The Dreams That Stuff is Made of
Page 46
Before concluding I should still like to emphasize the bearing of the great lesson derived from general relativity theory upon the question of physical reality in the field of quantum theory. In fact, notwithstanding all characteristic differences, the situations we are concerned with in these generalizations of classical theory present striking analogies which have often been noted. Especially, the singular position of measuring instruments in the account of quantum phenomena, just discussed, appears closely analogous to the well-known necessity in relativity theory of upholding an ordinary description of all measuring processes, including a sharp distinction between space and time coordinates, although the very essence of this theory is the establishment of new physical laws, in the comprehension of which we must renounce the customary separation of space and time ideas.ij The dependence on the reference system, in relativity theory, of all readings of scales and clocks may even be compared with the essentially uncontrollable exchange of momentum or energy between the objects of measurements and all instruments defining the space-time system of reference, which in quantum theory confronts us with the situation characterized by the notion of complementarity. In fact this new feature of natural philosophy means a radical revision of our attitude as regards physical reality, which may be paralleled with the fundamental modification of all ideas regarding the absolute character of physical phenomena, brought about by the general theory of relativity.
A SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION OF THE QUANTUM THEORY IN TERMS OF “HIDDEN” VARIABLES. I
BY
DAVID BOHM
The usual interpretation of the quantum theory is self-consistent, but it involves an assumption that cannot be tested experimentally, viz., that the most complete possible specification of an individual system is in terms of a wave function that determines only probable results of actual measurement processes. The only way of investigating the truth of this assumption is by trying to find some other interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of at present “hidden” variables, which in principle determine the precise behavior of an individual system, but which are in practice averaged over in measurements of the types that can now be carried out. In this paper and in a subsequent paper, an interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of just such “hidden” variables is suggested. It is shown that as long as the mathematical theory retains its present general form, this suggested interpretation leàds to precisely the same results for all physical processes as does the usual interpretation. Nevertheless, the suggested interpretation provides a broader conceptual framework than the usual interpretation, because it makes possible a precise and continuous description of all processes, even at the quantum level. This broader conceptual framework allows more general mathematical formulations of the theory than those allowed by the usual interpretation. Now, the usual mathematical formulation seems to lead to insoluble difficulties when it is extrapolated into the domain of distances of the order of 10−13 cm or less. It is therefore entirely possible that the interpretation suggested here may be needed for the resolution of these difficulties. In any case, the mere possibility of such an interpretation proves that it is not necessary for us to give up a precise, rational, and objective description of individual systems at a quantum level of accuracy.
*Now at Universidade de Sāo Paulo, Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciencias, e Letras, Sāo Paulo, Brasil.
Reprinted with permission from the American Physical Society: D. Bohm, Physical Review, Volume 85, Number 2, 1952. © 1952 by the American Physical Society.
1. INTRODUCTION
The usual interpretation of the quantum theory is based on an assumption having very far-reaching implications, viz., that the physical state of an individual system is completely specified by a wave function that determines only the probabilities of actual results that can be obtained in a statistical ensemble of similar experiments. This assumption has been the object of severe criticisms, notably on the part of Einstein, who has always believed that, even at the quantum level, there must exist precisely definable elements or dynamical variables determining (as in classical physics) the actual behavior of each individual system, and not merely its probable behavior. Since these elements or variables are not now included in the quantum theory and have not yet been detected experimentally, Einstein has always regarded the present form of the quantum theory as incomplete, although he admits its internal consistency.ik-il-im-in–io
Most physicists have felt that objections such as those raised by Einstein are not relevant, first, because the present form of the quantum theory with its usual probability interpretation is in excellent agreement with an extremely wide range of experiments, at least in the domain of distancesip larger than 10−13 cm, and, secondly, because no consistent alternative interpretations have as yet been suggested. The purpose of this paper (and of a subsequent paper hereafter denoted by II) is, however, to suggest just such an alternative interpretation. In contrast to the usual interpretation, this alternative interpretation permits us to conceive of each individual system as being in a precisely definable state, whose changes with time are determined by definite laws, analogous to (but not identical with) the classical equations of motion. Quantum-mechanical probabilities are regarded (like their counterparts in classical statistical mechanics) as only a practical necessity and not as a manifestation of an inherent lack of complete determination in the properties of matter at the quantum level. As long as the present general form of Schroedinger’s equation is retained, the physical results obtained with our suggested alternative interpretation are precisely the same as those obtained with the usual interpretation. We shall see, however, that our alternative interpretation permits modifications of the mathematical formulation which could not even be described in terms of the usual interpretation. Moreover, the modifications can quite easily be formulated in such a way that their effects are insignificant in the atomic domain, where the present quantum theory is in such good agreement with experiment, but of crucial importance in the domain of dimensions of the order of 10−13 cm, where, as we have seen, the present theory is totally inadequate. It is thus entirely possible that some of the modifications describable in terms of our suggested alternative interpretation, but not in terms of the usual interpretation, may be needed for a more thorough understanding of phenomena associated with very small distances. We shall not, however, actually develop such modifications in any detail in these papers.
