Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

by B Krishna

  My Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Rob Lockhart, certainly received information from the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province that his Government was encouraging raiders to enter Kashmir and was giving them transport and other facilities. Shortly afterwards came the accession to India.

  In regard to the final cease-fire, the only people with whom I had consultations and conversations about this were the Minister of Defence Sardar Baldev Singh and the Prime Minister himself Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. At that time I had no idea of what Sardar Patel’s views were, and I did not meet him then.

  Early in 1948 I remember a discussion in the Prime Minister’s office when certain marked maps showing a possible partition of Kashmir were produced. A month or two later a cease-fire lasting a few days took place . . . Sardar Patel certainly gave me the impression (at a meeting at Dehra Dun) that he was not resolutely opposed to the partition of Kashmir, but he did say most emphatically, if there were to be new boundaries, these must be capable of being seen and easily recognised on the ground itself, and that vague lines on maps or down the centres of rivers were of no use at all.

  With every good wish,

  Yours sincerely,

  Roy Bucher

  v) General Sir Roy Bucher, C-in-C, Indian Army

  30 July 1969

  My dear Mr. Krishna,

  I now attempt to recall the matters which Sardar Patel and I discussed in Dehra Dun . . . I was in Mussourie at that time, and Mr. Birla suggested I should call in on the Sardar who was convalescing in Dehra Dun. It was arranged for my wife and I to lunch at the Circuit House there with the Sardar and his daughter.

  After luncheon, the Sardar invited me into the room he was using as a study. He began by saying he was going to tell me of certain matters of which I, as C-in-C, should be thoroughly cognisant; he also said that if I repeated the conversation about to begin to others he, the Sardar, would merely say that my side of the story was inaccurate.

  The Sardar next said that he had been blamed for the Mahatma’s death because no special security arrangements had been laid on; that had been quite impossible because Gandhiji had forbidden any special precautions. I was told that I knew perfectly well that the Mahatma’s wishes were akin to orders to Congress leaders like himself and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

  Certain people had argued with force that monies held back in India on Partition and due to Pakistan should be sent across. When, therefore, the Mahatma expressed a wish that this should be done, arrangements for the despatch of these monies were put in hand. When this became known, coupled with the fact that a visit by Gandhi to Pakistan was being planned, the assassination was decided upon by the well-known revolutionary body to which the murderer belonged. The Sardar was extremely vehement on the guilt of those who had so strongly advocated the despatch of monies to Pakistan; he also said he never had any intention of retaining these monies permanently in India, but that in view of the distressful relations between India and Pakistan he had thought it wise to withhold these monies.

  The Sardar next spoke of internal security and said that he did not need the Armed Forces, as he could do all that would ever be necessary with the Police and the Armed Police. Naturally I could not agree with him on this in view of what had happened in the past and because of the troubled state of the country generally. The Sardar went on that everyone thought he was anti-Muslim, but this was quite untrue as he realized he was responsible for the lives and livelihood of all Muslims and that as long as he was in his present position no Muslim would be harmed or put at a disadvantage. To trust Muslims, however, was quite another matter. He found this almost impossible for him in view of the 1946 rioting which had begun in Calcutta and for which the Muslim League Government of Bengal was responsible, and also because of Partition with all its consequences. It was very easy to be wise in retrospect, but if he had sensed what tragedies would result from Partition he would never have agreed to it.

  On Hyderabad the Sardar said the Nizam’s Government was not in control and that the Razakars under Razvi were organizing a full-scale Muslim rebellion within the State. He spoke of the Moplah rebellion and the difficulties in suppressing that. He also mentioned gun-running from Pakistan into Hyderabad and how the general danger was increased because of Communist pockets around the State in Madras and elsewhere. He was adamant that the Government of His Exalted Highness must accept, without equivocation, the Government of India’s minimum demands, otherwise India must enter the State in the interest of law and order all over India. An alien Government in the “tummy” of India was an absolute impossibility.

