Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander

by Stephen English

  The final campaign we need to look at in terms of Persian activity in the Archaic period is the invasion of Thrace and Scythia by Darius in 513.42 It is difficult to know what Darius was intending with this campaign; he could have been preparing the ground for a later invasion of Greece by securing Thrace as a base of operations and ensuring the security of what would be his northern flank. It could equally be that the campaign was the aim in and of itself, simply to expand Persian rule into Thrace and across the Danube. Either way, he invaded Europe by crossing the Bosporus on a bridge constructed by the Greek mercenaries he had hired from Asia Minor, who created the structure by lashing triremes together, thus demonstrating that they were capable of more than just fighting and dying for the highest bidder, but that they were skilled engineers also.

  Once across the pontoon bridge Darius had no difficulty in suppressing Thrace. The Thracians were a proud and resilient warrior society, but their tribes were small and disparate and therefore easily fell prey to the invading Persians. Thrace was also a major source of mercenary peltasts within Greece in the fourth century. 43 Darius wasted no time in beginning the campaign against the Scythians and marched straight towards the Danube, where he crossed another pontoon bridge, this time built by his Ionian Greeks.

  Darius had originally ordered the pontoon bridge to be destroyed once he had crossed, and for the Ionian Greeks to join him on the campaign, but one of the Greek commanders persuaded him of the wisdom of keeping the bridge intact, and also indicated that the Scythians were unlikely to offer battle but would use guerrilla tactics, which in the end is exactly what happened. Darius evidently trusted his Ionian Greeks as he rescinded the order to destroy the bridge, and left a force of Ionian Greeks to guard it when he marched north of the Danube. 44

  The campaign went as predicted, with the Scythians refusing to offer battle. The major issue to note is that the Scythians evidently approached the Greek allied troops guarding the bridge with a proposal to destroy the bridge, stranding Darius in Scythia, where he would surely be defeated through attrition. In a noteworthy act of loyalty, or more likely self-interest, the Greeks refused. Darius eventually made his way back across the bridge, having failed in his goal of conquering the lands of the Scythians. Darius discovered quickly that conquering territory with no settlements of any kind, and populated by a nomadic people who refuse to offer battle, is all but impossible.

  The Persian failure north of the Danube emboldened the Ionian Greek cities of Asia Minor to revolt against Persian rule. They received assistance from Athens in their attempt, but were ultimately crushed one by one and brought back into the Persian fold. Whether this act of rebellion, and Athenian support for it, more importantly, led Darius to consider an invasion of Greece seems unlikely, but, whatever the reason, Greece was to be the next target of Persian expansionist policies. The newly re-conquered Ionian Greek cities would again soon be required to provide large numbers of mercenaries and allied troops for the campaign.

  The Archaic period saw the rise of the Greek mercenary soldier; his professionalism was welcomed on the battlefield by tyrants and pharaohs to the east, west and south of the mainland, and to a much lesser extent in Greece itself. The fall of these tyrants in many cities, and the rise of democracy, briefly saw a major decline in potential areas of employment, and thus a decline in the numbers seeking such service. This decline in demand would start to be reversed towards the end of the fifth century, and we will see an explosion in the fourth century.

  Chapter 3

  The Fifth Century

  Moving from the Archaic period, with its fairly frequent references to mercenaries in the sources, and into the fifth century, the most immediate and noticeable thing is the lack of source references to mercenaries in the first half of that century. This is not, however, an indication of a deficiency in our surviving sources, but a reflection of the reality. The development of democracies in Greece corresponded to an increase in the general level of prosperity. This prosperity meant that the city-states needed their citizens and could occupy them in the pursuit of necessary tasks and duties. The potential ‘push’ factor in the creation of mercenary soldiers, that of the economic weakness that existed in the Archaic period, was far less of an issue in the early fifth century. There was, therefore, a lack of supply of mercenaries from Greece, but that is not to say there was zero supply. The fifth century saw the rise of the dominance of Arcadia as a source of mercenaries. There was a seemingly constant stream of mercenaries from that region, although until the Peloponnesian War, towards the end of the fifth century, the majority found employment in Persia.

