Battles and Tactics

by Bob Bennett

  With the sources petering out, the Battle of Ipsus almost shuts down any discussion of the military history of Alexander the Great’s immediate Successors. After this epochal contest there really are no more detailed accounts of either full campaigns or individual battles. The Diadochi continued to clash for two more decades but we have no information about the size or composition of their armies or of the tactical evolutions that occurred during these encounters. Certainly we know something about the general outline of their actions and sometimes we even get details of particular episodes. We hear of the occasion when Seleucus, only accompanied by his guard and eight elephants, outflanks and accepts the surrender of the rump of Demetrius’ army after they had traversed Anatolia, herded there by Lysimachus’ son Agathocles. We get a few details on the conditions in Athens under siege by Demetrius in 296 BC but we can learn virtually nothing of the military details of the encounter. None of this allows us to analyze the conflicts as we can for some of those that were fought before 301 BC.

  But while the sources are scanty for the period 301 to 281 BC, this is also the case for many periods of ancient history. Paucity of detailed military information is far from unusual, which should make us be particularly appreciative of the considerable amount that is left to us on the Diadochi before the turn of the century. After this there is only an outline and the sources on military matters virtually run dry for over half a century after the death of Seleucus, in 281 BC, before any details of fighting in the Hellenistic world are available again. Only when Polybius takes up the baton with his close-to-contemporaneous account, towards the end of the second century BC, can we begin again to understand what is happening in the martial story of the Hellenistic world. Even so, if the decades before are pretty bereft for those interested in military developments, they are still crucial as these years saw the very long reigns of Antigonus Gonatus, Ptolemy Philadelphus and Antiochus I. Decades long, almost Augustan in their extravagant longevity and like the Roman Empire, with its sickly, un-heroic but long-lived ruler, these endurance kings ensured the Hellenistic world, after the trauma and bloodletting of the Diadochi years, had a comparative period of stability. Time was allowed for the three great Hellenistic kingdoms to establish themselves. It was not that these were years of peace but it was usually border conflicts on a much smaller scale than before. So with this breathing space, the Antigonid, Ptolemaic and Seleucid establishments had time to embed their dynasties into the regions they ruled. With the result that the dynastic achievements of Alexander’s Successors were etched into the fabric of southeast Europe and the Middle East before the Romans came to snuff them out.

  Notes

  Abbreviations

  ABSA Annual of the British School at Athens

  GRBS Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies

  JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies

  Introduction

  1. For a recent version of this view see R Lane Fox, The Classical World (Allen Lane, 2005).

  2. Plutarch, Pyrrhus, translated by I Scott-Kilvert and published in The Age of Alexander (London, 1973), 7.

  Chapter 1: Soldiers and Armies

  1. Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates, translated by Rev. J S Watson in Lives of the great Commanders (London, 1886), 3.

  2. See A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander (Oxford, 2002), pp 71–2.

  3. Ibid, p 72 ff contends that they would really have been less than this. He suggests that 7,000 would have remained based on the numbers and ratio of Asiatic troops Alexander had intended to mix together in new pike and missile armed phalanx, in order to utilize his recently recruited Iranian troops. However, the result may still be 10,000 if we assume the 3,000 hypaspists were not intended to be mixed but kept inviolate as might be expected of the royal guard. But as even Bosworth accepts, the sources and consequent figures for troops are all highly suspect.

  4. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, translated by R M Geer (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1947), 19.14.5.

  5. Ibid, 19.27.6.

  6. Ibid, 19.29.3.

  7. One piece of evidence that indicates they on occasions did carry the sarissa is that when killing Cleitus, the Black, Alexander took a sarissa held by his guard, who would surely have been one of the hypaspists.

  8. See R A Lock, ‘The Origins of the Argyraspids’, in Historia 26 (1977), pp 373–378. Most other scholars reject this view, see, for instance, E M Anson, ‘Alexander’s Hypaspists and the Argyraspids’, in Historia 30 (1981) pp 117–20 and W M Heckel, The Marshalls of Alexander’s Empire (London, 1992) pp 307–8.

  9. For a useful discussion of this conundrum see A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, in particular pp 83–4.

