Liberation of Paris : How Eisenhower, De Gaulle, and Von Choltitz Saved the City of Light (9781501164941)

by Smith, Jean Edward

“What the hell, Brad, I guess we will have to go in.”

  —EISENHOWER TO BRADLEY, AUGUST 22, 1944

  Eisenhower knew Paris and appreciated its cultural uniqueness and political significance. Unlike other American and British generals, or Roosevelt and Churchill for that matter, Ike had lived in Paris for fourteen months in the late 1920s. Assigned to General John J. Pershing’s Battle Monuments Commission in July 1928, Eisenhower remained in Paris until August 1929. And he enjoyed every minute. As he and Mamie said later, the time in Paris was the most idyllic period in their marriage. “We had a nice life and a nice group of friends. Our son, John, was going to a good school, and we had lots of fun and lots of company.”1

  Paris in the late twenties was a mecca for many Americans. The free-spiritedness, the absence of Prohibition, and a very favorable exchange rate made it a perfect place for Americans to enjoy life. Ernest Hemingway captured the mood when he wrote, “Paris in the winter is rainy, cold, beautiful, and cheap. It is also noisy, jostling, crowded, and cheap. It is anything you want—and cheap.”2

  The Eisenhowers lived in a very fashionable residence in the 16th Arrondissement, overlooking the Seine and the Pont Mirabeau.I Eisenhower studied French daily, became proficient in reading and writing it, but was never able to speak it without a pronounced Midwestern accent. They entertained frequently at home, and also in the elegant officers’ club, the Cercle de l’Union Interalliée, next to the Elysée Palace on the fashionable Faubourg Saint-Honoré. Eisenhower revised the army’s guidebook to World War I battlefields for American tourists, and helped Pershing write his memoirs. He marched in the funeral parade for Marshal Ferdinand Foch on March 20, 1929, and took an interest in French politics.

  Eisenhower, fifth from right, marching with General Pershing’s staff at the Paris funeral of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, March 20, 1929

  It was his study of French politics in the late twenties that helped explain Eisenhower’s attachment to de Gaulle. Unlike in the United States, the French did not agree on the rules of the political game. Since 1789 there had been three republics, three monarchies, two empires, the Paris Commune, and the Vichy Regime.II Ike understood that the French Revolution, unlike the American Revolution, was a civil war, and that the outcome was still being contested. The radical right and the Church rejected the republic, and the republic rejected Christianity and the Church. The principal party during the Third Republic was the Radical-Socialists, which was neither radical nor socialist but a middle-class party dedicated to the secularization of France. The issues dividing the country were intractable, and Eisenhower recognized that to govern France effectively was very difficult.

  After a year in Paris, Eisenhower became concerned that the Battle Monuments Commission was a career cul-de-sac, and that he was out of the army’s mainstream. He contacted his guardian angel, General Fox Conner, and asked to be transferred. General Fox Conner played a major role in shaping Eisenhower’s career. In 1921, when Ike was threatened with court-martial for drawing a housing allowance for his son “Ikey,” who was not with him at the time, Conner intervened and the charges were dropped. From 1921 to 1924, Eisenhower served as Conner’s executive officer in the Canal Zone, and they became close friends. In 1925 Eisenhower was passed over by the chief of infantry for attendance at the Army’s Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. Conner intervened once again. Eisenhower was transferred to the Adjutant General’s Corps and was admitted to Leavenworth on the AG’s quota in August 1925. Ike finished first in his class at Leavenworth, but the chief of infantry, annoyed that Eisenhower had made an end run around him, assigned him to be executive officer in the black Twenty-Fourth Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning. The Twenty-Fourth Infantry, unlike the black Tenth Cavalry, was regarded as a funeral parlor for the white officers assigned. Once again Conner came to the rescue and Ike was reassigned. After just five months with the Twenty-Fourth, Eisenhower received orders transferring him to the Battle Monuments Commission. As Mamie Eisenhower said, “No man can make a successful career on his own. And Ike was fortunate to have sponsors like Fox Conner… who pushed him ahead.” In 1930, Conner was on a short list of two to become the army’s chief of staff, and was strongly backed by Pershing, but Herbert Hoover chose Douglas MacArthur instead. In 1935, FDR offered to make Conner chief of staff, but Conner, who was close to retirement, declined. Eisenhower later told Stephen Ambrose that “Fox Conner was the ablest man I ever knew…. In a lifetime of association with great and good men, he is the one to whom I owe an incalculable debt.”3

