Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Page 28
Joshi, G. V.
Joshi, Moropant
Junagadh, Accession to Pakistan
Junagadh State Council
Kabir, Humayun
Kamath, H. V.
Kathiawar Defence Force
Katju, Dr. K. N.
Kashmir, Maharaja of
Khan, Hamidullah, see Bhopal, Nawab of
Khan Sahib, Dr.
Khan, Sikander Hyat
Khan, Zafrullah
Khare, N. B.
Kher, B. G.
Khilafat Movement
Kripalani, J. B.
Krishnamachari, V. T.
Lal, Shavax A.
Lall, K. B.
Liaquat Ali
Linlithgow, Lord
Macaulay, Lord
Malaviya, Madan Mohan
Manekshaw, Field Marshal Sam
Masani, Minoo
Mason, Philip
Mathai, John
Maulana Shaukat Ali
Maulvi Mahomed Baloch
Mavalankar, G. V.
Maxwell, Reginald
Mellor, Andrew
Menon, K. P. S.
Menon, Krishna
Menon, V. P.
Messervy, General Sir Frank
Miller, Webb
Mitter, B. L.
Mohd., Ghulam Bakshi
Monckton, Sir Walter
Moon, Penderel
Moraes, Frank
Morley-Minto Reforms
Mountbatten, Lord: plan for transfer of power; appointing Patel minister of states; support to Patel,warning to Bhopal and talk with Jodhpur; Bhopal’s request for standstill agreement and finally accession to India; Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan; Patel’s firm handling of Junagadh,Hyderabad’s resistance to accession,offer of plebiscite in Kashmir,influenced Nehru to offer cease-fire, discussion with Jinnah regarding states
Munshi, K. M.
Muslim League
Naidu, Sarojini
Nariman, K. F.
Nehru, B. K.
Nehru, Jawaharlal:association with Subhash Bose, and radical views upsetting the Old Guard, supporting resolution on Punjab,non-acceptance of mission plan, consent to invite Jinnah again to join interim government,blasting Mountbatten’s plan for transfer of power, Menon plan, Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan, against army action in Hyderabad,difference of opinion with Patel on timing of Police Action and open door policy with Nizam, Police Action in Hyderabad; 1950 riots in Calcutta; threat to Kashmir valley, reference of Kashmir to UNO; faith in Abdullah; taking away Kashmir from Patel’s charge,Article relationship with China,supporting Nepal’s king; communal killings in Naokhali, Tipura, and West Punjab; Gandhi’s intervention in proposing name for congress presidentship; note on China and Tibet
Nehru, Motilal
Nishtar, Abdur Rab
Noon, Firoz Khan
Panikkar, K. M.
Pant, Govind Ballabh
Paranjpe, Raghunath
Parliamentary Board
Partition Council
Partition of India
Patel, Ashabhai
Patel, H. M.
Patel, Maniben
Patel, Vithalbhai
Patel Zaverbhai Galabhai
Patiala, Maharaja of
Patwardhan, Achyut
Pethick-Lawrence
Pillai, Pattom A. Thanu
Pratt, F. G.
Princely states: integration of Bhopal; Eastern States; Greater Rajasthan; Hyderabad; Jodhpur; Junagadh; Kathiawar; Travancore
Pyarelal
Quit India Movement
Quit Kashmir Movement
Rajagopalachari, C.
Rajasthan, Union of
Rajendra Prasad
Razvi, Kasim
Round Table Conference
Roy, M. N.
Satyagraha movements: Bardoli; Borsad; Kheda; Nagpur; Salt Satyagraha/Dandi March
Sarabhai, Ambalal
Sarabhai, Mridula
Sastri, Srinivasa
Scindia see Gwalior, Maharaja of
Sen, Brig. L. P.
Senapati, N.
Shillidy, J. A.
Shirer, William
Shivdasanai, H. B.
Shuhib Qureshi
Singh, Baldev
Singh, Col. Thakur Kesari
Sitaramayya, Pattabhi
Smart, W. W.
States Negotiating Committee
Suhrawardy, H. S.
Syed, G. M.
Tata, J. R. D.
Templewood, Lord, see Hoare, Samuel
Thimayya, Gen. K. S.
Thorat, Gen. S. P. P.
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar
Tiwana, Khizar Hyat Khan
Treaty of Amritsar
Tricumdas, Purushottam
Tyagi, Mahavir
Udaipur, Maharana of
Union of Greater Rajasthan
United State of Kathiawar
United State of Travancore and Cochin
Venkatachar, C. S.
Wavell, Viceroy Lord
Wellesley, Lord
Willingdon, Lord
Wilson, Leslie
Winterton, Lord
Wolpert, Stanley
Zafrullah, Mohammed
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My acknowledgements are to those with whom I corresponded; also to those with whom I conversed. I am expressing my gratitude to the former by reproducing their letters in order to let readers know what they actually wrote and how they expressed themselves. This will give them a better understanding of their views. There is, however, a difference between correspondence and conversation. Being face-to-face, the latter is more intimate, lively, giving the listener greater clarity in understanding—even a feeling of living with events.
