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No Exit from Pakistan
they fear Indian competition, most relish the thought of cracking into India’s
vast and growing market. Joint ventures with Indian counterparts would open
new and lucrative vistas for Pakistanis who have tapped out their domestic
market and find it difficult to work in China or the Middle East.65
In late 2011, Pakistan’s business community supported moves by Islam-
abad to expand cross border trade by granting Most Favored Nation status to
India.66 In return, New Delhi moved to allow greater Pakistani direct invest-
ment in India. The positive response was immediate. For example, the Nishat
group, one of the largest conglomerates in Pakistan, jumped at the opportu-
nity, announcing that it had applied to open Indian branches of its Muslim
Commercial Bank.67
It is in Washington’s interest to support the natural inclinations of
Pakistan’s business community, at least with respect to deepening their ties
with India. Only a strategy of comprehensive cooperation would permit this
sort of involvement. Washington might, for instance, enact specific U.S. trade
policies designed to promote trade and investment between all three countries,
or invest in infrastructure projects like roads, ports, and rail lines, designed to
link India and Pakistan.
By building a comprehensive cooperation with Pakistan, Washington would
stand a better chance of avoiding scenarios – as described in Chapter 6 –
in which closer U.S. ties with New Delhi translate into greater tensions with
Islamabad and, in a worst case, spark conflict with Beijing as well. If the United
States can find a way to work with both India and Pakistan, Washington will
also be better placed to keep an eye on Chinese activities throughout the region
and, if necessary, to compete with Beijing for influence. Cooperation with
Pakistan’s business community and civilian officials – in addition to relation-
ships with the Pakistani military – would open windows to developments on
the ground that would otherwise escape American notice.
Tipping the Balance . . . Slightly
The clearest shortcoming of a comprehensive cooperation strategy is that it
takes two to tango. America’s outreach and aid to Pakistan cannot work with-
out willing partners on the other side. Washington can, for instance, fund the
65 “Pakistan Businesses Want Trade Barriers to India Cut,” Indo-Asian News Service, http://in
.news.yahoo.com/pakistan-businesses-want-trade-barriers-india-cut-134801058.html. On the Indian business community’s interest in opening to Pakistan, see Jim Yardley, “Industry in India Helps Open a Door to the World,” New York Times, March 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/04/01/world/asia/private-sector-helps-propel-india-onto-world-stage.html.
66 Zeeshan Haider, “Pakistan Grants India Most Favoured Nation Trade Status,” Reuters, November 2, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/02/us-pakistan-india-trade-id USTRE7A13VE20111102.
67 James Crabtree and Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistani Tycoon Targets Indian Banking,” Financial Times, July 17, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0aeabe48-cfdd-11e1-a3d2-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz20t4AlElB.
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America’s Options
233
construction of a Diamer Bhasha Dam, but it cannot fix Pakistan’s energy
regulations, or reform broken distribution and budgetary practices that today
squander power production capacity that Pakistan already has. The best the
United States can hope to do with a comprehensive cooperation strategy is to
tip Pakistan’s balance.
With potential thus measured at the margins, it will be difficult for U.S.
leaders to justify the time, political capital, or resources to Pakistan that such
a strategic approach would require for success. If present trends hold, it is
only a matter of time before the U.S. assistance authorized by the Kerry-Lugar-
Berman legislation is scaled back, or perhaps even ended altogether. The U.S.
Congress is not likely to continue funneling scarce resources to a Pakistan that
has proven decidedly unhelpful in Afghanistan and which has gone out of its
way on several occasions to stick a high-profile finger in America’s eye – for
instance, by jailing the Pakistani doctor who assisted U.S. efforts to find Osama
bin Laden.68
Moreover, even if Washington’s lawmakers and the White House were some-
how convinced to take another run at comprehensive cooperation, serious
questions would linger about whether the United States is up to the task of
turning its dialogues and dollars into constructive change. Patience would be
thin from the very beginning.
grappling with difficult choices
One problem with framing a clear set of three strategic options is that it
implies U.S. officials might actually sit down, pick one approach over the
others, and stick to it. As a practical matter, Washington is more likely to
cobble together a set of policies to address whatever appears to be the most
urgent need of the day. This scattershot approach is not unique to Pakistan;
it is a reflection of Washington’s bureaucratic and institutional rifts as well
as competing national priorities. Pakistan’s complexity also makes it especially
resistant to any single strategy, not to mention that it suffers from never-ending
crises that can make long-term plans and investments feel like an exercise in
futility.
