Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander

by Stephen English

  When the army reached the fortress of Charmande, Cyrus did pause briefly to allow the troops to purchase supplies, and here again we see another remarkable example of indiscipline in the Greek army. Xenophon relates the tale:27

  There one of Menon’s soldiers and one of Clearchus’ men had some dispute, and Clearchus, deciding that Menon’s man was in the wrong, gave him a flogging. The man then went to his own army and told about it, and when his comrades heard of the matter, they took it hard and were exceedingly angry with Clearchus.

  Menon took exception to Clearchus disciplining one of his men, further emphasizing the lack of cohesion in the army. Clearchus could rightly consider himself to be the most senior Greek, but neither Menon nor his men saw him in those terms. Xenophon continues: 28

  On the same day Clearchus, after going to the place where they crossed the river and there inspecting the market, was riding back to his own tent through Menon’s army, having only a few men with him; and Cyrus had not yet arrived, but was still on the march toward the place; and one of Menon’s soldiers who was splitting wood threw his axe at Clearchus when he saw him riding through the camp. Now this man missed him, but another threw a stone at him, and still another, and then, after an outcry had been raised, many. Clearchus escaped to his own army and at once called his troops to arms; he ordered his hoplites to remain where they were, resting their shields against their knees, while he himself with the Thracians and the horsemen, of which he had in his army more than forty, most of them Thracians, advanced upon Menon’s troops; the result was that these and Menon himself were thoroughly frightened and ran to their arms, though there were some who stood stock-still, nonplussed by the situation.

  This incident, in all likelihood, would have led to civil war between the two armies had Proxenus and his army not intervened to calm the situation. Cyrus then stepped in to exert his influence on Clearchus and further calm the situation.29 If the combined army had been much further away from Artaxerxes, back in Cilicia perhaps, it seems probable that it would have disintegrated with internal squabbles. The proximity of the Persians reduced such open displays of hostility to the level of issues bubbling just below the surface.

  After this incident, the army continued to march along the Euphrates towards Cunaxa and found that Artaxerxes’ cavalry were conducting a scorched-earth policy against him, which was sensible given Cyrus’ recent difficulties with supplies. Cyrus dispatched some cavalry in an attempt to stop the Persian cavalry. Given the lack of reference to this policy from then on, they may well have achieved a degree of success. Three days’ march into Babylonia, Cyrus conducted a review of his troops, at which he made a speech promising the Greeks a crown of gold each if they were successful in the coming battle. Gaulites, an exile from Samos and a close friend of Cyrus, then replied that the Greeks did not believe that they would receive everything that Cyrus had promised them over the previous few weeks. 30 Cyrus reassured the Greeks once again that the Persian Empire was vast and he would have no difficulties in paying and delivering what he had promised. The mercenaries were reassured by this and caused no further trouble before the crucial battle.

  On the following day, Cyrus set up his army on what he believed would be the field of battle, Clearchus on the right and Menon on the left, with the mass of the native Persian troops in the centre. When Artaxerxes did not appear, Cyrus marched nine miles in full battle array, taking much of the day, but still the Great King did not appear. Sometime around noon on the day of the long march, Cyrus came upon a ditch that had been dug by Artaxerxes’ troops ‘five fathoms across and three fathoms deep’.31 The ditch apparently extended for 36 miles over the plains as far as the Median wall, but with a ‘narrow passage twenty feet wide between the river and the ditch’; a formidable defensive barrier and quite an engineering feat, rather reminiscent of the Maginot Line.32 Artaxerxes must have planned that spot for his defensive action against Cyrus for some time. When Cyrus reached the ditch, Artaxerxes had already abandoned the position. The reasons are not recorded, but it was perhaps to continue the scorched-earth policy, knowing Cyrus was struggling with his logistics. When Cyrus reached the ditch, he simply went around it; again, rather reminiscent of the Maginot line.

