by Bob Bennett
The horsemen on the right wing were intended by Antigonus as the battle winners, the clunking fist to compliment the defensive jabbing of Pithon. Nearest the infantry came 500 mercenaries, some may have been the Greek light mercenary horse who survived the massacre of their fellows in Sogdia while Alexander still lived. Next came 1,000 Thracians, who may have been light cavalry of the type Alexander brought with him from Europe or heavier armoured warriors typical of the aristocratic horse of that region. Then 500 who are described as from the allies, perhaps the cavalry from the allied Greek horse who stayed on while their units were demobilized at Ecbatana, after Darius had been defeated. How they were equipped is unknown but it is probable that most, if not all, were heavies, wearing body armour and welding the long cornel wood spear. The Companions, 1,000 strong, came next under Demetrius. He is on this occasion mentioned as specifically in charge of just these heroes as he was ‘now about to fight in company with his father for the first time’, while at the next battle he would be attested as in command of the whole right wing of the army.9 And in the place of honour at the very edge on the right stood the old marshal himself, with his personal guard (agema) of 300. Placed in advance of them were 100 Tarentines and three troops of what are described as his slaves; we have no idea who they were but they would not have been servile retainers but brave and tried warriors. Their position as an advance guard in front of Antigonus’ own agema suggests they, too, would be light horse deployed, no doubt, to clear the way of enemy skirmishers, enabling Antigonus to fling his heavy men down the throat of his opponent. This made 3,700 men in the whole wing, so in numbers they were considerably weaker than the left wing but in quality they included the very best. In front of this splendid assembly of mainly heavy horse, thirty elephants were drawn up, with most of the rest in front of the infantry phalanx and just an unspecified few guarding Pithon’s front on the left. Antigonus led this awesome array down the mountain ridge they stood on towards the coalition army waiting for him.
Eumenes fielded 35,000 foot, 6,100 cavalry and 114 elephants. Much was analogous in his array to that of his counterpart and here, too, the allied left was intended to hold back and soak up the enemies’ blows rather than deal the coup de grâce. In command was Eudamus, who had brought the crucial elephants, fresh from the Indus valley. As well, there were fifty mounted light horse lancers posted as an advance guard at the base of the hill that the rest of Eudamus’ bodyguard was deployed on. After these men on the hill, to anchor the line came Stasander with 950 light horse from Aria and Drangiana, after him came Amphimachus, satrap of Mesopotamia, with 600 horsemen. This man may have been the half brother of Philip Arrhidaeus but what sort of cavalry he commanded we do not know.10 Then came 600 Arachosian cavalry, no longer under Sibyrtius who had fled, but led by Cephalon, 500 Parapamisadae from the Hindu Kush and again most probably light horse like their comrades from the Indus. Approximately 500 Thracians from the upper country, troops planted in townships in the upper satrapies at some time since Alexander passed by, were on the right side of the left flank and thus adjacent to the infantry phalanx. Forty-five elephants stood in front of them with bowmen and slingers to protect the great beasts. Most of the horse on this left wing were light horse, unarmoured javelin men or lancers, best for scouting and skirmishing. The troops from Mesopotamia may have been a heavier type and the same is true of the Thracians, though being arrayed with their lighter comrades might suggest they too were of this type. But, it is not impossible that some heavy armoured men, fit for close combat, were placed there to stiffen the whole left wing just as some would have been bodyguard troops, well armoured and fit for hand-to-hand fighting. Altogether they amounted to 3,400 horsemen.
In the centre came the phalanx, first 6,000 mercenaries and then 5,000 equipped like Macedonians ‘although they were of all races’.11 Next came more than 3,000 Silver Shields and then, more than 3,000 ‘from the hypaspists’ taking the place of honour on the right.12 So Eumenes fielded 11,000 sarissa-armed phalangites with the other 6,000 most probably classically-armed hoplites. Forty elephants stood arrayed in front of these spear and pikemen.