  Conner intervened, and on August 10, 1929, Eisenhower received orders transferring him to the War Department, where he would become military assistant to the assistant secretary of war. It was most unusual for someone with an overseas assignment to be transferred back to the United States before it ended, but Conner had arranged it.III

  Eisenhower’s time in Paris provided him with the necessary understanding to appreciate de Gaulle’s insistence that Paris be liberated without delay. He recognized that Paris was not just a capital city, but the center of French life. Whoever controlled Paris controlled France, and it was essential that it be in friendly hands. The inhabitants of Paris also had to be saved from civil war and a new Paris Commune. And if the monuments of Paris could be preserved, it was important to do so. The Germans were holding off, but could do so only for a limited time. And the truce that von Choltitz had agreed to would expire shortly. Also, the plan to bypass Paris had been prepared by the Allied staff in London before D-Day, not by Eisenhower.4 It made military sense, in that street fighting in Paris would delay the Allied advance, and the logistical burden of supplying food and fuel to a city of four million would be an incredible burden. But it ignored an important political reality. As in North Africa with the Darlan affair, Eisenhower realized that staff planners were often unfamiliar with the political needs of the military.5

  On August 21, the day after their meeting, de Gaulle sent an urgent letter to Eisenhower pressing for immediate action. The letter was delivered personally by General Koenig, who provided additional details of the situation in Paris. Wrote de Gaulle:

  The information which I received today from PARIS leads me to believe that owing to the nearly complete disappearance of the police forces and the German forces from PARIS, and the present extreme shortage of food which exists, that serious trouble must be foreseen in the Capital within a short time.

  I believe that it is really necessary to occupy PARIS as soon as possible with French and Allied forces, even if it should produce some fighting and some damage within the City.

  If disorder now occurs in PARIS, it will later be difficult to take things in hand without serious incidents that could, in my opinion, ultimately hinder future military operations.

  I am sending General KOENIG to you, nominated Military Governor of PARIS and Commandant of the Region of Paris, to confer with you on the question of occupation in case you decide to proceed without delay.

  Very cordially yours,

  C. de Gaulle6

  Eisenhower read de Gaulle’s letter carefully, and he listened to Koenig. It was clear that Paris could become a seat of revolution, and that another commune might be established. The need to go into Paris immediately was apparent. But to do so, Eisenhower needed the approval or at least the acquiescence of his superiors, the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He immediately wrote a very lengthy cable disguising his decision, but placing it before the Chiefs. To ease the matter, he talked about the liberation of Paris only in passing.

  I have reprinted Eisenhower’s cable of August 22 in its entirety to illustrate how skillful Ike was in disguising his decision. Paris was primarily a political and humanitarian issue, and Ike understood that he had to conceal that. Accordingly, the cable dealt with the overall military situation in France. Paris was a marginal issue. But it was the most telling portion of the message. I have italicized those portions dealing with Paris.

  TOP SECRET

  This is a personal re
port to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  The time is approaching when there will be put into effect the final system of Command as planned from the beginning for this operation. The exact date of initiating the final phase will be determined by possibilities in establishing on the Continent the communications needed by the operational sections of SHAEF Headquarters, accompanied by Operational Sections of the NAVAL and AIR Headquarters. The target date is September 1st, by which time the remaining elements of the enemy south of the SEINE and west of PARIS should have been destroyed and possibly crossings secured over that River.

  As arranged during April, the Tactical Air Force, The United States Strategic Air Force and the Bomber Command each report independently to the Supreme Commander, who uses his Deputy to assist in the coordination of the activities of these 3 Forces. There will be no change in this general system except that the Commander of the Tactical Air Forces, together with representatives of the Day and Night Bomber Forces will be with the Supreme Commander in FRANCE.