  Once around the ditch, Cyrus continued his march for three days, and again we get a picture of indiscipline in Xenophon:33

  Hence on the following day Cyrus proceeded more carelessly; and on the third day he was making the march seated in his chariot and with only a small body of troops drawn up in line in front of him, while the greater part of the army was proceeding in disorder and many of the soldiers’ arms and accoutrements were being carried in wagons and on pack-animals.

  This is hardly the picture of a disciplined fighting unit and stands in stark contrast to the narratives we have of the army of Alexander the Great on the march, or indeed of a Roman legion.

  Before midday on the following day, as the army continued its march, one of the scouts returned in great haste, proclaiming that the Great King approached and was already set for battle. This prompted a certain amount of panic within the ranks of Cyrus’ army as they rushed to prepare themselves for battle. They managed to set themselves into their prearranged positions relatively quickly, suggesting that the army was in a reasonable condition, although it was somewhat spread out, as later we hear that while they awaited Artaxerxes their ranks were still filling up with those arriving late.34 They set themselves us as follows:35

  Clearchus occupying the right end of the Greek wing, close to the Euphrates River, Proxenus next to him, and the others beyond Proxenus, while Menon and his army took the left end of the Greek wing. As for the barbarians, Paphlagonian horsemen to the number of a thousand took station beside Clearchus on the right wing, as did the Greek peltasts, on the left was Ariaeus, Cyrus’ lieutenant, with the rest of the barbarian army and in the centre Cyrus and his horsemen, about six hundred in number. These troopers were armed with breastplates and thigh-pieces and, all of them except Cyrus, with helmets–Cyrus, however, went into the battle with his head unprotected. [In fact, it is said of the Persians in general that they venture all the perils of war with their heads unprotected.] And all their horses [with Cyrus] had frontlets and breast-pieces; and the men carried, besides their other weapons, Greek sabres.

  There is little surprising or innovative in Cyrus’ dispositions; native Persian infantry in the centre with the detachments of Greek mercenaries to either side, and on the extreme wings, cavalry and light infantry. The only unusual element is Cyrus keeping 600 cavalry of his personal guard with him in the centre where they could be of least use. In all likelihood, these would have been stationed behind a continuous line of Persian infantry.

  Cyrus managed to set up quickly and was ready for battle by midday, but Artaxerxes was yet to appear. At some point in the early afternoon Cyrus saw a cloud of dust on the horizon that got progressively larger and more threatening as the Persian host approached.

  As the enemy came nearer and nearer, there were presently flashes of bronze here and there, and spears and the hostile ranks began to come into sight. There were horsemen in white cuirasses on the left wing of the enemy, under the command, it was reported, of Tissaphernes; next to them were troops with wicker shields and, farther on, hoplites with wooden shields which reached to their feet, these latter being Egyptians, people said; and then more horsemen and more bowmen. All these troops were marching in national divisions, each nation in a solid square. In front of them were the so-called scythe-bearing chariots, at some distance from one another; and the scythes they carried reached out sideways from the axles and were also set under the chariot bodies, pointing towards the ground, so as to cut to pieces whatever they met; the intention, then, was that they should drive into the ranks of the Greeks and cut the troops to pieces.

  The Persians advanced in silence at a slow, steady and relentless pace; this would have tested the nerve and discipline of Cyrus’ men, particularly given that they were also significantly out
numbered.

  Cyrus studied the enemy army as it advanced and rode out to Clearchus’ position shouting an order at him to attack the Persian centre where the Great King was stationed, the intention being to kill Artaxerxes and thus end the battle almost before it had begun. Clearchus had also been studying the enemy, and was worried that their army was of such a size that the enemy centre was beyond his flanks. If he were to detach the mercenaries on the left flank (Menon) and send them against Artaxerxes directly, he would open a gap at the end of his line that the Persians could exploit, but he would also allow the enemy to surround the detached mercenaries with ease and slaughter them. Clearchus replied that he ‘would see to it that things went well.’36 Cyrus evidently misread this response as acquiescence to his order and returned to his position in the centre; Clearchus had no intention of obeying Cyrus’ order, however.

