The Shadow of the Great Game

by Narendra Singh Sarila

  Another factor that distinctly influenced the situation was Nehru’s offer to Mountbatten to chair the Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet. It was this committee and not the Indian Cabinet as a whole that made the decisions on Kashmir war policy. This position gave the governor-general enormous power to influence the course of the fighting. After Mountbatten had lived up to his bargain to place the princely states in the Indian Union in July and August 1947, Nehru (as well as Patel and Gandhiji) had come to trust his word. The Indian leaders were also moved by Lady Edwina Mountbatten’s indefatigable efforts to provide solace to the suffering by touring refugee camps and hospitals day in and day out. Nehru and the Mountbattens had come close to each other. The Indian was less able to separate affairs of state from personal feelings than the Englishman.

  General Kulwant Singh, GOC, Kashmir Operations, had prepared a plan in November 1947 to clear the invaders from the entire belt (referred to above) along the Pakistan border. General Roy Bucher, the acting British commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, with support from Mountbatten (chairing the Defence Committee), opposed Kulwant Singh’s plan as being too risky. And though Nehru and the other ministers pressed for an attack, Kulwant Singh was instructed ‘not to take unnecessary risks’. On 9 November, Mountbatten left for London to attend the wedding of Princess Elizabeth with Prince Phillip.* Mountbatten’s absence gave Kulwant Singh an opportunity to interpret his chief Bucher’s order in his own way and, within fifteen days, his troops had relieved the towns of Kotli, Jhangar and Naoshera from tribal occupation and were able to reinforce the besieged town of Poonch. He could not, however, take back Mirpur, Domel and Muzaffarabad, situated near the Pakistan border.

  On returning from London on 14 November, Mountbatten wrote to Nehru as follows: ‘I have on several occasions repeated my views on the question of sending Indian troops into western areas…. During my absence in London this object changed. It thus evidently became the purpose of the Government of India to impose their military will on the Poonch and Mirpur areas.’53

  Admittedly, some portions of the uncharacteristically stiff letter to Nehru were meant for Attlee’s eyes. In London, he had been made wise to the alarming allegations being made against him for siding with India against Pakistan. The cheerleader of this campaign was none other than his former godfather, Winston Churchill: ‘Muslims were Britain’s friends and that it was terrible that an Englishman and a cousin of the King should now support Britain’s enemies against them.’54 Mountbatten later said: ‘He accused me of having planned and organized the first victory of Hindustan against Pakistan by sending British-trained soldiers and British equipment to crush and suppress the Muslims in Kashmir.’55

  The Indian success in stemming the Pakistani advance by flying in troops into the state had resulted in the welling up of frustration in all those Englishmen who saw India and the Hindus as their enemy. Most of the British officers who had decided, at the time of withdrawal, to serve on in the subcontinent had opted for service in Pakistan. Over 500 British personnel held positions in the Pakistan Army, and many in the Civil Service and the Political Department. The governors of Pakistan provinces such as Sir Francis Mudie in West Punjab and Sir George Cunningham in the NWFP were Britishers. Only some of them would fight for Pakistan in Kashmir, but most supported Pakistan’s efforts there. When the Indians complained to London about British officers taking part in the Kashmir war, some of whom were killed, A.V. Alexander, the minister of defence, agreed with Noel-Baker that: ‘It would be wise not to probe too deeply into the matter.’56

  C. Dasgupta has written:

  The course and outcome of the first India–Pakistan war cannot be understood if we overlook the fact that the two contestants had yet to establish full national control over their respective armed forces…. The international factor is particularly important in wars in the third world.… Decisive results must be speedily achieved before major powers can intervene. The role of Mountbatten and the British Service Chiefs made it virtually impossible for India to meet this requirement in 1947–48.… The British Government was kept informed at every stage and was thus enabled to take diplomatic steps to close India’s military options.57

