin Vlasto, commanding 1 Platoon, A Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion; cited in Middlebrook, p.152

  72. Testimony from Lance-Sergeant Bill Fulton, Section Commander, 3 Platoon, A Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion; cited in ibid., p.157

  73. See Kershaw, p.101

  74. Testimony from Signalman Bill Jukes, 1st Airborne Division Signals attached to 2nd Parachute Battalion; quoted from Middlebrook, p.158

  75. See WO 171/1509 1st Parachute Squadron RE War Diary, entry for 22:00. 17/09/1944

  76. See Frost, p.217; and Middlebrook, pp.157-158

  77. Testimony from Leutnant Joseph Enthammer; cited in Kershaw, p.98

  78. Testimony from Rottenführer Rudolf Trapp, 3 Kompanie, Panzergrenadier Regiment 21, 10 SS Panzer Division; cited in ibid., p.98

  79. See II SS Panzerkorps Order, issued by telephone at 17:30 Hours on 17.9.44; see ibid., Appendix A, p.322; some sources give Brinkmann’s rank as Sturmbannführer but Kershaw refers to him as an SS Captain (Hauptsturmführer); see ibid., p.97

  80. See ibid., pp.96-97

  81. Sergeant Thomas Edward Graham is listed as missing believed killed and has no known grave; he is commemorated on Panel 8, the Groesbeek Memorial, Gelderland, Holland

  82. Lieutenant Peter Leslie Hibburt is listed as missing believed killed and has no known grave; he is commemorated on Panel 8, the Groesbeek Memorial, Gelderland, Holland

  83. See WO 171/1238, 3rd Parachute Battalion War Diary, ‘Account of C Company Move to Arnhem Bridge by Sergeant Mason’, Appendix D ‘Diary of Events – 3rd Parachute Battalion’, entry for 17/09/1944; and The Pegasus Archive, Battle of Arnhem Archive, Biographies Section ‘Major R. Peter C. Lewis’ at http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/pongo_lewis.htm, accessed 02/9/2011; and Middlebrook, p.159

  84. See WO 166/14933 1st Airlanding Light Regiment RA War Diary, entry for 23:30, 17/09/1944; and Golden, Echoes from Arnhem, p.154

  85. See for example Middlebrook, pp.161-162

  86. Testimony from Leo Hall dated 2001 at The Pegasus Archive, Battle of Arnhem Archive, Biographies Section ‘Bombardier J. Leo Hall’, http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Leo_Hall.htm, accessed 02/09/2011

  87. See Fairley, Remember Arnhem, pp.73-74; and WO 166/14933 1st Airlanding Light Regiment RA War Diary, entry for 23:30, 17/09/1944 & 05:00, 18/09/1944

  88. Testimony from Leo Hall dated 2001 at The Pegasus Archive, Biographies Section, ‘Bombardier J. Leo Hall’ at http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Leo_Hall.htm; accessed 26/08/2011

  89. See Fairley, pp.73-74

  90. See WO 171/1236 1st Parachute Battalion War Diary, entry for 05:30, 18/09/1944

  91. See WO 166/14933, 1st Airlanding Light Regiment RA War Diary, entry for 05:00, 18/09/1944

  92. Quotes from WO 171/1375, 2nd Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment War Diary, Appendix ‘2nd South Staffords at Arnhem 17-25 Sept. 44’ ; and WO 171/1513, 9th (Airborne) Field Company RE, comment at end of section for 17/09/1944

  93. Testimony from Edward John Peters at http://thebritishairborneforcesclub.co.uk/pages/faces/peters.html, accessed 27/08/2011; see also Green, 1st Battalion The Border Regiment, p.13

  94. See Green, p.14

  95. See testimony from Joseph Hardy, The Pegasus Archive, Biographies Section, ‘Lieutenant Joseph Stephenson Davidson Hardy’ at http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/joe_hardy.htm; accessed 21/09/2011; see also Green, pp.14-15

  96. See Kershaw, Appendix B, table ‘Div Von Tettau 17-18 Sep 44’, p.328

  97. See Otway, Airborne Forces, p.266

  98. See Kershaw, pp.108-111; and Map 2, ‘The Formation of Kampfgruppe von Tettau’, between pp.192-193

  99. See WO 171/1323, 7th Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers War Diary, initial untimed entry for 18/09/1944

  100. See ibid., entry for 19:00 to 04:30, 18/09/1944;

  101. See Kershaw, pp.108-111

  102. See ibid., p.111 and Appendix B ‘The German Order of Battle during Operation Market Garden 17-26 Sept’, chart entitled ‘Div Von Tettau 17-18 Sep 44’, pp.328-329

