Our Friends Beneath the Sands

by Martin Windrow

  FOR THE TIME BEING, however, the towns were still dependent on protection by the old scrambling methods. In the western sector, the Deslandes Battalion were operating north of Teroual as part of a temporary mobile group under Colonel Niéger, established at Zitouna on 3 July, for operations loosely coordinated with the Spanish General Riquelme. Ahmed Heriro’s Djibala forces were still strangling the border posts north of Ouezzane, and on 8 July Brikcha and Ouled Allal were evacuated and blown up. All efforts to rescue the garrison at Rihana failed, and the occupants had to be left to their fate; the post fell a week later, but the surviving defenders were at least taken prisoner rather than massacred out of hand.68 By that time II/1st REI, like all the original ‘fire brigade’ units, were long overdue for relief, but there always seemed to be ‘one more little operation’ for them. The Niéger Group’s assignment on 18 July was to evacuate the posts of Ouled Hamrine and Bab Hoceine on hills above the Oued Aoudiar. Leaving their camp at Teroual guarded by the cooks and the sick, the Deslandes Battalion marched out at dawn and climbed the south-west slopes of the Djebel Lesmed to guard the right flank of the advancing brigade. The 8th was the duty company that day, and Private Ziegler was a runner with the liaison party attached to Mobile Group HQ, so his account repeats what his friend Sergeant Maurer told him that night.

  The plateau was completely flat and bare; the stones had been levelled, and the thorn bushes, aloes and dwarf palms seemed to have been cut short deliberately to deny attackers any cover. About 1,000 yards ahead Maurer could see the abrupt cliff of Hill 615; everything was quiet, but they knew the Rifians were waiting for them up there among the rocks. The companies advanced across the naked ground in the usual three-up, one-back formation; apart from the battalion’s machine guns, on this occasion a support platoon also had a couple each of 37mm trench-guns and 81mm mortars.69 When the lead companies were within 500 yards of the cliff the Rifians opened fire, looking down from their excellent concealment and cover. Men began to fall; the rest tried without success to scrape rifle-pits in the stony ground, and were reduced to crawling forwards, pushing the pathetic cover of their haversacks in front of them. The machine-gun, trench-gun and mortar crews did what they could, but without much apparent effect; the mobile group’s artillery batteries were busy with other targets, and without their support the advance was agonisingly slow. It took 8th Company no less than three hours to get within 50 yards of the base of the rocks by alternate fire and rushes, but they were then pinned down, and two messengers sent back to appeal for artillery support were both shot as they ran. Meanwhile the rest of the brigade were advancing up the Aoudiar valley below them; unless Hill 615 could be cleared, their right flank would be dangerously exposed, and Major Deslandes had to get his men moving again.

  A flurry of firing by the 37s and mortars did not inflict many casualties, but at least kept the Rifians’ heads down behind their granite ramparts while the légionnaires made two wild bounds that got them to the base of the rocks. After Bibane, it could hardly be doubted that Deslandes would lead 8th Company up the slope in person, and just below the summit he was shot full in the chest. A hundred men saw him fall; Maurer said that they let out one terrible cry of rage and hurled themselves the last few yards, taking the crest with grenades, bayonets and butts. No prisoners were taken; and as his men heard the rumble of artillery supporting other units, and before they could even get a stretcher up to him, Marcel Deslandes died. It was three days before the mobile group managed to reach Bab Hoceine.70

  (On that 18 July, some 2,500 miles away down at the far end of the Mediterranean, dissident tribesmen in the Djebel Druze of southern Syria opened fire on a circling French aircraft. These were the first shots in a simultaneous campaign that would convulse the French Mandate territory of Syria and Lebanon until 1927, placing a serious additional strain on French Army resources, and involving two Legion units in epic defences. For a brief summary of Legion operations in the Levant in 1925, see Appendix 2.)

