Battles and Tactics

by Bob Bennett

  In addition to all these Macedonians over the Hellespont, when their king died there was a further new levy that Antipater and Craterus brought over to fight Perdiccas in the First Macedonian Civil War, following their successful prosecution of the Lamian War. Neither group had sustained many casualties in their particular theatres of the war of 321/320 BC and consequently there may have been, all told, between 30 and 40,000 warriors split between the various generals. With attrition, the understandable desire to go home by some of the forces, and the leakage of some to rebels such as Eumenes, there would have been a comparatively small number of troops to be divided between the legitimist officers. Furthermore, all the Diadochi, except whoever ruled at Pella, faced the same problem of how to get replacements for these troops and, regardless of whatever other troops they might have under arms, nobody was able to play at the high table of regal ambition unless they could deploy a Macedonian-style phalanx of some description.

  The result was that soon, as well as the original Macedonian phalangites who conquered the world under Alexander, many ersatz versions were armed and drilled to fill the gap. Other troop types were re-equipped, trained and armed so they could stand in the main phalanx with their Macedonian comrades. Some of these would have been Greek citizen hoplites who had previously carried the old big shield and short spear that remained for many years the standard military equipment in Greece. Others originally would have been armed as peltasts (versatile unarmoured infantry, taking their name from the pelta, a kind of light shield). These, at least, would have had some experience of hand-to-hand combat so could be more easily retrained in contrast to bowmen, javelinmen or slingers who were used to fighting only from afar. What is clear is that the option Alexander considered of fleshing out his Macedonians with young men from the Iranian provinces, equipped as bowmen and javelineers, was not considered by his Successors. The reason almost certainly is that when Alexander had proposed this mixed phalanx he knew that, against the enemies he expected to encounter, it would be useful to have a missile component in the middle of the files between pikemen at the front and back. But when his Successors found themselves confronted by enemy phalanxes, the only answer was to fight fire with fire, to face sarissa-armed phalanx with sarissa-armed phalanx.

  But the changing complexion of the rest of the army had become clear by the time of the conflict between Antigonus and Eumenes. When the satraps who were later to join forces with Eumenes assembled at Susa, Peucestas, the satrap of Persia, had ‘3,000 men of every origin equipped for service in the Macedonian array’.4 In battle at Paraetacene, a few months later, Diodorus describes Eumenes’ infantry line up on the left as 6,000 and more mercenaries, then after them ‘five thousand men who had been equipped in the Macedonian fashion’ but were not Macedonian nationals.5

  On the other side in that combat, the Antigonid set up was described as (again starting on the left) 9,000 mercenaries, then 3,000 Lycians and Pamphylians, ‘8,000 mixed troops in Macedonian equipment’ and finally nearly 8,000 Macedonian phalangites.6 Again, the first two groups would have been largely hoplites while the rest were sarissa-wielding pikemen. At Gabene, in the winter, not much seemed to have changed except that Antigonus had lost men in the previous battle. All that is noted is that Antigonus had 22,000 foot in his phalanx, while Eumenes, although fielding essentially the same units, changed his formation and placed his best infantry on the left side, the hypaspists first (literally ‘shield-bearers’, an elite infantry unit), then the Silver Shields and after them the mercenaries and non-Macedonians armed as phalangites.

  What is clear from all this is that, on both sides, half or more of the phalangites were now non-Macedonians. Except for the special case of Europe, where Macedonians could be easily recruited by the incumbent powers, the proportion of foreigners was bound to increase. Men described as mixed, of all races or of every origin were almost certainly from the Iranian satrapies. If they had been Balkan or Anatolian their region of origin would in all probability have been given in the sources. Thus, for instance, we have Lycians, Pamphylians, Greeks and Thracians all mentioned by name. The inexactitude in reporting the homelands of these other warriors was essentially a function of ignorance. Diodorus and his sources were just not as familiar with Iranian geography as they were of those regions nearer to home, which had long been well within the Greek ken.

