by Bob Bennett
Eumenes used the time his subterfuge had gained to send off to all the winter camps and ordered the units to converge on his own position. The vast bulk of his army had marched in and defended themselves in a palisaded camp by the time Antigonus was able to try to interfere. Antigonus knew he had been tricked but nothing could dampen his aggression and every reverse made him more eager to achieve something in compensation. The need to sustain his men’s confidence was pressing and the opportunity presented itself when he learned the enemy elephants had not yet reached the main army but were still plodding along a road nearby. He determined to ambush them; a success here might at least rectify the previous imbalance he had suffered from in this arm. He sent 2,000 Median lancers, 200 Tarentines and all his light infantry in an effort to cut off this slow-moving detachment. At first, it seemed his luck would hold. Overtaken, the elephants and their guard suffered considerably against greatly superior numbers of attackers. It would have been quickly over but for the officer in command of the elephants who kept his head and drew up the animals in a defensive square, with the baggage in the centre and 400 horse guards bringing up the rear. The Antigonid cavalry drove off the Eumenid horse but were unable to overrun the elephants’ formation because of the horses’ fear of their noise and smell but, even so, they would have succumbed had not Eumenes reacted quickly. Guessing they were in danger when they did not appear, he sent a relief force of 1,500 of his best cavalry and 3,000 light infantry. They arrived just in time and, taking the Antigonids by surprise, drove them off and escorted the bewildered but unharmed beasts safely to the main camp. Antigonus’ feelings of frustration can only be imagined, with all his best laid plans countered by an almost-miraculously well-informed rival.
But nothing could keep the effervescent old marshal down; he wanted to pin down and destroy these gadflies who had frustrated him at every turn since he entered the lands of Iran. ‘Antigonus perceived he had been out-generalled by Eumenes and in deep resentment led his forces forward to try the issue in open battle.’24 He was determined on battle and with his army rested he moved to bring it on. Days were short in this winter season and the weather was unpredictable but still he intended there to be a decision, he could not allow this war to drag on. Eumenes was also disposed to accept the test, he worried the Antigonids would get stronger with the passage of time and he always had the anxiety that his fractious army might split apart if not bolstered by a victory. The two armies found each other with ease and for a time manoeuvred, keeping several miles apart. But, this was just a preliminary, a warming up, for armies that in these cold and dismal circumstances were about to go at each other’s throats. The battleground has not been identified but it was known to have been a vast plain, largely uncultivated because of the salt content of the earth, and with a river something over a mile behind Eumenes’ position.
The night before the battle, Antigonus waited in some trepidation, at his camp on the higher ground above the plain. His men had surveyed the field of combat to ensure there were no unexpected effects of terrain or traps laid by the enemy. Now the 5,000-odd campfires he could see sparkling in the cold night air on the horizon really did represent the whole of his opponent’s army and from the experience of Paraetacene he had some understanding of their strengths and weaknesses. The Silver Shields, pikes bristling, were vicious fighters and would be formidable opponents even for the Macedonian veterans that Antigonus could field in even greater numbers. Whether they could stand against a push of pike with these violent old veterans was a very moot point indeed.
Antigonus was not particularly noted for his piety but on the evening before the battle he would have given offerings to any Hellenic deities that might have been observing the dramatic events in prospect, so far from his homeland. In open combat against the greatest general he would ever meet, he needed all the help he could get, particularly as the open country and mutual familiarity seemed to rule out any ruse that might have increased the odds in his favour. In his command tent the council of generals entered a tactical debate. Present were men who had made great reputations under Alexander. Pithon led the officers in discussion; he had shown himself to be a cautious but intelligent tactician in the past months and he, like the Cretan Nearchus, could talk from their experience in these very hills years before. But the one-eyed old general had the final say and the battle plan he favoured was much like the one he had tried to put into effect at Paraetacene.