  WHILE THE FIGHTING RAGED in all three main sectors during July, and troop trains carried Metropolitan units towards Marseille, Franco-Spanish diplomatic feelers were nevertheless being extended to Abd el Krim. On 18 July the Madrid talks produced a joint document offering him surprisingly generous terms if he would give up his claim for an independent state and acknowledge the sultan. While Rif independence was never on the table, a considerable measure of ‘such autonomy as is compatible with existing international treaties’ was, together with a complete amnesty, commercial freedom to negotiate mining concessions, and (probably) a light policing presence among the still-armed tribes rather than full military occupation and disarmament. The French eventually published these terms on 14 August, and two days later the Spanish went further, stating that the sultan’s authority over the Rif would be ‘purely nominal’. The offer had been accompanied by a warning that if the Rifians refused, they would face joint Franco-Spanish operations to force unconditional surrender. Unable to sacrifice his prestige among the tribes by backing down from his widely published promises to lead them to independence, Abd el Krim did indeed refuse.

  Marshal Pétain followed his ten-day tour by travelling to the Spanish zone for talks with Primo de Rivera to put flesh on the bones of cooperation established in Madrid. His subsequent report to the French government, released on 9 August, was the first honest analysis with which the French public had been trusted; it gave reasons for sober confidence, but did not conceal the failures. Pétain admitted that Abd el Krim was the most dangerous and well-equipped enemy the French had ever faced in their colonial wars, that his followers were brave and skilful, and that he had inflicted serious setbacks and losses during the past months. He praised the heroism and endurance of the outnumbered troops who had unavoidably been sacrificed to hold the outpost line until reinforcements could arrive. He also paid a slightly back-handed compliment to Lyautey, the ‘great leader’ who ‘in spite of his age and the burdens of a rugged colonial career’ had succeeded in defending his ‘work of civilization’ from this ‘barbarian onslaught’ (at 70, Lyautey was actually less than 18 months older than Pétain).

  On 17 August, with no word of compromise from Abd el Krim, the government authorized Pétain to assume direct command and initiate his operations. He dismissed Lyautey’s and Naulin’s existing plan for a counter-offensive as being limited to regaining lost French-controlled territory. Assured of all the assets he needed, before winter halted active operations Pétain wanted to inflict defeats in Abd el Krim’s Spanish territory, and to advance to suitable jumping-off lines for a joint spring offensive to crush the Rif utterly.71

  ALTHOUGH THE LEGION’S NUMBERS on the Rif front would triple by the end of September, the huge multiplication of French – largely Metropolitan – strength overall would greatly reduce the corps’ contribution in proportional terms.72

  In the Taza corridor – where VI/1st REI was led by Captain Chavanne after 23 July, when Major Cazaban at last collapsed with dysentery – both the VII/1st REI (Major Merlet) and III/3rd REI (Major Boutry) had arrived during July. The bereaved II/1st Foreign, south of Ouezzane, had been led by Captain Derain, doubling up in command of the battalion and his own 5th Company due to the heavy officer casualties, but on 22 July he handed over to the more senior Captain Dolet transferred in from 3rd REI. Three further battalions from the 3rd and 4th Foreign from the Atlas would reach the front during August and September, and by late September the total Legion presence would stand at seven battalions and one mounted company.73 But while entire divisions would be available for Pétain’s counter-offensive, any hope that the burden would now pass from the units that had borne the heat of the day was to be disappointed.

  General Naulin assembled three small army corps in the western, central and eastern sectors of the Fes-Taza front, each with two divisions.74 His first initiative was to clear the Djibala attackers back from the northern approaches to Ouezzane, and from 2 August a two-week offensive by the now-General Freydenberg cleared the Djebel
Azjen and Djebel Sarsar. This saw the first use of tanks in Morocco; the little two-man Renault FT-17s looked like clockwork toys as they laboured up the slopes, but although the terrain limited their areas of operation and caused many breakdowns, they did better than some had predicted. Captain Dolet’s II/1st REI fought at Djebel Sarsar on 12 August supported by fire from Spanish posts, two days after Freydenberg’s French and Riquelme’s Spanish troops had formally linked up for the first time in the Loukos valley. By the middle of the month tribesmen were being disarmed in thousands, and on the 18th Lyautey met General Riquelme at Arbaoua. The Legion battalion spent the rest of August in exhausting routine duties and minor clashes before marching south-east for Ain Defali, and thence to Fes to prepare for a September offensive on the Ouergha. In that sector, the Rifians had paid a heavy price on 7 August for trying to hold the captured Djebel Amergou as a base for raids in Fichtala tribal country, since their attempted defence gave the artillery and bombers an easy target.75