  Under Alexander, and, certainly under his Successors, these well-drilled infantry, whether ethnic Macedonians of the old or new levy or new recruits from the non-European world were the very heart of the battle line. They would have been an awesome sight as they approached the enemy with pikes raised, lowering them only at the charge when the paean (battle song) was raised. Macedonians usually cried ‘alalalai’, a cry to their war god, but other nations, no doubt, had their own savage yells. And leading at the cutting edge of that most daunting of phalanxes were the Silver Shields (Argyraspids). These, it is generally agreed, were the same units as the hypaspists of Philip’s and Alexander’s army. The Silver Shields were divided into three chiliarchies of 1,000 soldiers each; men raised nationally, not regionally like the rest of the phalanx, in order to reinforce loyalty to the king. They normally fought on the right of the phalanx, in the place of honour, as befitted their status, but if their existence and history is fairly well attested there has been much debate over their equipment. Because they so frequently fought in rough terrain and were at the forefront in attacking towns and forts, it is claimed they were not pikemen. In these circumstances an 18-foot spear would be a great hindrance, so it is conjectured that they were some sort of hoplite or peltast. Further evidence for this claim is adduced from the Alexander Sarcophagus, where the foot soldiers (generally assumed to be guardsmen) are shown in hoplite panoply with aspis shield and not the pikeman’s smaller pelte. The most probable explanation is that they would have equipped themselves depending on the task in hand; such high-status troops would have had access to whatever size of spear and shield was required. But what is most certainly the case is that when we hear of them in the age of the Diadochi they fought as pikemen in the heart of the phalanx and, in fact, were the very best of them.

  These hypaspists had been built around the royal foot agema (guard) who defended the king when he fought on foot as the royal squadron (ile basilike) of the Companions did when he led from horseback. They also provided his guard in camp.7 These units were beautified by Alexander with new silver plating on their shields before they took the road to India in 327 BC, which gave rise to their new name. They also had had an interesting career, post-Alexander, before hooking up with Eumenes. Their leader, Antigenes, had been involved in the murder of Perdiccas during the Egyptian campaign, where these men certainly fought. At the Battle of the Camel Fort, Diodorus mentions shield bearers fighting with the elephants in the attempt to assault Ptolemy’s Nile defences. Then, after the settlement at Triparadeisus they were sent on punishment duty to Susa, perhaps because of their involvement in the near mutiny against Antipater. But it has been contended by at least one scholar that the Silver Shields were a new unit different from the hypaspists and created at Triparadeisus from 3,000 disgruntled veterans.8 Whoever these violent old fellows really were, they brought the Persian treasure from Susa back to Cyinda where they were recruited by Eumenes in 317 BC.

  If the question of who the Silver Shields were is open to debate, other information adds further confusion. This is that the Silver Shields were bracketed, in Diodorus’ account of the battles of Paraetacene and Gabene, with another body of 3,000 men who are themselves described as hypaspists. They are not attested before Eumenes got to Persia. When he winters in Mesopotamia, only the Silver Shields are mentioned and this is also the case at Peucestas’ great entertainment at Persepolis. The first mention of these hypaspists is at the Battle of Paraetacene, when they are placed on the extreme right of the phalanx on the right side of the Silver Shields. The 3,000 men were in the position of highest honour. So who were these, the most prestigious infantry in the whol
e army, who again at Gabene held the position of honour, next to the Silver Shields (this time on the left)? Not only are they not noticed before the two great battles, neither are they mentioned in the course of the fighting or the negotiations that led to Eumenes’ downfall. Again, it is the Silver Shields who receive all the attention of our sources. This is a mystery of great interest as it is difficult to credit any reasonable explanation. It is unlikely to be a mistake or misunderstanding as Diodorus is quite clear about the two units and their position in both battles. It does not seem possible that he would mistake them or double them up. But when he obviously recognizes they are the most prestigious unit, why does he not mention what they did in battle? They are as numerous as the Silver Shields and presumably as effective so why do they not demand the same attention? As they are not mentioned before Eumenes got to Persia, they must have been made up of men who were in the armies of the Iranian governors, perhaps veterans who had remained on garrison duty in the provinces and were recruited by Eumenes as an infantry guard. But the evidence is not there and to compound the mystery further they are never heard of again. It is even possible they were remnants of the well-born Persian warriors, who Alexander, in his later years, ordered to be drilled into sarissa-bearing phalangites. They may have remained in the east with satraps like Peucestas. Indeed, perhaps, they are the ones referred to as in the Persian satrap’s retinue when Eumenes joined him and his allies in Susiane.9 A proposition made more probable by the fact they, too, were reported as 3,000 in number.