  10. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, translated by I Scott-Kilvert (London, 1979) 18.31.

  11. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, translated by A De Selincourt (London, 1958), 2.11.

  12. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.19.4.

  13. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History VIII, translated by C.B. Welles (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), 17.17.4.

  14. Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander, translated by J Yardley (London, 1984), 8.14.28.

  15. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.71.5–6.

  16. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History X, translated by R. M. Geer (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), 19.83.3.

  17. The issue of the decline of Macedonian cavalry is discussed at length in P Sidnell, Warhorse (London, 2006) p127 ff.

  18. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.15.2.

  19. Some Thessalian cavalry accompanied Pyrrhus’ army when he went to the aid of Tarentum, against Rome, in the years immediately after the death of the last Diadochi.

  20. Asclepiodotus, Tactica, translated by the Illinois Greek Club, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1923), 7.3.

  21. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, 5.12.

  22. It has been suggested that the elephants were still in the process of being trained for military action when Alexander died. See for example, L Ueda-Sarson, ‘Alexander’s War Elephants’, in Slingshot 227 (2003) pp 19–22.

  23. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.27.1

  24. Plutarch, Eumenes, translated by B Perrin in Parallel Lives VIII (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1919) 14.4.

  25. Cited in Pliny, Natural History, 8.5.5. Surus is conjectured to mean the ‘Syrian’ which implies the animal was an Indian elephant rather than the African ones the Carthaginians would normally have used.

  26. Livy, Rome and Italy, 9.19 translated by B Radice (London, 1982), 9.19.

  27. Ibid, 9.18

  28. Sumptuary laws were enacted in Athens by Demetrius of Phalerum with the inevitable resulting condemnation of him for spending large amounts on putting up his own statues all over the city. ‘Austerity for others but not for us’ became a well-known motif in Rome, a little later, when her successes had brought the wealth and art of Greece and the East flooding into her coffers.

  Chapter 2: Lamian War

  1. Diodorus Siculus Universal History IX, 18.12 notes that the Macedonians were short of soldiers because of the numbers sent out to Alexander in Asia. However, in that case, 13,000 Macedonian infantry seems an unlikely figure. A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, pp 77, suggests that the figure of 13,000 Macedonian infantry is defective and should actually read 13,000 mercenaries and 3,000 Macedonians. For a full discussion of the problem of Macedonian troop figures at the death of Alexander, see Bosworth Legacy of Alexander, chapter 3, p 64 ff.

  2. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.12.4.

  3. Ibid, 18.13.4. What this national business was is not explained. Quite possibly they invaded Acarnania with whom they were in almost constant conflict over the next few years.

  4. A B Bosworth, Conquest and Empire-The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp 293–4, denies that Leosthenes was elected Athenian general in 324, arguing that it was a different Leosthenes. This argument seem
s somewhat tenuous.

  5. Jason of Pherae and Onomarchus of Phocis were the most notable examples of this, both raising large mercenary armies. Jason, a Thessalian, recruited a massive army but was assassinated in 370 BC before his plans could come to fruition. Onomarchus gained notoriety by plundering the temple at Delphi. His mercenary army conquered Locris, seized Thermopylae and invaded Boeotia. He defeated Philip twice in 353 BC before losing to him in the following year and being killed in the battle.

  6. Hypereides, Funeral Oration 10, translated by J.O. Burtt in Minor Attic Orators, II, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, Demades, Hypereides (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954).

  7. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.15.2.

  8. Ibid, 18.15.4.

  9. See Naval Warfare Chapter.

  10. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.15.7.

  11. Antipater’s original army had only 600 cavalry while Leonnatus and Craterus brought over 1,500 each. Taking into account the losses sustained in two defeats and a winter’s siege this would probably leave around 3,000 horse. There remains the strong possibility that Diodorus has garbled his figures.

  12. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.17.2.

  13. Ibid, 18.17.4.

  14. There is a marked similarity in the brief description of Crannon with the preceding battle involving Leonnatus. The suspicion lingers that Diodorus has muddled them up.