  On the ground, the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, 21 Army Group, in arranging for coordination between the 21st and 12 Army Groups, will terminate coincidentally with the establishment of SHAEF on the Continent. At that time the 21st Army Group, which in this Command will be designated the Army Group of the North, will operate to the northeastward, securing successive bases along the coast with its final base possibly ANTWERP. Eventually it will be directed to advance eastward generally north of the ARDENNES. The 21st Army Group will probably be reinforced by the entire Airborne Command and by such other units as are necessary to enable it to accomplish its first and immediately important mission, which will be to destroy forces lying between the SEINE and PAS DE CALAIS, and to occupy that area.

  The Army Group of the center, less portions necessarily employed otherwise, as indicated in this report, will advance, under General BRADLEY, to the east and northeast of PARIS, from which area it can either strike northeastward, thus assisting in the rapid fall of the CALAIS area and the later advance through the Low Countries, or, if the enemy strength in that region is not greater than I now believe, it can alternatively strike directly eastward, passing south of the ARDENNES. The speed of BRADLEY’S advance to the region east of PARIS will be governed by the speed at which the ports in BRITTANY can be cleaned up, and our supply situation improved. Depending on this it may prove possible for BRADLEY to thrust a mobile column southeast to create an additional threat, and speed up the rate of advance of DRAGOON. Because of the additional supply commitments incurred in the occupation of PARIS it would be desirable from that viewpoint, to defer the capture of the city until the important matter of destroying the remaining enemy forces up to include the PAS DE CALAIS area. I do not believe this is possible. If the enemy tries to hold PARIS with any real strength he would be a constant menace to our flank. If he largely evacuates the place, it falls into our hands whether we like it or not.

  When the Army Group of the South has advanced sufficiently far that the Combined Chiefs of Staff place responsibility for its control in the hands of this Headquarters it will continue to maneuver to support the advance of the Army Group of the Center.

  Each of these Army Groups will be accompanied by its own Tactical Air Force, comprised of mainly fighter, fighter bombers, and light bombers and reconnaissance units. Heavier types of airplanes will be centrally controlled, so as to be available when necessary, for the support of any one of the 3 Army Groups. In this connection, it is my conviction that the time has now come for the Strategic Force to resume maximum pressure against targets in GERMANY and this policy has been approved. Strategic Day and Night Forces will be diverted from that mission, only when the immediate requirements of the battle so demand. Naturally these forces will continue to blast Crossbow sites.

  There will no change in the Naval Command, except that the Naval Commander in Chief will be located in FRANCE.

  It is possible that some Airborne Troops may have to be used at an early date, to assist in gaining crossings over the SEINE but I would regard this use as undesirable and do not believe that we will have to do so. My hope is to preserve the full Airborne Command intact to be used in one great operation with the Army Group of the North in seizing CALAIS area and destroying enemy forces there. Afterward it will be recollected for use in advancing on GERMANY. In this connection the Air Transport Command (less detachments in the Mediterranean) is currently being used to help supply the marching wing of the 12 Army Group whose maintenance has been stretched to the limit. Two Corps of this Army Group are now being employed to thrust north and northwest from the general area DREUX-MAULETTE toward EVREUX-LOUVIERS to assist in trapping the army still west of the SEINE while 21 Army Group maintains direct pressure. Currently also, the Forces in BRITTANY are being reinforced so as to bring about the rapid capture of BREST and the ports on the southern coast of the Peninsula. I repeat that it is absolutely mandatory for us to clean up our maintenance situation on the southern flank.

  I desire to report that our Command system has functioned exactly as planned and in accordance with the developments of the tactical and strategic situation. No hitches have occurred and no frictions that I know of have developed. On the contrary, in spite of the difficult situation that always come about with overseas landings and the establishment of new theater of operations, the whole command has operated smoothly and effectively. For this the credit is due to the Commanders in Chief, to all other Senior Commanders and to the Higher Staff of all Services. The final stage in Command is becoming necessary because of somewhat diverging lines of operation and because on each of the main fronts there must be a Commander who can handle, with a reasonable degree of independence, the day by day detailed operations of troops, guided by the overall directives prescribed by this Headquarters.