  The Macedonian phalanx that fascinated so many for so long was early on described by the historian Polybius, a Greek general from Megalopolis, who was exiled for many years in Rome. His description of the Macedonian-style phalanx (in The Histories, not his lost Tactica) has the great advantage that he was contemporary with its use. He may have commanded, would surely have seen, these units drilling and fighting and would have talked to people who had experienced battles both where phalanx fought phalanx and where phalanx fought other sorts of national armies. The other great benefit is that he was, as far as it is possible to be, objective, as he had a foot in both the Greek and Roman camps. He lived from 203 to 120 BC, was a member of the Arcadian ruling class, but from 168 BC spent seventeen years as hostage in Rome where he was closely associated with the great Scipio family who included Aemilius Paullus who triumphed in the Third Macedonian War and Scipio Aemilianus who ploughed Carthage into the sand and finally subdued the brave Celtiberians of Numantia.

  Polybius states his intention was to explain to his Greek compatriots why the Roman legion overcame the Macedonian phalanx, as they apparently found this success ‘incredible’. He describes the phalanx as invincible ‘face to face’ when closed, each man occupying a space of three feet square and with every man wielding the sarissa, 18 feet long. He describes the first five ranks as showing a great pincushion to the front while the rest kept their weapons upright to both ensure they did not wound their comrades and also to ward off any missiles that might be rained down on them. This is not the only use of the men at the back; they gave a crucial psychological feeling of depth and support and more practically ensure that, even if they wanted to, the men at the front are pushed forward and cannot turn and flee. A very different formation from the one adopted by the Roman legionary who needed greater space to wield shield and sword and who was not pressed on by those behind him.

  The Macedonian phalanx, Polybius contends, was a slow and cumbersome formation that could be easily avoided if it could not be stood against. Despite its irresistibility on flat, even ground, the slightest disruption caused by change in terrain was fatal to the Macedonian system; ‘ditches, gullies, depressions, ridges and water-courses, all of which are sufficient to hinder and dislocate such a formation.’10 If the phalanx had to travel any distance there was an irresistible tendency to bunch up or spread out that was not shared by a looser Roman formation that could adjust more easily. The Battle of Pydna in 168 BC showed a classic example of this defect. As the phalanx pushed forward the ground became more uneven with the result that it lost its cohesion, enabling the Roman legion to exploit the resultant gaps. And, to further compound this fragility, the phalanx had another great disadvantage when facing the Roman system. Though each legionary would be facing at least two phalangites as well as ten spear points, the legion and maniple (subdivision of 120 men) with its separate lines meant there were always men kept in reserve. The Roman military organization had institutionalized a reserve of two lines. The front two lines were respectively the hastati and principes who could reinforce or interchange with each other when necessary. The third line, the triari, was able to reinforce the front two lines and could always, in the end, act as protective rearguard if all had gone wrong in front of it. Thus, when the phalanx became disrupted (either after a successful or unsuccessful attack), the Romans had warriors in hand to get under their spears and into the phalanx’s formation, where their Spanish swords could do their lethal work.

  So Polybius’ view was that the phalanx could only stay on clear ground, as if it found itself elsewhere it would become very vulnerable. More than this, it was difficult to split it into small parts, thus only being really of optimum use for great set-piece battles. A Roman legionary, by contrast, was a soldier and fighter either alone or in formation, while the phalangites were only effective in strict mass formation. Furthermore, the legion had the added advantage of a higher proportion of junior officers and NCOs enabling a greater degree of flexibility and use of local initiative.