Yet perpetual crisis management is not a recipe for enduring success in
Pakistan. It is more likely to yield confusion, frustration, and disappointment
on all sides. Skeptical Pakistanis will draw their own dark conclusions about
U.S. motives and policies. Other states in the region will hedge their bets,
uncertain of U.S. commitments. Americans too will struggle to explain how
the various pieces of U.S. policy fit together.
68 Declan Walsh and Ismail Khan, “New Details Emerge on Conviction of Pakistani Who Aided Bin Laden Search,” New York Times, May 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/
world/asia/new-details-on-conviction-of-shakil-afridi-pakistani-doctor-who-aided-cia-in-track ing-osama-bin-laden.html.
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No Exit from Pakistan
All of these problems could be swept away if any one of America’s strategic
options offered the realistic prospect of a bright new future with Pakistan.
The reality is that all of the options are flawed. The United States is left with
difficult choices. Moreover, those choices will be circumscribed by events inside
Pakistan, including the country’s selection of new leaders, whether through
the normal process of elections and promotions, or the drama of coups and
revolutions. To these Pakistani developments, America will have no choice but
to respond.
If someone like General Baig, the anti-American former army c
hief, ever
assumes power again in Islamabad, a strategy leaning heavily toward defensive
insulation would undoubtedly be Washington’s best option. Pakistan would
be an adversary, in league with countries like Iran and North Korea, and
committed to a policy of standing up to the United States.
Fortunately, we are not living in such a world. Not quite yet. Until we are, the
United States should avoid strategies that would accelerate a downward slide
in U.S.-Pakistan relations by playing into Pakistan’s worst fears and tendencies.
Retreating to an increasingly unilateral, coercive, and India-centric approach
would do exactly that.
A military-first approach to Pakistan would also do more harm than good.
It is clear that Pakistan’s civilian leaders are no paragons of virtue; even their
commitment to democratic principles can be called into question. Yet no white
knight on horseback has ever saved Pakistan from misrule for very long. Wash-
ington should not forget the debacle of Musharraf’s final years or fall victim to
the false hope that the next general will have a formula for governing Pakistan
that his uniformed predecessors, from Zia back to Ayub, did not.
Even more frightening, the enticing short-term gains from military rule –
unity of command, efficiency, reduced corruption – pale in comparison to the
corrosive effects of politicizing the military, an institution whose profession-
alism is central to its legitimacy and whose unity is central to national sta-
bility. Whenever the Pakistani army plays politics, it plays a dangerous game
that could end in bloody revolution. That would be a tragedy for millions of
Pakistanis. It would endanger any security gains that Washington was seeking
from military cooperation in the first place.
Finally, although USAID officials may point to ongoing development
projects throughout Pakistan and eager diplomats on both sides may express
their desire to reengage in dialogue after a trying couple of years, the reality is
that comprehensive cooperation of the sort envisioned in the early Obama years
died with bin Laden, if not before.69 Senators and representatives in Washing-
ton are more inclined to consider legislation to end assistance to Pakistan than
69 For an example of this eager rhetoric, see Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks in July 2012 in “Hillary Clinton Looks for Hope with Pakistan,” Associated Press, July 8, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78200.html.
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America’s Options
235
to debate how best to improve or reform USAID’s efforts.70 Most of Pakistan’s
politicians also view U.S. partnership as radioactive. It is not hard to imagine
that Islamabad might play to public sentiment and reject U.S. partnership and
assistance programs altogether, following the example set in May 2011 by
Shahbaz Sharif, chief minister of Punjab and brother of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif.71
Flawed as any of America’s options are, any one of them would be bet-
ter than chasing the mirage of a clean escape from Pakistan and its troubles.
To be sure, the United States could pull its military, intelligence, and diplo-
matic officials out of Pakistan. For a time, U.S. officials could even willfully
ignore or neglect Pakistan, hoping that its nuclear arsenal, violent extrem-
ists, burgeoning population, and tense regional relationships would all sort
themselves out without threatening important American interests. Yet nothing
about Pakistan’s history or likely future trajectory could reasonably lead to
that conclusion. One way or another, America will be forced to grapple with
the challenges posed by Pakistan, even if that means selecting from a slate of
unattractive policy options.