  103. For Panzer Kompanie 224’s start location see Zwarts, German Armoured Units at Arnhem, p.65; for Bataillon Eberwein’s estimated time of arrival see Kershaw, p.113

  104. See Kershaw, p.113

  105. For US map issue see Captain Carl W. Kappel, The Operations of Company “H”, 504th Parachute Infantry, p.12

  106. Kershaw, p.112

  107. Quoted from ibid., p.120

  108. Testimony from General Feldt; cited in ibid., p.121

  109. See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.160

  110. See Gavin, On to Berlin, pp.160-161

  111. See Captain Jack Tallerday, The Operations of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, p.16

  112. Quoted from letter from Gavin, nd; cited in MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.163

  113. See Major Benjamin. F. Delamater, The Actions of the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry, pp.9-10; and ibid., Major J. E. Adams, ‘Insertion to Monograph, Extracts of Letter from Major J. E. Adams, Jr.’, p.2; and MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.163

  114. See Delamater, p.10

  115. See Adams, p.3

  116. See WO 166/14933 1st Airlanding Light Regiment RA War Diary, ‘3 Bty Parachute Party, 17th September 1944’, entry for 17:00, 17/09/1944; the timing appears to be in error given that it was a further three hours before the lead elements of Frost’s force actually reached the Arnhem road bridge

  117. Kershaw, p.139; and Reynolds, p.133

  118. Adams, p.3; see also Kershaw, p.101, especially footnote 16

  119. See Delamater, pp.10-11; and MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.165

  120. See Adams, p.3

  121. See Kershaw, p.39; and Reynolds, p.133

  122. See Adams, pp.3-4

  123. Timings cited in Delamater, p.11; the latter cites a start time of 20:00 but that is unlikely to have been the case as Lieutenant-Colonel Warren did not give Captain Adams and Company A permission to move off from the rendezvous point on the outskirts of Nijmegen until that time, and it then took approximately two hours to reach the scene of the action

  124. See Kershaw, pp.75-78; and Appendix A, p.322

  125. Quoted from inserted comment by Delamater in Adams, p.2

  126. Quoted from Rapport & Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny, p.279

  127. See for example ibid., p.279

  128. Rendered Rafferty in some accounts

  129. See Rapport & Northwood, pp.277-279

  130. Quoted from Ryan, p.234

  131. See ibid., p.234

  132. See Kershaw, p.115

  133. See Rapport & Northwood, pp.298-299

  134. See ibid., pp.287-288

  135. See Headquarters Airborne Medical Company AOP 472 (US Army Medical Department, Office of Medical History), p.2 at http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/326thAirborneMedCo101stABDiv/326thABMedCo18Oct44.html, accessed 07/11/2011

  136. See Kershaw, p.117

  137. See Ambrose, Band of Brothers, p.126; and Rapport & Northwood, pp.274-275, 301

  138. See Rapport & Northwood, pp.284-5, 287

  139. See ibid., pp.284-7

  140. See CAB 44/254 Part II: Operation MARKET GARDEN, Book III, Chapter VII, Appendix A, Section 3 ‘Gds Armd Div and forward units of 50 (N) Div ‒ Narrative 17 Sep.’

  141. Quoted from Wilson, The Ever Open Eye, p.108

  142. See WO 171/1256 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 20:30, 17/09/1944

  143. See ibid., entry for 17:45, 17/09/1944; and Wilson, p.107

  144. See Wilson, pp.106-109

  145. Casualty figures cited in CAB 44/254 Part II: Operation MARKET GARDEN
, Book III, Chapter VII, Appendix A, Section 3 ‘Gds Armd Div and forward units of 50 (N) Div ‒ Narrative 17 Sep.’; and WO 171/1257 3rd Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 17/09/1944

  146. Quoted from CAB 44/254 Part II: Operation MARKET GARDEN, Book III, Chapter VII, Appendix A, Section 3 ‘Gds Armd Div and forward units of 50 (N) Div ‒ Narrative 17 Sep.’

  147. See WO 171/1256 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 22:00, 17/09/1944

  148. See WO 171/376 HQ Guards Armoured Division War Diary Jan-Sept 1944, Appendix JA ‘Guards Armoured Division Operations Order No. 12 Operation Garden’, Para. 14 ‘Divisional Tasks’, dated 15/09/1944

  149. See CAB 44/254 Part II: Operation MARKET GARDEN, Book III, Chapter VII, Appendix A, Section 3 ‘Gds Armd Div and forward units of 50 (N) Div ‒ Narrative 17 Sep.’, Part ii. ‘Supporting Units of 50 (N) Div.’

  150. See Kershaw, p.87

  151. See Wilson, p.112

  152. See Horrocks, Corps Commander, p.99; cited in Powell, p.87

  153. See WO 171/1256 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 12/09/1944; and Verney, The Guards Armoured Division, p.96

  154. The same point is raised by Reynolds; see Reynolds, Sons of the Reich, p.125

  155. Quoted from WO 171/1341 HQ XXX Corps War Diary Sept 1944, Appendix ‘O’, 30 Corps Operational Instructions, ‘30 Corps Movement Instructions for Operation Garden (239/G1 15 Sept. 1944)’

  156. See WO 171/846, 15th/19th King’s Royal Hussars War Diary

  157. See WO 171/605 5th Guards Armoured Brigade War Diary, Appendix D, dated 15/09/ 1944

  158. See Wilson, pp.109-111

  159. Quote from O’Connor’s report on Operation COMPASS, cited in Pitt, p.162

  160. See for example Ken Tout, Tanks, Advance: Normandy to the Netherlands (London: Robert Hale, 1987); and John Foley, Mailed Fist

  161. See for example William. F. Buckingham, D-Day: The First 72 Hours, pp.263-264

  162. For a detailed participant account of Operation TOTALIZE see Ken Tout, Tank!; for the advance from the Vernon bridgehead see for example Ellis, Victory in the West Volume I: The Battle of Normandy, p.470; and Delaforce, The Black Bull, pp.118-120

  163. Quote from Horrocks, Corps Commander, p.99

  Chapter 8

  1. See Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, p.85. It is unclear what unit the attackers came from, given that Budel lay in the line of attack allocated to Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O’Connor’s 8th Corps, and that formation did not move across the Meuse-Escaut Canal until the early hours of Tuesday 19 September 1944, twenty-four hours after the German account claims; see Powell, The Devil’s Birthday, p.138. The discrepancy may be due to a dating error, or it may have been Richter and his men looking to justify their withdrawal in the same manner as Harzer at Cambrai on 2 September 1944

  2. See Kershaw, p.88

  3. See ibid., p.89; and Reynolds, Sons of the Reich, p.124

  4. See Kershaw, pp.87-88

  5. See ibid., p.89; and Reynolds, pp.134-136

  6. See WO 171/341 HQ GS File, 30 Corps, September 1944, entry for 18/09/1944

  7. Wilson, The Ever Open Eye, pp.112-114

  8. See Verney, The Guards Armoured Division, p.103

  9. See WO 171/1257 3rd Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 18/09/1944; and Wilson, p.112

  10. See CAB 44/254 Part II: Operation MARKET GARDEN, Book III, Chapter VII, Appendix A, Section 6, ‘50 (N) Div - Narrative 18 Sep’; and WO 171/1257 3rd Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 17/09/1944

  11. See AIR 37/1249 21st Army Group: Operation ‘Market Garden’, Part II, Section 8, Narrative 30 Corps and 1 Airborne Corps Execution of Operation ‘MARKET GARDEN’ period 17/26 September 1944, ‘30 Corps Operations 18 September 1944’, Para 13, p.41

  12. See WO 171/1256 2 (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 07:00, 18/09/1944

  13. See WO 171/376 Guards Armoured Division War Diary, Appendix KKK, Narrative 1 – 30 September 1944, entry for 9/09/1944; Verney, pp.93-94; and Boscawen, Armoured Guardsman, p.119

  14. See WO 171/1256 2 (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 10:00, 18/09/1944; and Kershaw, p.89

  15. See Wilson, pp.114-115

  16. See WO 171/1256 2 (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entries for 10:00 & 12:00, 18/09/1944

  17. See Rapport & Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny, pp.301, 306; and CAB 44/254 Part II: Operation MARKET GARDEN, Book III, Chapter VII, Appendix A, Para. 4 ‘Gds Armd Div - Narrative 18 Sep’

  18. See CAB 44/254 Part II: Operation MARKET GARDEN, Book III, Chapter VII, Appendix A, Para. 4 ‘Gds Armd Div ‒ Narrative 18 Sep’; and Verney, p.103

  19. See WO 171/341 HQ GS File, 30 Corps, Sept. 1944, entry for 18/09/1944

  20. See WO 171/1257 3rd Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 18/09/1944

  21. See WO 171/1256 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards War Diary, entry for 18/09/1944; and WO 171/376 Guards Armoured Division War Diary, entry for 18/09/1944

  22. See Kershaw, p.89; and Rapport & Northwood, pp.301-302

  23. For a detailed account see Rapport & Northwood, pp.302-305

  24. See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.149; and Rapport & Northwood, p.305

  25. See Ambrose, Band of Brothers, p.127

  26. See Kershaw, p.89

  27. Quoted from MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.150

  28. See Rapport & Northwood, pp.293-294; and Devlin, Paratrooper!, p.497

  29. See Kershaw, pp.115-117

  30. Unattributed participant quotes cited in Rapport & Northwood, pp.290, 291

  31. Casualty figures cited in ibid., p.291

  32. See ibid., pp.291-292

  33. See Heeresgruppe B Situation Reports issued at 10:00, 15:30 & 20:00 17/09/1944; cited in MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.150; and Kershaw, pp.115-116

  34. See Rapport & Northwood, pp.292-293

  35. See ibid., pp.298-299

  36. See 101st Airborne Division After Action Report – Summary of Operations 17-18 September 1944

  37. See Field Order No. 11, 82nd Airborne Division, Annex No. 1. Intelligence, dated 13/09/1944

  38. See Burriss, Strike and Hold, pp.107-108

  39. See A Graphic History of the 82nd Airborne Division, entry for ‘D Plus 1, 18 September’

  40. See Guy LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, p.468

  41. Early morning entries in 82nd Airborne Division G-2 Journal; cited in MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, footnote 59, p.166

  42. Quoted from Gavin, On to Berlin, p.165

  43. Quote from Gavin letter, nd; cited in MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, footnote 56, p.165

  44. According to MacDonald’s Official History, Company G was commanded by Captain Frank J. Novak, but Gavin and a more recent account refer to Captain Russell C. Wilde; see MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.165; Gavin, On to Berlin, p.163; and LoFaro, p.337

  45. See Gavin, On to Berlin, p.163; and LoFaro, pp.336-337

  46. See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.165 & footnote 57, p.165

  47. Departure time cited in LoFaro, p.337; and MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.65

  48. See Phil Nordyke, All American All the Way, p.63

  49. See Kershaw, pp.138-139

  50. See Reynolds, pp.128-129; and Kershaw, p.139

  51. See Kershaw, p.139; and Reynolds, p.133

  52. See Nordyke, p.63

  53. See LoFaro, p.337

  54. See Kershaw, p.139

  55. See Reynolds, p.133; and Kershaw, pp.139-140

  56. See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p.165

  57. See Kershaw, pp.120-122

  58. See Gavin, On to Berlin, p.167

  59. See LoFaro, p.339

  60. See Captain Robert L. Sickler, The Operations of Company “D”, 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, p.12

  61. See Gavin, On to Berlin, p.167; and LoFaro, p.339
>
  62. Quoted from Captain Kenneth L. Johnson, Supply Operations of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, p.26

  63. See Sickler, pp.12-13, 22. The SCR 356 was a hand-held set weighing 5.5 pounds with a range of up to a mile and a battery life of c.fifteen hours; the SCR 300 was a forty-channel backpack set weighing 38.23 pounds with a range of up to three miles and a battery life of 8-12 hours

  64. See Sickler, pp.14-18

  65. See Johnson, p.28

  66. Quoted from Woodrow W. Millsaps, letter to Heather Chapman dated 27/07/1967, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Alden Library, Ohio University; cited in Nordyke, p.70

  67. See Nordyke, p.58; the latter claims the action took place in the evening of 17 September, but this does not accord with participant testimony and other accounts. See for example Tallerday, The Operations of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, p.17; and LoFaro, p.340

  68. The Möbelwagen (furniture van) was a Panzer IV chassis mounting a 37mm Flak 43 automatic cannon capable of firing 150 rounds per minute. The nickname came from the four large, rectangular armoured plates that enclosed the gun, which could be dropped to allow all-round traverse; doing this exposed the gun crew to enemy fire however, and it was common to leave the side and rear plates raised when engaging ground targets. In this instance the gun was unable to depress sufficiently to engage some US positions on the hillside.

  69. See Nordyke, pp.50, 64-65

  70. See Kershaw, pp.122-123; the ‘Craoneer Heights’ may have referred to Craonne on the Chemin des Dames ridge overlooking the River Aisne north of Reims, which was captured by the Germans in 1914 and was the scene of fierce fighting during the Nivelle Offensive of April 1917.

  71. See LoFaro, pp.340-341

  72. The Weertjesstraat appears as the Oranjewachtstraat on modern maps, presumably renamed in post-war redevelopment

  73. See Sims, Arnhem Spearhead, pp.49-53

  74. Figures and units cited in Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944, pp.287-288

  75. Locations taken from Middlebrook, Map 11 ‘Arnhem Bridge’, p.289; see also Sims, front endpaper; Zwaarts, German Armoured Units at Arnhem, maps on p.11; John Waddy, A Tour of the Arnhem Battlefields, 3D diagram and key on the rear of the enclosed ‘Arnhem Battlefield Map’; and Kershaw, map/diagrams ‘German Attempts to Recapture the Arnhem Bridge 17-20 September 1944’, p.133