  The truth of these observations was proved time and time again during the struggle for the possession of the western belt of Kashmir’s territory during 1947–48. In November 1947 Nehru proposed a ‘cordon sanitaire’, or a demilitarized zone, to be established along the frontier with West Punjab with orders that any observed movement within it should be attacked from the air after due notice. According to H.V. Hodson:

  They [Indians] were so insistent that Lord Mountbatten had to temporize by getting the proposal referred to Joint Planning Staff. He made sure meanwhile that the report would be adverse and so it was. The Ministers then gave up the idea without argument.58

  On 3 December 1947 Bucher made an effort to get the Defence Committee to accept the evacuation of Poonch, which, according to British thinking, had to be left with Pakistan. However, Nehru was able to shoot down this proposal despite the support Bucher received from Mountbatten. On the other hand, the commander-in-chief succeeded in getting shelved the push from Uri to Domel to clear the Jhelum Valley till the next spring. He also succeeded in getting dropped the plan to destroy the bridges across the Kishan Ganga river, which would have cut off Muzaffarabad from Pakistan.

  The struggle for control of this territory continued throughout 1948. During March that year, General K.M. Cariappa, the new GOC-in-C in the area, was able to reoccupy Jhangar and beat back a powerful Pakistani attack on Naoshera. In April the Indian troops entered Rajouri town and thus the Jammu–Naoshera lines of communication were restored. Cariappa had taken care not to inform the Army Headquarters about his operational plans. According to his biographer, Cariappa had to fight ‘two enemies, Army Headquarters headed by Roy Bucher, and the Pakistan Army headed by [Frank] Messervy’.59

  Bucher admitted to Gracey, the Pakistan C-in-C, that he had no control over Cariappa but hit upon an intriguing scheme to now stop the advance of his own army. Graffety Smith, British high commissioner in Karachi, reported to London the arrangements reached privately between the commanders-in-chiefs of the two dominions. General Bucher indicated to General Gracey that ‘he had no wish to pursue an offensive into what is effectively Azad Kashmir-controlled territory, i.e., to Mirpur and Poonch sector…. The object of these arrangements is to reach a situation in which each side will remain in undisputed military occupation of what are roughly their present positions…. An essential part of the process…is that three battalions of the Pakistan army should be employed in Kashmir opposite the Indian forces at Jhangar in or around Poonch and at Uri [italics added].… The Pakistan Prime Minister is aware of the exchanges I have reported above, but I understand he feels unable at present to endorse this officially.’60 Further, Bucher told Gracey that he would try to get Indian troops withdrawn from Poonch.

  Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, the leader of the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir’ Government, spilled the beans on this secret pact. He was so delighted that the Indian side had referred to, and thus recognized, ‘Azad Kashmir’ that he issued a press statement on 31 March 1948 to proclaim the same. It said: ‘His Government had been approached by India for a ceasefire.’ The Indian Government repudiated Bucher’s initiative, but there is no record of his being pulled up.

  Mountbatten too wanted to neutralize Indian military initiatives. He told General Gracey, the Pakistani Army’s commander-in-chief, who visited Delhi on 2 May 1948:

  I pointed out [to Gracey] that, if we could get the two Governments to…feel themselves thoroughly militarily impotent, then this appeared to be the best chance of reducing the risk of war after my departure.*61

  Nehru and the Indian Cabinet had no such intention. Terence Shone, the UK high commissioner in India, warned London on 14 May 1948 that the Indians intended to press ahead from Uri to Domel.62 The regular Pakistan Army had by now entered Kashmir. On 8 May 1948, the US mili
tary attaché in Delhi had cabled Washington:

  Pakistan has three regular…Army battalions in Kashmir now one vicinity Uri, one vicinity Poonch and one vicinity Mirpur.… Pakistan on practical war footing along entire India–Pakistan border Bahawalpur State to Domel.… Lack [of] supplies and reserves would mean short but bloody engagement; with India certain and quick victor…63

  As a result of the Pakistani reinforcements, the Indian two-pronged attack to capture Domel and Muzaffarabad fizzled out. Tithwal, north of Uri, was captured but the advance on the Jhelum road did not proceed beyond 10 kilometres west of Uri. Soon thereafter, the members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) arrived and India suspended operations for the duration of their stay in the subcontinent.