  Meanwhile, north of the Taza corridor, the VI/1st Foreign established and supplied firebases and carried out exhausting picketing duties before marching from Taza on 23 July to join a concentration at Dar Caid Medbogh south of Kifane. In this eastern sector, from 17 August, General Boichut’s units from the fresh 11th and Moroccan Divisions attacked to drive the Rifians out of the Tsouls country and to return that tribe to obedience. By 20 August three brigades had advanced 15 miles, and thereafter about 2,500 Tsouls tents submitted. The following week, Boichut’s troops pushed into the Branès country around Smila, Bab el Mrouj and Dar Caid Medbogh. On 26 August, both VI/ and VII/1st REI were present in reserve when Colonel Corap’s brigade of the Moroccan Division captured the Djebel Amseft; during this action Lieutenant de Bournazel polished the legend of ‘l’Homme Rouge’ by riding into battle at the head of his irregulars sporting a floating red burnous as well as his scarlet tunic, with his cigarette-holder at a jaunty angle.76 After the Branès asked for the aman on 27 August, the tired VI/1st Foreign were sent west once again, being trucked to Fes on 31 August for four days of what passed for rest while they were brought up to strength for the next operation. On 4 September, Major Cazaban returned from hospital and reclaimed his battalion, and two days later he marched them up to Kelaa des Sless.

  Having stabilized and advanced both his flanks, Naulin’s next phase was to be a general advance in the centre to recapture all the ground lost north of the Ouergha. The troops were assembled in three ‘marching divisions’: the 1st and the 2nd (including II/3rd REI) would hold the line in the east and centre, while 3rd Marching Division was concentrated further west for a heavy punch northwards into the Beni Zeroual country. However, this blow would not be delivered until the progress of a simultaneous Spanish initiative, which it was hoped would transform the strategic picture, had become clear.

  Marshal Pétain had met Primo de Rivera at Algeciras on 21 August for a briefing on the final plans for an amphibious operation to put a division-sized Spanish force ashore in Alhucemas Bay, threatening Abd el Krim’s home base at Ajdir.77

  THIS AUDACIOUS PROJECT had long been considered, but Primo de Rivera had now overridden those officers who drew pessimistic conclusions from a study of the Dardanelles campaign of 1915, and the success of a trial combat landing in the Straits of Gibraltar and subsequent rehearsals had persuaded the French staff that the planning was competent. Up to 18,000 troops were earmarked at Ceuta and Melilla, under the overall command of General Sanjurjo. General Saro’s Ceuta force was to land first on 7 September, spearheaded by Colonel Franco with the 6th and 7th Battalions of the Tercio, followed the next day by General Fernándes Perez’s Melilla force. Diversionary bombardments and smokescreens were planned, 100 aircraft were assembled in support, a floating dock had been prefabricated, and preparations had been made for landing drinking water in quantity.

  Contrary currents, and last-minute diversionary attacks towards Tetuan by Mhamed Abd el Krim and Ahmed Heriro, in fact forced a 24-hour postponement of Saro’s landings while Perez’s force waited offshore, but early on 8 September 50 Spanish and French warships began a 5-hour bombardment. Soon after 11am the first wave of armoured barges carried the 6° Bandera towards La Cebadilla beach – not inside the bay, where the Rifians had long anticipated a landing, but on the outer shore of the western headland of Morro Nuevo, about 7 miles from Ajdir (see Map 20). By nightfall some 8,000 men were ashore, with 3 batteries and 10 light tanks; among the Rifians there were mutters that treachery was behind the rapid collapse of the Ibuqquyen defenders. The Melilla force was landed over the same beach on 11 September, but in all it took the Spanish 15 hard days to fight their way 2 miles south-eastwards across the horn of the western headland. On 23 September, they finally reached the bay shore at Cala Quemada; on 2 October, they looted Abd el Krim’s abandoned capital at Ajdir, and the next day, with 13,000 men ashore, the fighting died away. Planning, preparation and execution had all marked a transformation in the effectiveness of the Spanish Army at every level, and the landing had inflicted a defeat from which the Abd el Krim brothers would never recover.78