A Glimmer of Hope
If short-term crisis management is a bad idea and each of Washington’s main
options is unappealing, might there still be a constructive way to deal with
this mess? There is. But the prescription is neither especially neat nor entirely
satisfying.
The United States should begin by recognizing that Pakistan is not a lost
cause. It is more like a race that must be run as a marathon rather than a
sprint. American timelines and expectations need to reflect Pakistan’s scale and
complexity. The next generation of Americans will come of age in a world
where al-Qaeda may be history and the U.S. war in Afghanistan is but a
dim memory, but by mid-century Pakistan will grow to be the world’s fourth
largest (and largest majority-Muslim) country, sitting nuclear-armed on the
border of two other Asian giants, China and India. The threats posed by a
giant Pakistani spoiler state in an increasingly important neighborhood can-
not be ignored, but they may have to be managed or mitigated rather than
solved.
Along the way, U.S. policymakers should seek to determine which pieces
of defensive insulation, military cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation
can be combined so as to maximize the strengths inherent to each approach. In
70 See, for instance, Manu Raju and Tomer Ovadia, “Paul May Hold Up Senate over Pak-
istan,” Politico, July 12, 2012, http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2012/07/paul-may-hold-up-senate-over-pakistan-128794.html.
71 “It’s Time to Say ‘No’ to Foreign Aid: Shahbaz Sharif,” Express Tribune, May 17, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/169730/no-to-foreign-aid-for-punjab-shahbaz-sharif/.
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No Exit from Pakistan
other words, they should ask the following question: What mixture of policies
will best allow the United States to prepare for the worst, aim for the best, and
avoid past mistakes?
Preparing for the worst means, for instance, investing in new technolo-
gies, including next-generation drones, that would help the United States
conduct certain counterterror operations inside Pakistan even if Islamabad
turns increasingly hostile; continuing to build America’s homeland defenses;
improving international controls on the flow of money, weapons, and people
that support terrorist networks; and contemplating what sorts of military and
diplomatic relationships with Pakistan’s neighbors, especially Afghanistan and
India, would be needed in the event that Pakistan takes a slide toward deeper
instability. In sum, Washington must adopt important pieces of the defensive
insulation strategy in order to protect its people and interests.
Aiming for the best means pursuing all of those steps only so far as is
possible without slamming the door on U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. That will
be a tricky balance. Aiming for the best also means seizing opportunities to
support Pakistanis who are already working hard to promote development and
peace inside their own society; encouraging Indo-Pakistani normalization as
cultivating better working relationships between military and intelligence on
both sides; and bearing in mind that Pakistan’s society is a remarkably youthful
one, so investments in that rising generation will have the potential to take
Pakistan along a different and more positive trajectory than it has traveled for
its first six decades. In sum, this means pursuing comprehensive cooperation
when possible, with the goal of tipping the balance toward stability inside
Pakistan and improved U.S.-Pakistan ties over time.
Avoiding past mistakes means studying the history of the U.S.-Pakistan rela-
tionship and recognizing that many present dilemmas bear more than a passing
resemblance to earlier predicaments. In particular, it means appreciating the
dangers inherent in over-reliance on Pakistan’s military and repressive, often
corrupt, civilian elites without overestimating the capacity of the Pakistani
reformers; avoiding statements and policies that irritate and humiliate without
the prospect of delivering a powerful coercive blow; and never forgetting that
Pakistani leaders will calculate their interests for themselves, often in ways that
are frustratingly at odds with our own perspectives and preferences.
At present, the ideal mix of U.S. strategies should tilt toward defensive insu-
lation. This is true for both political and strategic reasons. Politically, Wash-
ington should not waste energy attempting new and ambitious cooperative
ventures with Islamabad that would only prove unpopular in both capitals.
Strategically, U.S. concerns about the endgame in Afghanistan, Islamabad’s
persistent attachment to violent extremist organizations such as LeT, and the
fact that Pakistan may lurch into greater internal instability or anti-American
hostility all mean that America’s leaders must, first and foremost, gird against
security threats.
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Daniel S Markey Page 49