Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Page 19
The Times of India (1886) referred to the Treaty of Amritsar and wrote: “The British Government transfers and makes over for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Gulab Singh and his male heirs all the hilly or mountainous country, situated to the eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravee.”4 What did the words “independent possession” convey? In law, “possession” means “actual holding or occupancy, either with or without rights of ownership”.5 The treaty, thus, meant no more than “handing over of Kashmir to”6 the Dogra chief of Jammu, Gulab Singh, for ruling on their behalf.
Parting with “rights of ownership” would have undermined the interests of the empire. If no other Indian state enjoyed such rights, how could Kashmir? This would have been contrary to Wellesley’s policy of subsidiary alliances. “Independence”, on the other hand, meant giving Gulab Singh full freedom to rule in the far-flung regions of the empire which the British themselves could not directly and effectively rule. It was explained: “The Government of India is just now too busy to have time for any further schemes about the extension of British supremacy.”7
As paramount power, the British had posted a resident in Kashmir, under whose surveillance the Maharaja ruled. The resident’s writ prevailed in all matters, even relating to succession to the throne. On the demise of Maharaja Ranbir Singh in 1885, the installation of a new Maharaja was delayed by as many as eight months. It took place in May 1886. The reason offered was unconvincing: it was said to be “inconvenient” because of “the height of the hot weather to dispense the Princely hospitability”. Weather was a mere excuse. The Times of India (1886) wrote: “It is difficult to explain the delay in the ceremonial, for, as a matter of fact, there had been no interregnum. The son succeeded the father at once, and nothing was needed, but the imperial khillut.”8
In the 1880s, the British were worried about new developments across the state’s borders with Russia. The Times of India reported in a headline: “Russian apprehensions respecting Cashmere.” In view of such grave developments, the British, apparently, wanted to change Kashmir’s status. The report in the Times of India (1889) disclosed: “It may be confidently foretold that . . . Cashmere . . . is evidently doomed to become a new province of British India.”9
The amount of Rs. 75 lakh that Gulab Singh paid to the British was not for a sell-out, but “a tribute” (nazarana) that Indian princes paid to the paramount power under Wellesley’s policy of “subsidiary alliances”, which guaranteed help in defence in difficult circumstances. It “irrevocably attached” the princes to the paramount power, and “any hope of escape was idle”.10 The British, thus, did not sell Kashmir to Gulab Singh, but perforce allowed the Dogra dynasty to rule over Jammu and Kashmir on their behalf on par with the Nizam of Hyderabad and other Indian princes.
The malicious falsehood of Abdullah’s hypocritical utterances is proved untrue by the Treaty of Amritsar in Articles 3, 4, and 9. As per Article 3, the payment of Rs. 75 lakh was “in consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs” of the Kashmir territories. According to Article 4, “the limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall not be at any time changed without concurrence of the British Government”. Article 9 maintains supremacy of paramount power by conceding what it had to other princes under Wellesly’s “subsidiary alliances”: “The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies.” That is what Wellesley had offered to other princes earlier. Gulab Singh was as much subsidiary to the British as were other members of the princely order.
Paramountcy was always supreme, then or later, in all circumstances. Lord Reading had bluntly told the Nizam in March 1926, “The sovereignty of the British Crown is supreme in India, and, therefore, no Ruler of an Indian State can justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government on equal footing.”11 Nor could the British administrators in India “sell” sovereignty to any ruler under any circumstance. Gulab Singh could be no exception.
11
PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR
Mountbatten’s Offer to Jinnah
Note of a Discussion with Mr. Jinnah in the presence of Lord Ismay at Government House, Lahore, on 1 November 1947.
In the course of 3½ hours of the most arduous and concentrated conversation, Kashmir took up most of the time; Junagadh took next place and Hyderabad the least. We darted about between these three subjects as well as talking about the overall policy affecting States. I have divided this note into four parts, although this was not necessarily the order in which the subjects were discussed, nor, of course, were all the remarks made consecutively.
Part I: India’s Policy towards States Whose Accession Was in Dispute
I pointed out the similarity between the cases of Junagadh and Kashmir and suggested that plebiscites should be held under UNO as soon as conditions permitted. I told Mr. Jinnah that I had drafted out in the aeroplane a formula which I had not yet shown to my Government but to which I thought they might agree. This was the formula:
The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State’s, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.
Mr. Jinnah’s first observation was that it was redundant and undesirable to have a plebiscite when it was quite clear that States should go according to their majority population, and if we would give him the accession of Kashmir he would offer to urge the accession of Junagadh direct to India.
I told him that my Government would never agree to changing the accession of a State against the wishes of the ruler or the Government that made the accession unless a plebiscite showed that the particular accession was not favoured by the people.
Mr. Jinnah then went on to say that he could not accept a formula if it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that Hyderabad did not wish to accede to either Dominion and he could not be a party to coercing them to accession.
