The Shadow of the Great Game

by Narendra Singh Sarila

  ** Who were these rulers? Most of the rulers belonged to the old warrior clans who had survived the Turkish onslaught of the twelfth century by relocating themselves in deserts, forests and hilly areas. [Until the tenth century India was a distinct socio-cultural-religious entity in which the warrior clans ruled (and defended) the country under a centripetal polity. This system was wrecked by the Islamic invasions.] The Muslim rulers were those who had emerged from the satrapies of the crumbling Mughal Empire in the eighteenth century. (The British had conquered most of India by defeating Muslim rulers and annexing the territories they ruled. A few made alliances with the conquerors and survived. One amongst these was the Nizam of Hyderabad.) The Maratha rulers were the scions of the Maratha commanders, who in the eighteenth century from their redoubts in the Western Ghats, had conquered all of Central India from the weakening Mughals and clashed with the advancing British. The Marhatta ruler at Poona was removed but his commanders were left to rule large territories in Central India under British paramountcy. The Sikh states were founded after the collapse of Sikh power in the Punjab in mid-nineteenth century. This happened on the death of the powerful Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, based in Lahore. Much of the Punjab was annexed, but some areas were left to be ruled by Sikh princes under British paramountcy. The Dogra Rajput ruler of Jammu and Kashmir was recognized by the British about the same time. From 1935 onwards he permitted a force, commanded by British officers, to be stationed in his Northern Territories bordering Sinkiang.

  * ‘During my absence from my office for a moment’, says Mountbatten, ‘the young Maharaja pulled out a revolver concealed in a pen and told Mr V.P. Menon, the Secretary for Indian States, that he would shoot him down like a dog if he failed the starving people of Jodhpur.’37 This was not the last of Hanwant Singh’s histrionics. During the first elections held in Jodhpur after its integration with India, he sponsored thirty-five of his own nominees as candidates who all won, defeating in the process Jaya Narain Vyas, the chief leader of the Congress Party in Rajasthan. He, however, did not live to savour his brilliant triumph, as he died in a crash of his private monoplane the same afternoon.

  * Sir Kenneth Fitze, ICS, when appointed political secretary to the Government of India, had to leave his Anglo-Indian wife back in England. His colleagues in Simla and Delhi would not accept her.

  ** A British historian has written: ‘A company’s servant of the Mutiny days, Charles Raikes, while bluntly asserting that the British “should legislate and govern India as the superior race”, added with some prevision: “Whenever that superiority ceases, our right to remain in India terminates also.” A century later the concept of racial superiority, though employed by Hitler, had become outmoded, and in addition the undoubted advantage that the British had once enjoyed over Indians in scientific knowledge, technical skill and political organization had greatly diminished as Indians from the Mutiny onwards steadily acquired the know-how that they had previously lacked. One noteworthy, but not often mentioned, example of change was the ending of the superiority of British to Indian troops, which had been a factor in the Company’s original conquest of India. By 1943 Indian Divisions, in the opinion of Field Marshal Sir William Slim, were among the best in the world.... Thus, Charles Raikes, if he had still been alive, would probably have felt obliged to admit that on his own premises the time had come for British withdrawal.’44

  12

  The Kashmir Imbroglio I: Gilgit and Poonch

  ON 25 OCTOBER 1947, ANSWERING JAWAHARLAL NEHRU’S COMPLAINT about Pakistan’s tribal-led invasion of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Attlee replied evasively: ‘The future relations of this State with Pakistan and India have obviously, from the beginning, presented a problem of difficulty, the merits of which I do not think it incumbent of me to discuss.’1 However, Britain’s policy on J&K was made explicit by the secretary of state for Commonwealth relations in an internal top-secret policy directive to the British high commissioners in Delhi and Karachi on 31 October 1947, five days after Kashmir had acceded to India:

  It would have been natural for Kashmir to eventually accede to Pakistan on agreed terms [italics added].2

  This was the pith of British policy on J&K: the state had to go to Pakistan but with India’s agreement, as was done with the NWFP. (The compromise could be the partition of the state or India receiving compensation in some other way; for example, British support to India on Hyderabad.) This did not happen: war ensued. However, the two areas of the state that Britain had absolutely marked out for Pakistan – one in the context of Britain’s world strategy and the other to ensure Pakistan’s security – were successfully kept out of Indian control and so they remain even after more than fifty-five years. These were the Northern Areas of the state along the Chinese and Soviet frontiers and the strip of territory in the west with a common border with Pakistani Punjab.