  The phalanx’s fragility, which Polybius described, can be seen in the era of Alexander and his Successors, but it is far from the dominant motif. At the Battle of Megalopolis in 331 BC, fought between Antipater and Agis III, king of Sparta, when the Macedonian phalangites were led onto rough ground by the Spartan hoplites falling back, they were certainly less effective, but this did not stop them winning the battle. Equally at Issus in 333 BC, when the phalanx crossed the river in the face of Darius’ Greek mercenaries, they had real trouble.

  The Macedonian centre was much slower off the mark; in a number of places, moreover, the steep banks of the stream prevented them from maintaining a regular and unbroken front, and the result was that Darius’ Greek mercenaries attacked precisely at the point in the line where the gap was widest.11

  The phalanx had to suffer the indignity of being rescued by Alexander and his Companions but they then cut the mercenaries to pieces and helped win a famous victory.

  By and large, we search in vain for examples of the phalanx losing formation and suffering defeat for it during the Diadochi wars. In the Lamian War, at the battle where Leonnatus died, a green phalanx purposely moved to high, rougher ground where they retained formation to keep the rampant enemy cavalry at bay. More than this, veteran phalangites, at times, showed that they could be very manoeuvrable and extremely able to react to circumstances. At Gabene, when Eumenes’ phalangites were threatened in the rear by Pithon’s cavalry, they swiftly formed a square to a show a bristling wall of spear points all round to their enemies. Yet, the facts of later wars do bear out Polybius’ contention; not just at Pydna, but also at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC and Magnesia in 190 BC where exposed flanks and disruption caused by missile fire allowed the legionaries to get in and tear the phalanx apart. It seems almost as if the Roman infantry had a particular quality that tested the Macedonian steamroller. Indeed, Polybius goes on to suggest Pyrrhus was so struck by the usefulness of the Roman way of war that when he came to Italy he adjusted his tactics and mixed maniples of his Italian allies in with his own Epirote phalangites.

  Though certainly receiving the most attention, these pikemen were far from the only men who made a mark in the years of Macedonian world hegemony. Diodorus describes 7,000 Greek allies and 5,000 Greek mercenaries as being in Alexander’s army at the Hellespont and many thousands more of these came east as replacements over the years. Over 38,000 men described as allies and Greeks arrived when the army was away in Bactria and
further east. Furthermore, many mercenaries who had fought either for Darius or his satraps would have been incorporated in Alexander’s army as the Persian Empire gradually fell to the newcomers. How these men were equipped and how they fought is open to question. Many of the Greek allies, we know, were hoplites and could have stood shoulder to shoulder with the Macedonian phalanx. That Alexander used them in reserve, as camp guards or on garrison duty was more because of dubious loyalty than equipment.

  Some of these mercenaries and allies would have been peltasts. Originally these were Thracian javelineers who got the name because of their characteristic crescent shaped shield the pelte. Peltasts were the defining troops of the Thracian peoples, they were lightly armoured and skirmishing was their forte, but they could also fight it out face-to-face if necessary. Well before the Macedonian world era began, the term peltasts had come to mean something far beyond just a specific type of Thracian warrior. It had become a generic term for warriors who became the favoured type of mercenary, that almost all Greek states came to depend on later in the fifth and in the fourth centuries. The designation ‘peltast’ had come to mean a troop type, something between the frontline hoplite or phalangite, and the specifically light missile infantry using javelins, bows and slings. These soldiers certainly were skirmishers; indeed the Thracians had been brought in as such. They could keep out of the hoplites’ way and wear them down as at Corinth against a Spartan mora (battalion) in 390 BC.

  By our period peltasts seemed to have become a kind of medium infantry but unfortunately the sources for Alexander and his Successors virtually never use the term itself. One of the very few occasions the term is used is when Antigonus ‘selected the finest of the peltasts’ with light infantry to guard his long military caravan as it wound through the Cossaean hills in the face of a dangerous local enemy.12 They are clearly seen as an integral part of the war machine. Asclepiodotus describes them, with other light troops, as able to close up in ranks eight deep but they are also described as fighting in open order. Certainly, they are not the men who usually fight at the very front of battle, but are used for crucial but routine duties, like garrisoning towns and other line of communication duties.