A Spy's Journey

by Floyd Paseman

  With that tip, I called headquarters and found out, after much hemming and hawing, that, yes, a special envoy was coming out to see the Germans, “but we’ll keep you posted on what he finds out. Don’t tell the ambassador or anyone else.”

  This was unheard of, and I refused to follow their instructions. I told headquarters that I had no intention of allowing a special envoy to meet with the Germans on an intelligence matter without my being present. Further, I told them that I would personally brief the ambassador on the impending visit.

  Later that day, I received a call from a lawyer representing the U.S. government officials who had been accused of overlooking the breaking of sanctions. He asked if I could protect them. I told him that I would protect no one and that his request was totally inappropriate. I received several other calls suggesting that I wasn’t helping my career any. Finally, I called headquarters and told them that unless this matter was handled properly, I would resign. Shortly thereafter I was assured that I was the point of contact, and was told to brief the ambassador and set up the meetings. As it turned out, my suspicions were correct—the information alleging the misdeeds of senior U.S. officials was incorrect, and we were able to conclusively prove it.

  The appointment of unqualified people to senior positions began to wear me out. The frequent changes in DCIs and all the personnel movement in the ambassadorial ranks made conducting our business even more difficult. This led to a tremendous emphasis on no flaps—that is, it’s better to not do something than to risk doing something and having it go wrong. Given that we were in the midst of serious work against organized crime, narcotics, and terrorism, it was a formula for mediocrity. And this approach coincided, due to the lack of senior experience at the top, with the belief that headquarters is the place where the action is, and more and more operational positions moved to Langley from the field. CYA (cover your ass) became the byword, and the Agency became extremely risk averse, as Congress itself was to acknowledge by 1999.

  With a great deal of disgust I found out that an operation in a country neighboring Germany had come unwrapped, and headquarters was looking for someone to blame. I got a tip from a colleague at headquarters that, although I had only peripheral involvement, the chief of our division was conducting a secret investigation with one of his deputies with the idea of laying the blame at my feet. An officer had been arrested, and the division chief showed my photo to him several times to get him to match me with the police photo of the person they claimed was behind the operation. This officer held his ground and refused to make the false identification. Unknown to the division chief, this officer had known me in the past. It was a colleague of this officer who had called and informed me of the subterfuge in my own organization. This is all too symbolic of what went wrong with the Agency during this period.

  There was additional shock and disappointment when we learned on November 16, 1996, that another CIA case officer, Harold Nicholson, had been arrested for espionage—again, for working for the Russian Intelligence Service. In this case, Nicholson had been an East Asian officer for most of his career. I knew him tangentially, and he had been a senior officer at one of our field stations. He was at most an average officer—certainly not the high ranking and successful officer the press portrayed him to be. Fortunately, given his mediocre performance, I had turned down his request for an extension and a chief’s job when I was chief of the East Asia division. I didn’t have any particular insights, I simply felt he was undistinguished and perhaps burned out. I didn’t know the truth at that time. In this case, many of the fixes that had been put into place after the Ames case paid off. Nicholson had trouble with three polygraph examinations in 1995, which led to further measures, such as background financial investigations, surveillance, and surreptitious entry into his car and residence. Nicholson had worked for the CIA in Manila, Bangkok, Tokyo, Bucharest, and Malaysia, where he offered his services to the Russians in 1994. Over the next two years, Nicholson was paid over $180,000 for his treachery. His motivation was simple—money. As the plea-bargaining progressed, Nicholson was cooperative as we found the damage he had done. In addition to what he could tell the Russians from his overseas assignments, along the way Nicholson had been assigned to our secret training facility, and had passed to the Russians the names of everyone who went through the facility during his two-year assignment. Due to his cooperation and a plea bargain, he was sentenced to only 23 years in prison for his treachery.6

  But things did end on a high note for me. George Tenet was confirmed as the new DCI in July 1997 after President Clinton’s nomination of Anthony Lake went bad. I had known Tenet since 1990, when he was the staff director of the SSCI and I was working in the resource management staff. He was bright, energetic, and experienced in intelligence. It wasn’t long afterward that Tenet reached out and persuaded a legend in espionage, a true professional, and a good friend of mine, Jack Downing, to come out of retirement and become the new DDO. Jack had been chief in China twice, deputy in Moscow, and a former DDO division chief. He spoke fluent Mandarin and Russian. This was like a great reprieve, and an audible sigh could be heard throughout the DDO. We could once again begin operating again in a professional mode.

  And we did begin to operate again. But a lot had been destroyed in the process, and now, nearly six years later, we have still not totally recovered. But we are on the way.

  As my tour approached its end, I was involved in one last important operation. George Trofimoff, a retired army colonel, sold his country down the river, spying for the Russian Intelligence Services for nearly 25 years. He was finally arrested on June 5, 2001, but the operation to net him began long before. This operation involved the very best of U.S. intelligence cooperation with all agencies and at all levels. Contrary to a lot of press play, the CIA most often cooperates fully—and successfully—in investigations concerning national security. Trofimoff was convicted and will spend the rest of his life incarcerated for his treachery.