  When PARIS is entered, it is my intention to employ the French Division for occupation. In entering the city it will be accompanied by Token Units of British and American forces. Some days thereafter, General DE GAULLE will be allowed to make his formal entry into the city. I will not personally go there until military considerations require.7

  By stressing that Paris could become “a constant menace in our flank,” Eisenhower was presenting a military justification for taking Paris. And by concluding with a reference to Paris as a fait accompli, he was removing the issue from debate. Eisenhower was covering his tracks, and he was very good at doing this. He did not write to General Marshall, who commanded all American forces, but to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. That would make it more difficult to overrule him. He had decided to liberate Paris, and would allow de Gaulle to reap the benefits. This was a political decision. The best parallel in American history is Ulysses Grant at Appomattox in 1865, where on his own authority he pardoned all members of the Confederate army who returned home and abided by the laws in place where they resided. Eisenhower understood the importance of Paris, and that was all that was required.

  He also knew Bradley was opposed to taking Paris. As Bradley wrote in his memoirs, everyone wanted to liberate Paris. “Everybody, that is, except me. In a tactical sense Paris was meaningless. We were in pursuit of the fleeing German Army, which was leaving Paris behind. It had always been our plan to bypass Paris, isolating whatever garrison troops it might contain, and deal with it after we had destroyed the German Army or, at least, reached the Siegfried Line on the Rhine. Pausing to liberate Paris would not only needlessly slow our eastward drive, but also require the diversion of transport and gasoline to provide for four million Parisians a planned 4,000 tons of food and supplies per day.”8

  Eisenhower immediately sent for Bradley to inform him of his decision. At almost the same time, Roger Gallois of the Paris Resistance arrived at Bradley’s headquarters in Laval. Gallois did not see Bradley, but in the hour before Bradley departed to see Ike, Gallois spoke at length with Brigadier General Edwin Sibert, Twelfth Army Group’s intelligence chief (G-2). Gallois was fatigued after his three jeep journeys that night but ra
llied to the occasion. “The people of Paris wanted to liberate their capital themselves,” he said, “but they cannot finish what they have started. You must come to our help, or there is going to be a terrible slaughter. Hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen are going to be killed.” Gallois’s presentation was impressive. Sibert, who would accompany Bradley to Ike’s headquarters, was profoundly impressed by what he had heard. On the flight to see Eisenhower, Sibert briefed Bradley on Gallois’s presentation. “If we don’t get to Paris in a couple of days, there’s going to be an awful massacre.”9

  General Omar Bradley

  Bradley arrived at Eisenhower’s headquarters in Tourniers at about 10 a.m. on August 22. As a result of Sibert’s briefing, Bradley already recognized that Paris had to be liberated. The discussion with Ike was brief. Koenig and Juin also took part. “What the hell, Brad, I guess we have to go in,” said Eisenhower.10 He then instructed Bradley to use Leclerc’s Second Armored Division to lead the way, and said he had ordered twenty-three thousand tons of food and three thousand tons of coal to be dispatched to Paris immediately. “No great battle is going to take place,” said Eisenhower, and “the entry of one or two divisions would accomplish the liberation of the city.”11

  The decision had been made. It was a breathtaking decision that Eisenhower intentionally understated. In his memoirs, Ike does not mention his meeting with de Gaulle on August 20, or de Gaulle’s letter of the 21st. He is careful to place his decision to take Paris strictly in military terms. Later that day he penned a note on de Gaulle’s letter for his chief of staff, Walter Bedell Smith. “I talked verbally to KOENIG on this. It looks now as if we’d be compelled to go into Paris. BRADLEY and his G-2 think we can and must walk in.”12

  Bradley understood the importance of Eisenhower’s decision to take Paris and accepted it as his own. After the meeting with Ike, he flew to First Army headquarters. He arrived at 2 p.m. on August 22, and briefed General Courtney Hodges and his staff on the change in plans. “Paris can be avoided no longer,” said Bradley, and General Leclerc’s division was to lead the way. Hodges and his staff were taken by surprise, but adjusted quickly. As one staff member recalls, “The corps staff assembled in the war room… [followed by] the hasty assembling of maps, the hurried writing of movement orders, the determination of routes of march… [and] the careful instructions to the French, who have a casual manner of doing almost exactly what they please, regardless of orders.”13