  The Northern Areas consisted of the Gilgit Agency, with its dependencies of Hunza and Nagar and the principalities of Swat and Chitral* at the northern end of the Durand line, the de facto boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lying to the north and east of the NWFP, the Gilgit Agency stretched to the Chinese province of Sinkiang (‘the new dominion’) and only a narrow strip of Afghan territory separated it from the Soviet Union. It was of no less strategic importance in British calculations than the NWFP, which Mountbatten had worked so assiduously to place in Pakistan’s hands. It may be recalled that, on 27 May 1947, speaking to Ely E. Palmer, the US diplomat in Afghanistan, Sir Olaf Caroe had drawn the American’s attention to the possibility of Soviet penetration of this area when mentioning the desirability of the establishment of Pakistan. Ever since Lord Archibald Wavell formulated the partition plan, the British expectation was that northern Kashmir would remain under their influence either as part of an independent state or as a part of Pakistan.

  Sinkiang, in the mid-1940s, had become a sort of ‘no man’s land’, full of tension. The Kuomintang Government’s authority over this province was crumbling. Mao Ze Dong’s Red Army, which, at that time, was believed to be closely allied to Soviet Russia, was expected to enter Sinkiang shortly and, according to the British and American consuls in that province, a Soviet invasion too was imminent. The British believed – and rightly too – that if India acquired Gilgit, it would not permit any anti-Soviet moves to be made from there. On the other hand, Jinnah had already agreed to cooperate with Britain on matters of defence.

  In 1935, the administrative and defence responsibilities of this northern frontier had been transferred by the Maharaja of Kashmir to the British Government of India under a sixty-year lease. As the result of the civil war in China became uncertain, the viceroy had prevailed upon him to do so in the interests of the security of the Empire. The region was administered by the Political Department from Delhi in the same way as agencies in the NWFP, such as Malakand or Khyber, with political officers stationed there reporting to the viceroy through Peshawar. A carefully chosen force capable of rapid movement in mountainous territory, and controlled by British officers (called the Gilgit Scouts), provided the muscle to the administration.

  Fifteen days before independence, i.e., on 1 August 1947, the Gilgit lease was receded by Delhi to the Maharaja of J&K and Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Bacon, the British political agent, handed over the area to Brigadier Ghansara Singh, the newly arrived state’s governor sent from Srinagar. According to V.P. Menon, ‘the Kashmir authorities did not have the resources, including financial, to hold Gilgit which was cut off from Srinagar during winters…. In view of the lapse of paramountcy the retrocession was probably inevitable; but the fact remains that no sooner was Gilgit handed over to the Maharaja than it came under the mercy of Pakistan [through the NWFP)]’.3

  The British officers of the Gilgit Scouts, Major William Alexander Brown and Captain A.S. Mathieson, remained to serve the Maharaja of J&K as contract officers, though they continued to report to, and receive instructions from, the political agent, Khyber, based in Peshawar, which
, after 14 August 1947, had become part of Pakistan. Brown and Mathieson had had to swear an oath of allegiance to the maharaja on the ‘Holy Book’. According to the historian Alistair Lamb: ‘In fact they knew as the story has it that the book which they held in their hand, while swearing, was actually the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, suitably wrapped in opaque cloth.’4 The new wazir or governor occupied his official residence ‘in the grandeur of impotence’; it was Brown and Mathieson who held the keys to power in Gilgit. Lieutenant-Colonel Bacon, on transfer from Gilgit, was given the Khyber post. This ensured perfect coordination between the Gilgit Scouts and Peshawar. According to the Bulletin of Military Historical Society of Great Britain: ‘The broad post-partition plan had been discussed by [Major] Brown and the Colonel [Bacon] in June [1947].’ And after Mathieson arrived (in Gilgit), as second in command, ‘the two British Officers refined contingency measures, should the Maharaja take his State over to India’.5

