Battles and Tactics

by Bob Bennett

  The Antigonid army was hot, frustrated and confused; a weaker foe was keeping them at arm’s length, causing great loss, and there seemed no likelihood of the decisive action that Antigonus craved. To try and winkle the confederates out of their position by force seemed futile and another strategy needed to be tried. He decided that to revitalize the army’s sagging spirits, progress and success were needed. The lands of the upper satrapies were relatively unprotected, with their rulers and their best troops away with Eumenes. This, potentially a rich source of plunder, was attractive because it would both encourage his followers and it would make the generals with Eumenes squeal and insist he leave his hidey-hole to return to protect their holdings. Antigonus, decided on this course of action, set off north to Ecbatana, formerly the Persian king’s summer capital in the hills of Media, where his men could also escape the roasting climate of Susiane.

  Antigonus, in putting his plan into practice, showed less intelligence than in preparing it. Displaying an impatience that on several occasions would lead him into trouble, he determined to march directly north over the mountains instead of the army taking the longer but much easier route via the royal road, up the Tigris valley, before branching right through the Zagros range at the Median Gates. This way led through the territory of the Cossaeans. They were a hardy, aggressive and ‘uncivilized’ tribe who apparently still lived in caves and subsisted on acorns, mushrooms and wild game. But, if they lacked the amenities of life, their knowledge of the mountains made them formidable opposition on their own land. The Persian kings had sensibly left them untamed and paid tribute if they wished to use the routes through their territory. However, Alexander had not been prepared to suffer their presumptuous independence and campaigned against them. The Cossaeans could not have chosen a worse moment to challenge him, as he was suffering from massive bereavement at the death of Hephaistion, his chiliarch and favourite. Alexander vented his grief; harrying them for forty days through their glens and forests, massacring or deporting those he found. Almost seven years had passed since this humiliation and many had forgotten this unpleasant taste of Macedonian might, so they again demanded tribute from Antigonus. He compounded his already dangerous decision to march this way by refusing to pay. Pithon, more familiar with local customs, advised against such arrogance but Antigonus would not be swayed. The Cossaeans decided to take their tribute by force of arms.

  Realizing he would have to fight, the old general ordered his line in a competent manner. His missile men, peltasts, bowmen and slingers were divided into two parts; one to go ahead and occupy the main passes and the other to be distributed amongst the whole army and give it protection. In charge of the first detachment was Nearchus, Alexander’s favourite admiral and a man who had disappeared from view since Babylon, where he had tried to foist Alexander’s illegitimate son, Heracles, on the Macedonian assembly.2 Antigonus marched with the phalanx in the middle of the army, while Pithon brought up the rear with selected light-armed troops. All these preparations could not ensure protection from the fierce Cossaeans, especially as Antigonus had a massive army with camp followers and baggage, particularly vulnerable, as it snaked its way along the seemingly never-ending passes. Nearchus faced strong opposition and lost many men while the main body found itself under pressure all along the route as the Cossaeans occupied the high ground and rained missiles down on the Antigonids with impunity. The horses and elephants suffered particularly severely and many did not survive.

  As for the troops led by Antigonus, whenever they came to those difficult passes, they fell into dangers in which no aid could reach them. For the natives, who were familiar with the region and had occupied the heights in advance, kept rolling great rocks in quick succession upon the marching troops.3

  After a harrowing eight days, they finally managed to reach the safety of Media. Though an ordeal of shorter duration, this episode is very reminiscent of the march of Xenophon’s 10,000 and after their travails Antigonus’ men must have greeted the end of the Cossaean hills with as much relief as those earlier Greeks did the Black Sea coast. Morale, though, had again been heavily shaken and Antigonus must have rued his refusal to pay tribute. For once, he should have listened to Pithon.

  In Media, Antigonus’ first concern was to revive the flagging spirits of his men who, in the last month and a half, had suffered much from both the hands of man and nature. They were rested and fresh supplies brought in, while he personally visited as many troops as he could to convince them that the setbacks were only temporary. Pithon, back in his old province, was sent to get reinforcements. This he did with some élan, bringing back 2,000 horsemen and an additional 1,000 mounts as well as numerous pack animals and 500 talents from the eastern treasury at Ecbatana. By giving the horses to those who had so recently lost their own and distributing the pack animals as presents, Antigonus did much to restore spirits. The Antigonids in Media were also much relieved when news arrived that the ploy to draw their enemy out from behind his entrenched position had worked as well as could have been expected. The arguments in the coalition command tent had been bitter and protracted, but eventually things had fallen out as Antigonus had hoped it might.