The battle tactics of the Successors are often derided as a decline from the flexible use of all arms that had characterized Alexander’s genius. Although the assault on the right with a strong cavalry wing (the classic approach of the Successors) was clearly derived from the tactics of Alexander and Philip, it seems to have been an atrophied version. The subtle surgery of Gaugamela and Issus, where the infantry pinned down the enemy and the Companion cavalry carved a way to the centre of the opposition battle line, had degenerated from a deadly stab at the heart into a peripheral melee on the wings, with the outcome of the battle being decided by merely the brutal push of pike of the two phalanxes. But, in fact, this analysis fails to understand the differences in the problems faced by the men who came after, Alexander. He had confronted an enemy who, though numerically strong, could seldom field an infantry force capable of facing down charging cavalry in the open. Darius, and his generals, had squandered the majority of their good Greek infantry at Granicus and in the ensuing campaigns in Asia Minor. Without this hard defensive core, the Persian battle line was very vulnerable, once Alexander’s Companions had eluded the opposing cavalry. But in the inter-Macedonian affairs after his death, both sides could field a phalanx of levelled pikes at the centre of the line that could not be ruptured by an attack of horsemen, however disciplined or brave they were. Horses just would not throw themselves suicidally onto the line of spear points that faced a squadron coming in from the right centre. To disrupt and penetrate these fearsome formations, the cavalry had to get right round the flank or into the rear of the infantry. To do this required not just that the cavalry that defended the flank be fended off, they also had to be crushed and driven off to allow the time and space to attack the phalangites on their unguarded side. These cavalry fights on the flanks were longer and harder fought affairs which were often not settled before the foot soldiers had got at each other’s throats. And, the combat decided by a ferocious bloodletting in the centre of the battle line.
But, if new realities forced some changes in the pattern of battle, inevitably similarities remained and Antigonus, like his erstwhile king, used a deputy who could command on that side of the battle line, where he himself could not be. Pithon had taken on the mantle of Parmenion to Antigonus’ Alexander; he it was who held the left wing tight while his commander took the offensive on the right. The comparison does not stop there, he (like Alexander’s general) urged caution when Antigonus inclined to a too adventurous strategy.25 And, like his role model, Pithon would suffer at his leader’s hands when it seemed his power was at its height; though Antigonus had more cause than Alexander for the radical disposal of his right hand man.
For this the decisive encounter, the details of the formations are sketchier than in the previous one. But, as the tactics decided on by Antigonus very much mirrored those at Paraetacene, we can reasonably assume both cavalry wings were composed roughly as before. Pithon was apparently given fewer men this time, about 4,500 horsemen to again hold up the left flank of Antigonus’ array and by skirmishing occupy the enemy horse opposite him. Whether this smaller number of men was due to attrition from the previous battle and desert march or if the previous higher figure was exaggeration is unclear. His forces would have comprised Median gentry from his own satrapy, splendid in their colourful trousers and caps. The wealthier men wore gilded body armour that extended to frontal protection for the horses they rode. They had been, with their Persian cousins, the backbone of the Achaemenid imperial army and in a new world the fighting spirit Alexander had recognized had not deserted them.26 The
horses they rode were some of the best in the world. Pithon would also have commanded mounted archers from Parthia whose descendants, under the leadership of a Scythian ruling clan, would inherit the eastern Empire of Darius and Alexander in just over a century’s time. We are not told where the 1,000 Phrygians and Lydians, the Tarentines, the lancers of Lysanias, the two horse men or the up-country colonists were, but they were presumably under his command too.
