The Shadow of the Great Game

by Narendra Singh Sarila

  As to the Interim Government, Wavell’s memorandum stated:

  To give control of all India to a government in which Muslims refused to take part would be very dangerous. It would be likely to lead to grave disorders in the Punjab and Bengal and would be injurious to our whole position in the Muslim world. There is also sure to be in an Interim Government controlled by the Congress a continuous attempt to sap British authority in every possible way. A real coalition government might avoid this, as the Muslims…would not wish British influence to lessen or [be] removed.23

  Wavell ended by advising that if it proved difficult ‘to hold together the Interim Government or the Constituent Assembly’, it would be best to fall back on his plan, which he termed ‘the Breakdown Plan’.

  Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, the commander-in-chief of the British forces in India, had been asked to report on the repercussions of ‘the inclusion of Pakistan in the British Commonwealth [i.e., of remaining linked with the British defence system] while leaving Hindustan to its own devices and [for Britain] to undertake no responsibility for its defence’. Auchinleck’s comments (dated 16 May 1946) were considered by the Cabinet Mission in Delhi on 31 May together along with Wavell’s memorandum. Auchinleck dealt with the issue under two heads:

  (1) Influence of a British-controlled Pakistan on Hindustan.

  (2) The problem of defence of Pakistan.

  On (1) the report, inter alia, observed:

  In theory it might appear that Pakistan under British influence could act as a check to the hostile potentialities of an independent Hindustan. However: it is very doubtful if Pakistan would have the necessary resources in raw materials, industrial production, manpower, and above all requisite space to enable it to become a base for warlike operations against a Hindustan, supported and equipped by a hostile power such as Russia…. It would most certainly not be adequate as a base for operations on a grand scale. As atomic energy develops and weapons of all sorts whether on the sea, on the land, or in the air, improve, depth in defence and adequate space for dispersion…must become increasingly essential in war…. It follows, therefore, that Pakistan, whether it has two zones or the northwest India zone only, will not provide the means by which the British Commonwealth can hope to influence or coerce an independent Hindustan and keep it free of hostile foreign influence so as to ensure the security of our communications through the Indian Ocean area.24

  On (2) the report stated:

  Assuming that it [Pakistan] will absorb or at any rate dominate Kashmir, Pakistan cannot be seriously threatened from the North [Sinkiang] protected as it is by the Himalayas…Pakistan would however be open to attack by land on a large scale from the northwest [Afghanistan] and the southeast [India].25

  Auchinleck expressed the positive aspect of the creation of Pakistan (as a prospective partner in the Great Game) as follows:

  Because here we have Pakistan as a sovereign Muslim State controlling its own destinies, whereas before the real power was Britain, a non-Muslim State and, therefore disliked, suspected and feared by Afghanistan and also Russia. This change of affinities may, it is true, ease the problem of defence of Pakistan’s western frontiers.26

  Auchinleck’s conclusion was, however, unambiguous:

  If we desire to maintain our power to move freely by sea and air in the Indian Ocean area, which I consider essential to the continued existence of the British Commonwealth, we can do so only by keeping in being a united India which will be a willing member of the Commonwealth, ready to share in its defence to the limit of her resources.27

  Auchinleck’s view that partition would not be of much help to Britain militarily was at odds with Wavell’s ideas. Thus, Wavell strongly challenged the commander-in-chief’s view at the meeting of the Cabinet Delegation at which Auchinleck was present (but Cripps was absent because of his illness). The record reads:

  His Excellency the Viceroy said he did not feel that there were final grounds for rejecting the possibility that we might remain in North-East and North-West India [the proposed Pakistan] for an indefinite period. He was not entirely in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief that Pakistan as part of the Empire receiving British support would be strategically incapable of being defended and of no military advantage to the Empire.28

  This statement gives away the game. Attlee held the same view with minor reservations, but was unwilling to reveal his hand. To do so would have made it difficult for him to create the circumstances that might have persuaded Nehru and company to give up the northwest, if not the northeast, of their own volition.

  The chiefs of staff in London were also getting impatient with the prime minister’s apparent dithering. General Lord Ismay, who had been Churchill’s right-hand man during the war and, under Attlee, a member of the Cabinet Secretariat with the duty to liaise with the chiefs of staff, wrote to the PM:

  The fact remains however that should India so elect (independence) the chances of obtaining even our minimum requirements are remote, since the Indians will possibly be just as suspicious and jealous of their new-found sovereignty as Egyptians have been…. The Chiefs of Staff do not know what, if anything, can be done to influence the course of events…29

  Attlee continued to hold his cards close to his chest and to concentrate on wooing the Indian leaders.

  With Stafford Cripps laid up, Wavell was able to persuade a harassed secretary of state and Alexander to forward his ‘Breakdown Plan’ to Attlee. This plan proposed the British evacuation from the Congress Party-controlled provinces to those areas he had marked out for Pakistan. This was done on 3 June 1946. Pethick-Lawrence took the precaution to add that Cripps, from his sick bed, considered the Wavell Plan unworkable. Attlee, who preferred to catch flies with honey instead of vinegar, was bound to find Wavell’s approach distasteful. However, he armed himself with the views of the chiefs of staff before replying: ‘A Policy of withdrawal into Pakistan’ in the way proposed (by Wavell) ‘was unacceptable on military grounds’, the chiefs opined.30 Attlee, in his reply to Pethick-Lawrence on 6 June 1946, rejected Wavell’s proposal: ‘We ourselves get the impression that Muslims and Congress are not anxious to push matters to a certain crisis and that there might be advantage in a short delay’; i.e., the Cabinet Mission might as well return to London.31

  Wavell’s plan depended on London’s consent, which was not forthcoming. Jinnah’s plan, on the other hand, did not depend on anybody’s writ, except the fanaticism that his subordinates could whip up amongst his followers and the prowess of the Muslim National Guard that had been created. His plan envisaged violence and more violence to intimidate the British Labour Government and the Congress Party leaders.

  On 27 July 1946, in Bombay, the Muslim League passed a resolution, revoking its decision to support the Cabinet Mission plan. On this day, Jinnah announced that the League should ‘bid goodbye to constitutional methods and take “direct action”’. He added: ‘Today we have forged a pistol and are in a position to use it.’ Expressing doubts about the British Government’s will to adhere to their commitments, he addressed the gathering thus:

  Only the League’s direct action could prevent the Congress from hijacking the Constituent Assembly on the basis of its majority, turn it into a sovereign body and attempt a de facto takeover of power.32

  The sixteenth day of August 1946 was earmarked as ‘Direct Action Day’. On this day, Muslims were enjoined to observe a hartal and to organize meetings to explain and propagate the new League resolution. Bengal was the only major Muslim-majority province under the League’s control; Calcutta, its capital, was a major city from which Jinnah could effectively make his point, and Huseyn Suhrawardy, its premier, was the League’s most unscrupulous leader, who was well suited to launch Jinnah’s campaign.

  The violence that the Muslim League unleashed in Calcutta on 16 August 1946 was a measure of Jinnah’s desperation. He wanted to make the point that the Muslim League could not be ignored. Much has been written about the ‘great Calcutta killin
gs’, in which about 5000 people belonging to both communities were killed and over 20,000 injured. (Here the picture is presented as it appears in British official documents.)

  On 22 August 1946, the governor of Bengal, Sir Frederick Burrows, sent a long report to Wavell and Pethick-Lawrence, which amongst other things, says:

  The Muslim League meeting at the Ochterlony Monument began at 4 p.m. [on 16 August] though processions of Muslims from all parts of Calcutta had started assembling soon after the midday prayers…the number attending the meeting…about 100,000…. The Chief Minister (Suhrawardy) made a Laodicean speech, of which his audience naturally remembered the hot passages more clearly than the cold. The Central Intelligence Officer and a reliable reporter deputed by the military authorities agree on one most mischievous statement (not reported at all by the Calcutta Police). The version in the former’s report is: “He (Suhrawardy) had seen to police and military arrangements who [sic] would not interfere.” The version in the latter is “He had been able to restrain the military and police….” The impression an uneducated audience would form of such a statement by the Home Minister (the Chief Minister also held the law and order portfolio) must have been that it was an open invitation to disorder; and in fact many of the listeners started attacking Hindus and looting Hindu shops as soon as they left the meeting…. Short of a direct order from me, there was no way of preventing the Chief Minister from visiting the control room whenever he liked; and I was not prepared to give such an order, as it would clearly have indicated complete lack of faith in him…. I can honestly say that parts of the city on Saturday (17 August) morning were as bad as anything I saw when I was with the Guards on the Somme [Somme, in France, was the scene of a fierce battle between the British and the German armies in July 1916 during the First World War].33

  Though not mentioned in the governor’s report, the British brigadier in charge of law and order in Calcutta, J.P.C. Makinlay, ‘had ordered his troops confined to barracks for the day, leaving the city naked for the mobs’.34

  An English resident of Calcutta sent a report (now in the British archives) on the riots:

  It is the unanimous decision of all that the Mohammedans struck the first blow and took many lives before the latter (Hindus) were ready. I can quote the statement of an American Consul who watched the main meeting held in Calcutta from an apartment situated atop the highest building in the city. The movement of lorries carrying the League flags and filled with supporters containing piles of bayonets and sticks as well as stones could be seen from above while they could not be seen from the street level. The horror of the next four days is now known throughout the country.35

  After the Hindus, reinforced by the Sikhs, who plied all the taxis of Calcutta, struck back, Suhrawardy sought Gandhiji’s help. The Mahatma rushed to Calcutta. His threat to fast unto death, unless the killings stopped, had an immediate therapeutic effect. And the storm died down. However, its poison spread to Bihar, which was next door, where the Hindus took the offensive to a much wider area.

  Burrows concluded his long report to the viceroy by justifying his stand: ‘It was a programme between the rival armies of the Calcutta underworld…. My special responsibility for law and order is not a “discretionary” matter. I had always to consider the susceptibilities of my Ministry.’36

  The British archives contain a copy of the Muslim League’s proclamation for ‘Direct Action Day’, published on 13 August 1946, which was forwarded to London and to New Delhi from the governor’s office. This document leaves little doubt that the governor had received advance notice of the League’s intentions. It reads like some Al–Qaida abracadabra of more than half a century later. The last paragraph of the League’s proclamation states:

  It was in Ramzan that the Quran was revealed. It was in Ramzan that the permission for Jehad was granted by Allah. It was in Ramzan that the Battle of Badr, the first open conflict between Islam and Heathenism, was fought and won by 313 Muslims (against 900 in A.D. 634) and again it was in Ramzan that 10,000 Muslims under the Holy Prophet conquered Mecca (in A.D. 630) and established the kingdom of Heaven and commonwealth of Islam in Arabia. The Muslim League is fortunate that it is starting its action in this holy month.37

  Jinnah was never held responsible by the viceroy for the Calcutta killings. On the contrary, after his visit to Calcutta, Wavell, on 28 August 1946, in his telegram to the secretary of state, exonerated the Muslim League by noting:

  Both sides had made preparations, which may or may not have been defensive.38

  He dismissed Suhrawardy’s speech of 16 August as ‘foolish’. The lesson Wavell drew from the entire episode was that the Muslim League should be persuaded to enter the Interim Government. In order to enable him to accomplish this, he wanted a definite decision to be handed down by London in favour of Jinnah’s position on groupings in the Cabinet Mission plan, namely, that the NWFP and Assam not be given the option to keep out of groups (b) and (c), respectively, before their group constitutions were drawn up.

  Thus, Wavell tried to take advantage of the Calcutta killings to implement his own policy. The impact of Calcutta massacres on the ongoing constitutional negotiations will be discussed in the following chapter. But, in any event, the killings enabled Jinnah to convincingly reinforce his contention abroad that Muslims and Hindus could not be expected to coexist in the same country. The question whether they could, in fact, be separated into two distinct compartments in the subcontinent, an equally pertinent question, was swept under the carpet.