  He then said: “If you can do anything to persuade the Nizam’s Government to accept our demands, I give you a free hand, and you can even go to Hyderabad if you wish.” He considered that Lord Mountbatten was in error in thinking that he could get a solution to the Hyderabad problem; the only one was the acceptance of the Government of India’s conditions . . . I was very much in agreement with the Sardar and our only difference really was a question of timing. I did make touch with Zain El Edroos the C-in-C in Hyderabad, Brigadier Nepean and John Graham both in Hyderabad. I also recommended that the Government of India should appoint a senior soldier as its representative in the State in place of Mr. Munshi. Nothing came of these efforts of mine. When Indian troops did enter the State, the climate of world opinion was favourable to India and the manner in which the operations were carried out practically eliminated all criticism.

  The Sardar gave me the impression that he was quite in favour of partition, but that he was dead against a Plebiscite anywhere. To him, possible partition seemed to be for those parts of the State north of the Jhelum River and west of the Poonch River to go to Pakistan, the rest to India. The Sardar said that it was absolutely essential for any new frontiers to be easily seen and recognized both on maps and on the ground, and that vague lines across country or down the centres of rivers could not be countenanced.

  Before General Messervy, C-in-C Pakistan, went home he was asked to come to New Delhi by the Governor-General. This happened in late February and I believe the arguments in favour of Kashmir being ceded to Pakistan were advanced, and that India’s Prime Minister was present at these discussions. Be all that as it may, I remember being called along to Pandit Jawaharlal in the Secretariat and being shown certain marked maps portraying a possible division of Kashmir as between India and Pakistan . . . nothing came of these discussions because Ghulam Bakshi Mohd., the Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir, was opposed to any part of Titwahl going to Pakistan.

  Some time later, in March I think, General Gracey, now Cin-C in Pakistan, said to me that he thought a cease-fire in Kashmir might be arranged. I informed my Prime Minister of this, and he replied “I will try anything once”. A cease-fire did occur, but it could not be sustained as the Prime Minister of Pakistan wished Pandit Nehru to treat with the head of the Azad Government. This was an impossibility because India did not recognize any such Government. So fighting began again and an opportunity presented by India was lost. In verification of this last I wrote in my D.O. No. 18/C. in C. of 30 March 1948 to General Gracey: “It is sad that your Prime Minister could not find an approach to the Government here.”

  It has remained clearly in my memory, as it was after my interview, that I realised, far more than formerly, what a very wise and determined man the Sardar was.

  Kind regards,

  Yours very sincerely,

  Roy Bucher

  vi) General Sir Roy Bucher, C-in-C, Indian Army

  (Note dated 6 March 1969)

  I cannot quite remember whether it was late in 1946 or early in ’47 when I went to New Delhi for an Army Commanders’ Selection Board Meeting. I was invited to go and have tea with Mahatma Gandhi, but it was not deemed advisable for me to accept. I subsequently went to have tea with Sardar Patel. This was the first time I had met him in person. In his drawing-room he greeted me with: “You are a very good hotel-keeper, quite one of the best.” I said: “Surely you cannot be referri
ng to the time when you and your colleagues were detained in Ahmednagar Fort?” The Sardar replied: “Indeed I am and we were never more comfortable as the King’s guests.”

  All the detailed arrangements for the funeral of Gandhi were made in the sitting-room of our bungalow in York Place. The members of the Government of India were present. It is interesting that neither the Prime Minister nor the Home Minister interfered in any way with proposals for the conduct of the funeral, or made any criticism afterwards of the arrangements which had been carried through.

  At the time I recorded that rioting had broken out in and around Belgaum and that we became very busy rounding up certain private armies in an effort to stamp out communalism throughout the country once and for all. The Maharajah of Alwar was removed from his State about this time and I have a note that certain other rulers were similarly to be dealt with.

  The load on Sardar Patel must have been very heavy indeed in his dual capacity as Home Minister and Minister for States. There were twenty-nine Battalions in Kashmir where heavy fighting was taking place; aggression into Jaisalmer State and also from West Bengal into Assam occurred. It would have been small wonder had the Sardar become worried or perturbed, but I personally never saw him other than absolutely composed and determined to uphold law and order throughout India. Later I was to see him in a rage and realised how his colleagues were dominated.