These units were designed to absorb the blows of their opponents and not give way. As at Paraetacene, they were not expected to make the decisive breakthrough but to occupy the right wing of Eumenes’ army while Antigonus and his son led their own right hand flank to victory. Demetrius, we are told, now commanded the whole of the right wing, not just the Companions, but no explanation is given of why the change was made. It is possible that Antigonus was gradually increasing the responsibilities of his heir as a part of his education in power, and as Antigonus, himself, remained in the same part of the battlefield he could supervise or take direct command if necessary. At this station of honour on the right flank were about 4,000 horsemen, whose equipment, morale and discipline were second to none; the very heirs of those men who had chased Memnon, Darius and Porus off the battlefields of Asia. There were hundreds of picked Greek mercenaries and 1,000-odd ferocious Thracians, wild and uncivilized but well armoured and brave; we know of them from the previous battle and they almost certainly were arrayed on this wing. And then there came the Companions themselves, almost 1,000 strong; the very best of Antigonus’ Macedonian horse, with a sprinkling of Greek and Levantine aristocrats, armed and mounted to perfection. The commander-in-chief, a huge man in breastplate and crested helmet, would have seemed almost a mythical giant, on the biggest Nicaean horse that could be found, as he dressed the line and took up his place with his glamorous son at the head of the right flank cavalry. The customary appeal to the army dwelt on past success; he reminded them of their victories over the last few seasons. How Alcetas, Arrhidaeus, Cleitus had all fallen before them and that having chased Eumenes from Cappadocia to central Iran they could now finish off this pest too.
The dressing and encouraging of huge battle lines of around 40,000 men a side must have taken much of the short winter morning, before any blows were exchanged. Eumenes, seeing how his opponent had deployed his army, decided to arrange his men in exactly the opposite way. He took command on the left wing directly opposing Antigonus. Against his enemy’s 4,000 or so, he fielded his best cavalry. He positioned himself on the left of these squadrons with his personal guard and perhaps again, as at Paraetacene, supported by the 300 selected best of the satraps’ horsemen. After them came the massed retinues of the eastern satraps, splendidly armed and mounted heavy cavalry intended to close and fight hand-to-hand. The end of the left wing nearest the infantry centre was held by Peucestas and his Persian cavaliers, whose ancestors had conquered the world under Cyrus and Darius I. Indeed, at this point Diodorus emphasizes the Iranian dimension by mentioning the presence of one Mithridates, whose lineage went back to the seven illustrious warriors who killed Darius I’s rival and helped that great man to his throne. In front of the horsemen were sixty elephants, spread in a curve that extended around the far left of the cavalry line. They are described as the strongest of these beasts in the whole army and the intention was that they would stop Antigonus from using his superior numbers to outflank Eumenes.
On this side of the field, Antigonus had only thirty or so of these beasts to face the enemy’s 60 but they (like their counterparts all along the line) stood forward to begin the battle when the trumpets sounded the advance on both sides. The dust these animals and their infantry guards kicked up as they jousted with each other was incredible. The loose saline soil rose like a thick mist to obscure the position of both friends and foe for several minutes at a time. Even before the real battle had begun between the cavalry and infantry, Antigonus decided on a stratagem to utilize this peculiarly poor visibility. He had been informed that on Pithon’s flank the enemy had not extended the elephant line to prevent outflanking, so he sent to his subordinate to try a raid wide out to his left. Diodorus’ wording actually suggests that the troops in this enterprise came from Antigonus’ own wing, but the fact that they are specified as Medians suggests they were Pithon’s men. Whatever, a detachment was organized and orders given for the squadron leaders to gallop around the elephants and the enemy formations whose armour could be glimpsed shining through the choking air. The dash through the dust, around the enemy flank, took the Medians and Tarentines out behind their opponents’ battle line and ahead of them they saw the pack animals and loaded carts of the enemy baggage camp. The booty of years of campaigning, protected only by unarmed non-combatants, drew them on like a magnet and soon the whole camp was in uproar with the overrun defenders captured or killed. No line of reserves was there to help out, and the whole of their adversaries’ material wealth came into the hands of Antigonus’ men.
This manoeuvre is claimed as intended, Diodorus states that ‘such a cloud of dust was raised by the cavalry that from a little distance one could not easily see what was happening. When Antigonus perceived this, he dispatched the Median cavalry and an adequate force of Tarentines against the baggage of the enemy.’27 But to be sure of this is to try and resolve an insoluble mystery. To unravel the plans and events in ancient battles is a notoriously pitfall-ridden form of analysis. The probability is that an outflanking manoeuvre was ordered but once this was accomplished the capture of Eumenes’ baggage camp was an act of inspired local initiative.