  AS SOON AS NEWS of the successful establishment of the beachhead reached Pétain, he launched Naulin’s troops north of the Ouergha, into the hills for which the Colonial garrisons and Legion rescue columns had struggled so bitterly in April, May and June. With heavy artillery and air support, General Bauby’s 3rd Marching Division – including both Dolet’s II/ and Cazaban’s VI/1st REI – pushed off from Tafrant on 10 September. The II/1st Foreign advanced via Achirkane, Amjot and Aoudour, and VI/1st joined them at Bibane on the 16th. The great hill had been surrounded and virtually cleared by Colonial and North African units during 12 – 15 September; the following day VI/1st Foreign were sent up to the summit, supported by Private Ziegler’s 8th Company of II/1st and some Moroccan Skirmishers. On 25 May that climb had cost the Legion 127 dead and wounded, but on 16 September they took just 3 casualties from diehard snipers. On the 11th, General Pruneau’s troops from 35th Division coming eastwards from Teroual had reached Ain Bou Aissa post, where they found the terrible 6-week-old corpses of Sub-lieutenant Heurzé and 22 of his 30 Senegalese. From the viewpoint of the infantryman, 1918-style firepower and methods had much to recommend them.

  The Rifians withdrew northwards almost everywhere, and on 19 September the Cazaban Battalion were pulled back. They arrived at Fes on the 22nd, but the following day were sent on to Taza. As they left, the Dolet Battalion arrived in the capital, where they, too, were given four days to rest and replace their kit before they were rattling towards Taza, to arrive on 30 September. Neither battalion could be spared from the final phase of Pétain’s autumn offensive.79

  MARSHAL HUBERT LYAUTEY RESIGNED as Commissioner Resident-General of Morocco on 24 September 1925. Although his pride was certainly a factor, in effect he had been manoeuvred into this decision, and it is undeniable that he was no longer equal to a major military command. In a letter to Aristide Briand on 25 October he would express his revulsion at Pétain’s insistence on applying, in Morocco, massive and ponderous Western Front-style organizations and methods, and his disbelief in their effectiveness. Although his distaste was genuine, his scepticism was misplaced, and it is certainly arguable that his own ‘oil-stain’ doctrine had been failing since he first confronted the Middle Atlas Berbers more than ten years earlier.

  Nevertheless, it is also true that his conscientious exercise of his Protectorate had made him a popular scapegoat for both Left and Right in Paris. The former resented his resistance to a plan to give Great War veterans assisted status as colons in Morocco, and the latter his sharp eye for attempted exploitation by bankers and industrial interests – to the end, he had fought to save the country from Algeria’s fate. In 1922 he had told Pierre Viènot that ‘My intention is to lead Morocco towards independence’, and elsewhere he had written more explicitly: ‘It is predictable . . . that at a more or less distant time North Africa – evolved, civilized, living an autonomous life – will detach it
self from France . . . It must be the supreme goal of our policy that that separation is made without grief.’80 It may seem ironic that by 4 May 1925 he was calling for poison gas shells, but in justice this panic reaction cannot outweigh the relative humanity of his achievements over the previous thirteen years.

  Although a government anxious to reduce military expenditure had ignored his warnings in 1924, they still blamed him for getting them caught up in this war, and simultaneous setbacks in suppressing the rebellion in the Levant also played a part in Prime Minister Painlevé’s decision. After a shocking defeat there on 2 August, the Right were demanding the dismissal of the elderly high commissioner, General Sarrail, whose military functions were taken over by General Gamelin just as Lyautey’s were handed to General Naulin (see Appendix 2). The government’s intention to replace Sarrail with a civilian weakened their ability to protect Lyautey even had they wished to do so. His successor, too, would be a civil administrator: Théodore Steeg, a former governor-general of Algeria.81