On the right of the phalanx were fielded most of the heavy cavalry Eumenes had at Paraetacene. First was Tlepolemus with 800 cavalry from Carmania, they came from the country east of Persia, itself, and probably produced warriors similarly armed to their cousins from that country. Then, 900 Companions, the heirs of Alexander’s own, and then 300 cavalry under Peucestas and Antigenes (who though recorded as commander of the Silver Shields, with Teutamus, did not lead them in battle but took his place with the other commanders with the cavalry) where these two presumably shared charge as they had shared command of the whole army when Eumenes was indisposed. They led the quality of Persia; many were moneyed enough to equip themselves and probably their mounts with protective armour. They and their Median comrades had, since just before Gaugamela when Darius refitted them, taken up the longer, stronger lance used by the Macedonian horse. About this group, Diodorus says ‘which contained three hundred horsemen arranged in a single unit.’13 This is not explained, but it may refer to a specially strengthened ile, a bodyguard such as Alexander’s royal squadron of the Companions that was just the same strength. If so, it was most probably Peucestas’ bodyguard.
After this was Eumenes on the far right wing leading a complex array of horsemen. First were 300 cavalry, again the figure suggests it was his personal agema of heavy cavalry, many were surely his loyal Cappadocians who are not placed elsewhere but would still have been with him. They would have been looking to continue receiving the benefits of following a victorious patron. We know the Cappadocians who fought for Darius sometimes wore a full covering of scale armour and with Eumenes’ elite it is likely they were as well protected. And they seem always to have wielded the long lance (xyston) with which the Persians and Medes had been re-equipped. As an advance guard in front of him were two lots of fifty mounted soldiers of what are called his ‘slaves’. They are otherwise not described, but as this is one of very few occasions any group of soldiers are so referred to in our period it suggests they were specially attached to their leader whether Eumenes or Antigonus. Furthermore, as slaves, in the sense usually used, were very seldom armed for battle (except in extremis when the very state was threatened with extinction as at the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius) it is likely they were some of his very best troops of light cavalry. Then, at an angle, guarding the wing were first 200 selected men in four groups and then another 300 described by Diodorus as ‘selected from all the cavalry commands for swiftness and strength’; presumably these were the best equipped and bravest men from all the satrapal retinues picked for the purpose, kept in reserve behind Eumenes’ wing.14 In front of all these were forty elephants15 with some of them positioned round and backwards to match the front of the flank guard.16
The two armies fought from afternoon to midnight. Pithon, on the Antigonid left, seems to have been unable to resist pressing where he had superiority in numbers and manoeuvrability. He pushed hard against the enemy elephants, worrying them with missiles; they were caught mesmerized, unmoving and taking considerable punishment. ‘They kept inflicting wounds with repeated flights of arrows suffering no harm themselves because of their mobility but causing great damage to the beasts, which because of their weight could neither pursue nor retire.’17 Pithon’s horse archers were performing as intended and Eumenes, with only heavy cavalry and elephants, seemed to have no answer. But, by taking the offensive, Pithon was to bring on unforeseen consequences. Understanding what the problem was, the Cardian determined to respond by bringing round the most mobile of the light horse from Eudamus’ wing to help counter Pithon’s attack. When this reinforcement arrived, having moved behind the infantry phalanx, Eumenes made a concentrated push using light horse, elephants and light infantry to attack Pithon’s men, who found the combination too strong and his remnants were pushed right back to the foothills behind the Antigonid battle line. If Antigonus had hoped his lef
t wing would keep just to a holding role to occupy his enemies strongest wing he had been sorely disappointed.
While this was going on, in the centre the greater number of Antigonus’ infantry was countered by the fighting qualities of the Silver Shields, who won success after a stiff contest. Some of these veterans are claimed as 70 years old which seems excessive even in an era when many of the Successors, themselves, campaigned into old age. Whatever the real age of these Methuselahs, they it was, with sarissae levelled and shields locked, who with younger men in the taxis to their right and left, ensured the enemy infantry were defeated and pushed back towards the higher ground from which they had descended not long before.