  How the ceasefire was agreed to is for the next chapter, which deals with the story as it unfolded at the UN. The intensified fighting and the diplomacy that preceded it are also touched upon.

  Notes and References

  1. File L/P&S/13/1845 B (Oriental and Indian Collection, British Library, London). Cited in C. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947–48 (Sage, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 54–55).

  2. Ibid.

  3. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1961, p. 415).

  4. Alistair Lamb, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947–1948 (Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, 1997, p. 191).

  5. Bulletin of Military Historical Society of Great Britain, Vol. 46, No. 182, 1995 (OIC, British Library, London).

  6. Alistair Lamb, Incomplete Partition, p. 239, and Birth of Tragedy (Wisdom Books, Ilford, Essex, 1994, p. 120).

  7. MSS EUR D670 (OIC, British Library, London).

  8. Alistair Lamb, Incomplete Partition, p. 193.

  9. File MSS EUR F200/246 (OIC, British Library, London). Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 100.

  10. Quoted in Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Oxford University Press, New York and Karachi, 2002, p. 138).

  11. US FR 1948, Vol. V, p. 434.

  12. Ibid., pp. 448–49.

  13. Ibid., p. 456.

  14. Nehru to Attlee, 25 October 1947 in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. IV (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, pp. 274–75).

  15. Stanley Wolpert, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p. 435).

  16. US FR 1948, Vol. V, p. 356.

  17. Korbel, op. cit., p. 124.

  18. Ibid., p. 131.

  19. Lars Blinkenberg, India and Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts, Vol. I (Odense University Press, Odense, Denmark, 1998, p. 116).

  20. Ibid.

  21. US FR 1948, Vol. VII, pp. 729–30. US consul (John Hall Paxton) in Tihwa to the secretary of state.

  22. Quoted in Korbel, op. cit., pp. 138–39.

  23. V.P. Menon, op. cit., p. 394.

  24. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Oxford University Press edition, Delhi, 2000, p. 442).

  25. Mountbatten’s report of talk with Jinnah on 1 November 1947. Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. X (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).

  26. Karan Singh, Heir Apparent (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982, pp. 47–48).

  27. Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten (Collins, London, 1985, p. 445).

  28. V.P. Menon, op. cit., p. 395.

  29. Report on ‘The Last Viceroyalty’, Part E, Para 69 (OIC, British Library, London).

  30. Governor-general’s Interview No. 17, 10 October 1947, Broadland Archives (BA), University of Southampton, D 74.

  31. File L/P&S/13/1226, W.P. Webb’s reports (OIC, British Library, London).

  32. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p. 446.

  33. File L/P&S/13/1226, W.P. Webb’s reports (OIC, British Library, London).

  34. File L/P&S/13/1845B, General Victor Scott’s reports (OIC, British Library, London).

  35. Lars Blinkenberg, op. cit., p. 76.

  36. Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. X (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, pp. 49–50).

  37. Ibid., p. 42.

  38. Major General Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Army Publishers, Karachi, 1992 edition, p. 33).

  39. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (New Age Publishers, Delhi, 1994, p. 230).

  40. Major General Akbar Khan, op. cit., p. 68.

  41. Ibid., p. 191.

  42. V.P. Menon, op. cit., p. 413.

  43. Governor-general’s personal report to the King, 7 November 1947, Para 28 (other personal reports from 15 August 1947 to June 1948 not released).

  44. Ibid., Para 30.

  45. Government of India’s White Paper, March 1948, on Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 47–48. Cited in Lars Blinkenberg, op. cit., p. 78.