  Wrote N.P.A. Smith, the director of the Intelligence Bureau, in a memorandum to the viceroy a little later:

  Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action [sic] which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and lead us nowhere. The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem.39

  This report was forwarded to London by the viceroy, suggesting that he approved of the director’s views.

  Notes and References

  1. Transfer of Power (TOP) X, S. No. 194.

  2. John Grigg (ed.), Nehru Memorial Lectures: 1966–91 (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, p. 139).

  3. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (W.W. Norton, New York, 1969, p. 483).

  4. CAB/127/143, 75800, Nehru to Cripps, Public Records Office, London.

  5. Ibid., Cripps to Nehru.

  6. Ibid., Nehru to Cripps.

  7. TOP VI, S. No. 796, Para 7.

  8. Ibid., S. No. 472.

  9. Ibid., S. No. 491.

  10. Ibid., S. No. 507.

  11. Attlee in the House of Commons, 15 March 1945. Quoted by V.P. Menon, Transfer of Power in India (Longman Green, London, 1957, pp. 234–35).

  12. Anita Inder Singh, cited in Patrick French, Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division (HarperCollins, London, 1995, p. 226).

  13. Francis Turnbull, CHF, 127/128, Public Records Office London.

  14. TOP VII, S. No. 86.

  15. Ibid., S. No. 105.

  16. Minutes of COS meeting of 12 April 1946, Para 6 (OIC, British Library, London).

  17. Quoted in The Asian Age, New Delhi, 14 August 1997.

  18. US FR 1946, Vol. V, p. 97.

  19. Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2001, p. 72).

  20. TOP VII, S. No. 407.

  21. Ibid.

  22. Ibid.

  23. Ibid.

  24. Claude Auchinleck’s top-secret note on the strategic implications of Pakistan, GHQ, Delhi, 16 May 1946.

  25. Ibid.

  26. Ibid.

  27. Ibid.

  28. TOP VII, S. No. 415, Para 7.

  29. COS 1046/8, Para 2 of Lord Ismay’s top-secret minute to Attlee, 30 August 1946.

  30. TOP VII, S. No. 509, Para 25 of COS Cabinet Papers, 12 June 1946.

  31. TOP VII, S. No. 495, Para 9.

  32. S
ee V.P. Menon, op. cit., pp. 234–35.

  33. TOP VIII, S. No. 197, Paras 7, 8, 9 and 14 (2).

  34. M.J. Akbar, Nehru (Viking, London, 1981, p. 382).

  35. File in Indian Office Records (IOR), L/WS/1/1030, p. 127.

  36. TOP VIII, S. No. 197.

  37. Ibid., enclosure, Para 6.

  38. TOP VIII, S. No. 206, Wavell’s report to secretary of state, 28 August 1946.

  39. TOP IX, S. No. 304, enclosure.

  9

  Nehru in the Saddle

  ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1946, ATTLEE AND CRIPPS SUCCEEDED IN SADDLING Jawaharlal Nehru with responsibility. He was made the vice-president of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in the Interim Government. The Muslim League did not join it. This council came to be popularly called the ‘cabinet’ and its vice-president, ‘prime minister’. It created a thrill of success amongst the nationalists. Jawaharlal Nehru kept the foreign affairs portfolio with him; Sardar Patel became the home minister.

  To Jinnah, this development was ominous; it might have enabled the Congress Party to consolidate its hold on the levers of power as the British power faded. It could not be called a cabinet, he told the press. ‘You cannot turn a donkey into an elephant by calling it an elephant.’ To some Englishmen it was a deal: in exchange for keeping its followers in check, the Congress Party was given responsibility for a large tranche of the Government of India. The director of the Intelligence Bureau, N.P.A. Smith, looked ahead:

  As I have said for some months, Pakistan is likely to come from “Congresstan” [the acceptance of office by Congress Party].1

  Attlee would have concurred with Smith’s forecast.