Half a century later, in 2007, I still cherish sweet memories of my meeting with V. P. Menon at his bungalow in Bangalore one late evening—without prior appointment and without a questionnaire. I just dropped in and wanted to listen to what was uppermost in his mind. I had not met him before, but knew him well through correspondence. Our bond seemed to be Sardar Patel. Because of that, perhaps, he always addressed me as “My dear Balraj”. He welcomed me instantly as a friend. During the hour I spent with him I raised no questions, but let the narration flow out uninterrupted. The subject was not integration of princely states, about which Mountbatten had paid him rich tributes in a letter to Patel, terming it “the miracle which you and your faithful VP have produced”.
Earlier, Menon had rendered Mountbatten similar “faithful” service with regard to the transfer of power. Strictly adhering to Attlee’s mandate, Mountbatten made undue haste in despatching his plan to London by early May, and thereafter showed it to Nehru, who happened to be staying with him at Shimla, in the expectation of support as a family friend. Nehru’s reaction was rather violent. He was alarmed by the plan leading to India’s balkanisation. His total rejection threw Mountbatten into a crisis. What would London think of him? Would he justify their trust? That worried him most. Menon was in Shimla as Patel’s watch-dog. Mountbatten called him for “rescue” operations. It was late evening when Menon started his dictation. Page by page, Eric Mieville (ICS), principal secretary to the viceroy, would take the draft to Mountbatten, anxiously waiting in an adjoining room. Mountbatten breathed a sigh of relief when Nehru gave his approval to the “Menon plan”. Added to that, as a soother, was Patel’s acceptance from New Delhi. He was “delighted by the turn of events”. He saw in it a larger role for himself to play, as Mountbatten realised that the man to negotiate with was Patel. He drew up a six-point deal with him.
The second person who comes to mind is Col. Himatsinhji, brother of the Jamsaheb of Nawanagar. I met him in Mumbai accidentally at someone’s residence. Unexpectedly, he gave me information about how India was saved from a great crisis—one that would have pleased Jinnah, being of great gain to Pakistan. The Jamsaheb had finalised plans to form an independent confederation of the Kathiawar States, with allegiance to Pakistan.
Patel moved in to stop this, even when he did not yet exercise authority, transfer of power being two months away. He acted boldly and decisively. The Jamsaheb was to pass through Delhi prior to flying to central India to confer with the princes there. Patel lost no time. He sent Himatsinhji to the airport in his car to bring the Jamsaheb to his residence. The Jamsaheb and Her Highness lunched with Patel. In that short time, Patel’s influence worked. The Jamsaheb gave up his confederation plan; on the other hand, he lent his support to Patel in the achievement of Gandhi’s dream of a united Kathiawar, to which the Mahatma belonged. But for Himatsinhji, I would not have known this incident about how a crisis was nipped in the bud by Patel, and how an explosive issue was settled so quickly.
Equally revealing was what Mahavir Tyagi, MP and a senior Congress leader, told me about Sheikh Abdullah. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was being debated in the Constituent Assembly—relating to Kashmir’s relationship with India. Suddenly, an emotionally upset Abdullah stunned the House by announcing: “I am going back to Kashmir.” His behaviour amounted to an insult to the House; it also questioned India’s right to discuss Kashmir, which, he thought, was limited only to Nehru. Nehru wasn’t in India to come to his “rescue”. Acting as prime minister in Nehru’s absence, Patel had to deal with him. As the debate was on, he could not intervene there and then. That evening, Patel sent Tyagi to the railway station to deliver his stern message to Abdullah. The Sheikh had just settled down in his compartment when Tyagi stepped in, and announced: “Sheikh Sahib, the Sardar says you could leave the House; but you cannot leave Delhi.” Afraid of what Patel was capable of doing in Nehru’s absence, Abdullah quietly got down from the train and cancelled his departure. With Kashmir having been taken away from his charge by Nehru, under pressure from Abdullah, the strict disciplinarian in Patel would never go beyond his jurisdiction.
Two other people whom I remember with gratitude are Kalyanji Mehta of Surat, and Maniben, Sardar’s daughter, who not only managed his house all by herself, but served her father as a keeper of records, appointments, meetings, and correspondence. I spent two days with Kalyanji Mehta at his ashram near Surat. He gave me a moving description of how, as senapati (commander-in-chief), Patel led his army of 87,000 non-violent peasants to a glorious victory in the Bardoli satyagraha. He inspired them with discipline, obedience, sacrifice, looking upon him as their liberator from the injustice and oppression they suffered from. The British-owned and edited Times of India admitted that Patel had “instituted there a Bolshevik regime in which he plays the role of Lenin.” Kalyanji Mehta’s briefing drew a convincing picture of Patel as Lenin. But one absolutely Gandhian.
I have always felt grateful to Maniben for letting me have direct access to Patel’s correspondence and other papers in their original. I could feel the pulse of the man in his changing moods as an administrator or a unifier of over 560 princely states. The correspondence took me closer to him than the printed material could. He could be gentle as well as daunting, depending on what the occasion demanded. Correspondence in original proved lively and animated in regard to his wisdom and diplomacy; above all his boldness. That was why Patel, as Vinoba Bhave confirmed, “knew no retreat” as Gandhi’s GOC.