  In such a situation, whatever the fate of the rest of J&K, delivering Gilgit to Pakistan was fairly straightforward. This was accomplished on the night of 31 October 1947, apparently according to the already worked-out plan. As soon as Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India, Brown got the Gilgit Scouts to surround the Residency and, after a short gun battle in which he lost a scout, he imprisoned Governor Ghansara Singh. Peshawar was then informed by Brown about the accession of Gilgit to Pakistan. On 2 November the major raised the Pakistani flag at his headquarters and informed the force that they now served the government in Karachi (then the capital of Pakistan). Brown and Mathieson had opted for service in Pakistan on the maharaja signing the Instrument of Accession in favour of India. Since Gilgit by this act had become a part of India, properly, they should have made an immediate request for release from their appointments. Their staying on and the action they took were political in nature.

  Brown described his action as a ‘coup d’état’. Alistair Lamb has written three books during the last fifteen years on J&K, imaginatively upholding the Pakistani point of view. He says:

  Brown was certainly not acting as a party to a British conspiracy…. There existed, however, a small number of British soldiers and officials who, in a private capacity as friends of Pakistan, encouraged Brown and Mathieson to be in Gilgit on the eve of the Transfer of Power. Moreover, what happened subsequently came as no surprise to someone like Colonel Bacon…[who] certainly acted as a liaison between Major Brown in Gilgit and the Government of Pakistan, and in this respect he may have contributed significantly to the success of Gilgit coup d’état. Colonel Bacon, however, in no way represented the policy of the British Government in London…. Neither [Colonel] Bacon…nor indeed [Colonel] Iskandar Mirza, Defence Secretary to Government of Pakistan, [was] particularly unhappy when they heard about what was going on.6

  Sir George Cunningham, the new governor of the NWFP, ‘on hearing of Brown’s coup in Gilgit instructed him and his colleague Mathieson…to restore order’.7 Cunningham totally ignored the fact that J&K, of which Gilgit was a part, had acceded to India. Nor did the King in England frown upon the coup. An entry in the 1948 London Gazette reads: ‘The King has been graciously pleased on the occasion of the celebration of His Majesty’s Birthday to give orders for the following appointments to the Most Exalted Order of the British Empire: “Brown, Major (Acting) William Alexander, Special List (ex-Indian Army)”.’ The abovementioned Military Bulletin, which cites the above award, thereafter states: ‘No further details are available from official sources for what might have been recorded as a somewhat equivocal award.’

  Soon Major Aslam Khan, once the deputy to Major Khurshid Anwar (one of the Pakistan Army officers who had helped to organize and lead the Pakistani tribal invasion of Kashmir) arrived to take over control of Gilgit. Apparently, there was some resistance from a few chiefs at the transfer to Pakistan and, in fact, a republic called ‘Gilgit-Astore’ had been proclaimed in the interregnum. However, Aslam Khan was able to suppress this movement and the republic of ‘Gilgit-Astore’ sank without a trace.

  Says Lamb:

  Pakistan would retain a direct territorial contact with China to be of immense geo-political significance in years to come. India would not acquire the direct territorial contact either with Afghanistan or with the NWFP and thus miss the consequent opportunities for intrigues with Pathans both in and outside Pakistan to the detriment of that country’s integrity. It was a failure of India which would unquestionably contribute towards the survival of West Pakistan in future years.8

  Throughout the Kashmir war, right from 22 October 1947 to 1 January 1949 (when a ceasefire was proclaimed that left Gilgit in Pakistan’s hands), Britain successfully ensured that Pakistan’s occupation of this region was not disturbed. The military threat to Pakistan in Gilgit first arose in December 1947. This was after Mountbatten’s mediatory role, and after the direct talks between Nehru and Liaqat Ali Khan had collapsed and the Indian Cabinet girded up its loins for a full-scale war. However, Mountbatten was able to persuade Nehru that alongside preparations for military action he should seek the help of the United Nations. He argued ‘that the UN would promptly direct Pakistan to withdraw the raiders, which would make war unnecessary’.9 And Nehru believed him. Nor did the Indian prime minister anticipate how far the Security Council would come in the way of India’s military options. But that is a different matter; the military threat to Gilgit had been removed.

