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Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations

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  Voice recognition pattern is a combination of physical and behavioral

  characteristics that are related to the voice signal patterns. The physical pattern of a voice includes characteristics of the vocal tracts, nasal cavity, mouth, and lips. The behavioral pattern of a voice involves characteristics of the speaker’s physical and emotional state. The authentication of a voice is divided into two groups: text-dependent and text-independent methods.

  Text-dependent methods analyze a predetermined phrase.

  Facial recognition technology (FRT) uses a digital photograph of an indi-

  vidual’s face to take measurements between nodal points, which are locations on every humans face. While there are about 80 different nodal points, an FRT software algorithm requires only 14–22 of these points for comparison.

  Postoperational Actions and Debrief

  All information should be documented and, if necessary, concealed or kept secret. Once all the personnel are in a safe zone, a debriefing should take place to ensure the objectives were met, no mistakes were made that were not resolved, and the information is disseminated to the recipient(s) or collection is continued (e.g., monitoring).

  Make sure no evidence is left behind. This includes equipment, finger-

  prints, DNA evidence, disturbed items, and security detection (such as video,

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  Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations

  alarm activations, biometric evidence of intrusion, etc.). The operation will fail if any such evidence is found by the target subject. The information may become useless or obsolete if the target subject becomes aware of it. Once the information has been obtained, it should be analyzed and disseminated among those involved in the operation. These may be someone else’s responsibility.

  Order of Battle

  Order of Battle (OB) is the identification, command structure, strength, and disposition of personnel, equipment, and units of an opposing force participating in field operations. A basic understanding of the units of land, air, and sea forces is useful to understanding the OB of intelligence.

  Understanding the identification, command structure, strength, and

  disposition of personnel, equipment, and units of an opposing force can help determine the tactical and strategic intentions of a force, as well as the composition and capabilities of the force. Special Operations combat support and combat service support may have a different structure. Special operations, for example, usually operate much smaller, but highly specialized, units.

  The basic composition of most military forces (army, navy, air force) is

  illustrated in Figures 1.2 through 1.5.

  Army

  Theater commander or

  General of the army O-11

  chief of staff

  (only used in WWII)

  Army

  Army

  Army

  Army

  100,000

  100,000

  100,000

  100,000

  General O-10

  or more

  or more

  or more

  or more

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  LTG O-9

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  Corps

  (2–4 divisions)

  (2–4 divisions)

  (2–4 divisions)

  (2–4 divisions)

  50,000–75,000

  50,000–75,000

  50,000–75,000

  50,000–75,000

  BGN O-7 (usually deputy commander of a division or commander of a command, e.g., Division

  MGN O–8

  Division

  USACIDC—US Army criminal investigations command)

  Brigade or

  Division

  COL O-6

  LTC O-5

  Brigade or

  Brigade or

  Battalion

  (3–4 brigades)

  Battalion

  MAJ O-4

  13,748–15,000

  battle group

  Battalion

  (usually

  (3–4 battalions)

  Battalion

  executive

  Company

  CPT O-3

  1,356–3,000

  (3–5 companies)

  officer of a

  Company

  Company

  445–1,000

  battalion;

  Company

  may be

  Company

  Platoons

  2LT O-2

  Platoons

  commander

  (4–6 platoons)

  Platoons

  of a special

  185–200

  Platoons

  forces

  1LT O-2 (usually executive officer of a company or a

  (3–5 squads)

  B-team, i.e.,

  senior platoon leader)

  35–40

  B-4A-Teams or

  a USACIDC

  detachment)

  Figure 1.2 Order of battle: table of organization (army).

  Black Bag Operational Planning

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  Order of battle: Army organization

  Command

  Unit

  Strength

  ∙ SSG (E-6)

  ∙ Squad (2 teams)

  11

  ∙ 2LT/1LT (O-2/O-1)

  ∙ Platoon (3–4 squads)

  35

  ∙ CPT (O-3)

  ∙ Company (4–6 platoons)

  184–200

  ∙ Maj (O-4)

  ∙ (Usually executive officer of a battalion;

  • May be commander of a Special Forces B-Team, i.e.,

  3–4 A-Teams or a USACIDC detachment)

  ∙ LTC (O-5)

  ∙ Battalion (3–5 companies)

  445–1,000

  ∙ COL (O-6)

  ∙ Brigade or battle group (3–4)

  1,356–3,000

  ∙ Maj general (O-8)

  ∙ Division (3–4 Brigades)

  13,748–15,000

  ∙ Lt general (O-9)

  ∙ Corps (2–4 Divisions)

  50,000–75,000

  ∙ General (O-10)

  ∙ Army

  100,000 or more

  ∙ General of the

  ∙ Theater or chief of staff

  (only used in WWII)

  army (O-11)

  Figure 1.3 Order of battle: command structure (army).