  46. MBI/G25, BA, University of Southampton.

  47. File L/P&S/136/1845–46 (OIC, British Library, London). Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 59.

  48. Ibid. Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 56.

  49. Ibid. Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 59.

  50. File L/P&S/136/1845–46, Attlee to Liaqat Ali Khan, 29 October 1947 (OIC, British Library, London). Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 60.

  51. Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. X (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, p. 81).

  52. Mountbatten’s personal report, 7 September 1947, Para 63.

  53. File L/WS/1/1139, telegram from high commissioner to CRO, 28 November 1947 incorporating the text of the message (OIC, British Library, London). Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 68.

  54. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 461.

  55. Ibid.

  56. Alistair Lamb, Incomplete Partition, p. 242.

  57. Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 109.

  58. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p. 403.

  59. Brigadier C.B. Khanduri, Field Marshal Cariappa: His Life and Times (Lancer, New Delhi, 1995, pp.165–66).

  60. File L/WS/1/1141, Graffety Smith to CRO, Telegram No. 294, 26 March 1948/1 April 1948 (OIC, British Library, London). Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 138–39.

  61. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1976, pp. 292–94).

  62. File L/WS/1/1142, Terence Shone to CRO, 14 May 1948 (OIC, British Library, London). Cited in Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 144.

  63. US FR 1948, Vol. V, pp. 340–41.

  * The ruler of Chitral, in the nineteenth century, had accepted a ‘tributary relationship’ with the Maharaja of J&K and this move was confirmed in 1914 by Britain. On 6 October 1947 the Chitral ruler formally repudiated all ties with J&K, and, on 2 November 1947, formally acceded to Pakistan.

  * Both the towns, Kashgar and Yarkand in Sinkiang, lay on the old silk route between Europe and China.

  * Before the ‘basket of princes’ promised by Mountbatten had been delivered to him, which happened around 15 August 1947, Patel was more flexible on Kashmir. The viceroy was helping to place in the Indian dominion an area spread over 500,000 square miles with a population of 86.5 million, comprising the princely states. Patel was more concerned with them and also in obtaining Mountbatten’s help to discourage the Nizam of Hyderabad from seeking independence for his state. It was after Pakistan tried to seize J&K by force through a barbaric attack that Patel became the most indefatigable crusader against Pakistan on Kashmir.

  * The British resident in J&K had reported from Srinagar on 1 November 1946: ‘I am inclined to think that the Maharaja and Kak [prime minister of J&K from 1945 onwards] are seriously considering the possibility of Kashmir not joining the…(Indian) Union if it is formed…. The Maharaja’s attitude is, I suspect, that once Paramountcy disappears Kashmir will have to stand on its own feet, and that the question of loyalty to the British Government will not arise and that Kashmir will be free to ally herself with any Power – not excluding Russia – if she chooses.’

  * Rajindar Singh was the first Indian to be awarded the Mahavir Chakra (posthumously) after India’s independence.

  * ‘The Kas
hmir dispute started life as a contest over rights to a territory, not to establish the wishes of people’, remarks the historian Alistair Lamb in his work Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947–1948 (Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, 1997).

  * Almost all non-Pakistani writers have come to the conclusion that the accession of J&K was legally complete when the governor-general had signed the Instrument of Accession on 27 October 1947. The US Government recognized the accession. For a discussion on this issue see Lars Blikenberg, India and Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts, Vol. I (Odense University Press, Odense, Denmark, 1998, pp. 79–82). A few writers believe the accession did not come into force because of the letter written by Mountbatten; its coming into force is conditional on an approval by the population of Kashmir.

  In this controversy, the intention of the man who accepted the Instrument of Accession is important. Mountbatten, in an aide mémoire, to Lord Ismay after he had left India has explained: ‘This decision to hold a plebiscite in no way invalidated the legality of the accession of Kashmir to India. The position then was that Kashmir was legally part of the Dominion of India and the voluntary, unilateral, decision to hold [a] plebiscite to confirm this was only intended to be held after the tribesmen had been withdrawn and peaceful conditions had been restored throughout Kashmir.’46