I offered to put in some reference to States whose accession was in dispute “to try and get round the Hyderabad difficulty” and he said that he would give that his careful consideration if it was put to him.
I then pointed out that he really could not expect a principle to be applied in the case of Kashmir if it was not applied in the case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, but that we naturally would not expect him to be a party to compulsory accession against the wishes of the Nizam.
Part II: Hyderabad
I told Mr. Jinnah how much I regretted that at this serious moment he should have been compromised by the behaviour of the Itttehad-ul-Mussalmin’s delegation to Karachi.
He asked me what I meant. I told him that the two delegates, Yamin Zuberi and his companion, who had been reported by the Press as having seen him in Karachi, had returned to Hyderabad and were alleged to have influenced the Nizam into going back on his word to accept the standstill agreement which his Executive Council had passed by six votes to three. The inference had been drawn that they had carried a message to HEH from Mr. Jinnah, and that this was the cause of the latter’s reversal of his decision.
Mr. Jinnah assured me categorically that he had merely seen these two men out of courtesy, for a matter of five or perhaps seven minutes. They had told him that HEH was about to sign an instrument of accession to India, and they begged Mr. Jinnah to intervene. Mr. Jinnah had replied that it was outside his power to intervene and that it was only a question for the Nizam and his own Government to decide.
I then recounted to Mr. Jinnah briefly the events which Sir Sultan Ahmed had related to me on 31 October, and Lord Ismay substantiated this account from a letter he had received from Sir Walter Monckton.
Mr. Jinnah once more affirmed most solemnly that he had nothing whatever to
do with the recent reversal of the Nizam’s decision. He had sent no verbal message whatsoever to Hyderabad. The advice he had tendered to HEH in writing some time ago was that he was between the devil and the deep blue sea. If he acceded to India, there would be bloodshed in Hyderabad; and if he did not accede, there would equally be bloodshed. Thus an agreement, but not accession, seemed to be the only hope.
I told him that the Nizam had sent me a letter through Sir Sultan Ahmed, dated 30 October, in which he implied that if negotiations now broke down with a new negotiating committee he might have to consider entering into an agreement with Pakistan.
Mr. Jinnah laughed and said, “That looks to me as though he is threatening you. It has nothing to do with me. I have never discussed any form of agreement with the Nizam.”
I asked him straight out whether he would be prepared to sign a standstill agreement with Hyderabad if he were asked to by the Nizam. He replied that a standstill agreement implied that there were relations or intervening factors which formed the basis for a standstill [agreement]. He could not think of any such factors between Pakistan and Hyderabad, and whereas he did not envisage wishing to sign such an agreement, he would have to examine the matter carefully, if it were put to him, before refusing.
I drew his attention to the unfortunate effect it would have if in fact he were to start negotiations with the Nizam after they had been broken off with the Dominion to which he was irretrievably linked geographically and by majority of population.
Mr. Jinnah said he would bear this in mind.
Part III: Junagadh
I read out to Mr. Jinnah the following extract from a statement made by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, which had been published in the Statesman of Friday, 21 September:
The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has left all Indian States completely free to join either one Dominion or the other or to enter into treaty relations with either. Legally and constitutionally there can be no question of putting limitations on this right of the States. Muslim League leaders before 15 August and the official spokesmen of the Pakistan Government thereafter have publicly declared their agreement with this view; and have since rigorously stood by it. No objection has been raised by Pakistan to any State acceding to the Dominion of India.
I asked Mr. Jinnah if he still stood rigorously by his Prime Minister’s statement. He looked somewhat uneasy but admitted that it represented the legal position. I told him I would revert to this when talking about Kashmir, but in the meanwhile wanted to know what he proposed to do about Junagadh.
He admitted that there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan, and said that he had been most averse from accepting this accession. He had in fact demurred for a long time, but had finally given way to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan.
I told him that in the case of Babariawad and Mangrol, it was clearly the wish of the people that they had in fact signed instruments of accession to that effect. How then could he refuse them the right of accession? He said that Mangrol’s accession had been forced on him, and withdrawn almost before the ink was dry. In any event, he had persuaded the Nawab of Junagadh to accept legal arbitration.
I told him that the Government of India would not have minded the position so much if Junagadh had played the game and not interfered internally in these small States; but that they were oppressing the people, imposing fines and removing their grain. I pointed out that repeated telegrams had been sent protesting at this. Mr. Jinnah denied this, and stated categorically that neither Pakistan nor Junagadh had sent any soldiers or armed police into these States.
I told him that we had definite information that Junagadh had sent armed police into both of them, and that they were oppressing the people. Pandit Nehru had telegraphed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan about this, and the latter had undertaken to ask Junagadh to withdraw their forces.