  Order of battle: Navy

  Command

  Unit

  O-3/LIUET

  Patrol or escort

  O-4/LTCMD

  Destroyer escort, submarine, or small auxiliary

  O-5/CMDR

  Destroyer, auxiliary ship or

  Division of destroyers or submarines

  O-6/CAPT

  Heavy ship, squadron of destroyers or

  Naval station

  O-7/Commodore

  Usually commissioned only in time of war

  O-8/RADM

  Division of heavy ships, Flotilla of lesser ships,

  Naval district of task force

  O-9/VADM

  Major division of a fleet or naval district

  O-10/ADM

  The principal fleet or separate fleets

  O-11/Fleet admiral

  Theater commander or chief of naval

  operations (CNO) (only used in WWII)

  Figure 1.4 Order of battle: table of organization (navy).

  Communications in Unconventional Environments

  U.S. Army Field Manual 30-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques says,

  “The communications system and techniques employed by Special Forces are

  applicable to both unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency opera-

  tions.” There
are times, when conducting black bag or clandestine operations, that field-expedient means of covert communications must be relied upon.

  One such method is the use of field telephones, which, of course,

  on not a part of the local telephone system. Field phones are connected

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  Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations

  Order of battle: Air force

  Command

  Unit of establishment

  2LT O-1 or 1LT O-2

  Flight or detachment (unit)

  1LT O-2 or CPT O-3

  Flight (4 aircraft or a support detachment) (unit)

  CPT O-3 or MAJ O-4

  Squadron (2–4 flights) (unit)

  MAJ O-4 or LTC O-5

  Group (several squadrons) (establishment)

  BGN O-7

  Wing (up to 4 groups; 30–75 aircraft)

  (establishment)

  MGN O-8

  Air division (2 or more wings or several groups)

  LTG O-9

  Air force (numbered air force, e.g., 9th air

  force of the tactical command)

  GEN O-10

  Major command (e.g., space command,

  Military Airlift Command [MAC],

  Formerely Strategic Air Command [SAC],

  Tactical Air Command [TAC])

  General of the

  Chief of air operations or chief of staff

  air force O-11

  (only used in WWII).

  Figure 1.5 Order of battle: table of organization (Air Force).

  Figure 1.6 Field-expedient telephone: Ground return circuits using two strands of a fence line. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques, 1971.)

  phone-to-phone (or filed switchboard) by filed wire(s). In an unsecured environment where field wire cannot be run or might be detected, operators have borrowed fence lines made of wire to use as filed phone-wire lines. Phones are connected to fences, which become the phone lines and go unnoticed,

  requiring no retrieval upon exfiltration (see Figure 1.6).

  Field radios (transmitters, receivers, and transceivers) can also be

  connected to field expedient antennas using field-expedient (improvised)

  Black Bag Operational Planning

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  insulators (see Figure 1.7). Antennas can also be improvised from lengths of wire at appropriate lengths for the band being used (see Figures 1.8

  through 1.10).

  When encrypted communications are unavailable, an old technique

  may still be practical. In the old days, communications that were subject to unwanted interception were recorded in Morse code, usually in ciphered

  form (i.e., code other than Morse code, which is merely an International

  alphabet of dots and dashes). The recorded message was then transmitted

  at a much higher speed for reception on predesignated frequencies by the

  C-ration spoon

  Plastic bag

  Wood

  Button

  Bottle neck

  Nylon rope

  Rubber or cloth strip

  Figure 1.7 Field-expedient insulators. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20

  Special Forces Operational Techniques, 1971.)

  1/2 λ

  14% offcenter fed

  1/2 λ

  14%

  1/4 λ

  Figure 1.8 Field-expedient half-wave antenna off-center-feed. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques.)

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  Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations

  Inverted “L” antenna

  1/2 λ

  Insulators

  1/4 λ

  Counterpoise

  Figure 1.9 Inverted L field expedient antenna. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques, 1971.)

  10 feet

  Fasten wire to wall with tape

  Locate transmitter

  at center

  of loop

  10 feet

  Relative directivity at

  right angles to loop

  Antenna length: Full wave

  Antenna length : 984 = 40 feet

  Frequency shown: 25 megacycles

  25

  Normal range for

  300

  frequency shown: Day, 750 miles or greater;

  = 12 m

  Night, frequency too high.

  25

  Note: Tune output carefully by indicator lamp. Bulb will not glow brightly.

  Figure 1.10 Indoors, full-wave square-loop antenna. (Adapted from U.S. Army, FM 3-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques.)