But Antigonus now showed his quality, despite seeing his phalanx pushed back in defeat, if not in rout, and news reaching him that Pithon too had been overcome. He did not panic and felt no inclination to accept the outcome, withdraw back to the high country and attempt to rally what he could around his own undefeated forces. By his own swift action, he saved the army from destruction when he charged through the gap opened by the forward progress of Eumenes’ phalanx, following in pursuit of the Antigonid phalanx opposed to them. Through this breach Antigonus found himself behind the enemy phalanx and on the flank of the cavalry commanded by Eudamus, who, having sent many of his troops across to Eumenes’ wing, had remained immobile. This meant Antigonus was coming in from the flank; an attack from an unexpected quarter that proved a complete success. Many men were killed and the rest of Eudamus’ left wing cavalry driven away. Now Antigonus sent ‘out the swiftest of his mounted men and by means of them he assembled those of his soldiers who were fleeing and once more formed them into a line along the foothills.’18 This is confusing, but what must have occurred is that the thousands of his cavalry in the rear of the enemy battle line and the resultant danger they posed brought the advance of his opponents to a halt. Eumenes, thinking victory almost won, stood in the light of a full moon to harangue his generals into one last effort. Both armies had, by now, moved a long way from the original field of battle and reformed and faced each other. At only 400 feet apart, Diodorus seems to suggest the newly ordered armies began again to prepare to fight.19 But it was not to be, the hour having reached midnight and only the Cardian was prepared to fight on. His men would not countenance it with so much blood and effort already expended. So, reluctantly, the belligerent general withdrew and submitted to the insistence of his men that they get back to their baggage train which was now some miles in the rear of the main army.
Antigonus saw the enemy columns march away into the night with some relief; his army had missed being severely defeated by a hair’s breadth and only his own leadership in the crisis had averted disaster. His casualties amounted to around 4,000 foot and several score cavalry, many more than the few hundred dead the enemy had sustained. The consolation of camping his men on the battlefield, and technically being able to claim victory, did little to relieve the frustration that had been building since the setback on the Coprates River. The significance of setting up a victory trophy (usually of captured enemy panoplies hung on a convenient tree or frame, built if no trees were available), and of camping on the battlefield was very important. It meant that the victor could enjoy the fruits of looting the dead and also were able to most effectively try to identify their own dead and give them proper rites. And, just as Antigonus accomplished this, Eumenes also was forced into the other great ritual act of accepting defeat by sending to the enemy for permission to collect his own dead. This setting up of a victory trophy might help a little in retrieving the soldiers’ morale but the hollowness of the Antigonid claim to triumph was soon exposed when the orders were given to withdraw to Media, rather than pursue the enemy.
Yet still, what had occurred did highlight one great advantage Antigonus had over his opponent. He could command his men to stay put and camp on the battlefield whereas for Eumenes ‘there were many who disputed his right to command’; he had to cajole and persuade and at this time, in a way that presaged later developments, it was the baggage train that was the centre of many of his followers’ interests.20 However, Eumenes had much to be satisfied with. His own soldiers had fought remarkably well and his confederates had stayed loyal, despite the lack of a clear-cut victory and the withdrawal from the battlefield. It had been all hard campaigning since his men left Babylonia and, with the end of the year approaching, he led the army to the lush and unplundered land of Gabene to enjoy the winter in comfort. It had been in competing for control of this region that the Battle of Paraetacene had come about, leaving no doubt who had been the real victor.
Antigonus had been severely blooded and he wanted to put some distance between himself and his active enemy to gain time to recuperate, particularly as winter was coming on. By prevaricating as heralds talked about disposal of the bodies from both sides, he earned time to send off his baggage and wounded.21 He then forced-marched the rest of his men back to the city of Gamarga. Here, in Media, they could recuperate in a rich place with an administration well organized and loyal to his lieutenant, Pithon.