  15. Plutarch, Phocion, 26, attributes the defeat at Crannon to inexperienced leadership and Antipater bribing certain partners of the allied cause. The latter charge may have some substance but the former cannot be substantiated and seems to have been used by Plutarch in order to point up the qualities of Phocion.

  Chapter 3: Eumenes’ War

  1. Why he needed this reinforcement is not made clear, but presumably the regiments he had raised to take to the war in Armenia had been demobilized in the meantime.

  2. Plutarch, Eumenes, 6.3.

  3. P. Green, Alexander to Actium (London 1991), p.14.

  4. Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, 3.

  5. Plutarch, Eumenes, 11.1–2.

  6. PSI XII 1284: This quote comes from a papyrus fragment discovered at Oxyrhyncus in the early part of the twentieth century. Identified as a fragment of Arrian, it has been put in proper historical context by A B Bosworth, ‘Eumenes, Neoptolemus and PSI XII, 1284, in GRBS 19 (1978), pp 227–37.

  7. One of Antipater’s recent envoys to Leonnatus in Asia had been Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia, a close friend and confidant of the regent. One of his earlier tasks had been the arrest and subsequent execution of Attalus after Alexander’s accession. Well-grounded in the lively and dangerous intrigues of his home city, he was a consummate political operator. Eumenes had long hated Hecataeus and had importuned Alexander, unsuccessfully, to have him replaced.

  8. For this story see Plutarch, Eumenes, 2.

  9. While there is every reason to believe that Craterus was popular with the rank and file Macedonians, our sources tend to overstate it. Ultimately dependent on the eye witness accounts of Eumenes’ fellow Cardian, Hieronymus, this alleged popularity was used to point up Eumenes’ cleverness. Uncritical acceptance of Hieronymus is all too often the case. He had his biases, too, as pointed out by J Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia (Oxford, 1981).

  10. Plutarch, Eumenes, 6.5.

  11. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 18.29.4.

  12. For a full discussion of the vexed issue of how many Macedonian soldiers there were at the time of Alexander’s death and where they were see A B Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, pp 64–97. As for the 4,000 veterans left by Craterus in Cilicia when he went over to aid Antipater in the Lamian War it is perfectly possible, as we suggest, that they fought for Neoptolemus and then transferred their allegiance to Eumenes.

  13. Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.1–2. Pharnabazus had a very interesting past. Son of Artabazus, one of Darius’ nobles, he was the brother of Barsine, Alexander’s mistress. After the death of Memnon, he took command of the naval war in the Aegean, until captured in 332 BC. He later escaped but seems to have been forgiven and welcomed (like his father) by the Macedonians. Phoenix is hitherto unknown.

  14. Plutarch, Eumenes, 6.3–4.

  15. For this story see Plutarch, Eumenes, 13, and for its context see B Bennett and M Roberts, The Wars of Alexander’s Successors Vol. 1 (Barnsley, 2008), p 62.

  16. See Plutarch, Demetrius, 46.

  17. Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.4–6.

  18. Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.3.

  19. As related in Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.4. He may well be the Gorgias who Olympias tried unsuccessfully to help evade the Macedonian draft and who arrived as a page at Alexander’s court in 331 BC. Though there is another, possibly different, Gorgias who was a taxiarch in 328 BC, and according to the ever-unreliable Justin, was sent home with Craterus in 324 BC. Perhaps he remained in Cilicia and enrolled in Eumenes’ army. For further details, see W Heckel, The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire, especially p 327.

  20. According to Plutarch, Eumenes, 7.8, Eumenes found Craterus still alive and mourned over him as he lay dying. This seems a highly-romanticized account.

  Chapter 4: Gabene and Paraetacene

  1. For details see J Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia.

  2. There is, however, an anecdote in Polynaeus, Stratagems, 5.35, which tells of Nearchus capturing Telmessus, on the Lycian coast, from an old acquaintance, Antipatrides. If true, the incident most probably relates to the Antigonid campaign against Alcetas in Pisidia.

  3. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.19.6.

  4. Ibid, 19.22.2–3.

  5. Ibid, 19.24.3.

  6. A B Bosworth, Legacy of Alexander, p 126 suggests Eumenes may have been poisoned, drawing a parallel to similar rumours re Alexander’s death.