What is certain is that Antigonus had little leisure to think on the implications of this local success (even if he was aware of it) in the maelstrom of events elsewhere. The squadrons under his command each formed in offensive wedges and tried to manoeuvre through or around the elephants in preparation for an attack. On this occasion, sufficient gaps showed in the ranks of enemy beasts and light infantry in front so that Antigonus was able to lead his own wing forward against Peucestas, immediately opposite. That he aimed here, rather than directly for Eumenes, suggests he intended to force a gap between the enemy’s left wing cavalry and their infantry centre just as he had so successfully at Paraetacene. The satrap of Persia fled, taking with him not only his own followers but also 1,500 troopers that were posted next to him in the line. These must have been mostly from the eastern satraps’ retinues and suggests subversion or disenchantment with Eumenes amongst a large group of his allies. The dust of the retreating masses of enemy cavalry was a gladdening sight to the Antigonids clamouring for pursuit but they were not allowed the opportunity to succumb to this temptation. Eumenes could move his cavalry regiments quickly too, when required, and he responded to events by leading his own squadrons to attack Antigonus.
The Cardian showed extraordinary spirit against an antagonist who had outnumbered him even before over half his horsemen had fled; ‘preferring to die while still upholding with noble resolution the trust that had been given him by the kings’.28 Many of the men left were his own Anatolians and personal companions, who had been with him since the triumphs on the Hellespont and the setbacks at Nora. And, on his side, he had his sixty strongest elephants that might contain the enemy horsemen by their presence and stop them from exploiting the gap left by Peucestas. It was a bloody phase of the battle with charge and countercharge and generals fighting hand-to-hand alongside their men. It is, indeed, clear Eumenes hoped to bring down Antigonus personally as he had Neoptolemus on a previous occasion. Apparently, ‘he forced his way towards Antigonus himself ‘, but this time no such epic duel occurred and in this encounter the elephants were the key; while Eumenes’ animal line held, Antigonus could not bring all his extra horsemen to bear.29 ‘It was at this time, while the elephants also were struggling against each other, reports Diodorus, ‘that Eumenes’ leading elephant fell after having been engaged with the strongest of those arrayed against it’.30 With their leader down, these unreliably belligerent beasts gave up the strugg
le and it became apparent to Eumenes that his position on the left was untenable.
Leaving that part of the battlefield to the victorious enemy, with what men he could rally he withdrew to join Philip and the cavalry on the right flank. If in the fight on the left numbers had won out, the very opposite had happened in the centre. The Antigonids fielded 22,000 men in their phalanx, 6,000 less than at Paraetacene, indicating not just the inroads of the previous battle but the debilitating effects of the desert march. Assuming an even spread of casualties, 6 or 7,000 Macedonian phalangites must have remained to take up the position of honour on the right of the line. Next to them, the same number of other nationalities drilled and armed exactly as the Macedonians were. Then, between 7 and 8,000 Greek mercenaries and the balance made up of Anatolians from Lycia and Pamphylia, long-time loyal subjects of the Antigonids, all armed as hoplites or peltasts. Against them, waiting in the dust behind a line of 30 elephants, were 17,000 foot, deployed in a somewhat unorthodox manner. To ensure the Macedonians in Antigonus’ phalanx were opposed by his best men, Eumenes had reversed the normal order of battle (just as he had with the cavalry opposing Antigonus). The 3,000 hypaspists, instead of the usual position of honour on the right, took post on the left of the phalanx. Next to them stood the Silver Shields, also to the number of 3,000, and then 11,000 ‘mercenaries and those of the other soldiers who were armed in the Macedonian fashion’.31 We know from the previous encounter that 5,000 of these had been armed as pikemen but it may be that all the rest had now been so equipped and drilled. If this is the case, it might give some explanation of the ease with which they triumphed over an enemy who still fielded many troops carrying shorter spears. But, equally, it may be a mistake of the sources, as one must question whether even the extraordinary ability of Eumenes could reform and retrain these men in new arms and tactics in the short space of time between the two battles.