  Not all of the Greeks had yet arrived when the two armies were only ‘600 to 800 yards apart’ but the Greeks could wait no longer. Clearchus ordered forward his mercenaries and a gap quickly formed between themselves and the centre of Cyrus’ line. Clearchus was doing what countless Spartan commanders had done before him and, without any guile, was charging towards the enemy. They raised a battle cry, which did as much as anything else to rout their opponents, and the battle of Cunaxa was joined. Clearchus’ mercenaries quickly smashed through the Persian left and advanced rather further, cutting down the enemy as they went.37 Cyrus saw this and was pleased; although less pleased that his orders to attack Artaxerxes directly had been ignored.

  Artaxerxes was also studying the progress of the battle, and would have been distressed at how easily his left flank had collapsed. This collapse did present an opportunity for the Persians (essentially the opposite of what had occurred at Marathon, where the Greek centre had collapsed and the Persians had charged into the gap); Clearchus was now separated from the rest of Cyrus’ army, and the Persians began to press him on all sides. Artaxerxes also ordered his right wing, which overlapped the Greeks by quite a distance, to encircle Cyrus and outflank his position. If Cyrus allowed this to happen, his army would have been slaughtered, and he knew it. Still believing his tactic to be sound, Cyrus ordered the 600 cavalry of his personal bodyguard that were stationed in the centre of the line to charge directly at Artaxerxes in order to cut the head from the snake.38 They charged and quickly routed the 6,000 men arrayed in front of the Great King. The battle descended into confusion at that point, with some of the Persians fleeing and some of Cyrus’ bodyguard pursuing them. The confusion left Cyrus with very few cavalry under his immediate command. He tried to make one last desperate attempt to reach Artaxerxes but, on the very verge of victory, an unknown assailant struck Cyrus in the face with a javelin and killed him.39

  In this way, then, Cyrus came to his end, a man who was the most kingly and the most worthy to rule of all the Persians who have been born since Cyrus the Elder, as all agree who are reputed to have known Cyrus intimately.

  While the battle was raging in the centre, Clearchus, realizing he was being outflanked, withdrew from the battle in order to save his troops from destruction. It was only on the following day that he was informed that Cyrus had been killed whilst the Greeks were ensuring their own safety. What remained of the several Greek mercenary armies now stood together in a defensive formation close to the site of battle. They realized that they were in an very precarious position. They were hundreds of miles inside the Persian heartlands with no immediate hope of reaching home. Artaxerxes’ army remained largely intact and that of Cyrus had largely disintegrated after the death of the would-be usurper. The Great King demanded that the Greeks lay down their arms, which they steadfastly refused to do. Some of the Greeks ‘in a moment of weakness’ offered to join the Persians for a prospective invasion of Egypt. Clearchus, on the other hand, was attempting to find another Persian nobleman to lead the remnants of Cyrus’ army. He apparently offered the role to Ariaeus (the commander of a detachment of Cyrus’ cavalry), but he refused. 40 One wonders why Clearchus did not simply assume command himself, and I think there are a number of very sound reasons for this. Firstly, he did not have the trust of all of the Greek mercenaries; Menon and those he commanded still harboured a grudge for his previous actions. Secondly, the Persian element of the army might not have followed him. Finally, these were mercenaries, and quite simply needed another paymaster; Clearchus could never have performed that role satisfactorily.

  The standoff lasted for some time. Artaxerxes did not want to risk any more of his army by attempting to destroy these Greeks, especially after seeing what Clearchus had done to his left wing. The Greeks were marooned, probably surrounded, and had little chance of escape; a defensive square was their safest posture at that moment. During this time, remarkably few Greeks deserted to the Persian side; 300 Thracians and forty cavalry are all we hear of.41

  One of the Persian commanders, Tissaphernes, eventually approached the Greeks and informed them that the Great King would allow them all to return to Greece, and that he was to act as their guide. The route would be north along the Tigris rather than back the way they had come. A return journey along this latter route would likely have been impossible, as they would already have pillaged any available supplies. There was some agreement to this proposal amongst the Greek leadership, and they do not appear to have consulted an assembly of the soldiers; they were evidently trusted in such matters to do what was right. The Greeks agreed to this proposal, and they set off north very soon afterwards. The only one among the Greeks who did not trust Clearchus was, of course, Menon, because of their previous feud. The latter secretly approached Tissaphernes, using Ariaeus as an intermediary, with the intention of negotiating some kind of deal with the Persian, along with the added bonus of betraying Clearchus.