  I worked hard to ensure that the critically important U.S. military intelligence units in Germany got their fair due. I had maintained my United States Army Reserve commission, and had just completed 20 years of service before I got to Germany. The military people all knew and appreciated that, and it gave me credibility with them and helped me coordinate intelligence activities in Germany. As my time in the CIA ended, I was stunned—and proud—to be awarded the Defense Intelligence Agency Director’s Award in a great surprise ceremony. It is the highest honor granted civilians by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

  While in Germany, I had the opportunity to meet a number of figures of historical importance. The first, and perhaps the most interesting of all, was an 80-year-old woman who ran one of the great restaurants in the then-capital of Bonn. Her name was Rita Maternus, and she alleged that she had been the mistress of none other than General George Patton. She was stunning for her age, and it was obvious that she had been a knockout in her younger days. She was a legend, and she frequently drank enough of the local wine to get up on the bar and show off her legs. She would say how much George had liked them. She was exceptionally fond of Americans, and if she was around when you brought in a large party, she would frequently send a bottle of the best champagne. The staff took good care of her and made sure her glass was never empty. The restaurant had been one of the last places to fall to the invading Allied forces in 1945, and one booth has a lampshade signed by pilots of the last squadron of the Luftwaffe heading out on what they assumed would be their last mission.

  I met Felix-Christoph, the son of the noted General Reinhard Gehlen, who, among other accomplishments, headed the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, or Federal Intelligence Service) from 1956 to 1968. A mirror image of his elegant father, Felix was confident, pro-American, and grateful for the help the United States had given his country in the fight against communism.

  I also had the pleasant opportunity to meet the son of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Manfred Rommel, while visiting Stuttgart and
acquiring a couple of collector’s items from the Afrika Korps. Manfred Rommel was the mayor of Stuttgart, Germany. He had been mayor for some time, and was reaching the end of his statutory term limit. He too was pleasant, and was particularly interested in maintaining the good relationship the people of Stuttgart had with the U.S. Forces, Europe (EUCOM). The mayor had an excellent relationship with a whole series of EUCOM chiefs. I met him at several receptions as well as informally on several occasions. He was particularly grateful for what the United States had done in keeping the Soviet Bloc at bay. He talked about how the people of Stuttgart had been fortunate to have been liberated by the Americans, and contrasted that with the occupation by Russia of what would become East Germany.

  In my role as the CIA chief in Germany, I attended three years running of the Wehrkunde Conference, the largest gathering of defense ministers in the world, held annually in Munich. I met the fellow who started it all—Baron von Kleist—famous for his opposition to Hitler, which also landed him in prison. The Baron, as he liked to be called, fit all the images that imperial Europeans like to project—a white mane of hair, sartorial splendor, and domineering personality. He ran the conference with an absolute iron hand, never hesitating to tell a speaker to hurry up, sit down, or yield the floor. He even once told his own defense minister to be quiet while another defense minister had the floor.

  One of my favorite people in Germany was Rainer Kesselring. He had dropped the “von” from his father’s name. He was, indeed, the son of the famous Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, and was very much his father’s son. Kesselring had risen to become vice president of the German Federal Intelligence Service, the BND. He was a man of great integrity, and it was a pleasure to do business with him. He was extremely accommodating and did a great deal to further the cooperation between our two intelligence services and our two countries.

  I was offered the opportunity once to meet the daughter of the infamous Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring. However, I was informed that she, as were the children of other Nazi leaders, was still suffering from the unimaginable horror of living with the legacy of their fathers. I opted to pass on this opportunity, but I still regret not meeting her.

  I was quite fortunate with the new CIA leadership in place. Both the DCI and the DDO asked me which senior position I would like. I responded to both that I now had 33 years in the CIA and that I had long believed that there is a time for senior officers to step aside and let the next generation develop their own leadership for the good of the Agency. Ever since I assumed the leadership mantle, I had promised myself—and those who worked for me—that I would not hang around past my time. Finally, I explained to both the DCI and the DDO that I simply loved working in the field, and felt I had done all I could in senior positions at headquarters. It was time to either retire or to consider becoming a CIA officer in residence (OIR) at a major U.S. university. To their everlasting credit, both the DCI and the DDO immediately encouraged me to teach at a university for two years before retiring. Thus, I accepted the OIR offer.

  I loved Germany then, and still do. Where else could you get the official title “Botschaftsrat fur Koordinierungsangelegenheiten der Vereinigten Staaten Von Amerika”? The Germans can indeed be difficult, but they are also very predictable, and blunt. You know where you stand, and they will tell you the truth.

  Germany has been, and still is, one of the best friends the United States has had, and we take the country for granted too often. A good example is the speed and deliberation with which the Germans took on an important role in the Bosnian theater of war. It was a hard decision for them, given their history, but they stepped up to the responsibility and did it well. They were, and are, a responsible, important intelligence ally, and I was proud to develop useful and meaningful relationships with them that continue to today. I am proud that I continue to receive birthday cards and Christmas greetings from many of the official Germans with whom I dealt. Relationships are what it’s all about.