  Roy Bucher

  vii) General Sir Roy Bucher, C-in-C, Indian Army

  (From a letter of 10 August 1948 to his daughter, Elizabeth Bucher)

  Elements of the Pakistan Regular Army are now taking part in the fighting (in Kashmir). I do not know exactly how many units or sub-units are involved, but there appears to be quite a number. What is more, they are supported by Artillery. As you can imagine, this has altered the whole situation. To me it all seems utter madness, and especially as no warning was given by Pakistan of their intentions.

  The Government of the North-West Frontier pushed Mahsuds and Wazirs into the Jhelum Valley which forced Kashmir to accede to India. There was no other alternative— the fates of Kashmiri Muslims, non-Muslims and Christians in Muzaffrabad, Uri and Baramulla, etc. are ample grounds for saying that but for the advent of Indian Army troops, no one in the Valley would have been spared and that Srinagar would have been looted and burnt to the ground.

  Roy Bucher

  viii) Sir G. S. Bozman, ICS

  20 August 1968

  Dear Mr. Krishna,

  I have seen you letter in the London Daily Telegraph of 16 August and was glad to read of the forthcoming biography of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. I was Secretary of the Information & Broadcasting Department in Delhi when he took over the portfolio.

  I can contribute nothing to the political aspect of Sardar Patel . . . His was, nevertheless, an example, if one were needed, of his straightforward and clear-headed approach to all matters of administration. In this field, there could be no doubt that he far outshone all his colleagues and most of his officials. I often wondered if he knew how greatly these officials, including myself, admired his outstanding ability.

  Yours sincerely,

  Sir G. S. Bozman

  ix) Sir G. S. Bozman, ICS

  10 October 1968

  Dear Mr. Krishna,

  I must apologise for the long delay in answering your long letter of 30 August. Unfortunately, just after I received it, I fell seriously ill…

  Sardar Patel excelled in planning and getting things done, while Nehru’s role was more idealistic and less practical. The two together, of course, made a team—so long as they agreed together—of great force and character.

  Yours sincerely,

  G. S. Bozman

  x) Andrew Mellor, Correspondent in India of the London Daily Herald

  18 November 1968

  Dear Sri Krishna,

  I am sorry not to have replied earlier to your letter of 2 October. During my stay in India, I was representing the Daily Herald. The period was 1947-49 and Sardar Patel was, in my opinion, the strongest of the group of strong men who were engaged in the tremendous task of ending the Raj and seeing through the transfer of power—with the involvement of nothing less than the division of the sub-continent.

  I saw him first very soon after my arrival in New Delhi and was deeply impressed by his imposing presence. He had the appearance, I thought, of some great Roman consul. It was, I suppose, the immediate impression of strength and power which created that idea in my mind.

  The broad and heavy features, the great head and the generally unmoving, almost unblinking gaze from eyes which were extremely penetrating could not fail to have a considerable effect.

  With Nehru, the charm immediately reached out and one felt his humanity and friendliness. Patel was altogether different. He gave a feeling of aloofness, almost grimness, and certainly inspired awe. Nevertheless, I know that he was personally kind and patient.

  Returning from Kashmir, I saw him one evening and was describing the difficulties of terrain for Indian troops moving through the passes from Jammu towards Nowshera and the Pathan-invaded border towns.

  I had seen several guns which had rolled over at road curves and fallen hundreds of feet. It seemed to me that these difficulties were appalling, if not insurmountable. “The roads are so bad that a lot of vehicles cannot, in my opinion, be got up,” I said. “They must be got up,” he replied, “and they will be.” They were.