  When the two armies reached the confluence of the Great Zab and the Tigris, Clearchus asked for an audience with Tissaphernes to clear the air of mutual mistrust that existed between the two sides. Tissaphernes was a man of cunning and guile, whilst Clearchus was a straightforward Spartan warrior. Tissaphernes exploited this by inviting Clearchus, his fellow officers, 20 generals and 200 hoplites to a great banquet in their honour; they accepted without suspicion.42 Some among the Greeks attempted to dissuade Clearchus from accepting the invitation, stating that Tissaphernes could not be trusted, but Clearchus was insistent, and the offer was accepted. 43

  When they reached Tissaphernes’ doors, the generals were invited in–Proxenus the Boeotian, Menon the Thessalian, Agias the Arcadian, Clearchus the Laconian, and Socrates the Achaean–while the captains waited at the doors. Not long afterward, at the same signal, those within were seized and those outside were cut down. After this, some of the barbarian horsemen rode about over the plain and killed every Greek they met, whether slave or freeman. And the Greeks wondered at this riding about, as they saw it from their camp, and were puzzled to know what the horsemen were doing, until Nicarchus the Arcadian reached the camp in flight, wounded in his belly and holding his bowels in his hands, and told all that had happened. Thereupon the Greeks, one and all, ran to their arms, panic-stricken and believing that the enemy would come at once against the camp.

  The Persians did approach the Greeks, but not in great numbers. Ariaeus approached the Greek camp in order to deliver a message from Artaxerxes. Ariaeus informed the Greeks that Clearchus was dead, but that Proxenus and Menon were not, since they had given information to the Great King regarding Clearchus’ treacherous activities. Ariaeus further demanded that the Greeks lay down their arms. The Greeks responded with a predictably negative answer, partly delivered by Xenophon himself.44

  The Greeks remained belligerent, but they were now utterly leaderless. In most situations throughout history their predicament would have led to surrender, negotiation or simply the dissolution of the army in panic. These mercenaries, for the most part, were veterans of the Peloponnesian War, as well as the many privations of the march to this point; panic did not enter their heads.
They gathered together the remnants of the mercenary armies and elected five new generals, including Xenophon. Once these had been elected, the Greeks slipped away from Tissaphernes and continued their march north along the eastern banks of the Tigris.45

  A few days later, as the Greeks continued their march along the Tigris, they were confronted by Mithridates, formerly a general in Cyrus’ army, but along with several others, now supporters of Artaxerxes. He attempted to ascertain their intentions, whilst also trying to induce as many as possible to desert to the side of the Great King. He succeeded, but in a remarkably limited fashion. Nicarchus and twenty hoplites deserted, but no more. The cohesion and sense of collective cause was probably greater now among the Greeks than at any time during the whole campaign, particularly given that Clearchus and Menon were both no longer with the army. 46

  Mithridates retired, only to return several days later with Tisaphernes, and at the head of a small force of cavalry, light-armed infantry and archers. The Greeks formed up into a defensive square with the hoplites on the outside, and their own light-armed troops in the centre. Tissaphernes used his archers and greater mobility to inflict significant casualties on the Greeks, who could not respond; their Thracian cavalry had already rebelled and the enemy were out of range of the archers, as they were in the centre of the square. This incident is a perfect example of how lightly armed troops that are mobile could cause havoc to a heavily armed group of hoplites with little manoeuvrability. The Greeks finally tried to charge the enemy, but did no damage to them other than to cause their withdrawal. Tissaphernes was apparently happy with the level of damage he had caused.47