  Persian Wars

  The first major campaign of the fifth century, and the first evidence for the employment of mercenaries in that century, was the massive Persian invasion of Greece. It was noted in the previous chapter that this may have been an effort to punish Athens for her support of the rebelling Ionian Greek city-states in Asia Minor. It is just as likely that Persian attention had turned to the west anyway, and that the Athenian attempt to help the Ionians was in fact a sensible strategy of trying to move the potential front line away from the Greek mainland.

  In 490, the Persians launched their first major effort to extend their empire against the mainland Greeks. In all likelihood, the Greeks expected an invasion, but the location of the first contact was something that they did not know. The Persians had chosen to strike straight for Athens and landed virtually at their back door, at Marathon.1 The Athenians sent messengers to a number of city-states asking for help, but only Sparta and the ever-loyal Plataea offered any real support. Sparta was 150 miles from Athens and their support was not sent in time for the battle. Plataea was much closer, but was also considerably smaller; it did send help, but a relatively small amount, likely less than 1,000 troops.2

  The Persians landed with perhaps 25,000 infantry. These would have consisted of a large body of native Persians, as well as contingents from the western empire and the reluctant Ionian Greeks, although the latter would have been fighting as allied troops sent by their city-states rather than as true mercenaries. This force was eventually opposed by perhaps 10,000 Athenians, of which 9,000 were hoplites and 1,000 lightly armed, and at most 1,000 Plataeans. Callimachus was in overall command of the Athenian forces, whilst his most significant general was Miltiades; in terms of a discussion on mercenaries, Miltiades is the most interesting character on the Athenian side.

  Miltiades was, until recently, a tyrant in the Chersonnese and had commanded a personal bodyguard of some 500 mercenaries, largely comprising Greeks and Thracians. Miltiades was one of the Thracian leaders who had medized (gone over to the Persian side), and as a result was part of Darius’ Scythian expedition described above. Miltiades, according to his own defence at his trial in Athens before Marathon, apparently wanted to destroy the pontoon bridge over the Danube and strand Darius in Scythia, but he was opposed and ultimately outvoted by the other allied commanders there. At Marathon, Miltiades’ first-hand experience of the Persians and of their tactics was a vital factor in his acquittal in Athens, and would have been important in the coming battle.

  The battle is one that has been examined many times, and this is not the place for a full discussion, but, in brief, the Athenian order of battle had a weak centre that gave way once the Persians attacked. Conversely, however, they had reinforced wings, which defeated the Ionian Greeks and other allied Persian contingents that had been sent against them. The result was that the Persian centre pushed forwards and was surrounded on three sides: in front by the weak Athenian centre, and to left and right by the Athenian wings.

  Whether this was luck or good generalship remains unresolved, although I would tend to favour the latter, but it is interesting to note that the Ionian Greeks on the Persian wings do not appear to have fought terribly hard, their resistance collapsing quite quickly and fairly easily. They evidently had no real desire to fight for Persia, suggesting that they had been forced into reluctant service as allies, rather
than being enthusiastic volunteer mercenaries.

  Victory at Marathon was important to the Greeks. It demonstrated that they were capable of defeating the Great King, and gave encouragement to those who might try in the future. It was not, however, a decisive victory. The Persians had been driven off, but both their army and navy were largely intact. The Persians withdrew to safety, but it would have seemed evident in Greece that this was simply the opening engagement in what would become a much longer war. Hindsight suggests that Marathon, although important in itself to the Greeks, was little more than an opening salvo from the Persians. In 480, ten years later, they were to return to the Greek mainland with vastly greater numbers in a concerted effort to conquer their western neighbour.

  Darius, the defeated Persian king, had died before he could resume his attempt to conquer Greece. This fact, and the succession of Xerxes, was likely the main reason the second invasion was delayed as long as it was. That second invasion began in 480 with the Persians again marching through Thrace, as they had done before their failed invasion of Scythian territory north of the Danube. This time, however, their army was far superior in size to any the Greeks had seen before. Herodotus tells us that:3

  my final estimate . . . is that Xerxes, the son of Darius, reached Sepias and Thermopylae at the head of an army consisting of, in all, 5,283,220 men.