C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, the highly egoistic non-Travancorean diwan, was the first to have declared Travancore’s decision to be completely independent on the transfer of power on 15 August. Prior to Gandhi’s capture of the Congress in 1919-20, he was a leading Home Ruler and secretary to Annie Besant. In May 1947, he had come to New Delhi to see Mountbatten prior to the announcement of the 3 June plan. Patel was most diplomatic in writing to him: “It is in my nature to be a friend of the friendless. You have become one by choice, and I shall be glad if you will come and lunch with me tomorrow at 1 pm.”
Correspondence made me realise how impartially, but determinedly, Patel could maintain party discipline, sparing none who crossed the Lakshman rekha. His tone and temper would change with the issue, and with each individual. He wrote to Dr. B. C. Roy, chief minister of West Bengal: “I was disturbed to find you writing to the Prime Minister like this. Had it been a personal letter, or had you been talking to him, perhaps as an elder, you could afford this liberty. But in an official communication to him as Prime Minister, I had expected that you could be deferential as is appropriate to the dignity of the high office that he holds, as well as the office which you yourself occupy as serving your own interest.”
As party boss, Patel did not spare another chief minister— Gobind Ballabh Pant of Uttar Pradesh. Pant had inaugurated an exhibition of photographs at Varanasi, showing police atrocities during the Quit India agitation of 1942. Patel wrote to him: “In caricaturing official activities in the manner reported in the Press at a time when we are in office is open to serious objection. This is likely to affect the morale of the police force, which, in the present emergency, can hardly be considered proper. It is also likely to agitate the public mind against the Services. For obvious reasons, this must be avoided if administrative efficiency is to be maintained in these difficult times.”
Patel was much harsher to Jainarain Vyas, president of the Rajasthan Provincial Congress Committee. He had got a resolution passed by the PCC, calling upon chief minister Hiralal Shastri to resign. Patel told him bluntly: “You should understand that Hiralal Shastri as Premier is not responsible to the Provincial Congress Committee, which cannot appropriate to itself functions of the legislature . . . Your persistence in the undesirable and harmful course which you have adopted will merely recoil on you . . . the tactics you have adopted are a disservice to the organisation we all belong to.”
I am also grateful to General Roy Bucher, the British commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, for placing in my hands a copy of the letter he wrote to his daughter Elizabeth: “I personally never saw him other than absolutely composed, and determined to uphold law and order throughout India. Later I was to see him in a rage, and realised how his colleagues were dominated.” Patel was, according to Narhari Parikh, his biographer, “harder than steel in national matters, but softer than a flower in personal and private relations”. He was kind and forgiving to friend or foe alike. Patel’s hold over the party was absolute. His strength lay in restraint; his greatness in forgiveness.
It was so with the princes; even with the Nawab of Bhopal and the Nizam of Hyderabad. The former had conspired with Jinnah against India; the latter had waged a war. Bhopal requested Patel to ensure the safety of his son-in-law, the Nawab of Pataudi, who was trapped in communal rioting in his state near Delhi in Haryana. Patel sent an emissary in his car with instructions: either bring the family back or provide adequate protection if he wished to stay on. He was magnanimous to the princes on their “surrender” and offer of abiding friendship to India. He never allowed the past to influence the present—the virtue of the truly great.
I express my gratitude to Ramesh Prajapati, administrator of Sardar Patel Trust, Karamsad, Gujarat, for his valuable support.
About The Book
SARDAR VALLABHBHAI PATEL’s extraordinary contribution to the Indian freedom struggle and his farsighted and courageous approach in building a strong, integrated India are unforgettable.
As prime minister, Winston Churchill ordered the preparation of an imperial strategy to balkanize India and tighten Britain’s post-war hold over her. The strategy envisaged two Pakistans, one in the west and the other in the east. Within the borders, India was to be balkanized with the creation of independent confederations of princely states.
In keeping with this strategy, Lord Louis Mountbatten was given the mandate to transfer power and quit India. However, Churchill’s imperial plans were foiled by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who insisted on the partition of Punjab and Bengal, as well as a free hand in reaching a settlement with the princes. This enabled Patel to integrate over 560 princely states in a period of about eighteen months, thus creating a united India.
About The Author
Balraj Krishna began h
is career as a journalist with the Civil & Military Gazette, Lahore, in 1944. Post-Partition in New Delhi, he was with the Publicity Division of the External Affairs Ministry and British Information Services. He was a special correspondent with the Hindustan Times in Kashmir. His articles, book reviews and photo-features appeared in the Illustrated Weekly of India, the Times of India, the Economic Times, the Hindu and Frontline, besides Eastern World, London. He is the author of Indian Freedom Struggle and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel: India's Iron Man.
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First published in 2012 by Indus Source Books
This edition co-published in India in 2018 by
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Copyright © B. Krishna 2012, 2018
P-ISBN: 978-93-5302-480-2
Epub Edition © December 2018 ISBN: 978-93-5302-481-9
B. Krishna asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work.
The views and opinions expressed in this book are the author’s own and the facts are as reported by him, and the publishers are not in any way liable for the same.
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