After this article was completed, the author’s attention was called to similar proposals for an alternative interpretation of the quantum theory made by de Broglieiq in 1926, but later given up by him partly as a result of certain criticisms made by Pauliir and partly because of additional objections raised by de Broglieiq himself.is As we shall show in Appendix B of Paper II, however, all of the objections of de Broglie and Pauli could have been met if only de Broglie had carried his ideas to their logical conclusion. The essential new step in doing this is to apply our interpretation in the theory of the measurement process itself as well as in the description of the observed system. Such a development of the theory of measurements is given in Paper II,it where it will be shown in detail that our interpretation leads to precisely the same results for all experiments as are obtained with the usual interpretation. The foundation for doing this is laid in Paper I, where we develop the basis of our interpretation, contrast it with the usual interpretation, and apply it to a few simple examples, in order to illustrate the principles involved.
2. THE USUAL PHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE QUANTUM THEORY
The usual physical interpretation of the quantum theory centers around the uncertainty principle. Now, the uncertainty principle can be derived in two different ways. First, we may start with the assumption already criticized by Einstein,1 namely, that a wave function that determines only probabilities of actual experimental results nevertheless provides the most complete possible specification of the so-called “quantum state” of an individual system. With the aid of this assumption and with the aid of
the de Broglie relation, p = hk, where k is the wave number associated with a particular fourier component of the wave function, the uncertainty principle is readily deduced.iu From this derivation, we are led to interpret the uncertainty principle as an inherent and irreducible limitation on the precision with which it is correct for us even to conceive of momentum and position as simultaneously defined quantities. For if, as is done in the usual interpretation of the quantum theory, the wave intensity is assumed to determine only the probability of a given position, and if the kth Fourier component of the wave function is assumed to determine only the probability of a corresponding momentum, p = hk, then it becomes a contradiction in terms to ask for a state in which momentum and position are simultaneously and precisely defined.
A second possible derivation of the uncertainty principle is based on a theoretical analysis of the processes with the aid of which physically significant quantities such as momentum and position can be measured. In such an analysis, one finds that because the measuring apparatus interacts with the observed system by means of indivisible quanta, there will always be an irreducible disturbance of some observed property of the system. If the precise effects of this disturbance could be predicted or controlled, then one could correct for these effects, and thus one could still in principle obtain simultaneous measurements of momentum and position, having unlimited precision. But if one could do this, then the uncertainty principle would be violated. The uncertainty principle is, as we have seen, however, a necessary consequence of the assumption that the wave function and its probability interpretation provide the most complete possible specification of the state of an individual system. In order to avoid the possibility of a contradiction with this assumption, Bohr3,5,10, iv and others have suggested an additional assumption, namely, that the process of transfer of a single quantum from observed system to measuring apparatus is inherently unpredictable, uncontrollable, and not subject to a detailed rational analysis or description. With the aid of this assumption, one can show10 that the same uncertainty principle that is deduced from the wave function and its probability interpretation is also obtained as an inherent and unavoidable limitation on the precision of all possible measurements. Thus, one is able to obtain a set of assumptions, which permit a self-consistent formulation of the usual interpretation of the quantum theory.
The above point of view has been given its most consistent and systematic expression by Bohr,3,5,10 in terms of the “principle of complementarity.” In formulating this principle, Bohr suggests that at the atomic level we must renounce our hitherto successful practice of conceiving of an individual system as a unified and precisely definable whole, all of whose aspects are, in a manner of speaking, simultaneously and unambiguously accessible to our conceptual gaze. Such a system of concepts, which is sometimes called a “model,” need not be restricted to pictures, but may also include, for example, mathematical concepts, as long as these are supposed to be in a precise (i.e., one-to-one) correspondence with the objects that are being described. The principle of complementarity requires us, however, to renounce even mathematical models. Thus, in Bohr’s point of view, the wave function is in no sense a conceptual model of an individual system, since it is not in a precise (one-to-one) correspondence with the behavior of this system, but only in a statistical correspondence.