  Black Bag Operational Planning

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  intended recipients. These burst transmission were sent at, say, 10 times the original speed, received, rerecorded, then played at 1/10 the received speed to play the message at normal speed. Any unwanted monitoring could easily miss the 20 seconds message sent in 2 seconds because the monitors did not know what they were hearing (in 2 seconds), if they hear it at all while scanning thousands of frequencies.

  Communications and communications security are important, yet it

  is limited only by one’s imagination, even in the absence of state-of-the-art technology. In fact, with advanced technology, often it is the old and outdated technology that goes unnoticed (more on communications technology

  in Chapter 8).

  Human Intelligence

  2

  Human Intelligence Operations

  Human Intelligence ( HUMINT) is intelligence gathering by means of inter-personal contact, rather than technical intelligence such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and measurement and

  signature intelligence (MASINT). NATO defines HUMINT as “a category

  of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human

  sources.” Clandestine HUMINT ( HUMan INTelligence) involves obtaining information (using human intelligence methods) that is considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information.

  HUMINT includes a wide range of espionage operations, including the use

  of spy-professional assets or agents who collect intelligence, couriers who handle secure communications, access agents who arrange contacts between potential spies, and case officers who recruit them.

  Sometimes, the recruiter continues to supervise the recruited agent, but

  sometimes, the asset may be handed off to a different handler or case officer.

  Espionage networks may consist of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors and are usually organized on a cell system. An operator usually knows the people in his or her own cell, the external case officer, and an emergency method to use to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is apprehended or discovered. They usually have no knowledge of people in other cells.

  “I’m with the CIA, but I tell people I’m with the CIC, so they think I’m

  with the CID”—Colonel Sam Flagg (from M*A*S*H). Typical HUMINT

  operations consist of interrogations and conversations with persons having access to information. HUMINT is sometimes related to counterintelligence (CI) and sometimes in direct opposition to CI. In one episode of the television show M*A*S*H, intelligence officer Colonel Sam Flagg tells Dr. Hawkeye Pierce, “I’m with the CID. Although I told your boss I was with the CIA.

  It throws people off who think I’m with the CIC.” In another episode, he has a dialog with Major Frank Burns:

  Colonel Flagg: I’m in the CIC. (Counter Intelligence Corps)

  Major Burns: I thought you were in the CIA. (Central Intelligence Agency) Colonel Flagg: No I just tell people that so they think I’m in the CID.

  (U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division Command)

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  Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence O
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  (Footnote for M*A*S*H fans: Colonel Flagg was in seven episodes of the

  popular TV show:

  1. Deal Me Out (December 8, 1973)—alias Captain Halloran

  2. A Smattering of Intelligence (March 2, 1974)—Colonel Samuel Flagg

  3. Officer of the Day (September 24, 1974)—Colonel Samuel Flagg

  4. White Gold (March 11, 1975)—Colonel Samuel Flagg

  5. Quo Vadis, Captain Chandler (November 7, 1975)—Colonel Samuel

  Flagg

  6. The Abduction of Margaret Houlihan (October 26, 1976)—Colonel

  Samuel Flagg

  7. Rally ‘Round the Flagg, Boys (February 14, 1979)—Colonel Samuel

  Flagg)

  The relationship between HUMINT and CI becomes at odds when one side

  is trying to turn agents of the other side, while the other side seeks to detect those turned. Recruiters can run false flag operations in which a source of one side believes they are providing intelligence to the other side, when they are actually providing intelligence to a third-party side. For example, a member of the Federation may be recruited to provide information to the Romulans—a

  culture friendly with the Federation—when in fact they are providing

  intelligence to the Klingons, which are not friendly with the Federation.

  (Presumably these examples will not offend anyone in the foreseeable future, regardless of the changing geopolitical environment and relationships.)

  Often, the source believes there is no harm in sharing secrets with an

  ally or neutral state. Sometimes that false assumption comes to reveal that the source is sleeping with the enemy—that is, the true identity of the other half of the transactions are a known enemy. That scenario may be further

  extrapolated when the member of the Federation refuses to continue to provide information and is informed that his or her activities of selling secrets to the opposing Klingons will be revealed if cooperation is not continued.

  Documentation in the form of financial deposits and audio–video can make

  a source regretfully fear prosecution for espionage, rather than reveal that he or she has been unwittingly trading in secrets with a known enemy.

  Intelligence management begins with a determination of what needs to

  be known—a needs assessment or determination of the essential elements

  of intelligence (EEI). Espionage activities often involve accessing places where the information sought is stored or accessing people who know the

  information. Covert operations may include reconnaissance, sabotage,

 

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