  Yours sincerely,

  Andrew Mellor

  xi) C. W. E. U’ren, British Indian Police Officer

  18 March 1969

  Dear Krishna,

  Your letter to me of 14 January. I was ASP Ahmedabad during the Gujarat floods of 1927. You may recall that they were very serious indeed and at one time practically the whole of Ahmedabad was a few feet deep in water. This was due to the fact that the Ahmedabad rain-water drains, which were all directed into the river Sabarmati, could not function as the river was in high flood. I well remember Sardar’s calling a meeting (he was then President of the Ahmedabad Municipality), which was attended by the Collector, DSP, myself and several other municipal officers . . . He kept discussions strictly to the point, having heard the various opinions expressed, made up his mind on the spot.

  He impressed us all by his extreme calmness and dignity at this critical juncture. Just before we left, he said he hoped, one day, Ahmedabad would be modelled on the lines of a western city—particularly insofar as its municipal services were concerned. In other words, even in a crisis he was able to look forward to better days for the city he was administering.

  When the All-India Congress Committee passed its “Quit India” Resolution on the evening of 8 August 1942, the Government of India issued orders that all the members of the committee, plus Gandhiji, were to be detained. It fell to my lot to serve orders on the Sardar, his daughter Maniben and Acharya Kripalani (then AICC General Secretary) and to take them to Victoria Terminus (GIPRy) where a special train waited to take the party to Poona and Ahmednagar. I well remember Maniben’s asking her father whether the detention documents were in order. Mainly, I think, to pacify her, the Sardar asked to see the order relating to his own case and having scanned it rapidly, nodded his head. He was most dignified throughout and his example to the other two made my task a comparatively simple one.

  The Sardar was a “big” man in every way—a great administrator, of few words with the gift of getting to the root of a complicated problem very quickly indeed.

  Yours sincerely,

  C. W. E. U’ren

  xii) K. B. Lall, ICS

  24 June 1970

  My dear Shri B. Krishna,

  Your letters of 12 June and 15 June were transmitted to me while I was enjoying a 10-day break in the Simla hills.

  Around 20 August 1947, Delhi was in the grip of a most serious disorder since 1857, resulting in a virtual breakdown of civil order and governmental authority. On that date, V. P. Menon, H. M. Patel and myself had gathered at Sardar Patel’s residence to discuss
with him the issue of payment to Pakistan of Rs. 55 crores which she had been demanding. It was during the course of this meeting that a man rushed into Sardar Patel’s room, bitterly complaining about the murders which were being committed, and asking him to do something effective to stop them.

  The Sardar’s face suddenly darkened with pain. In a voice filled with agony, he asked me, who belonged to Delhi and resided in my ancestral home in old Delhi, as to why I could not do something effective about the matter. Since the Sardar was not in the habit of saying much, these words of his could have been taken for an order from the Home Minister.

  A day later, we three met again at Sardar Patel’s residence. During the course of this meeting, a man ran into Sardar Patel’s house shouting that a couple of Muslims had been stabbed to death near Sardar’s residence. This shocked Sardar beyond measure. His face showed tremendous grief. The agony of helplessness was writ large on it. With some annoyance he asked me as to what I had done to tackle the communal situation.

  He could not bring himself to say that no specific responsibility had been entrusted to him. He did say, however, that as far as he knew there were no armed forces nearabout and the majority of police armed force consisted of Muslims who were themselves seething with revolt. The local Muslims had been collecting arms for many months and the refugees, Sikhs and Hindus, having suffered atrocities in the Punjab, were bent on wreaking vengeance and on forcibly evicting Muslim residents in order to gain shelter for themselves. The Sardar was both impatient and angry. He only muttered in great anguish to me: “Why can’t you get on with the job?”

  Acting on the Sardar’s firman, I set up headquarters of an Emergency Committee at the Town Hall and organised a “Control Room”. In a couple of days, the situation was brought under control. The Muslim pockets around Jama Masjid and Bali Maran were fully protected against attacks by infuriated refugees. The Muslims living in these areas were also provided with food and fuel in their houses. A number of camps were set up for the Muslim refugees, the chief among which was in Purana Qila. A total of 150,000 were fed, clothed and provided with blankets and medical attendance.