  The Cardian and the officers who had come with him saw an opportunity with Antigonus far to the north to retrace their steps back to Babylonia and the Levant. This open road to the west would put them, with a mighty host, at the centres of power in Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia and not far from the great cities of the Aegean. But the satraps were not prepared to leave their provinces open to depredations by the invader. A reluctant Eumenes had to fall in with men whom he knew, at bottom, that he absolutely needed. So, the mix of Macedonians, Greeks, Iranians and Indians who comprised the coalition army moved away towards Persepolis, the capital of the Persian lands, where Peucestas had been the ruler for almost ten years. They took it easy, no foolish escapades against hardy locals for them; in fact, they went through country so bounteous it allowed them to flesh out both their numbers under arms and their quartermasters’ stores.

  Peucestas had, from the beginning, been intriguing to be appointed commander in chief of the allied army and took advantage of their presence in his own province. He laid on ostentatious entertainment:

  With the company of those participating he filled four circles, one within the other, with the largest enclosing the others. The circuit of the outer ring was of ten stades (approximately 6,000 feet) and was filled with the mercenaries and the mass of the allies; the circuit of the second was of eight stades and in it were the Macedonian Silver Shields and those of the Companions who had fought under Alexander; the circuit of the next was of four stades and its area was filled with the reclining men – the commanders of lower rank, the friends and generals who were unassigned, and the cavalry; lastly in the inner circle with a perimeter of two stades each of the generals and hipparchs and also each of the Persians who was most highly honoured occupied his own couch. In the middle of these there were the altars for the gods and for Alexander and Philip. The couches were formed of heaps of leaves covered by hangings and rugs of every kind, since Persia furnished in plenty everything needed for luxury and enjoyment; and the circles were sufficiently separated from each other so that the banqueters should not be crowded and that all the provisions should be near at hand.4

  Competition for command seemed to be really heating up and Eumenes, deep in the heart of Peucestas’ satrapy, was becoming very concerned. He responded with both carrot and stick. First, he circulated a forged letter that peddled it that Olympias had gained complete control in Macedonia, had slain Cassander and sent Polyperchon into Anatolia. Indeed, it was claimed he had reached Cappadocia with an army that included elephants. With this making an impression (it looked to auger very well for the campaign now the Cardian was to be reinforced) he also threatened a slippery ally with dismissal and death.

  This was Sibyrtius, satrap of Arachosia, a close friend of Peucestas and it is not difficult to see against whom Eumenes was aiming. In fact,
this episode is a little unclear as Diodorus claims he was close to being tried by the assembly, at the behest of Eumenes, and only escaped death by flight. Yet, soon after, he is recorded as still in situ in his satrapy, though it maybe he fled back and found his old government loyal and stayed there until the outcome of the contest between Antigonus and Eumenes became clear. Finally, to bind his iffy friends even closer, the Cardian borrowed 400 talents from the allied satraps, turning them ‘into most faithful guards of his person and partners in the contest’.5

  The enemy was now near at hand, for Antigonus had broken camp in Media and set out for Persia. Eumenes must have been confident in the arrangements he had just made – that hindsight shows us were to prove very rickety indeed – as he moved his army towards his enemy clearly now prepared for a fight. Yet, he was still thinking about hearts and minds and, though not quite able to compete with Peucestas’ munificence, he still threw a party for the army at which everybody indulged in the binge drinking that Macedonians were famous for. Eumenes, it seems, was first at the front of the wine queue, as he was so hung over and incapacitated that for several days the army was reduced to waiting for its commander to recover.6 Indeed, even when they moved off, he was reduced to following his men in a litter with temporary command exercized by Antigenes and Peucestas. At least here was a safety valve, as these two hated each other so much that they would be unlikely to join forces to depose Eumenes.

  The two sides, after many months of chasing each other, finally came face to face. Yet, even then the final denouement was not at hand. For both armies had drawn up on either side of a river in a ravine, making a battle impossible. For five days they swapped insults, skirmished and plundered the countryside; a hiatus in which an impatient Antigonus sent agents over to try and subvert the satraps. Strangely enough, their efforts seem almost open as Eumenes knew of their presence and even protected them from his followers who became enraged by their importuning at what Diodorus claims as an army assembly. This parallels the claim that Ptolemy spoke before Perdiccas’ army prior to the invasion of Egypt but is perhaps slightly more plausible. In this case, Eumenes did not have the complete authority that Perdiccas had on the previous occasion, and, perhaps for the sake of unity, had to let the satraps hear what Antigonus had to say.

  The coalition leaders would not hear of Antigonus’ terms and by now his army had become desperately short of forage and was forced to move. Their destination was the plains of Gabene, a three-day march away, where there were ample supplies. However, dissatisfaction in the Antigonid ranks caused some desertions and, by this means, Eumenes got wind of their plans. Eumenes, showing the skills that made him probably the greatest general of all the Diadochi, proceeded to outwit Antigonus. He correctly guessed where Antigonus was heading and determined to get there before him and take up the best position. To do this, he needed a breathing space so he sent some soldiers over to Antigonus posing as deserters. They put it out that Eumenes was preparing a night attack, information that Antigonus readily believed. Eumenes, meanwhile, secretly sent his baggage on ahead and stealthily withdrew towards Gabene. After some time, Antigonus realized he had been duped and reacted swiftly. Leaving the bulk of the army under Pithon, he rode out at top speed with his cavalry. By dawn he had managed to overtake the enemy’s rearguard and took up position on a favourable ridge. Giving the false impression that he had more troops than was the case, Antigonus forced Eumenes to turn and draw up his forces in battle formation. A manoeuvre that inevitably took up much time and allowed Pithon to arrive and now from high ground Antigonus could at last force a fight on his enemy.