  Half of that figure Herodotus attributes to sailors and camp followers, but even so it hardly needs saying that it is a preposterous overestimate. Many ancient armies are overestimated in terms of their size, but none more so than this estimate of Xerxes’ army. Modern scholars admit that there is no way to know for certain the actual size of the invading force, but modern estimates range between 100,000 and 300,000.4

  Whatever its size, we know it was significantly larger than anything the Greeks could put into the field, hence the request for aid from Greek regions like Sicily. We also know that Xerxes had taken his time in raising and training the army. It consisted of contingents from across the Persian Empire, and also contained an unspecified number of mercenaries from beyond the empire, presumably from mainland Greece.

  Once again, the northern states were faced with the choice of collaboration or conquest, and many chose collaboration as they could not possibly stand against such a host. The southern Greeks, seeing the capitulation in the north, resolved to resist the invasion at the Vale of Tempe. Upon arrival, however, they discovered that there were at least three other mountain passes in the vicinity that could be used to turn their position, and they retired without engaging the Persians.

  The Greek coalition resolved on a joint land and sea defence at Thermopylae and Artemisium. The defence was not in force and rather suggests that some factions were not fully behind such a proposal, Sparta for one. Both battles were hard fought, and after two days the band of 7,000 hoplites, including the famous 300 Spartans, fought the Persians to a standstill. They were only defeated when a Greek, Ephialtes, showed the Persians a second pass that would allow them to turn the Spartan position. Once the army had been defeated, the Greek navy withdrew from Artemisium after inflicting heavy losses on the Persian navy.5

  After the battle, Herodotus tells us, in regard to the Persians:6

  A few Arcadian deserters came in–men who had nothing to live on and wanted employment; they were taken to Xerxes and questioned about what the Greeks were doing.

  This is one of the first references to mercenaries in the fifth century. It also appears to be the first that refers specifically to Arcadian mercenaries, and is an indication of how some recruitment would have occurred. The incident also provides an insight into intelligence gathering processes, specifically the questioning of prisoners and deserters.

  The Thebans of central Greece were a long-time enemy of Athens, and were one of the many states that had chosen collaboration over opposition to Xerxes. Exactly when that occurred (before or immediately after Thermopylae) is unknown. Accusations of medizing were a common tool used by Athenian orators against the Thebans in the fifth and fourth centuries. After the Greek defeat at Thermopylae, the Thebans no doubt urged Xerxes to march on Athens, although this would likely have been his strategy even without their prompting. The Persians arrived to find a city virtually empty, save for a small band of defenders on the Acropolis; but they were slaughtered after two weeks of dogged resistance. Athens was plundered by the Persians, and much of it was razed to the ground.

  The Persians were now in possession of much of Greece, north of the Peloponnese. They still needed to defeat the powerful allied Greek navy (of which the Athenians were the largest faction), and to defeat the Greek land forces at the Isthmus of Corinth. It was the Allied Greek navy that was to be Xerxes’ next target. If he could eliminate this, he could land troops anywhere along the Peloponnesian coast and easily outflank the allied Greek land army.

  The decisive naval battle was to occur at Salamis, where the Greeks lured the Persians into an area of sea where their superiority in numbers was a liability, and delivered a decisive victory for the Greek coalition, sinking 200 Persian ships for the loss of only 40 of their own.7 The Ionian contingents fought with considerable vigour; perhaps they feared the consequences if they did not. The Phoenician fleet suffered more than any of the other Persian contingents. They took the lead in the battle and suffered the worst of the casualties. Xerxes was unimpressed and executed a number of Phoenician naval captains. This caused a greater loss to the operational effectiveness of his fleet by further reducing the number of skilled captains he had available. The act also increased the number of desertions in his fleet, as fear spread that further executions might follow.