In place of a precisely defined conceptual model, the principle of complementarity states that we are restricted to complementarity pairs of inherently imprecisely defined concepts, such as position and momentum, particle and wave, etc. The maximum degree of precision of definition of either member of such a pair is reciprocally related to that of the opposite member. This need for an inherent lack of complete precision can be understood in two ways. First, it can be regarded as a consequence of the fact that the experimental apparatus needed for a precise measurement of one member of a complementary pair of variables must always be such as to preclude the possibility of a simultaneous and precise measurement of the other member. Secondly, the assumption that an individual system is completely specified by the wave function and its probability interpretation implies a corresponding unavoidable lack of precision in the very conceptual structure, with the aid of which we can think about and describe the behavior of the system.
It is only at the classical level that we can correctly neglect the inherent lack of precision in all of our conceptual models; for here, the incomplete determination of physical properties implied by the uncertainty principle produces effects that are too small to be of practical significance. Our ability to describe classical systems in terms of precisely definable models is, however, an integral part of the usual interpretation of the theory. For without such models, we would have no way to describe, or even to think of, the result of an observation, which is of course always finally carried out at a classical level of accuracy. If the relationships of a given set of classically describable phenomena depend significantly on the essentially quantum-mechanical properties of matter, however, then the principle of complementarity states that no single model is possible which could provide a precise and rational analysis of the connections between these phenomena. In such a case, we are not supposed, for example, to attempt to describe in detail how future phenomena arise out of past phenomena. Instead, we should simply accept without further analysis the fact that future phenomena do in fact somehow manage to be produced, in a way that is, however, necessarily beyond the possibility of a detailed description. The only aim of a mathematical theory is then to predict the statistical relations, if any, connecting these phenomena.
3. CRITICISM OF THE USUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE QUANTUM THEORY
The usual interpretation of the quantum theory can be criticized on many grounds.5 In this paper, however, we shall stress only the fact that it requires us to give up the possibility of even conceiving precisely what might determine the behavior of an individual system at the quantum level, without providing adequate proof that such a renunciation is necessary.9 The usual interpretation is admittedly consistent; but the mere demonstration of such consistency does not exclude the possibility of other equally consistent interpretations, which would involve additional elements or parameters permitting a detailed causal and continuous description of all processes, and not requiring us to forego the possibility of conceiving the quantum level in precise terms. From the point of view of the usual interpretation, these additional elements or parameters could be called “hidden” variables. As a matter of fact, whenever we have previously had recourse to statistical theories, we have always ultimately found that the laws governing the individual members of a statistical ensemble could be expressed in terms of just such hidden variables. For example, from the point of view of macroscopic physics, the coordinates and momenta of individual atoms are hidden variables, which in a large scale system manifest themselves only as statistical averages. Perhaps then, our present quantum-mechanical averages are similarly a manifestation of hidden variables, which have not, however, yet been detected directly.
Now it may be asked why these hidden variables should have so long remained undetected. To answer this question, it is helpful to consider as an analogy the early forms of the atomic theory, in which the existence of atoms was postulated in order to explain certain large-scale effects, such as the laws of chemical combination, the gas laws, etc. On the other hand, these same effects could also be described directly in terms of existing macrophysical concepts (such as pressure, volume, temperature, mass, etc.); and a correct description in these terms did not require any reference to atoms. Ultimately, however, effects were found which contradicted the predictions obtained by extrapolating certain purely macrophysical theories to the domain of the very small, and which could be understood correctly in terms of the assumption that matter is composed of atoms. Similarly, we suggest that if there are hidden variables underlying the present quantum theory, it is quite likely that in the atomic domain, they will lead to effects that can also be described adequately in the terms of th
e usual quantum-mechanical concepts; while in a domain associated with much smaller dimensions, such as the level associated with the “fundamental length” of the order of 10−13 cm, the hidden variables may lead to completely new effects not consistent with the extrapolation of the present quantum theory down to this level.
If, as is certainly entirely possible, these hidden variables are actually needed for a correct description at small distances, we could easily be kept on the wrong track for a long time by restricting ourselves to the usual interpretation of the quantum theory, which excludes such hidden variables as a matter of principle. It is therefore very important for us to investigate our reasons for supposing that the usual physical interpretation is likely to be the correct one. To this end, we shall begin by repeating the two mutually consistent assumptions on which the usual interpretation is based (see Sec. 2):(1) The wave function with its probability interpretation determines the most complete possible specification of the state of an individual system.