  Thus began the first of the two epic battles that are the centrepiece of this campaign and, it could be argued, the whole Diadochi era. Diodorus states Antigonus fielded 28,000 infantry (in reality this number is just those in the phalanx and does not include many thousands of light troops), 8,500 horse and 65 elephants. On the left wing, under the treacherous but competent Pithon, were drawn up the lightest of his horsemen and here the tactical intention could not be clearer, they ‘were to avoid a frontal action but maintain a battle of wheeling tactics’.7 These were the classic manoeuvres of steppe peoples that achieved so much for the Scythians, Sakae and Parthians, both before this and in generations to come. They were to use these tactics to occupy the strong right wing of Eumenes that Antigonus could see deployed below him from the heights. There were 1,000 Medes and Parthians described as lancers or horse archers. Then, according to Diodorus, came 2,200 Tarentines who were brigaded with them, ‘men selected for their skill in ambushing’; an interesting new type of soldier who are given their first mention in this war; skirmishers who carried javelins and a small shield.8 The association with the Italian city of Tarentum is real enough: coins from there show just such soldiers. In the cosmopolitan world that had seen Alexander’s uncle fighting in southern Italy, it demonstrates the cross-fertilization of military techniques. The actual origin of these Tarentines is obscure; they are described as coming up from the sea but this is probably to distinguish them from the men who had joined Antigonus in Mesopotamia and Iran. A problem here is that this is a far larger group than you would expect from a new specialist troop type that had travelled up from the Mediterranean, even if not from Italy itself, and perhaps it is best to lose a nought from this estimate. Particularly as when Tarentines are again mentioned, whether when they ambush Eumenes’ elephants or a few years later at the Battle of Gaza in 312 BC it is usually in numbers of a couple of hundred or so, never even close to the 2,200 recorded here. To reduce the number of Tarentines would also help solve the arithmetical dilemma that Diodorus poses when he states Antigonus had 8,500 cavalry but, in fact, all the separate units mentioned add up to 10,600.

  After the Tarentines came 1,000 Phrygians and Lydians, gentry from West Anatolia with long association with Antigonus. Then 1,500 horse with Pithon, who we have no evidence about, but common sense suggests Pithon would have had with him good horse from his satrapy of Media. The last units on the left flank were 400 lancers under a Lysanias. Being on the left, these were probably light lancers rather than heavies who confusingly can also sometimes be designated by the same name. The rest of the left wing was made up of the ‘two horse men’ and 800 colonists from the upper satrapies. We know nothing of either of these regiments though presumably the former actually brought an extra horse to battle. Most cavalrymen had spare mounts; Alexander, famously, would only saddle up Bucephalus, his favourite warhorse, just before battle, using another one to get him to the field of combat. But, to get such a designation these men must have actually brought the spare mount into the line of battle, though it is not clear what great advantage this would give. If it meant they had a fresh steed immediately available, it also meant they needed to use one of their hands to hold the halter of the led horse which must have considerably impaired their fighting ability. What is interesting is that there are no figures given, so perhaps there were only a few of them and they had a specialist role. Last in the left wing were those 800 colonists already mentioned and all we can surmise is that, as colonists in the upper satrapies, they were most likely European or Anatolian horse who could have been settled by Alexander, or any others who had passed through the east in the years since his death. But, as the whole of the left is specified as being required to skirmish rather than charge straight home against the enemy, it is reasonable to suggest they again were light horse with either javelin or lance and with no armour except possibly a helmet. There was something around 7,000 all told on this wing if the high figure of Tarentines is accepted, but about 5,000 if the lower is used.

  The 28,000 infantry mentioned are all attested in the phalanx. On the left 9,000 mercenaries; then 3,000 Lycians and Pamphylians (Anatolians who are perhaps specifically designated thus because they were old soldiers of Antigonus); more than 8,000 mixed troops in Macedonian equipment and then the nearly 8,000 real Macedonians who had come courtesy of Antipater at the start of the war. This indicates that 16,000 men
in the phalanx carried sarissa and pelte as opposed to the classical panoply of aspis and shorter spear carried by the rest. What this leaves out is many thousands of light-armed troops that must have been fielded. Eumenes, for his part, had almost as many light troops as he had soldiers in his phalanx but he would have certainly had a higher ratio than Antigonus as many of his allies brought large numbers with them from satrapies that specialized in producing this kind of missile-armed warrior. Yet still Antigonus must have had many thousands; he would have needed at least 3,000 just to provide guards for his 65 elephants.