  Each Persian ship, like each Greek ship, carried marines onboard. Many of the Phoenician ships carried Saka mercenaries from the Central Asian region. The significant loss of Phoenician ships also led to a major loss of these mercenaries.8 Many drowned or were killed in hand-to-hand combat. Xerxes still had a number of mercenaries in his employ, although probably not great numbers; he always had the potential to hire more as required.

  Xerxes was now in a very difficult position; he still commanded a very powerful land army, but he did not posses enough of a fleet to keep it supplied or to defend his flanks and prevent the Greeks from landing troops behind any position he was to take up. Further to this, there was the potential for unrest, particularly in Asia Minor, as a result of the defeat. If rebellion did occur in Asia Minor, his only remaining supply line would be compromised.

  Xerxes’ response was to divide his forces. A large force was left in central Greece under the command of Mardonius, while he marched back through northern Greece and into Asia Minor, where he acted to restore order after news of Salamis reached that region. The troops left behind consisted of contingents from most of the Persian Empire, as well as some Phrygian and Greek mercenaries and Greek allied troops from those areas that had supported Xerxes.

  Whilst Xerxes was pacifying the Asia Minor region, Mardonius took up a defensive posture and stationed himself in Thessaly. Once Xerxes had completed his campaign, he sent back to Greece some of his elite units to bolster Mardonius’ forces. In order to maintain his army at a manageable size, Mardonius then dismissed some of his lesser-quality central Asian mercenaries. The reorganization of Mardonius’ army made it a little smaller, but more effective, as it retained the best-quality troops that were available. The Central Asian mercenaries were gone, but there were still some Greek mercenaries, and particularly Greek allied troops from the city-states of central and northern Greece. Overall, the numbers of mercenaries with Mardonius was probably not terribly large.

  Once Mardonius was prepared and his army at full strength (and quality, more importantly) he resolved to force a conclusion with the allied Greeks. He was still in a relatively weak position strategically. He certainly possessed the larger army, but he was in territory with which he was not wholly familiar. Added to which, his supply lines back to Persia through Macedonia and Thrace were vulnerable, and his army was simply
too large to live off the land for long. He also recognized the dangers inherent in his not possessing a fleet; he could not defend the coastline from the possibility of the Allies landing troops behind him, severing his lines of supply. If he could win over the Athenians, and their fleet, then he could reasonably assume the Peloponnese would follow either through cooperation or conquest. Mardonius made overtures to Athens in this regard, but was rebuffed. In revenge, he again marched to Athens and sacked what remained of the city after Xerxes’ destruction the previous year.

  It seems that this aggressive move by Mardonius persuaded the Spartans to put their full levy in the field to join the Athenians. The Spartans knew full well the consequence to them and the Peloponnese if the Athenians medised. The mobilization from Sparta was as much about maintaining the morale of the Athenians and the rest of the allied contingents as anything else. Once the full Spartan levy arrived at the Isthmus of Corinth, the total Greek force was perhaps 70,000 to 80,000, still outnumbered by the force of 100,000 to 120,000 commanded by Mardonius.9

  Once the Greek army was fully assembled, it began its lumbering advance towards the Persians. The Greeks were an allied army, but they were far from unified. Various contingents evidently found it difficult to overcome decades of political unrest or hostility in order to fight on the same side. The worst offenders, of course, were the Athenians and Spartans. The Greek advance was not cohesive or coherent; different contingents marched at different rates and perhaps via slightly different routes into central Greece. Upon seeing the Greeks begin their advance, Mardonius withdrew to Boeotia, which possessed terrain that was more suitable to his massive superiority in cavalry (the Greeks had none to speak of). To cover his movements, and to harass the Greeks as much as possible, Mardonius left his cavalry behind to operate semi-independently. They were successful in this regard and we know that they caught a 3,000-strong Megarian contingent on open ground and mauled them quite badly before being driven off by a detachment of Athenian light armed.10 They could not stay to harass the Greek troops indefinitely, however, and as the Allies approached Plataea the Persian cavalry returned to their army to prepare for the coming battle.