  Another alarm about Indian military moves against Gilgit was sounded in late 1948. On 1 November, Indian tanks crossed the Himalayan range through the 3500-metre-high Zojila Pass. Never before had tanks been used at such heights anywhere in the world. This crossing opened the passage to Ladakh in the east and via Kargil, Skardu and the Indus Valley to Gilgit in the north. General Sir Douglas Gracey, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, in a briefing in Karachi a few months earlier, had analysed the dangers of an Indian push towards the northwest as follows:

  It would have placed [sic] the Indian army to reach the boundaries of the Pakistani State of Chitral and Swat (west of Gilgit) and establish a physical link with the leaders of the anti-Pakistan movement for independent Pathanistan.… It would have opened the opportunity also for a pincers movement against Pakistan by India and Afghanistan, the latter having shown a suspicious interest in the Pathan movement.10

  The Zojila crossing was a false alarm. The Indians had crossed the Himalayas to save Leh, the capital of Ladakh, from being occupied by Pakistan. In mid-February 1948, a Pakistan Army column had started to move from Gilgit towards Ladakh, with Leh as its target. This column had been halted for six months at Skardu, where the maharaja’s forces put up stiff resistance. But, by September, it was marching again up the Indus. It must be noted that since most Ladakhis were (and are) Buddhists, it cannot be argued that ‘the tribesmen’ were wanting to liberate Muslims there.

  How the Gilgit issue together with the rest of the state of J&K was tackled at the United Nations is for the next chapter. Suffice it to highlight here the reasons the British gave to the Americans why they wanted Gilgit to go to Pakistan. Matters came to a head in August 1948 after the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) proposed the withdrawal of Pakistani troops that had entered Kashmir (which would include Pakistani withdrawal from Gilgit also). This proposal was against British policy. However, the Americans continued to support a Pakistani withdrawal on the ground that the state’s accession to India could not be questioned until India lost the proposed plebiscite. It was at that stage that Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, decided to talk frankly to George Marshall, the American secretary of state. Bevin spoke to Marshall on 27 October 1948 when the two were present in Paris for the UN General Assembly meeting. After observing ‘that Nehru since he was a Kashmiri Hindu was very emotional and intransigent on the subject’, Bevin added:

  The main issue was who would control the main artery leading into Central Asia. The Indian proposals would leave that in their hands…11

&nbs
p; Bevin had let the cat out of the bag: that the issue concerning Gilgit was strategic and not one of the legality or the presence or otherwise of the Pakistani forces there. The ‘main artery’ into Central Asia that Bevin had referred to was the British-built track from Gilgit to Kashgar in Sinkiang, via the 4709-metre-high Mintaka Pass, across the mighty Karakoram range. (This artery had been an important link for them with their Consulate General in Kashgar, which maintained a British presence north of the Karakoram.)

  From the internal telegrams exchanged between the State Department in Washington and the US delegation to the UN in Paris, it is evident that Bevin failed to carry the Americans along.

  Simple cease-fire order (as the British were insisting on) without provisions for truce and plebiscite would imply sanctioning of Pakistani troops [italics added] and would not only be inconsistent with provisions of SC (Security Council) and UNCIP approach but would [also] be highly unacceptable to GOI (Government of India).12

  wired back Washington to its delegation in Paris on 11 November 1948.

  Accordingly, the US delegate to the UN, John Foster Dulles, on 20 November 1948, told Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British delegate to the UN: ‘Difficulties involved in immediate cease-fire remain substantial without overall political settlement and in the light of India’s claim to this area [Gilgit].’13

  Let us now for a moment look at India’s policy towards Gilgit. Nehru first briefed Mountbatten on J&K through a note on 17 June 1947: ‘The State consists of roughly 3 parts: Kashmir Proper, Jammu and Ladakh [Baltistan, Skardu and Kargil].’ The note altogether omitted to describe Gilgit as a part of the state. Such a document coming from the future prime minister could have created the impression in London that the Indian leaders had ceased to consider Gilgit as a part of J&K (possibly because of the lease). It could have emboldened those planning Brown’s ‘coup’. However, on 25 October 1947, after Pakistan attempted to seize J&K through the tribal invasion, Nehru wrote to Attlee as follows: