Beyond Reason

by Roger Fisher

  Conversely, during the negotiation what did the other party do that was probably a mistake on their part or something that could have been done more effectively? If you were going to share honest advice, what could you suggest they might want to do differently next time? Why?

  Having reviewed what worked well for the other side and what they might want to do differently, you can go through the negotiation asking the same questions about your own performance. During the negotiation, what specific things did your team do that appeared to work well?

  And finally, what mistakes might you have made? Why? Can you now turn these into a few guidelines for the future? What will you want to repeat and what will you want to do differently? After creating guidelines, imagine how they might be applied in different cases, whether with family members, colleagues, or representatives of other organizations with whom you deal.

  Focus on Emotions, Process, and Substance

  As you review what worked well and what might have been done differently, focus on three important subjects: emotions, process, and substance. What worked well with how you and the other party managed each of these issues? What might be done differently?

  Check your memory for the emotions that each of you appeared to experience. Think about what seemed to annoy you, excite you, interest you, or anger you. What kinds of things might you do next time to soothe escalating negative emotion?

  The easiest emotions to recall may be the ones that arose from expressions of appreciation—or lack thereof. Run through your core concerns to consider what feelings may have been generated in you and in others:

  1. Appreciation

  Did you feel understood, heard, and valued for your point of view?

  Did the other side feel appreciated?

  2. Affiliation

  Were you treated as a colleague? (or as an adversary?)

  Do you think they felt treated as a colleague?

  3. Autonomy

  Do you feel that your autonomy was impinged upon?

  Do you think they felt their autonomy was being respected?

  4. Status

  Do you feel they respected your status in areas where it was deserved?

  Did you respect theirs?

  5. Role

  Did you feel satisfied with the activities you performed within your role?

  Did you adopt temporary roles that felt fulfilling and useful?

  Did you broaden their role by asking for their advice or recommendations?

  With regard to process, you may want to recall whether an agenda was set, how it was set, and by whom. To what extent was the agenda followed? Did it streamline or impede the progress of the negotiation? Throughout the negotiation, how did people decide what to talk about and how forthcoming they would be? What worked well, and what might be done differently in the future?

  Consider how the agenda might be improved and turned into a possible standard agenda. This revised agenda could be the basis of an agenda for the next negotiation.

  To review substantive success, simply consider what worked well and what to do differently regarding each of the seven elements discussed earlier in this chapter. For example, what questions did you ask that worked well in helping you discover the interests of the other side? What might you do differently next time? In the future, how might you encourage more creative brainstorming of options?

  Keep a Journal of Lessons Learned

  Create a journal to record what you learn from your negotiations. Write down your thoughts in a bound notebook or put them on your computer. Record what you have learned from your own successes and mistakes as well as from the skills and missteps of those with whom you have negotiated. Over time, you will have your own personal negotiation guide.

  As you articulate the lessons you learn, your brain will tend to store that information and have it ready for use. The more often you recall and use those ideas, the more you will find them at your disposal.

  In a class we teach on the role of emotions in negotiation, students are required to keep a weekly journal about their experiences in dealing with the core concerns. We spend two weeks exploring each of the core concerns, starting with autonomy. During the first week, students are asked to observe and document the ways that their concern with autonomy had an emotional impact on them during their daily interactions with others. Throughout the second week, the role of students becomes more active: They are asked to respect their autonomy and that of others in their day-to-day interactions. They write about what worked well and what they might do differently in the future to appreciate that core concern more effectively.

  As the weeks progress, students learn to observe and appreciate core concerns, and they develop skills in learning from their negotiation experiences. At the end of the semester, we ask students to review their journal entries and to write a final paper on what they think they have learned. Reflecting upon their thoughts, feelings, and actions helps their learning stick in their heads.

  SUMMARY

  Preparation improves the emotional climate of a negotiation. A well-prepared negotiator walks into a meeting with emotional confidence about the substantive and process issues, as well as with clarity about how to enlist each party’s positive emotions.

  There are two important activities involved in effective preparation:

  Establishing a routine structure of preparation. You want to prepare in terms of the process of the negotiation, the substantive issues, and the emotions of each party.

  Learning from past negotiations. Experience is of little future value unless you learn from it. After a negotiation, review the interaction in terms of process, substance, and emotions. Ask yourself what each party did that worked well and what could be done differently in the future.

  CHAPTER 10

  On Using These Ideas in

  the “Real World”

  A Personal Account by Jamil Mahuad,

  Former President of Ecuador

  A fifty-year boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru ended through the successful negotiation between Jamil Mahuad, president of Ecuador (1998–2000), and Alberto Fujimori, president of Peru (1990–2000).

  President Mahuad has taken two negotiation courses at Harvard University—one several years ago with Roger and a seminar more recently with Roger and Dan that explicitly articulated the core concerns framework. During our seminar, President Mahuad realized the extent to which he intuitively had used the core concerns to help resolve the Peru–Ecuador border dispute. We invited him to contribute this chapter to share with readers his creative use of those concerns.

  I took office as president of Ecuador on August 10, 1998, after serving six years as mayor of Quito, my country’s capital.

  The main motivation for entering the presidential race was to alleviate poverty and to reduce inequality in my Nevada-sized Andean country of 12 million people. My political strategy was to replicate at a national level the successful formula that I had used while mayor of Quito’s 1.2 million people. My formula was: “Promise attainable projects, deliver on my promises, and stay close to the people.” While I was mayor, Fortune magazine considered Quito one of the ten Latin American cities that greatly improved the quality of life of its citizens.

  As I took office, however, the Ecuadorian economy was spiraling into—arguably—its worst economic crisis of the twentieth century. Simultaneously, political, military, and diplomatic experts foresaw an imminent and perhaps unavoidable new armed conflict with Peru.

  THE PERFECT STORM

  If you have read The Perfect Storm or have seen the movie based on the book, you’ll have the right mind-set to understand Ecuador’s situation in 1998 and 1999. The film depicts how, in October 1991, the unique combination of three immense meteorological events produced a storm stronger than any in recorded history. A hurricane from the Caribbean and two fronts from Canada and th
e Great Lakes converged and fed each other in the Atlantic. The storm trapped a small fishing boat from Gloucester, Massachusetts, and doomed its entire crew.

  Here’s where the analogy comes through. In 1998–1999, Ecuador was suffering from the once-in-a-century combined effects of:

  • The coastal destruction left by El Niño floods (the largest in five hundred years)

  • Record low-level oil prices (oil then accounted for around half of the Ecuadorian exports and the government’s revenue)

  • The Asian economic crisis (the first global economic crisis)

  These factors came on top of a fiscal deficit of 7 percent of the GDP; the final puffings of a crashing financial system; and a physically destroyed and paralyzed private sector. The inflation rate was 48 percent and the debt to GDP ratio was more than 70 percent—both the highest in Latin America.

  Consequently, international creditors—mistrusting Ecuador’s capacity for servicing its debt—were demanding full repayment of loans at maturity and closing their lines of credit.

  This economic meltdown demanded immediate attention. My top short-term priorities were to reduce the fiscal deficit and consequently decrease the inflation rate; to reconstruct the Pacific coastal area of the country recently devastated by the flood; and to restore the country’s credit worthiness through a program with the International Monetary Fund that would get new financing for my social programs, mainly health and education.

  Nevertheless, an unexpected twist in the international front forced me to change priorities and work first to avoid a war with Peru. I considered this situation to be my first and most important responsibility morally, ethically, and economically. An international war would have escalated our already critical situation into a desperate one. How could Ecuador face an international war with the economy already in shambles? I needed a definitive peace accord with Peru in order to reduce the military budget, to dedicate our scarce resources to invest in social infrastructure, and to focus our attention and energies on growth and development.

  THE CURRENT SITUATION

  The long, tough, disappointing history of armed conflict with Peru represented for Ecuadorians a painful wound. Ecuadorians felt abused, stripped of their legitimate territories by the force of a powerful neighbor supported by the international community.

  Here was the scenario the moment I took office:

  • “The oldest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere.” The United States State Department called the Ecuador–Peru border dispute the “oldest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere.” Its roots can be traced back at least to the discovery of the Amazon River in 1542 by the Spanish conquistador Francisco de Orellana or, even before that, to the 1532 precolonial Indian war for the control of the Inca Empire between the Quiteño Atahualpa (now Ecuador) and the Cusqueño Huascar (now Peru).

  • The largest land dispute in Latin America. The territory historically claimed by both Ecuador and Peru was bigger than France. It constituted the largest disputed territory in Latin America and one of the largest in the world.

  • Numerous attempts to resolve the conflict had failed. Since the early nineteenth century attempts to reach a solution consistently failed. The countries had tried war, direct conversation, and amicable intervention by third parties, mediation, and first-class arbiters including the King of Spain and President Franklin Roosevelt. None yielded a positive result.

  The last period of this conflict started in 1942. After an international war between Ecuador and Peru in mid-1941 and following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States pressed Ecuador and Peru to end definitively their land dispute. In 1942 in Rio de Janeiro, the two countries signed a treaty called the Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Limits. Known in short as the Rio Protocol, this treaty was guaranteed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States.