  1. Der Spiegel, No. 12 (1997), pp. 34–36.

  2. Klaus Eichner and Andreas Dobbert, Headquarters Germany (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1997).

  3. Tomas M. Troy, “Headquarters Germany,” Book Review, Studies in Intelligence, 1998, p. 30.

  4. Preparing for the 21st Century—An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, March 1, 1996, U.S. Government Printing Office.

  5. Vernon Loeb, “CIA Giving Fired Agent Top Award,” Washington Post, March 10, 2000, p. A1.

  6. The Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Frank J. Rafalko, ed. (NCIC) pp. 354–363.

  FIFTEEN

  OFFICER IN RESIDENCE—

  A SCHOLAR

  1998–2001

  I returned to the United States and took up my assignment as CIA officer in residence (OIR) at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. I had wanted to participate in the CIA’s officer-in-residence program—sponsored by the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI)—when I first became familiar with the program after my return to headquarters in 1988. When I was asked to consider a major chief’s job in early 1994, I did so with the understanding of the DCI that I would apply for the OIR program after completing my three-year assignment. As things developed, I was asked to take a fourth year, and did so upon the agreement with a second DCI that I would then be considered for an OIR assignment. Finally, under yet a third DCI, I applied from overseas duty prior to completing my chief’s assignment and was selected for the position at Marquette University.

  I had voiced my interest in one of these teaching assignments to three different DCIs, who were knowledgeable and supportive of the program and were positive and verbal in their support of my participation in it as a senior officer. That said, there was an incredible bureaucratic process involved in submitting an application from overseas. For reasons that never were clear, it seemed impossible to use an electronic cable format for the application—it had to be submitted in a formal letter—which I could not do from overseas due to security requirements that we use aliases in all reporting, and the application had to be in my real name. Fortunately, the German support desk, in particular the patience and great assistance of a secretary on that desk, helped me submit the paperwork as if I were at headquarters itself.

  There were a number of considerations once I began the process of applying for the program. To begin with, since the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) has no positions or any budget for its own OIR program, I needed a sponsor. Despite the support of three different DCIs for proceeding with this assignment, I found resistance within my own operating division. The chief there refused to sign off on the assignment. Fortunately, his boss, the deputy director for operations (DDO), Jack Downing, was in favor of the assignment, and it proceeded forward.

  In general, the CIA sponsors officers under this program for two-year tours on the faculties of participating colleges and universities. The objective is to promote broader understanding of intelligence roles and missions, closer collaboration with the academic community, and to make contributions to the scholarly study of intelligence. CIA officers are visiting faculty members and teach and serve as a resource for faculty and students. The program began in 1985, and the CIA has sponsored officers at over 50 academic institutions, including Harvard, Princeton, Ohio State University, Clemson, and Marquette, to name a few. The program has been a huge success, with more universities asking for CIA officers than we can provide. And this success is demonstrated by the fact that over 200 universities currently include intelligence and intelligence-related subjects in their curricula.

  I selected Marquette for two reasons: first, they had been asking for an officer for nearly four years; second, the DCI, George Tenet, was anxious to get someone out to Marquette and to the Midwest. During the application process, I visited Marquette and was warmly welcomed by the history department and the College of Arts and Sciences. Also, one of the great scholars of intelligence, Ralph Weber,
was on Marquette’s faculty and had been pushing for the program. He and I hit it off very well during my initial visit, and I knew I would have his support. Weber had previously served as a scholar in residence at both the CIA and the National Security Agency. He knew well the unique parts of my business, and I considered that a tremendous advantage.

  I spent three months prior to moving to Milwaukee working out of the CIA Center for the Studies in Intelligence—sort of the CIA think tank. The CSI oversees the Agency’s program to send senior officers to major universities to teach subjects related to intelligence, and it also has the CIA history staff. The history staff has seven to eight doctorate-level history professors whose job it is to research major historical events in the Agency’s development and produce studies, both classified and unclassified. It is, by any standards, a remarkable jewel in the CIA organization. The staff there, including Brian Latell, head of the CSI at the time, did everything they could to prepare me for my teaching assignment. I had access to anything I wanted, and I prepared several draft syllabi for the staff at CSI to critique. By the time I arrived at Marquette, I was fully prepared for the transition into academia.

  I decided, having been away from the academic world for such a long time, that it would be to my advantage to arrive in time for freshmen orientation. And by the end of the week, I knew some of the school’s history, where things were located, and I came to know and appreciate the philosophy of Ignatius Loyola that forms the basis of Jesuit education.

  Most OIRs are given the first semester to get comfortable and prepare their courses. Nevertheless, I was indeed busy. Dr. Weber had me guest lecture one of his history courses. Another professor, Dr. John Krugler, had me make a presentation on the Vietnam War. Things then blossomed. The local chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, the national history honor society, asked me to make an evening address to the local chapter. It was right before Halloween, and so I titled my talk “Spooks, Who Needs Them?” It was a great success, with a packed house, including the chair of the history department. My contacts and reputation blossomed.