  7. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.29.1.

  8. Ibid, 19.29.2.

  9. Ibid, 19.29.4.

  10. According to the very fragmentary Arrian, Events after Alexander, F.135, Amphimachus was the ‘king’s brother’. Philip Arrhidaeus’ mother was a woman called Philinna from Larissa. As A B Bosworth, Legacy of Alexander, p 113, points out, it is by no means impossible that she had been married before and was the mother of Amphimachus as well.

  11. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.27.6.

  12. Ibid, 19.28.1.

  13. Ibid, 19.28.3

  14. Ibid, 19.28.4

  15. Where these elephants were really deployed is discussed at length by A M Devine in his article ‘Diodorus’ Account of the Battle of Paraitacene’, in Ancient World 12 (1985), pp 75–86. He contends that that the word used by Diodorus could be interpreted to mean that the elephants were used as just a flank guard and were not in front of Eudamus’ wing at all. Devine believes that, if the elephants were curved round acting as defence both in front and round the side, this would have made their formation unworkable. Whatever the linguistics, he appears to make assumptions that are not warranted. Firstly, it seems that Eudamus’ wing was already anchored on high ground and so would not need all the elephants as well to make it safe and thus deprive the rest of the wing of the support of these beasts. Equally, his contention that a bent line would not be practical does not seem to hold water; single beasts with their infantry guards could manoeuvre in a curved line, without necessarily exposing a flank, especially as the enemy troops that might threaten them were the very horsemen whose steeds were afraid of coming near elephants at all. However, one point in favour of his argument could be that it explains why Antigonus could so easily get at the space between Eudamus’ wing and the infantry because there would have been no elephants in his way as they were all on the far left acting as a flank guard. And this would also apply at Gabene where Devine in his subsequent article: ‘Diodorus’ Account of the Battle of Gabiene’ in Ancient World 12 (1985), pp 87–96, again contends the animals act just as a flank guard and so, therefore, would not have impeded Antigonus getting at Peucestas and forcing him and so many of
his followers to flee. But none of this explains why Eumenes, at Paraetacene, with more elephants would forgo having a guard of elephants in front of his weak left wing when this was exactly the work the beasts were intended for.

  16. As with the arithmetic of Antigonus’ army there is also a problem with Eumenes’ host. When we add together each detachment it totals 11 more elephants and 200 more cavalry than Diodorus claims as his total. But, this is not a huge discrepancy and perhaps needs little explanation above the normal muddle due to attrition or troop accounting.

  17. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.30.2.

  18. Ibid, 19.30.10.

  19. Ibid, 19.31.2 suggests as much; ‘they were moving from column into line.’

  20. Ibid, 19.31.4.

  21. According to Polynaeus, Stratagems, 4.6.10, Antigonus detained the heralds to try and conceal the number of casualties he had sustained.

  22. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.33.1.

  23. A B Bosworth, Legacy of Alexander, p 144.

  24. Plutarch, Eumenes, 15.7.

  25. However, most historians reject this characteristic of Parmenion considering that it is merely a literary device to spotlight Alexander’s superior judgement.

  26. Alexander had created a corps of Iranian Companions (including Medes) shortly before his death.

  27. Diodorus Siculus, Universal History IX, 19.42.1–2.

  28. Ibid, 19.42.5.

  29. Ibid, 19.42.5.

  30. Ibid, 19.42.6.

  31. Ibid, 19.40.3.

  32. Plutarch, Eumenes, 16.4.

  33. See Chapter 1: Soldiers and Armies.

  34. Philip, himself, had had a chequered career, receiving Sogdia and Bactria at Babylon. In 323 BC at Triparadeisus he was apparently transferred to command in Parthia. However, Philotas is named as satrap of Parthia, when Pithon aimed at taking the province over, before Antigonus ever arrived east of the Tigris. Philip, perhaps, never had any great local support and had only been restored to some office after the arrival of Eumenes. He later served Antigonus. But, it should be noted that there were at least five officers named Philip under Alexander, so our identification is tentative. For an alternative view see R A Billows, Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Berkeley, 1990), p 422, who considers the above mentioned Philotas to be an error, by Diodorus, for Philip.