When they had failed to do so, the Government of India had telegraphed, a few days back, saying that we would have to protect the interests of these States if the Junagadh forces were not withdrawn. Since they had not been withdrawn, India were going to put in forces to protect their interests, subject to a plebiscite being subsequently held in these States about final accession. They would go in under a flag of truce, with loud-hailers and inviting the cooperation of Junagadh authorities.
Mr. Jinnah lamented that the Government of India had not invited the co-operation of Pakistan before hand. I pointed out that they had in fact been unable to enforce their own orders and that so far as I was aware, Indian forces had been sent into these two States that very day.
Part IV: Kashmir
I handed Mr. Jinnah a copy of the statement of events signed by the Indian Chiefs of Staff, which I had shown to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. He asked if he could keep it, but I made him return the original and gave him an unsigned copy. Although he expressed surprise at the remarkable speed at which we had been able to organise sending troops into Srinagar plain, he did not question the document or my statement.
Mr. Jinnah’s principal complaint was that the Government of India had failed to give timely information to the Government of Pakistan about the action that they proposed to take in Kashmir.
I pointed out the speed at which events had moved. It was not until the evening of the twenty-fourth that reliable reports had been received of the tribal incursion, and it was not until the twenty-fifth that observers had been sent up to confirm these reports. Thus the decision to send in troops had not been taken until the twenty-sixth, by which date the Maharaja had announced his intention of acceding to India. There had not been a moment to lose. I added that I could not recall the exact time, but that it was my impression that Pandit Nehru had telegraphed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on the twenty-sixth, immediately the decision to send in troops had been taken.
Mr. Jinnah complained that this information should have been sent much earlier—in fact on 24 October. “If,” he said, “they had on that date telegraphed saying that a critical situation was reported to be developing in Kashmir and they had sent in observers to confirm these reports and suggested that Pakistan should co-operate in dealing with the situation, all the trouble would have been ended by now.”
Lord Ismay agreed that the Government of Pakistan should have had the earliest possible notification. This was the first thing that had occurred to him on his return to Delhi from the United Kingdom, and, indeed, he was under the impression that it had been done. To the best of his recollection, Pandit Nehru had told him on the twenty-eighth that he had kept Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan in touch with what was happening all the time. If this had not been done, the oversight must have been due to the pressure of events, and not because the Government of India had anything to hide.
Mr. Jinnah looked up his files and said that the telegram had arrived after the troops had landed, and that it did not contain any form of an appeal for co-operation between the two Dominions in this matter; it merely informed him of the accession and the landing of troops. Continuing he said that the accession was not a bonafide one since it rested on “fraud and violence” and would never be accepted by Pakistan. I asked him to explain why he used the term “fraud,” since the Maharaja was fully entitled, in accordance with Pakistan’s own official statement, which I had just read over to him, to make such accession. It was therefore perfectly legal and valid.
Mr. Jinnah said that this accession was the end of a long intrigue and that it had been brought about by violence. I countered this by saying that I entirely agreed that the accession had been brought about by violence; I knew the Maharaja was most anxious to remain independent, and nothing but the terror of violence could have made him accede to either Dominion; since the violence had come from tribes for whom Pakistan was responsible, it was clear that he would have acceded to India to obtain help against the invader. Mr. Jinnah repeatedly made it clear that in his opinion it was India who had committed this violence by sending her troops into Srinagar; I countered as often with the above
argument, thereby greatly enraging Mr. Jinnah at my apparent denseness.
From this point, he went on to say that the Government of India authorities had encouraged the Kashmir Government to massacre Muslims in the Poonch and Mirpur areas. I repudiated this as obvious nonsense. He then said, “Very well, it was the Congress party that did it.” I pointed out that if there had been any such massacre by Hindus in the Poonch area (which I did not deny) this had been done entirely by Kashmir Hindus and could hardly have been done with the object of inciting the tribes to invade Kashmir and come so close to capturing Srinagar, merely to afford the Maharaja an excuse for acceding to India for the purpose of obtaining help.
I then explained to Mr. Jinnah, at some length, the policy which I had consistently pursued in regard to Kashmir, namely—trying to persuade the Maharaja to institute progressive government, ascertain the will of the people and then accede to the Dominion of the people’s choice before 15 August. I recounted how I had tried to persuade HH to do this during my visit to Kashmir in July, and how I had told him my views privately whilst driving in the car with him; but that when I had wished to have a formal meeting with him in the presence of his Prime Minister and my Private Secretary (Sir George Abell) on the last day of my visit, he had pleaded illness and gone to bed to avoid the meeting. On leaving Srinagar, I had instructed the Resident (Colonel Webb) to continue to give the Maharaja this advice officially; and finally Lord Ismay had gone up at the end of August with instructions to advise the Maharaja to hurry up and ascertain the will of the people. But the Maharaja had invariably avoided the issue, and had always turned the conversation to lighter topics.