Eumenes had stayed where he was whilst the ritual of burial was accomplished and, at this time, Diodorus notes a particular event that indicates there was a strong Indian element in his army: ‘Ceteus, the general of the soldiers who had come from India’, had died in the battle and was cremated in the Indian fashion and both his wives, who were with the army, accompanied him into the flames.22 After the dead were given due rites, Eumenes did not pursue Antigonus but moved to enjoy the abundant resources of Gabene. So, as the year ended, the two forces rested several hundred miles apart.
Antigonus had shown qualities of grit, ambition and some tactical brilliance over the previous year but his performance had been far from flawless. He had received a bloody nose from Eumenes, shown bad decision making over the Cossaeans and had even been hoodwinked by his talented opponent on one occasion. But, whatever had gone before, it never affected his self-confidence or his determination to act. What was typical of him in a complex and difficult situation was his preparedness to bend the rules: to make war in the winter when custom and weather dictated a hiatus, to achieve what he could not the year before and bring the enemy to decisive battle.
Winter was just begun as Antigonus collected his men and animals from their camps in the hills and valleys of Media. He intended a surprise and though winter warfare had been pioneered by Philip II, to great effect, it was still the exception rather than the rule. He banked on Eumenes expecting him to remain under cover in a region where winter conditions could be fierce. It was twenty-five days’ march to Gabene by the regular road but there was another way. It had been learned, from local inhabitants, that Eumenes had distributed his units far and wide over a large area to make use of all available forage for the winter, and they would need several days to concentrate together again. By crossing the Dasht-e-Kavir Desert, the Antigonids could complete the journey to Gabene in just nine days. But it would be dangerous and uncomfortable across a grim waterless waste in the middle of the Iranian plateau, where hardly anything grew except a few shrubs that sustained the goats of the nomads who passed there on the way to better pasture. None the less, surprise was of the essence and many officers present knew that Alexander had traversed the fringes of this sterile region when he was chasing the fugitive Darius. But he had only taken a light-armed pursuit force across the edge of the desert while Antigonus intended to take the whole of his army through the heart of it.
This risky strategy had a particular advantage; the region was so inhospitable that it was not expected they would encounter any inhabitants who might alert the enemy. Great lengths were gone to in order to disguise their intention; word was spread that the preparations were for a move northwestwards to Armenia, a plausible enough plan after the defeats of the previous campaign. Ten days’ rations were distributed, leaving no room for error on the route and, in December 317 BC, the army set out. The forced march typified the qualities of Antigonus that would
take him to the very pinnacle of success; a dash across harsh terrain at a time of year when custom and conditions demanded a cessation of fighting: all this to steal a march on an enemy who had recently handed out a bloody reverse that would have kept lesser men quiet for some time.
This Alexander-like enterprise did not meet with Alexander-like success. Eumenes was renowned for the quality of his intelligence system and on this occasion also had more than an element of good fortune. After five days marching across the desert with no night fires to warm them (Antigonus had strictly ordered this precaution against discovery), the soldiers could no longer bear the freezing temperatures (it has also been suggested the elephants particularly needed to be kept warm) and flagrantly began to light campfires whenever they stopped, day or night.23 Local people living near the edge of the desert saw the glow in the night sky. The speediest dromedaries were used to take the news to alert the Cardian general to the approaching threat. Peucestas was with Eumenes at his headquarters and allegedly panicked when he heard of the development, advising immediate flight. His commander was made of sterner stuff and responded with great invention. He ordered the units that were with them to light hundreds of their own campfires to give the impression to observers that the whole of the army was there. Again Eumenes’ cunning paid off; some shepherds, who had previously served with Pithon, when he was satrap of Media, saw the campfires and informed their former master that the whole enemy army awaited them at the edge of the desert. Antigonus and his officers, convinced that their surprise had failed, reluctantly redirected their route away from Eumenes’ headquarters. Bitterly disappointed, Antigonus took his men off to a position where they could camp in safety and comfort to recover from the rigours of the hard and ultimately futile desert journey.