  The Rio Protocol established that part of the boundary between Ecuador and Peru would be a watershed (a ridge of high ground) between the Santiago and Zamora rivers. It turned out, however, that between these two rivers there was not a single watershed, but a third river, the Cenepa. As a result, out of a 1500 kilometer-long block of land marked frontier, approximately 78 kilometers remained an “open wound.”

  Armed conflict erupted in 1981 and again in 1995, but did not settle the issue. On the contrary, more bitterness and mutual mistrust developed. This zone was epitomized by the outpost of Tiwintza, a small area of land where soldiers from both countries had been killed and buried. Tiwintza became a heroic symbol to each country.

  The post-1995 negotiation process had advanced important agreements regarding future joint projects, mutual security, trust, commerce, and navigational rights over some tributaries of the Amazon. Nonetheless, all this progress was contingent on a final agreement over Tiwintza.

  As an almost final effort to overcome entrenched positions, Ecuador and Peru asked a special commission for a nonmandatory but morally important opinion (a Parecer) on the issue. The special commission was known as a Juridical–Technical International Commission and included representatives of Argentina, Brazil, and the United States. The opinion of the commission was released a few weeks before I was elected president. It expressed the view that Tiwintza was part of the sovereign territory of Peru. That opinion, contrary to the situation on the ground where Ecuadorian troops had been for decades, stirred up escalating hostility between the two countries.

  By the time I took office, the troops from Ecuador and Peru had occupied the previously agreed upon demilitarized zone. They faced one another so closely that, in some places, they could shake hands and say Buenos días before raising their rifles. The Ecuadorian military command briefed me that a Peruvian invasion starting a few hours after my inauguration was a likely scenario. Peru would most likely provoke not a localized but a generalized armed conflict. The magnitude of this risk was perceived only by the most informed echelon of society. The rest of the country was immersed in their struggle to survive the economic difficulties and was distracted temporarily by the new president’s inauguration.

  THE CHALLENGE: AGAINST ALL ODDS

  Upon stepping into office, pursuing peace with Peru would require:

  • Belief. There would have to be the popular belief that the war could be resolved. Myths are almost impossible to debunk; the intractability of the problem with Peru had deep roots in Ecuadorians’ flesh and souls.

  • Civic participation. Making peace between Ecuador and Peru would have to be a “people’s project,” not a government issue. There would need to be a boost in participation of the people represented by any legitimate organization or group.

  • Trust. Cooperation and mutual trust would need to be elicited from all sectors in this fragmented country.

  • Political support. A formula for peace would need to be created. It would have to be acceptable for both countries and for many different sectors in each country.

  • Economic stability. There would need to be ways to bring economic stability to a country on the verge of war. In such a moment of distress, how could the government go about dictating badly needed, but unpopular, economic adjustments that would compromise the national unity and governability of Ecuador?

  • A clear, coherent, comprehensive action plan. The resulting plan would need to be not only military but also economic, political, and international in scope.

  PREPARING FOR PEACE

  Since the purpose of this chapter is showing the core concerns in action, I’ll focus my attention on the negotiation strategy of the border conflict and some interactions with my colleague, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru, while ignoring the complications of the economic situation in Ecuador.

  I needed a talented governmental cabinet to carry out peace efforts. Dr. Jose Ayala, allegedly the most respected Ecuadorian diplomat, had been minister of foreign affairs and had conducted peace negotiations.
I asked him to remain in his role. General Jose Gallardo had been minister of defense during the most recent armed conflict in 1995; that conflict had ended with an Ecuadorian military victory. I appointed General Gallardo to be minister of defense. In short, I appointed the chancellor of peace and the general of war as members of my cabinet. This was done to send a clear signal: Although Ecuador was openly inclined to a peaceful solution, we were ready to defend ourselves fiercely if necessary.

  Chancellor Ayala informed me of the general perception that nearly every contentious issue had been agreed upon by the two diplomatic delegations. The remaining point, the territorial dispute of the zone symbolized by Tiwintza, was something that only the presidents themselves could decide. It required a final stage of diplomacy at the highest level—“Presidential Diplomacy” as the press labeled it.

  I phoned Professor Roger Fisher at his Harvard Law School office and invited him to come to Quito and join the Ecuadorian government team to analyze the current situation, brainstorm possible approaches, and prepare a negotiation strategy.

  When Roger arrived in Quito, we worked on various fronts simultaneously. We carefully reviewed with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs the up-to-date military and diplomatic facts. To get everybody on the same page, Roger offered, for the benefit of some cabinet and staff members connected with the negotiation, a half-day presentation of his classic Seven Elements of Negotiation and some useful techniques for their application.

  Due to the current tensions, a personal meeting of the two presidents was most unlikely to occur. However, in preparation for an eventual encounter with President Fujimori, Roger and I examined ways to start a personal working relationship.